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‘Reparation and Inequality through different Diasporas: 
A case study of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Leeds, 




This thesis focuses on the unprecedented exodus of Zimbabweans from the country 
of their birth to South Africa and the UK and their subsequent experiences of life in 
the diaspora. Since the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe has lost a significant percentage of 
her population. This loss accelerated towards the dawn of and into the new 
millennium in a series of migration episodes that were spawned by both economic 
and political catastrophes.  
These migration episodes to South Africa and the UK comprised of mixed flows i.e. 
both skilled and unskilled migrants; economic and political refugees etc. Leeds and 
Limpopo were chosen as the main loci of this study because of the contrasting stock 
of migrants found there. Given that this thesis explores the differences in human and 
social capital and migration strategies between the two countries, these two areas 
were selected because of their contrasting population of migrants. These differences 
are evident in terms of educational and professional qualifications, levels of financial 
capital and histories of transnational circulation.  
This thesis uses a mixed method approach consisting of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. This was informed by the dearth of credible statistical data on 
the Zimbabwean diaspora resident in Leeds and Limpopo. The thesis therefore, 
draws on a questionnaire survey, semi structured interviews and ethnographic data 
that was gathered in Leeds and Limpopo with members of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora.  
Data gathered from the survey enabled a detailed profile of migrants to be 
constructed which disentangled the different constituents of this nascent diaspora. 
Migrants’ transnational activities were investigated given the public interest currently 
surrounding diasporic activities such as remittances. Migrants’ diasporic experiences 
are shaped by complex and intertwined factors e.g. immigration status. These 
factors have a bearing on migrants’ ability to meet their transnational obligations. 
Furthermore, migrants’ transnational linkages and transactions have an impact on 
their return intentions.  
Key words: Transnationalism; migration; diaspora; remittances; social capital; 
human capital; ambivalent diaspora; clandestine diaspora; enthusiastic diaspora; 
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Unprecedented emigration from Zimbabwe has been witnessed since the end of the 
1990s. This outflow continued unabated until the formation of the inclusive1 
government between President Robert Mugabe and his erstwhile opponent, Morgan 
Tsvangirai who became Prime Minister in February 2009. This emigration consisted 
of several migration episodes whose causes are complex and intertwined. These 
migration waves comprised of mixed flows i.e. skilled and unskilled, economic and 
political migrants moving alongside each other. South Africa and the United Kingdom 
(UK) attracted a sizeable number of Zimbabwean migrants and are thought to have 
the largest concentrations of Zimbabweans living outside the country. At the height 
of the crisis, these migrants are said to have become the lifeblood of the 
Zimbabwean economy through their transnational transactions such as remittances.  
 
This study compares the formation and experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora2 in 
the Limpopo Province, South Africa and in Leeds, UK by interrogating their migration 
and transnational experiences. In so doing, it investigates the role of social networks 
in channelling, fuelling and sustaining migration flows to these two destinations. The 
third and final aspect of this research conveys the experiences of Zimbabwean 
migrant workers in South Africa and the UK in the labour markets of these countries, 
and it thus situates the study against the backdrop of current debates on 
transnational migration and transnational practices. Such a study is necessary 
because of the extraordinary and complex migration flows to these two resident 
countries beginning in the late 1990s.  
 
The different migration episodes comprised of migrants with different human capital 
endowments. Differences in migrants’ human capital can be ascribed in significant 
part to the policies pursued by the minority colonial government of the previous 
Prime Minister Ian Smith and those of President Mugabe soon after independence. 
Furthermore, these flows were mixed which merits an investigation to tease the 
differences within these flows and migration episodes. A detailed profile of the 
migrants in the two countries was generated, outlining the participants’ age, gender, 
class, immigration status, profession, education and social networks etc. This was 
done in order to distinguish the constituent parts of the Zimbabwean diaspora in 
South Africa and the UK. The study profiles migrants in both countries to enable a 
                                                     
1
 The inclusive government is also referred to as the coalition government in some quarters while others 
erroneously call it the unity government. It was brokered by the then South African President, Thabo Mbeki 
who was the African Union (AU) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) appointed mediator.  
2
 The Zimbabwean diaspora is a very recent one compared to other established African Diasporas e.g. Ghanaian, 
Nigerian or Ethiopian. Until 2000, there was no diaspora to talk about as Zimbabweans preferred to live and 
work at home while those who would have left the country for further studies or to work seasonally abroad 
usually returned. This however, appears to be changing as more Zimbabweans who fled the country and are 
taking steps to regularise their stay in the countries that they are domiciled.   
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comparative picture to be built of the different migration flows as well as to capture 
the different human capital flows in the two different study areas.  
 
The study uses transnationalism as the theoretical framework for this study. The 
concept of transnationalism has emerged as a useful concept for explaining 
international migration (Portes, 2000; Vertovec, 1999; Portes et al., 1998; Glick-
Schiller, 1992). The use of transnationalism as a theoretical framework is predicated 
on the need to obtain a holistic understanding of the migrants' decisions to leave 
Zimbabwe and form a new life in South Africa and the UK - it also links together 
these decisions and their consequences with the intimate ties which these migrants 
have maintained with those left behind. Transnationalism was also favoured as the 
theoretical framework because of the realisation that no one theory can fully explain 
the complexity of migration. Furthermore, transnationalism helps to illuminate the 
migrants’ intentions to return, where they occur.  
 
Remittances and diasporic politics have been identified as exemplary features of 
transnationalism. Recent studies have concluded that remittances from the 
Zimbabwean diaspora have become the life blood of the country and have played a 
critical role in avoiding the total economic implosion of the country between 2000 and 
2010 when the economic crisis was at its utter worst (Branning and Sachikonye, 
2002; Crush and Tevera, 2010). Remittances demonstrate the complex connections 
that migrants have with the lives of those left at home. While the remitting practices 
of the migrants have often been praised, what has escaped scholarly attention is the 
cost these practices incur on the migrants. This thesis delves deeper into the 
remitting practices of Zimbabwean migrants.  
 
A mixed methods approach was used in order to satisfy the research objectives by 
obtaining complementary data sets. This comprised of a questionnaire survey, 
interviews and multi-sited ethnography in both Leeds and Limpopo (McKendrick, 
1998; Marcus, 1995). The use of the questionnaire survey helped the study to recruit 
and gather biographical data which enabled the construction of the crucial migrant 
profiles. Semi-structured interviews, ethnographic methods and key informant 
interviews made up the key qualitative methods that I employed to gather data. In 
addition to these primary data sources, secondary data was derived from a number 
of sources including the British Home Office data on asylum applications, similar 
documentation stored by South Africa’s Department for Home Affairs (DoH), relevant 
scholarly texts and key journals and internet articles.  
 
The title of the thesis suggests a link between reparation and inequality. This is 
pertinent because of the different circumstances which occasioned departure from 
Zimbabwe and the class differences of migrants when they were in Zimbabwe and 
how these shaped the destination of migration. These class differences were later 
redefined by being in the diaspora given the opportunities that this presented. In this 
study, the term reparation is used to describe the role which the transnational 
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practices of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK are playing in the 
development and reconstruction of the country as it slowly returns to normalcy 
having been ravaged by a debilitating socio-economic and political crisis. Linking 
repair to diaspora acknowledges the growing body of evidence which contends that 
diaspora is a resource for development which takes effect via remittances and return 
migration processes (Black and King, 2004; Lowell, 2001).  
 
This link also affirms how social, economic, and cultural commitments can 
perpetuate inequality, personal and group vulnerability, power discrepancies and 
social entrapment (Bloch, 2006; Ghosh, 2006). By leveraging their financial and non-
monetary remittances, many migrants have played an integral role in avoiding the 
country’s total economic implosion over the past decade. Some migrants have used 
their time in exile to develop their human capital and skills bases which can in turn 
be deployed positively in the reconstruction of a country which has frozen and 
depleted its human capital and skills base over the past ten years. Reparation is thus 
not used in this thesis to refer the ‘entire spectrum of attempts to rectify historical 
injustices’, such as the slave trade or colonialism (Barkan, 2001: xix).  
 
For the sake of consistency with the participants’ lexicon, London is used 
interchangeably with the UK, Britain and England. The same applies to 
Johannesburg in terms of it being used to refer to South Africa writ large. The study 
uses the term diaspora to refer to any Zimbabweans living away from home in South 
Africa, the UK or other countries with a high concentration of Zimbabwean migrants.   
 
1.2 Research aims and objectives   
 
The principal aim of this study is to compare the formation and experiences of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora in Limpopo Province, South Africa and Leeds, UK. This is 
achieved by ascertaining the human and social capital differentials between migrants 
in these two areas and how these different capital levels have helped channel 
migrants to specific destinations. In so doing, the thesis seeks to unveil the 
complexities that are embedded in the transnational linkages between Zimbabwean 
migrants in South Africa, the UK and those at home.  
 
The study profiled a sample of the Zimbabwean diaspora, discerning its 
heterogeneity; it is constituted of disparate groups who have moved because of 
radically different factors. It is important to point out here that there is a dearth of 
statistics about the number of Zimbabweans resident in these two countries (IOM, 
2006) which informed the decision to use a questionnaire survey as an initial data 
collection tool. To this extent, four research objectives were used to realise this aim: 
 
Objective 1 To investigate and compare the profiles of the Zimbabwean   
  diaspora in Limpopo, South Africa and Leeds, UK    
  (Who; When; How) 
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Objective 2 To examine the role of social networks in producing and maintaining 
  diaspora links and the complex connections with those left behind  
  (Why; When; Transnational Transactions; Transnational social fields)  
Objective 3 To explore the evolving transnational strategies employed by  
  migrants in their relationship with home (Communication mediums;  
  Why; How; When; Who) 
Objective 4 To investigate the return intentions of Zimbabwean migrants in  
  Leeds and Limpopo (Transnational Identity and Citizenship; When;  
  Why; Who; How) 
The first objective entailed the collation of biographical data regarding the sample 
migrants in South Africa and the UK in order to build a holistic picture of the people 
residing there, including reference to their educational qualifications and their 
professions. The second objective aimed to examine the role of social capital in 
producing and maintaining intra- and inter-links between the migrants themselves 
and those left behind. In so doing, it spans the various social arenas in which the 
diaspora exact their transnational practices. Objective three aimed to explore the 
migrants’ transnational transactions specifically with those at home. These 
interactions have been shaped by a range of factors, especially technological 
changes. The final objective sought to investigate migrants’ return intentions and 
their attitudes regarding possible return. It thus aimed to discern the factors which 
encourage and impede migrants’ return aspirations.  
 
1.3 Research design 
 
The study deployed a mixed methods approach which involved a questionnaire 
survey being initially used to generate codified data. A questionnaire survey was 
used because of the absence of reliable data on the Zimbabwean diaspora (IOM, 
2006). There is no credible data available on the number of Zimbabwean migrants in 
either Leeds or Limpopo. Only national estimates are available, and these vary wildly 
(Magunha et al., 2009; Makina, 2007; Muzondidya, 2008; Pasura, 2008). The 
statistics provided by government departments in both countries are not entirely 
reliable given that they are only for migrants who have had some liaisons with these 
departments and the nature of migration means many others are unknown to the 
system.  
 
A multi-method approach was thus deployed within specific areas in Leeds and 
Limpopo which migrants use because of the presence of relevant religious, civic, 
community, political or professional organisations. Further help was sought from 
charitable and employment organisations so as to recruit a sufficient number of 
participants. This extensive questionnaire survey was designed to establish a 
demographic backdrop for the subsequent semi-structured interviews which gave 




Semi-structured interviews and multi-sited ethnography formed the second part of 
the data collection process. This qualitative facet of the study provided a means 
through which data could be gathered regarding the migrants and their migratory 
patterns, the reasons why they had left Zimbabwe and their experiences in the host 
country. Through the use of these qualitative methods, the transnational activities of 
the migrants were investigated. The use of ethnographic methods also helped to 
reveal the ways in which migrants utilise public spaces, how they navigate the 
treacherous border between Zimbabwe and South Africa, engage in paid work etc.    
 
While the initial interview agenda focused on the exodus from the homeland, the 
study gradually turned its attention to other areas associated with migration. These 
areas of focus include the dangers that migrants have faced in their travels, and their 
experiences with immigration departments and in the labour market. These are 
salient features of this study because for the majority of the migrants, the decision to 
emigrate was premised on the need for social mobility which migration engendered. 
This section of the study involves an exploration of how migrants use their social 
capital and networks in their politically relevant interactions (also including with those 
at home). This analysis is concluded by developing a framework of the migrants’ 
experience in diaspora and by exploring the shifting identities created by competing 
interests in favour of return and against.  
 
1.4 The study area: Leeds (UK) and Limpopo (South Africa) 
 
South Africa and the UK were chosen as representative case studies because they 
appeared to attract different kinds of migrants. The two areas were chosen as the 
main loci of this study because of the differences in human and social capital 
endowments as well as the migration strategies that migrants used to travel to these 
countries. In short, the two areas were selected because of their contrastive 
populace of migrants. These differences are evident in terms of educational and 
professional qualifications, levels of financial capital and histories of transnational 
circulation. Historically, Zimbabweans have ‘circulated’ between their home and 
South Africa, where they worked on the farms and in mines. Limpopo’s close 
proximity to Zimbabwe and the porous border between the two countries together 
promote circulation. In a similar vein, Roberts et al (1999) have argued that the 
extensive and hard to manage border between Mexico and the USA encourages 
circulation because the two countries are at different stages of economic 
development.  
 
Previous works have suggested that migration to South Africa is dominated by low 
skilled migrants drawn from the border areas such as the Chiredzi, Beitbridge, 
Filabusi and Mwenezi districts etc (Kanyenze, 2004; Zinyama, 1990, 2002). 
However, recent changes have been noted in terms of migrants’ age, gender, 
academic history, and in terms of the movement of whole families rather than 
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breadwinners alone. These changes demonstrate the novelty and extraordinariness 
of the migration waves witnessed from the mid-1990s to 2010, which have differed 
from previous ones because of their intensity, scale and diversity.  
 
Leeds, on the other hand, has attracted a quite different type of migrant, one who 
can afford the expensive airfares. This suggests that these migrants have higher 
levels of social, financial and educational capital than those found in Limpopo. 
However, such an interpretation is both misleading and an inaccurate reflection of 
the migration dynamics of the past 15 years, wherein Zimbabwe has damaged its 
human capital and therein sequestered it to foreign countries.  Weaker social 
traditional bonds have been identified as fuelling the emigration of skilled 
professionals (Granovetter, 1973). The recruitment of Zimbabwean health and social 
care professionals by the National Health Service (NHS) and British local authorities 
(beginning in 1998) has further promoted the exploitation of these weak ties and thus 
increased levels of emigration.  
 
Previously migration to South Africa and the UK was largely temporary and was 
dominated by males who engaged in ‘circular’ migration (Rutherford, 2011). 
Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and the UK is steeped in international history. 
Different historical antecedents have helped shape these migration waves, such as 
the Mfecane3 and WENELA4 labour movements, the 1970s liberation war, the 
Gukurahundi5 of the early 1980s, the movement of professionals escaping from the 
after-effects of the World Bank instigated Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) in the mid-1990s, and the exodus which accompanied 
Zimbabwean economic collapse in the new millennium. However, current migration 
patterns depict a shift from temporary to permanent migration between Zimbabwe, 
South Africa and the UK, thereby signifying a new pattern of migration giving rise to 
Zimbabwe’s transnational migrant communities (Kearney, 1995; Goldring, 1998; 
Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). The growing permanence of migration and increased 
transnational practices in the Zimbabwean context, are under-researched 
phenomena, a genuine knowledge gap which this study seeks to fill.   
 
 
                                                     
3
 Mfecane is associated with the rise of the Zulu Kingdom under Tshaka which led to the movement of other 
ethnic groups like the Ndebele, Shangaan, Tonga, Lozi etc northwards into what is now modern day Zimbabwe 
and Zambia 
4
 WENELA – the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was a recruitment agency that was created in South 
Africa in 1897 and had exclusive rights to labour recruitment in the entire Southern African region where it 
offices in every country e.g. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi etc. 
5
 The concept of Gukurahundi originates from the Shona peasant population which translates into ‘the rain that 
washes away the chaff’ and is generally used to refer to the deaths of over 20,000 people in the Matebeleland 
and Midlands Provinces during the political disturbances of 1982 to 1987. These disturbances followed an 
insurrection that started at Enthumbane Army Barracks in Bulawayo in February 1982 when some members of 
the former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) rebelled against the army leadership. President 
Mugabe who was then the country’s Prime Minister, responded by sending the North Korean trained 5 th Brigade 
to quell the rebellion. It is widely reported that the 5
th
 Brigade indiscriminately killed civilians with the death 
toll alleged to be over 20,000 which President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party disputes.  
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1.5 Major contributions  
 
The study makes a significant empirical contribution to literature about hard to reach 
Zimbabwean groups living in South Africa and the UK. By focusing on the lived 
experiences of a cross section (legal, illegal and undocumented migrants) of the 
Zimbabwean populace in Limpopo and Leeds, the study sheds light into mechanics 
of emigration from Zimbabwe to these two countries. These special insights into 
migrants’ experiences have been elicited by privileging their voices and perspectives 
in order to draw conclusions about their transnational lifestyles. The study thus 
contributes to current debates regarding international skilled and non-professional 
migration by providing context to the migration patterns which proceeded from the 
Zimbabwean crisis. Zimbabwe is an interesting case of emigration because the 
migratory patterns have been both economic and political; this resonates with 
scholarly opinion as to the difficulties inherent in pigeon-holing migrants as either 
economic migrants or political refugees (Bloch, 2006; UNCHR, 2004).  
 
Secondly, despite the existence of a significant number of Zimbabweans in South 
Africa and the UK, very few comparative studies have been undertaken to explore 
similarities and differences between Zimbabwe’s key diaspora communities (Bloch, 
2006). The comparative nature of the study between two contrasting and interrelated 
migration flows from Zimbabwe to South Africa and the UK makes it novel. By 
comparing migrants in these two countries which are at different levels of socio-
economic and political development, a richer picture of migrants’ lives emerges 
which shape their interactions with those at home. This study includes both skilled 
and non-skilled workers, in order to obtain a broader and more holistic insight into 
the Zimbabwean diaspora groups in South Africa and the UK. This study addresses 
a critical gap in the literature by examining the views of both skilled and unskilled 
migrants in South Africa and the UK. 
 
Thirdly, the study deepens our understanding of the diaspora through the 
development of the six pronged taxonomy i.e. enthusiastic, reluctant, ambivalent, 
clandestine, fearful and ephemeral diaspora. This typology captures the categories 
of migrants in South Africa and the UK engendered by a range of factors such as 
immigration status, gender, education, class etc. The fluidity of these categories 
further contributes to our understanding of the diaspora as experienced by migrants. 
The taxonomy, coupled with migrants’ transnational diasporic politics adds to 
existing literature on the nexus between diaspora and homeland politics.   
 
Fourthly, the study contributes to academic and policy debates on return migration, 
circulation and re-integration of migrants in their home countries. This is critical as 
there has been no in-depth study of the return intentions of Zimbabweans domiciled 
in South Africa and the UK since the dawn of the new millennium. Previous studies 
have investigated the return intentions of Pakistani migrants living in the British city 
of Bradford (Anwar, 1979); Caribbean (Duval, 2004; Potter et al., 2005), Salvadorans 
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and Guatemalans in the USA (Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005) and Mexicans in 
the USA (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996; Constant and Massey, 2003). Such a study is 
pertinent given the extent to which Zimbabwe haemorrhaged her human capital 
during the crisis and the economic and political developments which are unfolding in 
the country.  
 
1.6 Thesis structure   
 
Migration is a highly contentious topic which has been explained from both economic 
and social perspectives (Massey et al., 1993; Borjas, 1990). The causes of migration 
are steeped in both contemporary and historical factors. It is against this temporally 
fused background that Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of Zimbabwe, 
concentrating on the periods just before and just after the attainment of 
independence. The period before independence was characterised by high outflows 
due to the liberation war. Emigration prior to independence was largely multi-racial, 
with both black and white people exiting the country to escape from the intensifying 
war, while after independence white people continued to leave due to uncertainty 
over the policies which the socialist government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe 
was intending to pursue. The Chapter considers these factors and conveys events 
which climaxed in the mass exodus of Zimbabweans between 2000 and 2008. It 
chronicles the eight migration episodes which dominated the migration process 
during this period. These episodes arose from a combination of socio-economic and 
political decisions which had a devastating effect on the economic and political 
landscape of the country.    
 
Chapter 3 looks into the emerging transnationalism discourse in migration research 
and draws on this to inform the research as a theoretical framework to explain the 
international migration. The chapter examines the utility of these concepts in 
explaining international migration. This chapter is also concerned about general 
theories of migration and it relates to them in their broadest sense as an attempt to 
explain the emigration of Zimbabweans. Other areas of concern in this chapter are 
the concepts of diaspora, social capital, remittance and development and return 
migration.  
Chapter 4 sets out the mixed methods approach in this research in an endeavour to 
reach as many and as diverse migrant groups as possible. The questionnaire survey 
was used to generate a sample of participants and was then followed by semi-
structured interviews which sought to honour the participants’ own voices. The 
chapter argues the case for this methodology against the backdrop of the difficulties 
inherent in researching ’hard to reach’ groups such as undocumented migrants and 
asylum seekers.  
 
Chapter 5 explores the reasons behind the decisions taken by many to exit 
Zimbabwe. It analyses the migrants’ choices of destinations. The Chapter is 
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concerned about the deterioration in the country’s socio-economic, political and 
environmental fabric which has hastened departure from Zimbabwe. It presents 
testimonies of migrants about their journeys from Zimbabwe and sojourns in other 
countries and how they have drifted in and out of different statuses as they have 
continued to mediate their lives away from home.   
 
Chapter 6 critically examines the experiences of Zimbabweans in Leeds and 
Limpopo. It is about their experiences of life in their host countries and what they 
perceive as being constraints on their agency. It focussed on how the diaspora has 
enabled, impeded or promoted the status quo in so far as social mobility is 
concerned. The chapter draws on the migrants’ narratives of their experiences in 
Leeds and Limpopo to gain an insight of life in the diaspora and whether it matches 
what they envisaged. A typology of the Zimbabwean diaspora is discussed which 
allows for a comprehensive analysis of the Zimbabwean communities in Leeds and 
Limpopo.  
 
Chapter 7 considers the transnational linkages and activities that migrants are 
engaged in. The advent and proliferation of ICTs has opened new avenues through 
which news is disseminated and shared. It has opened a new front through which 
Zimbabweans in the diaspora can become more involved in events in Zimbabwe. 
The transnational activities of migrants are manifold and complex and they are 
undertaken for a variety of reasons. This chapter captures the various transnational 
practices of the sampled migrants and the various mediums through which these 
take place. It delineates the complex and highly sensitive nexus between asylum and 
homeland-immigrant politics.  
 
Return migration is considered by some scholars as the final ‘chapter’ of the 
migration process. The subject of return migration is pertinent to Zimbabwe because 
of the human capital that Zimbabwe sequestered during the crisis, which has the 
potential to help in rebuilding the country given the relative stability now prevailing 
there. Chapter 8 discusses the factors that promote or hinder migrants’ return 
intentions. The formation of the inclusive government in February 2009 was 
considered to be a highly significant event. It is not only seen as having halted the 
economic and political problems that were plaguing the country, but also as initiating 
a wave of return migration. Indeed, the xenophobic attacks which gripped South 
Africa in 2009 resulted in significant flows back to Zimbabwe. However, evidence on 
the ground suggests that far from witnessing a stampede back to Zimbabwe, the 
country continues to sequester its human capital. This chapter will explore the 
migrants’ own understandings and interpretations of return mobility as well as 
unravelling the inclusive government’s policies regarding its citizens abroad.  
 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by offering a summary of the findings and 
how they relate to the study’s original aims and objectives. It pulls together the 
different facets of the research and considers the academic and methodological 
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contributions and wider implications of the research, together with any gaps that 








Chapter 2 Zimbabwe: Independence and the emergence of a nascent  
  diaspora 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses and highlights the major developments in Zimbabwe before 
and after its independence in order to contextualise the different migration practices 
of its citizens (Table 2.1). This is important because one of the central thrusts of this 
study is to explore the differences in human and social capital between migrants in 
the two study areas, and the implications of these on their intentions to return. These 
differences are connected to the policies and events immediately prior to and after 
independence. This approach is critical in understanding the country’s calamitous 
socio-economic collapse, which led to the emigration of a quarter of its population to 
countries within the region and beyond in a series of migration episodes (Crush and 
Tevera, 2010; McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2008). The chapter charts the country’s 
emergence as an independent and sovereign nation before mapping its progress as 
it lurched from one crisis to another. These crises contributed towards the formation 
of the country’s nascent6 diaspora as some of the migrants who left did not return 
home while others engaged in circulation.  
 
A series of crises have led to outflows of Zimbabweans to South Africa, the UK and 
other countries. These include the violence of the early 1980s in Matebeleland and 
the Midlands provinces; the unsustainable debt crisis which pre-empted the 
introduction of ESAP, the deleterious effects of ESAP (such as high costs of leaving, 
job losses and unemployment) the payment of gratuities to liberation war veterans in 
November 1997, the military adventure in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
rejection of the draft constitution in February 2000 resulting in an upsurge of political 
violence, and the invasion of commercial farms and concomitant destruction of 
agriculture. These historic moments have all combined to provoke different migration 
waves to South Africa and the UK.  
 
The proceeding section justifies the chosen location of the research project in the 
light of other studies involving Zimbabwean migrants undertaken in South Africa and 
the UK. Migration episodes (Table 2.2) experienced since independence help shed 
more light on the emergence of diasporic communities in South Africa and the UK. 
This chapter, therefore, provides deeper insights into the migrant groups who are the 
focus of this study. The lives of this diasporic community have, as will be seen in 
Chapters 5 to 8, been shaped by events that occurred in the period shortly before 
and after independence. Indeed, the majority of the study participants in Limpopo are 
‘born frees’, that is, they were born after the country attained its independence from 
                                                     
6
 I use the tern nascent to describe the Zimbabwean diaspora because in comparison with other diasporas, it is a 
relatively young one having started in earnest in the late 1990s when the country started experiencing socio-
economic and political problems. Prior to that Zimbabweans tended to return home after spending brief periods 
working or studying away from home.  
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minority white rule in 1980, and a large segment of those in Leeds benefited from the 
new government’s education drive (see Figure 5.6). The independent government of 
the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe embarked on expansionary education 
policies partly to redress skewed colonial educational policies and partly to fulfil its 
socialist policies. The networks that the current crop of migrants relied on to make 
the UK and South Africa home were sown during the tumultuous period of the pre 
and post independence era. This chapter explores the roots of the crisis, how these 











1963  ZANU formed and constituted into a guerrilla movement advocating for an armed struggle 
1965  Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Rhodesian Front led by Ian Douglas Smith 
1972  Liberation war intensifies 
1976  Geneva Convention peace talks between the nationalists and Rhodesian Front fails 
1978  Bishop Abel Muzorewa elected Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Elections boycotted by ZANU (PF) 
and PF - ZAPU.  
 New government not internationally recognized. 
1979  Lancaster House Conference – ceasefire signed between the warring parties 
 Land reform framework adopted 
 War ends 
1980  Independence,  
 Robert Mugabe becomes Prime Minister and pronounces a reconciliation policy.  
 PF – ZAPU and Rhodesian Front  members co-opted into new independent government 
1982  Political violence and banditry activities break out,  
 Joshua Nkomo and other ministers from PF - ZAPU dismissed from cabinet.  
 Government deploys the North Korean trained 5th Brigade to Matebeleland and Midlands provinces  
 Approximately 20,000 Ndebele speaking people killed  
1987  Unity Accord signed, Mugabe becomes Executive President,  
 Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda become Deputy Presidents 
1990  Inception of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
 International framework for funding land reform re-defined 
1997  Zimbabwean dollar crashes after the government awards unbudgeted for gratuities to the over 50,000 
veterans of the liberation war 
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1998  Svosve people in Marondera district, Mashonaland East Province invade Igava Farm 
 President Mugabe deploys the Zimbabwean National Army in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
 International Land Donors Conference held in Harare 
1999  A 395 member Constitutional Commission appointed by President Mugabe 
 Outreach programme to gather people’s views undertaken 
 MDC formed with Morgan Tsvangirai, a trade unionist at the helm 
2000  Government sponsored draft constitution defeated;  
 MDC and its partners campaign against the draft constitution 
 Land invasions intensify; government launches the ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme’ in June 2000; 
 ZANU (PF) narrowly defeats MDC in the parliamentary elections 
2002  President Mugabe re-elected after defeating Morgan Tsvangirai;  
2005  Operation Murambatsvina,  
 Over 2,1 million people lose their livelihoods 
 Parliamentary, senatorial and presidential elections held, President Mugabe and ZANU (PF) win 
 MDC splits into two factions, led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube 
2006-2008  Hyperinflation 
2008  Harmonised presidential and parliamentary elections,  
 Morgan Tsvangirai defeats President Mugabe but fails to win an outright majority 
 Presidential run-off characterised by violence, 
 Tsvangirai withdraws, 
 Mugabe conducts a one man poll and declares himself the winner 
2009  Formation of coalition government with Robert Mugabe as President and 
 Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister 
Source: Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009); Martin and Johnson (1981) 
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2.2 Contemporary emigration from Zimbabwe – 1975-2010                                                                                                                                 
   
This study argues that there have been eight episodes of emigration from Zimbabwe 
between 1975 and 2010 (Table 2.2). This differs from findings of previous studies 
(Pasura, 2008; Zinyama, 2002). The differences could be ascribed to several factors 
including the devastating socio-economic and political catastrophes which befell 
Zimbabwe since 2000. The mixed flows that characterised the post 2000 exodus 
also helps to account for these differences as migration ceased to be associated with 
low skilled migrants who tended to circulate between Zimbabwe and South Africa but 
included professionals and skilled migrants. Permanency was a characteristic 
feature of this ‘new’ migration which differentiates it from previous migration which 
was largely circular. These waves were driven by different factors and comprised of 
mixed flows. This explains the existence of skilled alongside unskilled migrants, 
asylum seekers and students in South Africa and the UK. These differences also 
denote the human, economic and social endowments of the migrants.  
 
For the sake of consistency with the participants’ lexicon, London is used 
interchangeably with the UK, Britain and England. London is described as having a 
levelling effect by migrants due to the existence of opportunities that some migrants 
tapped to achieve social mobility. London is seen by migrants as offering hope for 
the future and a break with the past that stifled migrants’ upward mobility due to 
structural constraints which existed at home. The same applies to Johannesburg in 
terms of it being used to refer to South Africa writ large. The study uses the term 
diaspora to refer to any Zimbabweans living away from home in South Africa, the UK 
or other countries with a high concentration of Zimbabwean migrants.
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Table 2.2 Migration episodes from Zimbabwe to South Africa and the UK 1975-2010 
 
 
Period Migration Wave   Event    Destination 
South Africa UK 
1975-1982 1  Intensifying liberation war  
 WENELA programme  
 




e.g. Chiredzi  
 Higher education  
 White 
Rhodesians 
 Higher education 
 Refugees 








1990-1997 3  ESAP  
 Rising unemployment 
 Rising prices of goods and 
services 
 Public sector strikes 









 Doctors  
 Skilled 
professionals 








 Constitutional Commission 
Referendum 
 Formation of MDC 
 Invasion of commercial farms 
 Deployment of soldiers to 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
 Skilled 
 Unskilled 




 Nurse education 




 Crash of the Zimbabwean dollar 
 
2000-2002 5  Black market and falling value of 
the Zimbabwean dollar 
 Intensification of land invasions 
 Political violence 
 Parliamentary elections 










 Higher education 
2003-2007 6  Economic decline Operation 
Murambatsvina and loss of 
livelihoods 
 Bank and bureau de change 
closures 
 Presidential and parliamentary 
elections 
 Skilled and 
unskilled  
 Higher education  
 Dispossessed 
farmers  
 Skilled    
 Unskilled  




2008-2010  7  Hyper inflation 
 Collapse of public services e.g. 
health 
 Cholera outbreak 
 Political violence 
 Harmonised presidential, 
parliamentary and local 
government elections 
 Zimbabweans 
from all walks of 
life 
 Skilled 




1980-2010 8  Economic collapse 
 Political violence 
 Zimbabweans 
from all walks of 
life 
 Visa over-stayers 
 Visitors 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010
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2.2.1 The First Episode of Emigration: turmoil and tenacity 
 
The intense fighting that accompanied the liberation war in the 1970s saw a 
significant outflow of white Rhodesians7 as they attempted to escape the ravages of 
the war. Black people also moved out to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, and 
for higher education in countries such as the UK, thereby laying the roots of the 
contemporary Zimbabwean diaspora as some of them did not return following the 
cessation of hostilities in 1980. The attainment of independence from colonial rule in 
April 1980 did not stop the outflow of white people. Despite the incoming government 
of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe pursuing a reconciliation policy, this did not abate 
white emigration. I consider both the inflows and outflows prior to and shortly after 
independence to constitute the first migration episode (Table 2.2). This is 
differentiated from the rest of the migration waves by its multi-racial nature that 
moved to different destinations (Zinyama, 2002). It is estimated that about 100 000 
whites emigrated from Zimbabwe during the first few years of independence, the 
majority of whom are settled in South Africa (Uusihakala, 2008), while Australia, the 
UK, Canada and New Zealand attracted a sizeable number (Chikanda, 2010).  
 
Some scholars (Kanyenze, 2004; Mlambo, 2010; Zinyama, 2002) have sought to 
attribute the pre-independence migration of black Zimbabweans to South Africa to 
the contract labour system which was used to recruit labour to South Africa in order 
to ameliorate the acute shortages that were being experienced in the gold mines and 
farms. Migration to South Africa from Zimbabwe has long been associated with 
unskilled people who were needed to provide cheap labour in the mines and farms 
(Crush, 2005). The WENELA scheme helped forge and strengthen the historic ties 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa which have been of enduring significance. The 
enduring nature of this phenomenon is exemplified by the continued flow of 
Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa where they provide low waged labour on the 
farms, construction sites etc (Muzondidya, 20008; Rutherford, 2011). Economically, 
South Africa is Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner with Zimbabwean exports totalling 
2.9 billion Rands while imports stood at 14.5 billion Rands in 2011 (Mashonganyika 
and Latham, 2012).  
 
Historical and colonial ties opened up channels of communication between the 
centre and the periphery, provided knowledge and awareness of untapped 
opportunities available in the UK and South Africa (Robinson, 1986), and 
transformed the aspirations of many Zimbabweans. The majority of black people 
who partook in this migration episode were from the dry agro-ecological regions of 
Matebeleland and Masvingo Provinces which lay on the border (see Figure 2.1).  
 
                                                     
7
 This thesis describes Rhodesians as white people who elected to leave Zimbabwe prior to and shortly after 
independence because of their opposition to an independent black led government. Some emigrated because 
they were unsure of the policies that the government of the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was going to 
pursue given the socialist rhetoric it was espousing. 
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Figure 2.1 Map of Zimbabwe 
 
Regions associated with historical migration to South Africa 
 
 
Source: Surveyor General (2010) 
 
The events that were to unfold were to fundamentally alter this migration trend; this 
will be demonstrated in the analysis chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8). Thus, while 
white Rhodesians exited the country due to the security fears and uncertainties 
engendered by the prospect of a socialist government, black Zimbabweans moved to 
South Africa in search of employment, refuge and educational purposes. 
Zimbabweans living in areas bordering South Africa continued with their circulatory 
practices after the dawn of independence. It can be argued that for these people, 




The pursuit of higher education also accounted for emigration during this period. 
Students expelled from the then University of Rhodesia for their political activism in 
the 1970s won scholarships to pursue higher education in South Africa and the UK 
(Mlambo, 1995). For example, a significant number of senior government officials, 
including ministers, obtained their degrees at South African and British universities. 
The independent government actively promoted emigration for higher education 
purposes. Students were sent to study in South Africa, the UK and former Eastern 
bloc countries like East Germany and USSR, to replenish the depleted human 
resource base (Chung and Ngara, 1985). This loss is demonstrated by 19,300 white 
skilled and professional workers emigrating to Australia, the UK, Canada and South 
Africa between 1980 and 1983 (Mlambo, 2009). Temporary emigration for higher 
education purposes was encouraged by the independence government in order to 
address the skills gap caused by the emigration of white Rhodesians who held civil 
service positions prior to independence.  
 
The relative peace between 1980 and1982 led Raftopoulos (2004:4) to characterise 
the period as ‘years of restoration and hope.’ The outbreak of political disturbances 
in 1982 was to change the complexity and intensity of emigration from Matebeleland 
and Midlands’ provinces (see Figure 2.1). Whereas, these provinces had provided 
the bulk of migrants to South Africa by virtue of proximity and sharing similar cultural   
traits including the Ndebele language with the Nguni people of South Africa, the 
outbreak of political violence fundamentally altered the gender and age of migrants 
who moved.  
 
2.2.2 The Second Episode: Gukurahundi and the involuntary emigration of the 
 Ndebele people 
 
For Masunungure (2006), Zimbabwe’s politics, like its society, is polarised and 
fractured along ethnic lines, between the majority Shona-oriented groups who are 
mostly found in the north, east and southern parts of the country and the minority 
Ndebele-oriented groups that inhabit in the western, south west and north western 
parts of the country. Masunungure argues that ethnic tensions had stalked the 
country since its colonisation in September 1890, causing a societal bifurcation. 
However, this idea of two nations can be challenged by the heterogeneity 
exemplified by the cosmopolitan nature of Zimbabwean population i.e. comprised of 
white minority settlers and the black majority. The tranquillity brought by 
independence, and any pretences of a newly homogenised nation, were shattered in 
1982 when hostilities broke between the different military wings that had been 
integrated into the Zimbabwe National Army8 (ZNA) culminating in a period of 
political instability characterised by violence against the minority Ndebele people by 
the North Korean trained 5th Brigade that was deployed to Matebeleland provinces to 
                                                     
8
 ZNA was created in 1980 as a unified army comprising of the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas and Rhodesian 
Front soldiers who had fought on opposite sides during the liberation war. This attempt failed resulting in the 
outbreak of violent clashes pitting ZANLA and ZIPRA members soon after independence.   
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quell the insurrection. This mutiny in the armed forces pitted members of the former 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA9) against those of Zimbabwe 
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA10) and resulted in the state acting violently 
toward civilians (most of them Ndebele) in the Midlands and Matebeleland provinces 
accused of harbouring dissidents. This violence became a significant driver of the 
emergence of the Zimbabwean diaspora in both South Africa and the UK.   
 
This protracted violence was only halted by the signing of the Unity Accord in 
December 1987 during which Joshua Nkomo effectively dissolved ZAPU to join 
ZANU (PF) (Tendi, 2011). The violence is estimated to have led to the death of 
20,000 people in the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces (Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace (CCJP), 2007; Solidarity Peace Trust (SPT), 2004). The violence 
resulted in increased emigration from Matebeleland and Midlands provinces, which 
bore the brunt of the disturbances. South Africa attracted a large contingent of 
fleeing Ndebele people due to their close cultural ties with the Nguni people of South 
Africa (Gatsheni-Ndhlovu, 2009).  
 
Scholars such as Maphosa (2007) have highlighted the long history of migration 
between the two countries. This is evidenced by the work of Crush (2003) who found 
out that 23% of the Zimbabwean adult population have migrated to South Africa and 
24% had parents who had been to South Africa, and a further 23% had grandparents 
who had been to South Africa. As Kanyenze (2004) argues, the discontinuation of 
the WENELA system at independence in 1980 did not stop Zimbabweans from 
trekking southwards in search of employment. Whilst the regional countries were 
popular with the majority of the Ndebele people, others with higher capital (social, 
educational and financial) endowments looked to more distant countries such as the 
UK. As will be demonstrated in Chapters 5-8, some migrants interviewed in Leeds 
were victims of this war who arrived in the mid 1980s. Such migrants played key 
roles for the later group of migrants as they provided the much needed bonding and 
bridging capital.  
 
There were different flows within this migration wave: those with superior human and 
financial capital moved to distant countries like the UK and USA, and those with 
limited skills trekked to Botswana and South Africa where they had social networks 
(Maphosa, 2007). This episode of migration to South Africa was male dominated 
(Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndhlovu, 2007; Maphosa, 2011; Pasura, 2008). The 
dominance of young male adults is accounted for by the persecution that they were 
suffering at the hands of the notorious 5th Brigade, the North Korean trained soldiers 
who were deployed to the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces to quell the 
                                                     
9
 ZANLA was the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (ZANU) military wing which was initially led by 
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole who was later replaced by Robert Mugabe in the 1970s. The majority of its 
supporters were Shona.  
10
 ZIPRA was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo. The 
majority of its supporters were Ndebele.  
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rebellion. Young adults were targeted because of suspicions that they supported the 
dissidents.  
 
The gender dynamic of migration changed over time due to the worsening brutality of 
the soldiers who progressively were indiscriminately killing civilians, including women 
and children (CCJP, 2007; Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), 2000; SPT, 2004), 
prompting the emigration of women and children. As Masunungure (2006) claims, 
despite the cessation of the hostilities, violence remains a potent weapon in 
President Mugabe’s armoury, there to deal with perceived and real enemies of 
ZANU (PF). His claim appears to have been vindicated by the violence that 
President Mugabe has used to crush dissent as witnessed by the unprecedented 
violence that he unleashed on perceived opposition supporters during the 2008 
presidential run-off election.   
 
The cessation of hostilities after the signing of the Unity Accord between President 
Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo in December 1987 brought much needed peace but not 
development, especially for Matebeleland and other provinces outside the 
Mashonaland (Alexander, 2006; Maphosa, 2007). While the peace brought by the 
unity accord was welcome, the euphoria which greeted it was to be extinguished by 
the news that the economy was struggling. It had started showing signs of distress 
by the mid 1980s despite being bankrolled by international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and multi-lateral agencies. This was to culminate in the 
adoption of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which, as will be 
seen in the next section, led to another migration episode. 
    
2.2.3 Third Episode: ESAP and the flight of skilled professionals 
 
Economic and political upheavals are known to cause migration (Castles, 2000). The 
government introduced ESAP in 1990 to inject life in an ailing and faltering economy 
at the instigation of the World Bank (Mlambo, 1997). ESAP was accompanied by 
swingeing cuts to the public sector resulting in massive redundancies and the 
introduction of cost recovery mechanisms such as user fees in schools and 
hospitals. The economic hardships that followed the introduction of ESAP in 1990 
were a key driver of emigration to countries like South Africa and Botswana. ESAP 
had a disproportionate impact on the poor, which exacerbated inequalities with 
society. Squeezed out of the job market, a significant number of Zimbabweans left 
the country. Some scholars have cited ESAP as the turning point in Zimbabwe’s 
political and economic fortunes (Gaidzanwa, 1999; Mlambo, 2010).  
 
It is likely that the migration of skilled professionals was more visible because their 
departure was more noticeable than that of unskilled people. What ESAP brought to 
light was that skilled professionals were not immune to the economic difficulties of 
the nation. The by-products of ESAP were a dramatic fall and erosion of disposable 
incomes of the middle class, such as nurses, teachers, and doctors, which prompted 
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Gaidzanwa (1999) to assert that it hastened their departure to regional countries like 
Botswana and South Africa and more distant countries like the UK. The introduction 
of ESAP marked the beginning of relentless strikes by public and private sector 
personnel (Gaidzanwa, 1999; Kanyenze, 2004). The strikes can be considered 
responses to ESAP’s failure/negative effects.  
 
While unemployment was already unsustainably high prior to the introduction of 
ESAP, its inception had a debilitating effect on the socio-economic fabric of society 
(Bond and Manyanya, 2003). People were suddenly exposed to the harsh economic 
difficulties brought about by ESAP’s introduction. For example, the cost of living 
increased dramatically due to rising inflation and soaring interest rates. Real wages, 
according to the government’s own Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social 
Welfare (1995) declined in real terms. Furthermore, the anticipated growth in the 
private sector which was expected to absorb the surplus labour shed from the public 
sector did not materialise, this added pressure on the safety nets that had been 
created to cushion the impact of ESAP (Kanyenze, 2004).  
 
There is a corpus of scholarly literature which documents the negative repercussions 
of ESAP on vulnerable people such as pensioners and children (Mutisi and 
Bourdillon, 2000). In order to provide for their families, both skilled and non-skilled 
Zimbabweans considered emigration thereby triggering the third migration episode in 
which professionals featured prominently as they moved to regional countries. The 
health sector bore the brunt of this emigration as evidenced by a high vacancy rate 
in the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, which had soared to 30% by 1997 
(Chikanda, 2010). The departures witnessed in the 1990s were a precursor to the 
mass exodus which began at beginning of the new millennium, when an estimated 2-
3 million Zimbabweans emigrated (Makina, 2007; SIRDC, 2003). As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, some migrants who left Zimbabwe during this period 
used South Africa and other regional countries as springboards for further migration 
to the UK.   
 
While the introduction of ESAP had a negative impact on the Zimbabwean economy, 
its decline was exacerbated by the events which began in November 1997. On the 
14th of November 1997, President Mugabe capitulated to demands for 
compensation by 50,000 war veterans for their participation in the 1970s liberation 
war. Each war veteran received a one off payment of Z$50,000 and a Z$2,000 
monthly pension.  This decision sent the economy into a tailspin from which it has 







2.2.4 The Fourth Episode: Health and social care: new opportunities, new  
 frontiers 
 
Faced with a growing shortage of health and social care staff to care for an ageing 
population, the incoming UK Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair 
embarked on a two-pronged approach: to train its own staff, and to launch an 
aggressive recruitment campaign in developing countries (Dyson, 2003). This 
opened up nursing education to people from the Commonwealth and provided free 
bursaries until 2002 in order to attract people to the profession. The provision of free 
bursaries to study nursing was a welcome development for Zimbabweans who could 
not qualify to enrol in the local universities. Young people and adults who had failed 
to enter local universities and tertiary colleges due to the competitive nature of 
education in Zimbabwe jumped at the chance of studying in the UK (Ranger, 2005).  
 
This migration wave was dominated by young school leavers who had completed 
their ‘O’ and ‘A’ Levels. As news of the existence of scholarships filtered through the 
country, gainfully employed adults were attracted and took the opportunity to switch 
careers. The chance to study in the UK presented jobless young people and adults a 
‘once-in-a-lifetime’ opportunity (Dyson, 2003). However, the exorbitant airfares 
needed to travel to the UK deterred people from poor backgrounds. Conversely, 
people from middle and upper classes and those with social networks already in the 
UK, who helped finance their travel, were attracted to the opportunities.  
 
The fourth migration episode appeared to have been gender neutral and challenged 
the prevailing feminisation of care in Zimbabwe. Nursing has historically been 
considered a female profession due to the gendered division of labour. Like in the 
UK where in 1997 almost 91% of nurses were female (UK Central Council, 1998), 
nursing in Zimbabwe is highly feminised (Chikanda, 2006; Gaidzanwa, 1999). 
However, the prospect of studying in the UK appears to have induced males to 
consider joining the profession. This should be considered against the backdrop of 
rising unemployment in the country, although this alone cannot account for the 
sudden interest that studying in the UK created. It is likely that the scholarships 
offered a way out of the worsening economic conditions in the country. It also offered 
the opportunity of further education for young people and adults with low grades 
(Ranger, 2005).  
 
Zimbabwe was a fertile ground for both strategies given its respected educational 
policy. Parallel to the emigration of nursing students was the emergence of the UK 
as a possible destination for medical professionals who had previously settled in 
Botswana and South Africa (Chikanda, 2010; Gaidzanwa, 1999) due to their close 
proximity to home and the existence of social networks. However, this trend changed 
in 1998 when the UK became the preferred choice for medical professionals due to 
rising demand for qualified health professionals, and better working conditions and 
remuneration (Pasura, 2008; Tinarwo, 2011). This coincided with a policy of the 
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British Labour government in 1998 to recruit skilled overseas workers to augment 
critical shortages that were being experienced in sectors such as health and social 
care (Modood and Salt, 2011). These professionals relied on weak ties as a mode of 
entry in to the UK (Poros, 2008; Granovetter, 1973).  
 
Scholars such as Bach (2003) and Muula and Maseko (2006) argue that migration of 
skilled health personnel is primarily a response to globally uneven development 
manifested in low wages, few incentives, poor working conditions, poor promotion 
possibilities, inadequate management support, heavy workloads, limited access to 
good technology and medicines. The chance to earn decent wages in the UK was an 
inducement that the pauperised Zimbabwean health and social care personnel could 
not turn down. Recruitment agencies launched forays into Zimbabwe to help 
alleviate the critical shortage at home. The recruitment agencies, local authorities 
and the NHS had a significant role in attracting Zimbabwean professionals; in one 
recent study, 41% of all migrant nurses in the UK had come primarily because they 
had been recruited (Winkelmann-Gleed, 2006: 44). Thus, the fourth migration 
episode was not only driven by passive awareness but by active recruitment thereby 
differentiating it from the previous migration waves discussed earlier. As Poros 
(2008) explains, employers lower their transaction costs once they recruit labour 
from overseas by relying on the recruited migrants to informally recruit family, friends 
and community members to live and work with them.  
 
As the economic performance worsened, ordinary Zimbabweans were compelled to 
consider emigrating. Information gleaned from the Nursing and Midwifery Council 
(UK) show a steady increase in the registration of Zimbabwean nurses beginning in 
1997, peaking in 2002/2003 before falling when general nursing was removed from 
the Skills Shortage Occupational listing in 2006 by the Home Office (Table 2.3). The 
available statistics vary; some authors estimate that in 2002, there were 18,000 
Zimbabwean nurses working abroad (Mangwende, cited in Pang et al., 2002).  
 
Table 2.3 Number of Zimbabwean nurses registered with NMC per year – 
  1998- 2008. 
 
Yr 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 
No 52 221 382 473 485 391 311 161 90 49 
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council (2009) 
 
The outflow of skilled professionals from Zimbabwe and other developing countries 
inevitably led to growing choruses of ‘brain drain’ (Faini, 2007) while others consider 
it as ‘brain gain’ and ‘brain circulation’ (Robertson, 2006). This emigration of health 
and social care professionals was anchored by cultural capital which Castells (2002) 
describe as knowledge of other societies and the opportunities they offer, as well as 
information about how to actually go about moving and seeking work elsewhere. 
 26 
Some medical professionals had experience of migration having initially moved to 
South Africa and Botswana during the early 1990s before relocating to countries 
such as the UK. Such migrants provided the much needed cultural capital for others 
still at home who were contemplating leaving.  
 
The migration of skilled professionals, similar to that of non-professionals, was aided 
and sustained by the existence of social networks (Maphosa, 2007). Gaidzanwa’s 
(1999:47) study of the emigration of health professionals to Botswana and South 
Africa in the 1990s shows the importance of these networks by revealing,  
 
  ‘a very active grapevine about job possibilities in South Africa which saw 
 doctors arranging references for their colleagues and keeping them informed 
 about job opportunities in specific institutions as they arose.’  
 
It can be argued that this migration wave also coincided with signs of a growing 
shortage of nurses in the UK which attracted some professionals to move there. 
However, the majority of the professionals still preferred to work in the region as they 
hoped for stability at home.  
 
Like the migration waves which preceded it, this wave was dominated by earners 
while the spouses remained in the country. Migration was seen as temporary, as a 
means of cushioning the family from the economic shocks induced by ESAP. The 
spouses therefore remained in Zimbabwe, caring for their families (Gaidzanwa, 
1999). This differed from the other waves of migration which followed, such as that of 
nursing students to the UK detailed in the next section.  
 
These problems arose in an environment which was largely peaceful and where 
property rights were respected. However, as Section 2.2.5 demonstrates, this was 
soon to change following the government sponsored draft constitution in February 
2000. The defeat saw the government supporting the violent invasion of commercial 
farms which resulted in the destruction of commercial agriculture which was the 
backbone of the economy. The violence that accompanied the farm invasions 
caused significant emigration.  
 
2.2.5 The Fifth Episode: Land reform and the demise of agriculture 
 
The Zimbabwean economy prospered because of commercial farming (Dashwood, 
2000) which was the country’s biggest employer with over 2.5 million workers 
(Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), 2000; Moyo et al., 1995). The successes of 
Zimbabwean agriculture saw the country being labelled as the ‘bread basket’ of 
Africa. However, land ownership was owned mainly by white people due to land 
alienation during the colonial period. As Tendi (2011) notes, land dispossession was 
a popular grievance throughout Zimbabwe’s independence struggle. Unfortunately, 
the nationalists failed to have their demand fulfilled at the Lancaster House 
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Conference to address the imbalance in land ownership, thereby compelling the new 
government to acquire land on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ basis instead of 
compulsory acquisition for the first 10 years of independence (1980-1990) (Moyo et 
al., 1995). Upon expiration of this clause, parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act 
in 1992 (subsequently amended in 2000) which provided for the compulsory 
acquisition of white owned land.  
 
In March 1999, President Mugabe appointed a Constitutional Commission to draft a 
new constitution to replace the Lancaster House constitution, which had been 
adopted at independence. The Commission undertook extensive consultations 
throughout the country which culminated in a draft constitution which was then put to 
a referendum. The draft constitution was rejected in a referendum in February 2000 
(Raftopoulos, 2006) with the government subsequently blaming the white 
commercial farmers for this defeat (Magaramombe, 2010; Mlambo, 2008).  
 
Shortly after the referendum, the war veterans, with the support of the government, 
intensified the jambanja11 which began in June 1998 when the Svosve people 
invaded Eirene and Igava farms in Marondera district, Mashonaland East Province. 
Similar invasions were re-enacted throughout the country. The farm invasions 
marked what was later to be called the ‘fast track land reform programme’ which 
many critics consider to have been reprisals against the farmers for having 
sponsored the opposition to the draft constitution (CFU, 2000; Scoones et al., 2010). 
Although provided for in the legal statutes, the government did not compulsorily 
acquire commercial farms until after the defeat of the government sponsored 
constitutional referendum in February 2000.  
 
The seizure of white owned farms is considered to have precipitated the collapse of 
the economy (Chan, 2003; McGregor, 2006). The collapse of the agricultural sector 
released over 2.5 million former farm workers onto the job market which worsened 
the unemployment situation (Sachikonye, 2003). Commercial farm workers found 
themselves stateless when the Zimbabwean government revoked citizenship rights 
to people born in Zimbabwe to parents of foreign origin. The Citizenship Act (2003) 
has been criticised for disenfranchising millions of commercial farm workers, 
‘coloureds’ and white people principally to punish them for their perceived support of 
the opposition MDC (Muzondidya, 2007). The majority of the farm workers were 
second or third generation Zimbabweans of Malawian, Zambian and Mozambican 
descent who had worked on the farms all their lives (Magaramombe, 2010). With the 
new farmers uninterested in inheriting these farm workers, they were left with little 
choice but to retrace their parents’ footsteps back to their countries of origin or move 
to South Africa and Botswana (Mlambo, 2010). The downstream industries which 
                                                     
11
 Jambanja is a term used to describe the violent takeover of white owned commercial farms by supporters of 
President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) party. The farm invasions were led by war veterans, security services 
personnel and the youth militia (Green Bombers).  
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relied on agriculture were also forced to lose staff, who then promptly joined the 
migration phenomenon (Pilossof, 2012).  
 
Some scholars have claimed that President Mugabe’s government ordered the 
invasion of white owned farms to ward off the threat posed by the MDC who had 
spearheaded the campaign against the draft constitution (Mlambo, 2005, 2010). The 
emergence of the MDC as a multi-racial party appealing to all segments of the 
population was to have far reaching repercussions in the way ZANU (PF) and the 
state interacted with the Zimbabwean citizenry. The defeat of the government-
sponsored constitutional referendum in February 2000 and the near loss of its 
parliamentary majority in the June 2000 parliamentary elections resulted in the 
adoption of an ultra-nationalistic stance and populist policies which it used to court a 
restive population (Primorac and Chan, 2007). However, this worsened the 
economic crisis and set in motion a political crisis which increased the exodus.  
 
The political atmosphere became polarized between two protagonists, President 
Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. This polarization was 
greatest during the March 2008 harmonised elections (presidential, parliamentary 
and local government) which President Mugabe and his party lost for the first time 
since independence, but refused to cede power on the basis that the MDC leader did 
not achieve 51 percent of the votes as required by the constitution. This prompted a 
violent run-off from which Tsvangirai withdrew, and President Mugabe was declared 
the victor. Migration to South Africa peaked during this period (Table 2.3).  
 
In 2005, the government launched a blitz against informal traders in an exercise 
code named ‘Operation Murambatsvina’12 (Drive-out Trash). This action resulted in 
an outcry which prompted the UN Secretary General to dispatch a special envoy to 
investigate. The action of the government spawned another migration episode, 
detailed below.  
 
2.2.6 The Sixth Episode: Operation Murambatsvina and collapsing livelihoods 
 
The invasion of farms entrenched economic regression. With job scarcity becoming 
the norm, enterprising Zimbabweans turned to the informal economy for salvation 
and sustenance (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). As noted by Bratton and 
Masunungure (2006) the phenomenal shrinkage of the economy resulted in the 
unemployment rate increasing to over 70 percent, thereby forcing many 
Zimbabweans to turn to the informal sector as a source of livelihood and survival. 
                                                     
12
 The government claims that Operation Murambatsvina (Drive-out Trash) was aimed at enforcing planning 
laws and bye-laws in Harare and other urban areas. According to the government, Operation Murambatsvina 
was necessary in order to rid cities and towns of illegally erected houses and buildings as well as to ensure 
compliance with trading standards and laws. However, the civic society and opposition MDC alleged that it was 
a government ploy to curb its urban support base as ZANU (PF) had lost in urban areas in both the 2000 and 
2005 elections. 
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Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009) claim that as many as 80% of the population work 
in the informal sector.  
 
The government in a bid to rein in uncontrolled growth and to bring stability to the 
informal economy launched ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ in May to July 2005 which 
resulted in the involuntary movement and displacement of approximately 700,000 
people in Harare (UN Habitat, 2005). Bratton and Masunungure (2006) claim that the 
operation was security led and was justified as a strategy to eradicate illegal 
dwellings and eliminate informal trade. Thousands of houses and business premises 
were destroyed in the process and wares of informal traders confiscated.  
Some scholars (Potts, 2006; Mlambo, 2008) have claimed that Operation 
Murambatsvina was an act of retribution by President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) 
party against the urban electorate for having overwhelmingly rejected it in the 2000 
and 2005 elections. Such scholarship regards the operation as an attempt to reduce 
the support base of the opposition MDC party. According to this school of thought, by 
destroying houses and informal businesses, ZANU (PF) was strengthening its hand 
whilst weakening the opposition’s (Potts, 2006). This view resonates with the 
conclusion of the UN Secretary General’s special envoy, Anna Tibaijuka who 
concluded that the operation could have been a pre-emptive strategy designed to 
prevent popular uprising in light of increasing food insecurity and other economic 
hardships (UN Habitat, 2005).  
 
For the victims of Operation Murambatsvina, who had seen the destruction of their 
livelihoods, emigration became a possibility which promised a fresh start (Chapter 5). 
South Africa was an attractive destination given its proximity to Zimbabwe. Operation 
Murambatsvina marked Zimbabwe’s descent into hyper-inflation which caused an 
unprecedented migration episode, which I call the ‘Great Trek.’   
 
2.2.7 The Seventh Episode: The Great Trek 
                                                                                         
The deterioration of Zimbabwe’s social services sector has attracted scholarly 
attention (McGregor, 2008; Pruyt, 2009). The decline stemmed from years of 
underinvestment owing to the worsening economic situation. Raftopoulos and 
Mlambo (2010) sum this up succinctly when they suggest that by 2008, the economy 
had undergone a veritable meltdown, with all indicators signifying a country in severe 
distress. The cholera outbreak began in Chitungwiza in August 2008 before rapidly 
spreading throughout the country (WHO, 2009b) triggering an exodus whose 
consequences are still being felt today. Children and old age pensioners joined the 
exodus (Muzondidya, 2008). The country did not have foreign currency to buy 
chemicals required for water treatment. What initially appeared to be a simple 
disease outbreak served to demonstrate the perilous state of both the economy and 
the health delivery system. WHO (2009b) reported that there were a total of 98,522 
cases with 4,282 deaths between August 2008 and 8 June 2009. The government 
initially spurned offers of help by NGOs and UN agencies, before eventually 
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capitulating once the death rate mounted. The cholera outbreak triggered the largest 
exodus from Zimbabwe to South Africa. But by then, the damage had already been 
inflicted, as evidenced by the over 4,000 deaths (Nyazema, 2010).  
 
The precipitous decline of the health sector is demonstrated by the spectacular fall in 
the life expectancy rate from 63 years in 1990 to 34 and 37 years for women and 
men respectively in 2004 (WHO, 2006). Similar increases were also noted in the 
child mortality rates from 76 to 132 deaths per 1000 between 1990 and 2005 
(Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2010). Chikanda (2010) bemoans the fact that the crisis 
occurred at a critical juncture when health services were badly needed to address 
the growing threat of HIV/AIDS infections which was causing about 3,200 deaths per 
week in 2007, making Zimbabwe the fourth highest HIV/AIDS prevalent country in 
the world. The availability of life saving drugs in South Africa appealed to medically 
neglected Zimbabweans. 
 
Cholera was not the only problem that the battered Zimbabwean populace had to 
contend with. Hyper-inflation was severe and made life difficult for citizens. Unable to 
migrate to western countries such as the UK, due to their increasingly restrictive 
immigration policies of these countries, South Africa became the gateway to a new 
life. It attracted every Zimbabwean with the desire to leave. It is therefore not 
surprising that this migration episode was generated by the cataclysmic collapse of 
the Zimbabwean nationhood project (Bratton and Masunungure, 2006). This wave 
consisted of the healthy and unhealthy, the educated and uneducated, married and 
the unmarried, and a myriad others who were moving in search of a new life and 
money. The South African government set up an emergency clinic in Musina (the 
nearest town from the border) dedicated to attending to the cholera and other health 
needs of the newly arrived Zimbabwean migrants (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
2009).   
 
The great trek stands out from the other migration waves in that it was caused by the 
collapse of the state, evidenced by its failure to tackle the cholera outbreak. The 
cholera outbreak was the event which exposed the government’s bankruptcy. It 
caused cross border migration and movement, including travelling to South Africa or 
Botswana to purchase foodstuffs which were in short supply at home. This period 
saw migrants in western countries such as the UK remitting money by Money 
Transfer Organisations (MTOs) to neighbouring countries where their relatives 
travelled to buy groceries which were in short supply at home (see Chapter 7). The 
great trek was characterised by short-term movements, as migrants moved to South 
Africa for short periods of time and often shuttled between Zimbabwe and Limpopo 
in search of foodstuffs. Businesses were also involved in the great trek as they 
hedged their losses by moving to South Africa as the Zimbabwean currency 
weakened under hyper-inflation. It was therefore not uncommon to find Zimbabwean 
businesses opening branches in South Africa and the UK to serve the interests of a 
burgeoning Zimbabwean population. For example, entrepreneurs operated medical 
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companies and brokerage services which sourced medicines and groceries that the 
migrants could purchase on behalf of those at home which solidified networks 
between and within the exiled Zimbabweans with those at home.  
 
Skilled people abandoned their jobs in droves due to the ravages of hyper-inflation. 
According to Tevera (2010) 15,200 teachers deserted their jobs between 2007-2008 
for careers in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland which compelled 
some schools to close due to shortage of teachers. Teachers had been labelled by 
President Mugabe and ZANU (PF) as opposition supporters. Before the year 2000, 
teachers had played a central role in organising and running elections, which were 
suspended after the near defeat of ZANU (PF) in June 2000; teachers have since 
been increasingly alienated and underpaid (Tevera, 2010). The desperate situation 
that the education sector finds itself in is demonstrated by the government’s decision 
to ask approximately 10,000 teachers whom it had previously dismissed or 
suspended to reapply with the view of having their jobs back (Mpofu, 2009). 
 
Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2010) note that the economic crisis caused a massive 
collapse of the country’s once-celebrated social services sector, with health and 
education provision declining precipitously in the face of chronic and severe 
underfunding and a debilitating brain drain as most professionals voted with their feet 
in search of better prospects abroad. School-going children and beggars also joined 
the great trek. Reports abound of Zimbabwean beggars begging in the streets and 
other public spaces (Mail and Guardian, 2010). Vulnerable people such as the 
visually impaired saw their grants from the government wiped out by hyper-inflation 
and chose to join others in search of redemption in South Africa.  
 
The political repression that accompanied the presidential run-off of June 2008 
exacerbated emigration. The harmonized elections in March 2008 were praised for 
their peaceful and tranquil nature. Petrified at the prospect of losing power to the 
MDC, ZANU (PF) mobilized its war veterans, youth militia and state security services 
that went on an orgy of violence against perceived opposition supporters. The MDC 
claims that over 500 of its supporters were killed between March and June 2009 
(MDC, 2009). South Africa and the UK offered refuge from the escalating violence. 
However, the UK was out of reach for many because of the stringent visa 
requirements and the cost involved.  
 
The migration episodes delineated and discussed above contributed towards the 
formation of the Zimbabwean diaspora. It is relatively young compared to other 
African diasporas like the Ghanaian or Nigerian diasporas (Pasura, 2008). It is even 
younger if compared against the established and classical diasporas such as the 
Jewish diaspora (Cohen, 1997). The next section discusses the notion of seeking 
asylum in South Africa and the UK as a migration episode which consisted of 
migrants from the waves discussed above. This is informed by the unprecedented 
numbers of Zimbabweans who have sought asylum in South Africa and the UK as a 
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strategy of both extending their stay in exile and making their stay permanent. 
Between 2000 and 2010, Zimbabwe was one of the top asylum generating countries 
in South Africa and the UK (UNHCR, 2011).   
 
2.2.8 The Eighth Episode: Post-migration - asylum seeking and permanency 
 of migration   
 
The eight migration episode can also be called the post migration wave given that 
this relates to the actions that migrants took once in destination country. For 
example, some migrants entered the UK as visitors as part of the waves identified 
earlier and overstayed their visas before claiming asylum to regularise their 
immigration status. The deteriorating socio-economic and political situation at home 
meant that migrants that had entered South Africa and the UK as visitors and 
intended to stay for short periods postponed their intention to return. Migrants had 
left Zimbabwe with the intention of target saving for specific purposes e.g. buying a 
house (see Chapter 7). Pasura (2008) discussed how migrants flirted between 
immigration statuses in order to prolong their stay in the UK. In his study of 
Zimbabwean migrants in the British cities of Birmingham, Coventry, London and 
Wigan, he demonstrated how asylum seeking had gained currency with migrants as 
a strategy of extending their stay in the UK. Home Office (2012) figures show that 
asylum seeking peaked in 2009 when 7611 Zimbabweans claimed asylum with the 
bulk of these claims (7541) made in-country, and only 24 being made at the port of 
entry (Table 2.4).  
 


















1999 230 - - 105   
2000 1,010 20 10 525   
2001 2,140 120 45 1,970 1512 627 
2002 8,695 2,644 124 4,351 5812 2,644 
2003 4,018 1,070 35 3,931 809 3,209 
2004 2,522 303 31 2,874 455 2,067 
2005 1,392 105 23 1,203 194 1,193 
2006 2,147 191 46 1,983 194 1,953 
2007 2,402 337 26 1,542 319 2,083 
2008  4,475 796 151 2,817 350 4,125 
2009 7,611 2,386 430 5,457 70 7,541 
2010 1,955 519 236 1,931 24 1,755 
Source: Home Office (2011) 
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It is not an exaggeration to say that the majority of the applications came from 
people who entered the UK prior to the inception of the visa regime in November 
2002 (Figure 5.3, p.100). Many of these migrants overstayed their visas while they 
worked illegally in the burgeoning social care and manufacturing sectors before 
claiming asylum in most cases several years after the expiration of their visas as will 
be demonstrated in Chapter 7. 
 
Records from South Africa’s DHA13 indicate that 44,423 Zimbabweans claimed 
asylum between 2005 and 2007, before jumping to 111,968 in 2008. In addition, 19, 
564 corporate work permits were issued to farmers in Limpopo in relation to their 
Zimbabwean farm workers (DHA, 2010). The UNHCR (2009) data indicates that 
between 2004 and 2006, 241 Zimbabweans were recognised as refugees. Other 
statistics show that there has been a phenomenal rise in year on year deportations 
from South Africa to Zimbabwe, which surged to 74,765 in 2004 from a paltry 17,000 
in 2001, before reaching 97,433 in 2005 and peaking at a staggering 102,423 
between January and June 2007 (HRW, 2008).   
 
While the British government condemned the developments in Zimbabwe, the South 
African government under President Mbeki maintained its policy of ‘silent diplomacy’ 
through which it sought to persuade the government of President Mugabe to be 
tolerant of its political opponents (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). It refused to 
recognise that there was a political problem in Zimbabwe which was capable of 
generating refugees. President Mbeki’s exasperation with the continued inflows of 
Zimbabwean migrants into South Africa was captured in a speech that he made in 
Parliament on 17 May 2007 when he said,  
 
 ‘As to this.... inflow of illegal people, I personally think that it’s something that 
 we have to live with... it’s difficult; you can’t put a Great Wall of China between 
 South Africa and Zimbabwe to stop people walking across14.’   
 
The refusal to admit that there was a political crisis in Zimbabwe which was 
spawning refugees was reflected in the miniscule number of people granted refugee 
status in South Africa and its continued deportation policy which was only halted 
when President Jacob Zuma assumed power in 2009.  
 
Thus, until April 2009, there were parallels between how the British and South 
African treated Zimbabwean asylum seekers. There was an over reliance on 
deporting refused asylum seekers in the UK while in South Africa, illegal immigrants 
suffered the same fate given that the government did not recognise Zimbabweans as 
asylum seekers but economic migrants. In both countries, the issue of what to do 
                                                     
13
 Personal communication from the Acting Chief Director for Asylum Seeker Management dated 22/04/2010. 
14
 Speech by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki in the South African Parliament on 17 May 2007. 
‘Mbeki: Zimbabweans here to stay’, News24, May 17. [Available at 
http://news24.com/News24/SouthAfrica/News/0,,2-7-14422119467,00.html] [Accessed 28 March 2009] 
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with Zimbabwean asylum seekers provoked intense debate and attracted 
considerable attention (Bloch, 2006; Ranger, 2005; Refugee Council, 2008). A 
number of permutations were floated in the two countries regarding Zimbabwean 
asylum seekers. These alternatives included granting all asylum seekers temporary 
residence status, giving them temporary work permits and a blanket amnesty (HRW, 
2008; Refugee Council, 2006, 2008). The British government has been castigated 
for condemning President Mugabe’s human rights abuses but not tending to his 
victims (Ashton and May, 2008).  
 
Although the British government cannot forcibly return refused asylum seekers, they 
are not allowed to work to sustain themselves and their families. This has left such 
migrants living in ‘limbo’ (Ashton and May, 2008) and ‘trapped’ (IPPR, 2006) 
because they can neither work nor be returned home. They are generally unentitled  
to the most basic ‘hard cases’15 support of hostel housing and vouchers for basic 
necessities which are provided to refused asylum seekers who cannot go home 
(Institute of Race Relations, 2009). As a result of the cutting off of NASS support, 
many refused asylum seekers have resorted to working illegally where they face 
severe exploitation and the constant risk of arrest and imprisonment. The Institute of 
Race Relations (2008) claims that Zimbabweans make up a large proportion of those 
arrested in immigration raids and sentenced to up to nine months in prison for using 
false documents to obtain work (New Zimbabwe, 2010).   
 
In South Africa on the other hand, refugee charities working with Zimbabwean 
asylum seekers, like their counterparts in the UK, called on the government to 
introduce a range of policies to ameliorate the growing vulnerability of Zimbabweans, 
such as granting blanket refugee status (Forced Migration Studies Programme 
(FMSP), 2007). These measures were suggested in order to end the endless cycle 
of informal border crossing, arrests, deportation, and curb informal border crossings, 
as well as freeing up security resources for more important jobs (HRW, 2008). The 
new government of President Jacob Zuma halted the deportation of all 
Zimbabweans when it came to power, and in April 2009 directed that all 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants apply for renewable 6 months asylum 
permits16. These permits entitle the holder to work, and access to basic social 
services such as health care.  
 
Like the British asylum system, the South African asylum application and 
determination process is severely strained. The DHA aims to process applications 
within 3 months, but in 2008, the backlog of applications dated back to 1998 
                                                     
15
 Hard cases refer to asylum seekers who have exhausted their appeals process resulting in their support being 
stopped.  
16
 The South African government announced on 23
rd
 September that the asylum permits system will expire by 
31
st
 December 2010. A new dispensation for Zimbabweans was to be introduced in which migrants would 
transition to four year temporary residency permits, including work and study permits. The DHA was to issue 
these permits upon presentation of a valid passport and other relevant documentation, such as ‘proof of study, 
work, self-employment and business’ (DHA, 2010a) 
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(Muzondidya, 2008). Similarly, in the UK, the then Home Secretary, Dr John Reid 
told Parliament in 2007 that the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) which 
was then responsible for processing asylum applications was not fit for purpose. 
Both countries’ asylum determination processes have been criticised for the 
inordinate delays in processing asylum applications. There are cases in which 
applicants waited up to 10 years to get the outcome of their applications 
(Muzondidya, 2008; Lewis et al., 2008).  
 
The preceding paragraphs have shed some light on the asylum episode in South 
Africa and the UK which is closely linked to the other episodes already discussed. 
Migrants who sought asylum arrived in South Africa and the UK as part of the earlier 
episodes and sought asylum to prolong their stay in the host country as a strategy to 
make their stay permanent. The two countries have different asylum processes that 
Zimbabwean immigrants have to navigate in order to get documented status.  
 
2.3 Origins of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK 
 
This section develops the above discussions of migration episodes and 
demonstrates how these waves contributed to the formation of Zimbabwean 
diasporic communities in South Africa and the UK. There are multiple differences in 
these communities owing to the nature of the migrants’ departure, their social and 
human capital, immigration status, ethnicity and gender which has relevance to the 
communities subsequently established. The section demonstrates how migrants 
utilised their agency to negotiate the difficulties of immigration. The earlier migration 
waves built, fuelled and sustained further migration due their social networking role 
(Massey et al., 1993). One of the objectives of this study relates to the role of social 
networks in the development of the Zimbabwean diaspora. It also seeks to 
understand the transnational links that migrants have with those at home. As noted 
earlier, initial migration episodes were circulatory as migrants moved between South 
Africa and the UK on one hand and Zimbabwe, on the other. However, as 
demonstrated in the last wave, migrants moved with their families or have been 
joined by their families thereby diminishing the prospects of immediate return. 
Against this background, asylum seeking by migrants with superfluous skills not 
required in UK and South Africa should be seen as a strategy of incrementally 
extending their stay.  
 
Available evidence shows Zimbabwe being amongst the top 5 asylum generating 
countries to the UK between 2002 and 2008 and in the top 2 in South Africa during 
the same period (DHA, 2010b; Home Office, 2010). The imposition of the visa in 
November 2002 on Zimbabwean nationals wanting to travel to the UK only produced 
the desired drop in asylum figures but did not halt the inflow of Zimbabweans into the 
UK (Ranger, 2005). According to the Home Office (2002), visas against Zimbabwean 
nationals were introduced to curb the fraudulent use of the Zimbabwean passport. 
However, the strained and poisoned political relationship between London and 
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Harare cannot be discounted as the real reason for the introduction of visas. 
Zimbabwe had just pulled out of the Commonwealth and was persisting with its 
controversial land reform programme despite the international outrage that it was 
attracting. Ranger (2005) suggests that the visa requirement did not completely 
abate the movement of Zimbabweans to the UK as migrants used circuitous routes 
and travelled on false Malawian and South African passports which were then visa 
exempt.   
 
Social networks and channelling played a critical role in the choice of destination (cf. 
Poros, 2001). The role of recruitment agencies in channelling nurses to Leeds 
cannot be underestimated as they acted as weak ties for skilled professionals 
(Granovetter, 1973; Poros, 2001). Nursing homes in Leeds recruited heavily in 
Zimbabwe, and a large segment of nurses in Leeds now working for the NHS did 
their adaptation courses in nursing homes in the Leeds and surrounding areas17. 
The organizational ties of the migrant nurses helped other nurses to follow them, 
including other professionals and students. The importance of organisational ties is 
demonstrated by Waldinger (1999 cited in Poros, 2008: 1618) who asserts that,  
 
‘organizational ties play a critical role in controlling the process of selectivity 
for recruits, especially for professionals, who depend more heavily on 
organizational ties than do most other recruits because of requirements such 
as educational degrees, certification, and licensing.’ 
 
Channelling of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa and the UK was not only a 
consequence of structural and historical ties, but, as argued by Koser and Pinkerton 
(2006), of social networks which influenced the destination taken by migrants. 
Similarly, Boyd (1989) posits that in international migration, social networks typically 
comprise family and friends, community organisations, and associations and 
intermediaries such as labour recruiters and travel agents. As already highlighted in 
Section 2.2.2 for example, the movement of the Ndebele people to South Africa was 
driven to a large extent by the existence of social networks, as was that health and 
social care workers to the UK. Massey et al (1993) claim that migrants tap into the 
existing networks to considerably reduce the costs and risks associated with 
migration.  
 
Drawing on Massey et al’s (1993) seminal work on the role of networks in migration, 
Koser and Pinkerton (2006) differentiated ‘personal’ networks from those based on 
more distant relations such as co-ethnics or co-nationals who are not necessarily 
personally acquainted with potential migrants whilst the former include family and 
friends. Personal networks were instrumental in the migration waves discussed 
above. These networks were developed at school, work and home, and as Gurak 
                                                     
17
 Interview with Eliza, Leeds, 16 November 2009. Zimbabwean trained nurses had to do a 6 month adaptation 
course with registered institutions e.g. a Care Home before being registered with the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council (NMC) and work as nurses.  
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and Caces (1992) contend, provided momentum for further migration. Kritz and 
Zlotnik’s (1992) geographical definition of social networks situates social networks as 
one of a series of processes that link origin and destination countries in international 
migration. They add that in origin countries potential migrants are embedded in a set 
of relations with family and friends, whilst in destination countries they may have 
both personal and impersonal contacts. These explanations resonate with the 
circumstances that surround the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa and the 
UK as the greater majority had an acquaintance that provided accommodation and 
access to labour markets on arrival. In the UK for example, personal networks 
assisted with information needed for immigration purposes such as invitation letters, 
job vacancies and asylum claims.                                                                                                                              
   
The migration and settlement patterns of Zimbabweans in both Leeds and Limpopo 
vindicates Ritchey’s (1976) facilitating and information hypotheses which asserts that 
flows were propelled by social networks. The networks facilitated migration by paying 
transportation costs (Chapter 5). Migrants also relied on their networks to ease the 
integration process and to find jobs. A large segment of the migrants in both Leeds 
and Limpopo are settled in areas where pioneer immigrants are concentrated. The 
UK’s National Asylum Support Service’s18 (NASS) clustering and dispersal system 
seeks to disperse asylum seekers from areas of high concentration (London and the 
South East) to other areas such as Yorkshire and Humberside. Dispersed asylum 
seekers and refugees are clustered according to language and ethnicity (Lewis et al., 
2008). This policy has added a sizeable Zimbabwean community to the Yorkshire 
and Humberside region, adding to an already burgeoning Zimbabwean community 
which had formed around the health and social care professionals working in the 
region.   
 
The granting of documented status to asylum seekers in both countries promoted 
formal travel to Zimbabwe to visit family and friends. However, those without 
documented status in South Africa also made holiday visits using informal channels 
(see Chapter 8). Some scholars refer to these frequent visits as ‘circulation’ (Glick 
Schiller, 2004; Tollefsen and Lindgren, 2006).    
 
 2.4 Majoni-joni/Injiva: An exemplar of transnational circulation? 
 
Implicit in the transnational discourse, is the notion of ‘circulation’ which Levitt and 
Glick Schiller (2004) describe as the circular, situated and at times continuous sway 
between migrants' sustained, occasional or non manifestation of transnational 
engagement. While highly skilled migrants have long been associated with 
transnational migration due to demand for skilled personnel in developed countries 
                                                     
18
 NASS is a Home Office agency which provides accommodation to asylum seekers. It commissions public and 
private sector organisations to provide accommodation to asylum seekers. The clustering and dispersal policies 
were started in 2000 to ease the shortage of accommodation in London and the South East by dispersing asylum 
seekers to cities in the North of England using a range of factors such as language and country of origin.   
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(Iredale, 2001), recent scholarship has started to highlight the informal ‘circulation’ of 
less skilled people which often involves large-scale migrations of less privileged 
groups (Tollefsen and Lindgren, 2006). This resonates with the work of Sassen 
(2003) which associates ‘circulation’ with low-skilled, low-paid migrant workers, often 
women, moving in different ‘survival circuits’ between poorer and richer countries. 
Scholars such as Saurez-Orozco (2003:55) refer to labour migrants as 
‘sojourners…who move for well-defined periods of time, often following a seasonal 
cycle, and eventually return home.’ 
 
The circulation of majoni-joni19 and injiva20 between Zimbabwe and South Africa is 
an example of this. These poor and often uneducated ‘circulators’ have been 
described by Rouse (1992), as a ‘transnational semi-proletariat’ trapped in migratory 
circuits. The migrants’ circulation between Zimbabwe and South Africa is 
encouraged by a number of factors including their close proximity, historical and 
economic ties and the demand for cheap labour in the latter. The migration episodes 
discussed earlier confirms this as migrants moved to South Africa and the UK for 
social mobility. As the movement of health and social care workers revealed, 
migrants moved due to demand for skilled professionals.  
 
The livelihoods of the circulators and that of their families are structured by 
continuous mobility between places (Portes, 1996). The families of majoni-joni/injiva 
that are left behind are reliant on the remittances from South Africa in order to 
augment food supplies which they would have harvested from subsistence farming. 
Families use remittances for a range of purposes like buying maize seed for the next 
agricultural season and buying cattle which are used as draught power for 
agricultural purposes. Thus, the continuous movement between the two countries is 
pivotal to the lives of those left behind and has influenced permanent migration.  
 
Scholars such as Portes (1996) and Rouse (1992) ascribe circulation to blocked 
income opportunities and labour-market marginalisation in both sending and 
receiving countries. In a similar vein, Parreñas (2001b) attributes this phenomenon 
to a thwarted allegiance of circular migrants emanating from ‘partial citizenship’ while 
Hoang (2011) claims that circulation is caused by exclusionary measures which label 
migrant contract workers as indentured and unfree workers. As demonstrated earlier, 
some migration waves were fuelled by high unemployment, however, most migrants, 
due to immigration restrictions and shrinking employment opportunities, find 
themselves engaging in temporary and seasonal work (Rutherford and Addison, 
2007), which promotes a cycle of circulation. As argued by Castles and Davidson 
                                                     
19
 Majoni-joni is a term used by those left at home to describe Zimbabwean migrant workers in South Africa. 
Those left at home perceive all migrants working in South Africa as living and working in Johannesburg (Joni). 
Majoni-joni usually come home once a year during the Christmas holidays and can easily be identified by, for 
example, their hairstyles which mirror that of South Africans whom they will be trying to imitate.  
20
 Maphosa (2004) uses the term Injiva to describe Zimbabwean migrants from the Matebeleland Provinces who 
live and work in South Africa. The term conjures a person with both money and style of South African urban 
youth culture associated with criminality (cf. Maphosa, 2004, 2011; Muzondidya, 2008; SPT, 2004) 
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(2000), ‘differential exclusion’ of migrants compels migrants to inhabit the 
transnational sphere.   
 
‘Differential exclusion’ entails failure to integrate in the host country thereby 
compelling migrants to circulate between home and host country. Maphosa (2011) 
attributes the circulation of Zimbabwean migrants to a failure of integration in South 
Africa. He cites the May 2008 xenophobic attacks as a poignant demonstration of 
how migrants are despised in the host country. This resonates with Portes (1996) 
who argues that the challenge of transnational migrant communities is that of the 
weak who seek to use transnational space to counter marginality in both country of 
origin and country of destination.  
 
Similarly, Roberts et al (1999) posit that the rural origins of most Mexican immigrants 
and their low position in the USA labour market make them marginal members of 
both nations. Likewise Maphosa (2011) claims that for Zimbabwean migrants in 
South Africa, it is the feelings and experiences of being unwanted that oblige them to 
preserve links with people at home. However, this does not explain the sustenance 
of ties by migrants in the UK who are more privileged than their equivalents in South 
Africa. Here, some migrants in Leeds and Limpopo find themselves in the unenviable 
position of suffering from a double exclusion, as they experience exclusion both in 
the host and home countries due to circumstances attendant to their immigration 
status and the political policies of the home government.   
 
Circulation or oscillation for South African based migrants entail migrants staying in 
Zimbabwe for a few days or months per year mostly during the Christmas break 
when industries are closed in South Africa. For most migrants working on the farms 
in Limpopo, circulation is largely determined by the citrus picking season which runs 
from April to September (Rutherford, 2011). Many return home during the off season 
with the intention of returning during the next picking season, while others remain in 
South Africa looking for work opportunities at other farms (Rutherford and Addison, 
2007). Likewise, documented British based migrants also engage in circulation, 
mostly during the Christmas period and summer holidays, while those with business 
interests at home ‘circulate’ several times a year. In Mexico, Arias (1998) and 
Escobar et al (1987) observed the circulation of male earners in the USA, where they 
work temporarily to supplement an informal income from their wives. The circulation 
of Zimbabwean migrants also mirrors that of Polish migrants observed by Krzystek 
(2008), who Iglikca (2001) calls ‘shuttle migrants.’ These Ukraine based Polish 
migrants were seen to remain in Poland for several months in a year which makes 
them ‘permanently circular’ (Slany and Malek 2005: 116). The same can also be said 
of Zimbabwean migrants working in South Africa some of whom come from 
households that have been involved in inter-generational circulation. 
 
The loose border that separates Zimbabwe and South Africa encourages circulation 
more than UK. Furthermore, good transport links bode well for documented migrants 
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who can travel between the two countries with ease. This resonates with the work of 
Roberts et al (1999) which claims that the circulation between the USA and Mexico 
is underpinned by several factors, including ease of communication, a porous 
border, good roads, rail and air connections, and cheap telecommunication links.  
 
Informality of migration to South Africa is typified by circularity (Weyl, 1991) or 
oscillation (Wilson, 1972) which entails migrants occasionally returning to their 
homes and families. Muzondidya (2008) has argued that migration from the dry agro-
ecological regions of Masvingo and Matebeleland provinces to South Africa has 
always been circulatory. Such an explanation suggests that the migrants are 
therefore predominantly low skilled given their backgrounds, which are largely in 
subsistence agriculture and the informal economy. However, evidence adduced from 
this study shows increasing diversity in migrants’ origins, age, gender, and family 
composition. Previously, migration to South Africa was male dominated and 
comprised mostly of single young males. However, as Crush et al., (2012) 
demonstrated, increasingly whole families are moving rather than heads of 
households alone. Further, in recent migration episodes, a significant number of the 
migrants were highly-skilled, white-collar workers and are of urban origin which 
contradicts the findings of earlier studies (Muzondidya, 2008; Rutherford, 2011).  
 
This section has argued that circulation of South African based migrants is driven by 
a number of factors, including historical ties, a porous border which encourages 
informal migration, and a lack of economic and employment opportunities at home. 
For those in the UK, documented status is a key driver as it enables migrants to 
travel without hindrance. It can be argued that the majority of UK based migrants are 
precluded from circulating (physically) due to their immigration status, for example 
asylum seekers cannot return home until their cases have been concluded, and 
those granted refugee status can travel to all other countries except Zimbabwe.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
   
This chapter demonstrated the significance of different migration episodes to the 
sustenance of present day migration and to the characteristics of communities, 
which is the focus of this study. Earlier migration waves provided the impetus for the 
episodes which have occurred since the year 2000. The migration episodes were 
driven by a combination of factors including human and financial capital. These types 
of capital determined a migrant’s destination as evidenced by the migration of 
professionals such as health and social care workers to the UK since 1998, while the 
unskilled moved to South Africa as they lacked the financial wherewithal needed for 
airfares.  
 
The notion of circulation has been explored and shown to predominate between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. Circulation has also been linked to subsequent 
migration due to connections and relationships built during the sojourn in the host 
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country. This has been ascribed to the close proximity of the two countries. Migrants 
with documented status have also been shown to circulate in the UK more than their 
undocumented counterparts who are immobilised by their immigration status. 
Emigration from Zimbabwe, although initially temporary, has started to assume some 
degree of permanency, as witnessed by the increase in the number of migrants 
seeking to formalise their status in both South Africa and the UK. The majority of 
migrants in both countries have sought to formalise their status by applying for 
asylum, which appears to be easier in South Africa due to its more liberal policies. 
The next chapter builds on the literature about Zimbabwe to understand the 
concepts of diaspora, transnationalism and social capital upon which this research is 



































Chapter Three Theorizing Transnational Migration  
         
3.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis aims to understand the formation and experiences of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora in South Africa and the UK. Chapter 2 explained that emigration from 
Zimbabwe occurred in a series of episodes from Zimbabwe from the period 1975 to 
2010, acts which contributed immensely to the formation of distinct diasporic 
communities in South Africa and the UK. This chapter focuses on the theoretical 
approaches to conceptualising migration and the interconnections between these 
‘geographically dispersed communities.’ One of the major and original contributions 
of this thesis is to explore the relationship between transnationalism and return 
migration in tandem with the formation of the Zimbabwean community in South 
Africa and the UK. 
 
A transnational approach captures the morphology of migration between South 
Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe which consists of seasonal/temporary, permanent and 
short-term episodes of mobility/circular migration which were discussed in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, a transnational approach to migration aids an exploration of migrants’ 
intentions to return. The use of transnationalism as a theoretical framework in this 
research is predicated on establishing the nature of relationships which the migrants 
have in both the home and host country (Bailey, 2001) which was highlighted in 
Chapter 2 through the circulation of migrants. Such an inquisition helps to explore 
migrants’ potential to return which forms one of the original contributions of this 
study.  
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section, Section 3.2 
discusses the use of transnationalism as a theoretical framework for this study while 
Section 3.3 has four subdivisions. The first section focuses on the utility of 
transnationalism as an analytical framework. Section 3.3.1 discusses the notion of 
social capital within the broad realm of transnationalism, and explores its role in 
migration flows and maintenance of ties with those left behind. This provides a 
platform for exploring how these migration flows take place, their motivations and 
how migrants interpret them. The second subsection (3.3.2) focuses on remittances 
which have been described as an exemplar of transnational linkages. Remittances 
have assumed a greater profile in the development discourse, with the World Bank 
describing them as ‘the new development mantras’ (World Bank, 2006). Section 
3.3.3 explores the concept of return migration within international migration literature 
and lays the groundwork for Chapter 8. Section 3.3.4 explains the links between 
diaspora and transnationalism given the ‘myth of return’ occasioned by the 
permanency of migration as some migrants do not return home. The chapter 




3.2 Conceptualising transnationalism as a framework for international 
 migration 
 
A key purpose of this study is to investigate the role of transnationalism in the 
formation of the Zimbabwean diaspora. This is achieved through the use of 
transnational theory which according to Piper (2009:94) recognises ‘the role of 
migrants is based on the loyalties and engagement many of them show towards their 
countries and localities of origin.’ The use of a transnationalism framework enables 
the study to have a binary focus i.e. how the actions of the migrants affect the 
livelihoods of those left at home and their role in encouraging further emigration 
(Toyota et al., 2007).  
 
The concept of transnationalism privileges the notions of diaspora, social capital 
remittances and circulation as its key components. There is a gradual acceptance in 
migration scholarship that diasporas emerge from the acts of transnational 
communities in both the sending and receiving countries (King and Chrsitou, 2011). 
Transnationalism promotes the presence of networks through which information 
flows. These networks comprise migrants and other people in the receiving country 
as well as those left at home whose effects are felt in both locations.  
 
My aim in appropriating transnationalism as the conceptual framework for this study 
is the realisation that current theoretical conceptualisations study migrants' social 
networks in isolation from other networks that significantly shape, alter and structure 
their lives and that of people left behind. Such an approach recognises the multi-
sitedness of migrants’ lives; that is, their actions are shaped by multiple factors and 
from places other than South Africa and the UK.  
 
Thus, the adoption of a transnational framework allows this thesis to better 
comprehend the complexities, fragmentations and contestations that pervade the 
transnational social fields that mediate migrants’ daily lives. These transnational 
social spaces are avenues through which intra and inter migrants interactions are 
performed as demonstrated, for example, remittances, visits, phone calls, e-mails, 
memories and ideas about home and belonging (Bailey, 2001; Vertovec, 2001; King 
and Christou, 2010). 
 
A growing number of migration scholars have questioned the polarised models of 
migration by highlighting the existence of sustained mobility and links between the 
sending and destination countries. This scholarship recognises the differences 
embedded in the mutually constitutive nature of all fields of economic, political, 
personal and cultural life so much that, rather than focusing on exclusive categories, 
it is pertinent to realise that all of these spheres contain overlapping and 
interdependent sets of actions, institutional processes and norms (Fraser, 1995:72).  
 
 44 
Like Fraser (1995), Pries (1999: 26) identifies the four spheres of ‘transnational 
social spaces’ as: political and legal framework of the migration process, the material 
infrastructure, the social institutions and the ‘identities and life projects’ of 
transmigrants. This taxonomy mirrors that of Faist’s (1999: 44) which is built on the 
duality of spatial extension and temporal stability. Faist’s four transnational 
classifications are:  
 
 dispersion and assimilation (weak simultaneous embeddedness in sending 
and receiving countries and short lived transnational social ties);  
 transnational exchanges and reciprocity (strong simultaneous embeddedness 
but rather short-lived social ties);  
 transnational networks (weakly embedded and long lived); and  
 transnational communities (strongly embedded in at least two countries and 
long lived).  
 
Therefore, in adopting a transnationalism approach, this study recognises that 
transnationality is a complex space which is multidimensional and multiply inhabited 
by participants drawn from multiple ethnic groups (Crang et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 
2008). The Zimbabwean diaspora is multiply fractured along race, ethnicity, gender, 
class and education (Pasura, 2008a). Hence, it is pertinent to deploy a transnational 
framework given that the focus of this study is investigating the constituent parts of 
the Zimbabwean diaspora and their transnational practices. Such approach observes 
transnationalism from ‘above’ and from ‘below’, given the migrants’ heterogeneity 
(Smith and Guarnizo, 1998).   
 
3.3 Transnationalism and Transnational Practices 
 
As intimated in the preceding section, the field of migration is a highly contested 
terrain. Notwithstanding these contestations, there has been a gradual shift in 
migration scholarship from the dominance of particular paradigms e.g. Neoclassical 
Economics Approach (Todaro, 1969) to a greater plurality of approaches. One such 
approach is the transnational perspective which is used as the theoretical framework 
underpinning this study.  
 
According to Glick-Schiller et al (1992:1), transnationalism is ‘the process by which 
immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their 
country of settlement.’  In other words, it refers to the ‘web of cultural, social, 
economic, and political relationships, practices, and identities built by migrants 
across national borders (Guarnizo, 1997:288). For Patterson (2006:1891), 
transnationalism focuses on people who ‘…manage to construct and nurture social 
fields that intimately link their respective homelands and their new diasporic 
locations’ (Patterson, 2006: 1891).  
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In accord with critics of the traditional migration perspective (see for example, 
Portes, 1997; Skeldon, 1990, 1997), this thesis takes the view that the complexity 
that surrounds modern day international migration does not lend itself to explanation 
by a single theory. Such a view is informed by scholars such as Joly (2004) who 
claim that theories of migration do not adequately explain contemporary patterns of 
international movements.  
 
This observation is critical in light of the revelations of Chapter 2 which showed that 
the migration episodes consisted of mixed flows with different types of migration 
outcomes. Furthermore, it was argued in Chapter 2 that the stimuli for the episodic 
migration differed between the two countries in that it was circular in South Africa 
and more permanent in the UK. Joly’s (2004) postulation is consistent with Arango 
(2000:283) who criticises migration theories for ‘their partiality, limited scope and 
limited applicability to certain types of migration…migration is too diverse and 
multifaceted to be explained by a single theory.’ Similarly, Portes (1997:208) asserts 
that ‘the limitation of migration theories is their fascination with either macro or micro 
structural issues…most of the so-called theories are not theories but concepts, 
theoretical frameworks and approaches or typologies.’  
 
Against this background of scholarly disenchantment with traditional migration 
approaches to migration, this thesis deploys the concept of transnationalism as a 
framework to explore the transnational migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa 
and the UK (see Chapters 5, 7 and 8). Transnationalism in international migration 
has emerged as a way of dealing with the inadequacies of migration theories in 
explaining migration and circulation in an increasingly globalised world (Levitt and 
Glick Schiller, 2004; Portes, 1996).  
 
The transnational framework is used in this study to examine the different flows and 
different connections that migrants have and maintain with those at home. Most 
scholarship on Zimbabwe documents the political problems that have plagued it 
since the late 1990s (cf. Blair, 2002; Chan, 2003; Holland, 2010; Raftopoulos and 
Mlambo, 2009) with little attention paid to the role that migrants play in the 
development of the country and sustenance of the livelihoods of those left behind 
through their remittances (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006, 2008; Maphosa, 2007).  
 
The role of globalisation in shaping modern migration cannot be underestimated. 
Transnationalism is driven, amplified and fuelled by globalisation, which has enabled 
its different forms to flourish or flounder. For example, the phenomenal 
developments in the telecommunications sector have drastically changed intra-
migrant communication as well as how they communicate with those left behind (see 
Chapter 7).  
 
Scholars have identified several forms of transnationalism including transnational 
social fields, transnational social formations and transnational social spaces (Faist, 
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2000b; Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004; Portes, 1997, 1999). These have been 
described as the 'spaces' of interaction generated through migrants' (and non-
migrants') engagements in transnationalism (Faist 2000a, 2000b; Levitt and Glick 
Schiller, 2004). For Itzigsohn et al (1999: 317), transnational social spaces denote ‘a 
field of social interactions and exchanges that transcend political and geographical 
boundaries of one nation.’  For Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK, 
the transnational social fields are mediums through which potential migrants partake 
in the migration process and/or maintain intra and inter-country contact with those at 
home as well as how goods (Zimbabwean foodstuffs and merchandise), services 
and information are exchanged (see Chapter 7).  
 
Faist (2000b) on the other hand, uses the term transnational social space both 
theoretically and as a description of the material and symbolic spaces that occur as a 
result of transnationalism. In this thesis, such an interpretation helps to identify the 
migrants’ understandings of their current circumstances relative to home, and their 
return intentions (Chapter 8). Faist's taxonomy of transnational social spaces 
(2000b) outlines the three categories as transnational kinship groups, transnational 
circuits and transnational communities (Table 3.1) which are dynamic and 
sometimes overlapping indicating the fluidity in migrants’ everyday lives and 
transnational relationships with home and those left behind (Chapters 6 and 7).  
 
As Faist (2000b: 189) argues, whether we talk of transnational social spaces, 
transnational social fields, transnationalism or transnational social formations in 
international migration systems, we usually refer to sustained ties of persons, 
networks and organisations across borders, across multiple nation-states, ranging 
from poorly to highly institutionalised forms (see Chapters 7 and 8). An important 
distinction that emerges from the above is the difference between personal and 
organisational ties which are exploited by migrants with varying degrees of success 
depending on the strength of the ties and their embeddedness (Granovetter, 1973). 
Organisational ties that migrants can tap into include political parties, home town 
associations (HTA) and consular services. Some governments like India and 
Philippines have designated offices for their diaspora citizens (Agunias, 2009). 
Unfortunately, Zimbabwe does not have a diaspora office and does not recognise 
dual citizenship. However, migrants have access to embassy officials in both South 
Africa and the UK, who provide them with an array of services including visa and 
consular affairs.  
 
Migrants utilise their ties to enhance not only their transnational capabilities in both 
the host and home country, but also of those left behind. As Levitt (2001a) claims, 
transnational lives in themselves may have become a strategy of survival and 
betterment. The transnational lives that Faist (2000b) refers to, include circulation 
between nation states as demonstrated by the practices of majoni-joni/injiva in South 
Africa who ‘circulate’ between the two countries several times a year as outlined in 
Chapter 2.  
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Table 3.1 Three types of transnational social spaces arising from   
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Similarly, documented migrants in the UK lead ‘astronaut lifestyles’ (Aye and Guerin, 
2001:8) by travelling frequently between the UK, Zimbabwe and elsewhere (see 
Chapter 8). These ‘astronaut migrants’ travel to Zimbabwe at least twice a year 
although the majority of the migrants’ ability to ‘circulate’ is impeded by a lack of 
financial resources needed to travel, leaving them to pursue transnational lifestyles 
by other means, such as virtual contact. Ansari (1992: 139) has noted how the 
internet and email have fundamentally transformed the way in which ethnic 
minorities communicate.  
  
Transnational social spaces have enabled migrants to engage in political, social and 
cultural activities (Magunha et al., 2009; Pasura, 2008). Consistent with such 
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explanations, Al-Ali et al (2001:581) argue that transnational activities can be 
classified in a variety of ways and may include activities that are political (e.g. 
lobbying), economic (e.g. remittances and investment), social (such as, promotion of 
human and other rights of the transnational group within different societies) and 
cultural (e.g. articles in newspapers). They further posit that transnational activities 
may take place at the individual level (through family networks) or through 
institutional channels (such as, through community or international organizations). 
Landolt (2008) in a study of migrants from El-Salvador residents in the United States 
of America, found evidence of economic transnationalism embedded in transnational 
ties between El-Salvador and the USA.  
 
Previous studies of migration suggested that migrants’ transnational links were 
denuded by the length of time that they would have spent away from home (Borjas et 
al., 1991). However, this school of thought has been dismissed by some scholars 
who point to the maintenance of ties by migrants whose families remained behind 
(see Chapter 7). Scholars such as Gardner and Grillo (2002: 179) refer to this as ‘the 
transnational domestic sphere.’ Thus, as Baldassar (2007) observes, while national 
borders may separate migrants from their families, this has not precluded them from 
maintaining mutual care-giving relationship. This transnational domestic sphere in 
countries such as Zimbabwe obligates children to look after their parents in old age. 
It is partly because of this cultural expectation that migrants engage in circulation in 
order to fulfil their culturally constructed ideals about appropriate family 
responsibilities (Baldassar, 2007). This cultural expectation and societal obligation 
plays a big part in the migrants’ decision to maintain transnational ties including 
circulation. 
 
Politically, migrants in the UK have lobbied the British government to expand the 
targeted sanctions that are in place against some members of President Robert 
Mugabe’s government in order to force it to democratise the political space in 
Zimbabwe (see Chapter 6). These demands are part of wider efforts to emasculate 
President Mugabe’s rule and ultimately his removal from power. Their actions can be 
said to fall under ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ transnational practices (Itzigsohn et al., 1999; 
Mahler, 1998). ‘Narrow’ transnational practices, according to Itzigsohn et al 
(1999:323), refers ‘to those people involved in economic, political, social, or cultural 
practices that involve a regular movement within the geographic transnational field, a 
high level of institutionalization, or constant personal involvement’ while ‘broad’ 
transnationality refers ‘to a series of material and symbolic practices in which people 
engage that involve only sporadic physical movement between the two countries, a 
low level of institutionalization, or just occasional personal involvement, but 
nevertheless includes both countries as reference points.’  
 
Transnational organising by political parties is not a recent phenomenon as 
historically parties have always relied on exiled members for financial support (Levitt, 
2001). The recruitment and mobilisation of members in the diaspora by political 
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parties is premised on the idea that migrants are able to influence the voting patterns 
of the people left behind through their social remittances and other transnational 
linkages (see Chapter 7). For example, during the liberation war in Zimbabwe, both 
ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU mobilised for financial and material resources from exiled 
Zimbabweans and former communist countries like Bulgaria. It should be noted 
however, that there were different dynamics involved in the involvement of the 
diaspora and the eastern bloch countries providing support and assistance to the two 
parties.  
 
In South Africa, groups such as the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum have been at the 
forefront of campaigning for Zimbabwean migrants’ rights as well as documenting 
the human rights abuses of President Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) party and members of 
the security forces. This is consistent with Levitt’s (2001) assertions that some 
political and immigrant groups articulate a dual agenda of advocating political 
integration in the host country while simultaneously encouraging migrants to stay 
active in homeland politics (see Chapter 6). The activities undertaken by migrants 
are consistent with Dunn’s (2005) views about political transnationalism of 
expatriates who militate against political regimes ‘at home’, as well as bilateral 
agreements between nations and the emerging influence of international NGOs. 
Similarly, Guarnizo’s (1997b) work on the political activities and influence of 
Dominican activists in the USA further attests to the growing power of migrants’ 
political transnationalism. Likewise, Levitt (2001b) highlights the importance of the 
formation of branches of major political parties from India, Mexico and Brazil in areas 
that have high concentrations of diaspora communities from these countries.   
 
At the heart of the transnationalism discourse is the ability of migrants to sustain 
relationships in different nation states (Pasura, 2008). For example, some migrants 
in the UK have ties with their children in South Africa and Australia where they attend 
universities, and parents in Zimbabwe. For Glick Schiller et al (1992: 1-2) 
transmigrants are migrants ‘whose daily lives depend on multiple (familial, social, 
economic, political, organisational, and religious) and constant interconnections 
across international borders and whose public identities are configured in 
relationship to more than one state.’ In Caglar’s (2001: 607) analysis, current 
scholarship on transnationalism provides a new analysis of the increasing intensity 
and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by 
international labour migration. It therefore follows from Caglar’s analysis that 
transnationalism is not just about migration but also circulation; this is important 
because it makes more visible low skilled migrants who have been neglected by 
traditional migration scholarship which, for example, focused on the migration of 
skilled professionals (Chikanda, 2007; Iredale, 2001). Some scholars argue that 
such an interpretation allows for a critical analysis of how migrants assemble and 
reconstitute their lives which are concurrently embedded in more than one society 
(Pasura, 2008; Tinarwo, 2011).  
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The concept of transnationalism has challenged scholars not to view migration in the 
binary focus of ‘emigration-immigration’ (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). This view 
agrees with the work of Nyberg-Sorensen et al (2002) who posit that transnational 
approaches suggest that migration should be understood as social processes linking 
together countries of origin and destination. Likewise Magunha et al (2009) debunks 
the myth of migrants severing ties with their homeland when they settle in a new 
country. Portes et al (1999: 219) elevate this idea by suggesting that ‘transnational’ 
migration involves a significant number of people engaging in ‘sustained social 
contacts over time’, with more than just occasional trips and activities across national 
borders (see Section 2.4). The transnational practices of Zimbabwean migrants 
corroborate these claims as exemplified by the maintenance of ties with those at 
home as well as in other countries. As will be demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8, 
migrants maintain regular contact with those at home whilst other migrants engage in 
dual living.  
 
As Levitt and Schiller (2004) suggest, the emergence of the concept of 
transnationalism has been an attempt to explore migrants’ simultaneous 
embeddedness in more than one society. There is scholarly consensus that many 
contemporary migrants and their predecessors maintain various kinds of ties to their 
homelands concurrently with incorporation into host countries (Basch et al., 1994; 
Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007: 129); the transnational practices of Zimbabweans in the 
UK (Mbiba, 2005, 2012; McGregor, 2008, 2010; Pasura, 2008) and South Africa 
(Maphosa, 2007; Muzondidya, 2008) support this notion. Some Zimbabwean 
migrants have assumed transnational identities as evidenced by the fact that, 
despite becoming naturalised British and South Africans, they still describe 
themselves as Zimbabweans and visit Zimbabwe regularly (cf. Levitt, 2001). The act 
of assuming a new citizenship does not spell the end of migrants’ association with 
their home country and the people left behind. McGregor and Pasura (2010) 
demonstrated that some migrants in the UK of Zimbabwe attend themed events and 
activities such as national days, religious festivals and musical shows.  
 
Emergent migration theories describe ways in which contemporary migrants live in 
‘transnational communities’ (Pasura, 2008). Such types of migrant community, 
according to Portes (1997: 812), ‘comprise of dense networks across political 
borders created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social 
recognition.’ Portes asserts that it is through these networks that an increasing 
number of people are able to live dual lives, that participants are often bilingual, 
move easily between different cultures, and frequently maintain homes in two 
countries as they pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require their 
presence in both. This explains the economic transnational activities of Zimbabwean 
entrepreneurs who have managed to set up businesses in Zimbabwe and travel 
frequently between Zimbabwe and South Africa and the UK. For migrants in South 
Africa in particular, and the UK to a lesser extent, the ability to converse in a local 
language is crucial to integration (Maphosa, 2004). Majoni-joni and Injiva (Section 
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2.4) for example, speak more than four South African languages to aid their 
‘integration.’ Likewise, Magunha et al (2009) demonstrate how the ability to speak 
English encouraged Zimbabwean migrants to the UK as employers preferred 
migrants who could converse in English.  
 
Some scholars have claimed that transnationalism has been deployed too broadly, 
with too little attention paid to place-specific variations in the form of cross-border 
activities and sensibilities (Foner, 1997a; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004). This 
criticism highlights that some of the activities that are described as transnational are 
in fact translocal, taking place between a village in one place and a suburb in 
another, rather than in a transnational context (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 
2004:1182). However, this has been rebutted by some scholars because it fails to 
recognise that, even though the exchanges take place within villages or suburbs, 
they still retain a transnational identity as they involve people residing in different 
countries (Dunn, 2005).  
 
Likewise, Fabricant (1998:26) opines that transnational theories ‘must address the 
yawning gulf separating those privileged groups apparently able to flit around the 
world at will from the much larger group of migrants threatened with incarceration.’ 
However, this criticism is unreliable; the majority of migrants are irregular (Chapter 
5). Another criticism raised by Foner (1997a) and Smith (2001) pertains to the 
growing tendency to label some of migrants’ practices as transnational and therefore 
new, when in fact they have been in operation for a long time, many for centuries. 
The fact that they have been practised for a long time does not in itself deny their 
transnational nature. Foner (1997a:355) further claims that ‘transnationalism is not 
new, even though it often seems as if it were invented yesterday.’  
 
Nonetheless, transnationalism, despite these criticisms, remains a valuable 
conceptual tool with which to investigate the complexity and multifacetedness of 
migration. The criticisms help to remind scholars to be rigorous when using this 
framework (Binaisa, 2009). Portes (2003) draws our attention to the idea that 
transnationalism is not a new occurrence but rather a novel perspective which 
enables the researcher to maintain attentiveness to the dynamic nature of the 
processes emanating from both migrants' home and host contexts. Similarly, Brettell 
(2000:104) reminds us that ‘as a theoretical construct about immigrant life and 
identity, transnationalism aptly suits the study of population movements in a world 
where improved modes of transportation as well as the images that are transmitted 
by means of modern telecommunications have shortened the social distance 
between sending and receiving countries.’  
 
In the next four sections, I will discuss four salient aspects of transnationalism: social 
capital, transnational practices, return migration and the notion of the diaspora. By 
focusing on social capital within the debate on transnationalism, a greater 
understanding of the differences between the various migration episodes and flows 
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to South Africa and the UK can be constructed and situated. Such an approach will 
also deepen our understanding of how migrants’ transnational practices are informed 
by social capital, given the centrality of the latter in the transnationalism literature.      
 
3.3.1 Embedding Social Capital in transnational migration 
 
The role of social networks in fuelling and sustaining transnational migration by 
opening access to social support has received scholarly attention (Faist, 2004; 
Portes, 1996; Ryan et al., 2008). This thesis uses the notion of transnationalism to 
explore the ways in which the existence of personal and organisational ties facilitated 
the migration of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa and the UK (Chapter 5) (cf. 
Granovetter, 1973; Poros, 2001). This approach agrees with Granovetter’s (1973) 
observation of the salience of ‘weak ties’ in opening and extending social contacts 
beyond dense friendship groups. Likewise, Tilly (1990: 84, cited in Vertovec, 2002) 
posits that, 
 
 ‘Networks migrate...the effective units of migration were (and are) neither 
 individuals nor households but sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship, 
 and work experience.’  
 
It is important to highlight that social networks are instrumental in establishing 
transnational migration networks (Faist, 1997; Pries 2004). The migration of health 
and social care workers (Section 2.2.4) demonstrated the importance of personal 
and organisational ties.   
 
Central to the transnationalism discourse, is the notion of social capital which has 
gained currency with scholars as a framework to understand international migration 
(Portes et al., 2007; Pieterse, 2003). Garip (2008) observes that migrants’ social 
capital is frequently conceptualised as a resource of information or assistance 
obtained through social ties to pioneer migrants (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). This 
facilitatory role is similar to Böcker’s (1994) ‘bridgeheads’ function which binds 
migrants and non-migrants’ relationships spatially and reduces the risks and costs of 
migration for later migrants. The ‘bridgeheads’ facilitate migration by financing 
migration and meeting other pre and post migration related essential needs like 
accommodation, jobs, information and emotional support (Boyd, 1989: 651) (see 
Chapter 5).  
 
Resources provided by pioneer migrants have been touted as critical to reducing the 
migration costs and ameliorating the risks of migration (Böcker, 1994; Massey et al., 
2003). Crucially, migration networks, as the IOM (2003: 14) claims, facilitate the 
crossing of borders by migrants, legally or otherwise. The role of coyotes in Mexico 
and maguma-guma21 in Zimbabwe in facilitating informal migration into the USA and 
                                                     
21
 Maguma-guma is a Shona term for gangs of crooks who patronise the Beitbridge border post engaging in 
criminal activities ranging from petty theft to facilitating the illegal crossing of goods and people through the 
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South Africa respectively demonstrate this (see Chapters 5). The coyotes and 
maguma-guma are not necessarily pioneer migrants but are agents who have 
become embedded in transnational networks.  
 
There is a corpus of literature on Mexican migration to the USA which has 
demonstrated the importance of social capital in sustaining migration flows between 
the two countries (Curran et al., 2005; Espinosa and Massey, 1998; Massey and 
García-España, 1987; Winters, et al., 2001). Similarly, as this thesis will show, the 
emigration witnessed from Zimbabwe has been fuelled, sustained and maintained by 
the existence of social networks (see Chapter 2). Likewise, migrants’ return 
intentions have been shown to be rooted in the transnational linkages that they have 
with ‘home’ (Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005) (see Chapters 7 and 8).  
 
In his seminal work on social capital, Bourdieu (1986) defined it as the aggregate of 
the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition. He identified three forms of capital: cultural, economic, and social.  
Cultural capital has been described as ‘an ‘interpersonal identifier’ of social ranking 
which is only recognised as such by those who possess the legitimate culture 
(Lamont and Lareau, 1988: 158). Cultural capital can be taken to mean the symbolic 
capabilities that a person possesses and are usually embodied in language and 
behaviour (Ryan et al., 2008). Waters (2006) posits that cultural capital also 
manifests in educational qualifications.  
 
Due to the existence of better opportunities to pursue further education in the UK, it 
is expected that migrants in the UK would have enhanced their educational and 
professional qualifications than their counterparts in South Africa. As shown in 
chapter 2, there is a widely held perception that South African and British education 
is superior to Zimbabwean education. Economic capital on the other hand, denotes 
the financial and material resources and assets that are available to potential 
migrants. Lastly, social capital can be provided by family, friends and acquaintances 
who may find resources to help a potential migrant or provide them with 
accommodation once they have arrived. Thus, as Bourdieu (1986) observed, social 
capital derives from the size and type of social networks a migrant can access and 
draw upon. 
 
Putnam (1993) advances a wider definition of social capital to include features of 
social organisation such as networks, norms and social trust, which facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. He also distinguishes the types of 
capital as bonding; bridging and linking social capital (see Chapter 6). Putnam (2007: 
143) defines bonding social ties as that which bind people from the ‘same 
                                                                                                                                                                     
border post and also through informal channels. Some of the maguma-guma are said to lie in wait for people 
trying to ‘border jump’ by traversing the river banks on both sides of the Limpopo river or in known paths used 
by migrants once they are on the South African side of the border. 
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background in some important way’, while bridging social capital are ‘ties to people 
who are unlike me in some important way.’ For example, an asylum seeking migrant 
may identify fellow asylum seekers as ‘people who are like me’, as well as those 
from the same ethnic group or clan. In similar vein, Pieterse (2003) considers social 
capital to be the capacity of individuals to gain access to scarce resources by virtue 
of their membership of social networks or institutions (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). 
This observation is important for this research because some migrants depended on 
their membership of a social group for the resources that were needed to move. 
Once these migrants moved, they then helped others in their social group.  
 
The social capital theory holds that the existence of social networks of information 
and assistance (social capital), significantly increases the likelihood of continued 
international migration between places or origin and destination (Chapter 5) 
(Massey, 2003). Eventually, argues Massey (2003:15), labour recruitment becomes 
superfluous, as, once begun, immigration displays a strong tendency to increase the 
growth and elaboration of migrant networks. Thus, according to this view, the 
existence of a community of immigrants in particular destination areas create a 
‘family and friends’ (Massey, 2003) effect that channels immigrants to the same 
places, and facilitates their arrival and incorporation. The emigration of Zimbabwean 
social workers to the UK as demonstrated by Tinarwo (2011) was driven largely by 
the existence of social networks. Likewise, Chikanda (2010) and Gaidzanwa (1999) 
showed how Zimbabwean medical staff in South Africa relied on their social 
networks to find jobs once they had decided to leave Zimbabwe (section 2.5). 
Building on earlier work on social capital, Portes (1998:6) identified three strands of 
social capital as: the recipients (those making claims), the sources (those agreeing 
to those demands), and the resources themselves.   
 
Drawing on Portes’ conceptualisation, Lin (2000:786) summarises the dimensions of 
social capital as: quantity and/or quality of resources an actor can access or use its 
location in a social network.  Coleman (1998) reiterates the significance of resources 
that migrants can access from prior migrants and places these at the heart of social 
capital. Previous studies have highlighted the importance of transnational practices 
of established migrants in fuelling and sustaining migration (Massey et al., 1993). 
They achieve this by transmitting information to potential migrants about, for 
example, the availability of jobs and invitation letters that were needed to facilitate 
entry. The notion of the value of the resources being contingent on the strength of 
the relationship between sources and recipients resonates with a number of scholars 
(Porters, 2001; Garip, 2008). The availability of resources for newly arrived migrants 
or those contemplating migrating are important in initiating and sustaining migration. 
Scholars such as Garip (2008) and Massey et al (1993) argue that the resources 
pertaining to migration are shared with and utilised by potential migrants through 
social networks, which are a set of interpersonal ties based on kinship, friendship, or 
shared origin community which connect migrants and non-migrants (see Chapters 5 
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and 7). Similarly, Poros (2001) claims that subsisting interpersonal and/or 
organisational ties encourage migration in multiple ways and locations.  
 
For the purpose of this study, I will use Garip’s (2008) interpretation of Portes’ 
terminology where migrant social capital is redefined as a resource (information 
flows or assistance with migrating) that recipients (potential migrants) access 
through their social ties to sources (prior migrants). In a departure from other 
definitions (see for example, Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000), this definition highlights 
the three dimensions of migrant social capital, which is important because each 
dimension affects migration propensities in different ways (Garip, 2008). According 
to Hugo (1981: 202), the information dissemination role of pioneer migrants is 
exemplified through the provision of information on opportunities, and support in the 
areas of travel, transportation, accommodation and work. For example, some 
migrants who claimed asylum at the port of entry in the UK had more resources than 
others as a result of their social ties (prior migrants) who had already gone through 
the immigration process, whilst others were helped with transportation costs. By 
using their networks, Zimbabwean migrants have been able to easily access 
information about immigration requirements, availability of work, education and 
training, thereby contradicting Aguilera’s (2005) observation that migrants need to 
stay in an area for considerably long periods of time in order to access information 
about labour markets. This is particularly true of migrants who constituted the eighth 
migration episode discussed in Chapter 2 who overstayed their visas during which 
period they acquired knowledge about the labour market and immigration process. 
 
Three types of social capital have been identified: bonding, bridging and linking 
social capital (Putnam, 2000). These are relevant to this study as they not only help 
the migrants to travel but also to settle in new host communities. According to 
Putnam (2000), bonding social capital pervades relationships amongst members of a 
network who are similar in some form. For Woolcock (2003), bonding social capital 
essentialises the provision of social, physical and emotional support. Identity and 
status preservation are also thought to be central elements of bonding social capital 
(Szreter and Woolcock, 2004; Woolcock, 2003). He further claims that it exists 
between people with similar demographic characteristics like family members, 
neighbours, church members, close friends and work colleagues. Some 
commentators see bonding social capital forming in homogeneous communities 
(Putnam, 1993, 2003; Leigh and Putnam, 2002) which does not appear to hold for 
Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo; communities that are far from being 
homogenous but exhibit high levels of bonding social capital.  
 
The strength of migrants’ bonding and bridging capital is demonstrated during times 
of crisis such as deaths (Mbiba, 2010) (see Chapters 6). Such displays of bonding 
social capital are consistent with Hawkins and Maurer (2010) who posit that migrants 
and societies give help to their immediate or proximal networks. For example, in 
Leeds, it is common for migrants to meet and discuss their ‘stories’ prior to going to 
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‘claim’ asylum at the Home Office. Zimbabwean entrepreneurs also utilise bonding 
social capital. For example, in both countries, entrepreneurial migrants who run 
businesses rely on information provided by other Zimbabweans already running a 
business about how to navigate regulatory barriers. There is evidence of overlap; it is 
possible for migrants to exploit all three types of social capital simultaneously. 
 
Migrants are also reliant on bridging social capital. Bridging social capital, according 
to Szreter and Woolcock (2004) refers to relationships amongst people who are 
unrelated in a demonstrable fashion, such as age, socio-economic status, 
race/ethnicity and education. It is important to highlight that these forms of social 
capital are relied upon both in the receiving and sending country. Thus, bridging 
social capital links people who do not share any commonalities (Agger, 1998). 
Common interest and voluntarism join people from heterogeneous backgrounds. 
Bridging social capital is considered to be valuable for social cohesion as it 
encourages migrants to associate with people from backgrounds other than their 
own (Uslander and Conley, 2003). Majoni-joni/injiva in South Africa demonstrate 
migrants’ ability to mobilise and utilise bridging and cultural capital to enhance their 
chances of ‘blending in.’ Similarly, the migration of skilled professionals, such as 
health and social care workers, to South Africa and the UK reveals the importance of 
cultural capital (language, skills and educational qualifications) (Chikanda, 2010; 
Tinarwo, 2011).  
 
Linking social capital on the other hand, refers to migrants’ ties to influential people 
through whom migrants can access services and resources which they can use for 
their own social mobility (Garip, 2008; Woolcock, 2003). Portes (2007) emphasises 
the ties linking individuals or groups which they belong to, to people or groups in 
positions of political or financial power. Several Zimbabwean and non-Zimbabwean 
groups provide linking social capital to migrants in South Africa, the UK and at home 
in transnational social fields (see Section 3.2). For example, asylum seekers in both 
Leeds and Limpopo receive legal help from charities and institutions. The I Believe in 
Jesus Church in Musina provides newly arrived male migrants with accommodation 
whilst they await the conclusion of their asylum cases, while in Leeds; groups such 
as Immigration Advisory Services provide legal aid. Membership of a political party 
such as MDC can also be considered a form of linking social capital which helps 
migrants in Leeds to acquire documented status, which further builds their linking, 
bonding and social capital. Linking social capital is characterised by exposure to and 
development of new ideas, values and perspectives (Woolcock, 2001; Szreter and 
Woolcock, 2004) which migrants are able to use in their host country as well as 
passing them on to those left behind, for example information about the availability of 
scholarships in South Africa, UK and other parts of the world. However, as 
Granovetter (1973) points out, there are attendant dangers to migrants being 
embedded in organisations or institutions such as churches and political 
organisations as they have weak organisational ties.  
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An interesting dimension of linking capital pertains to vertical relations that help 
individuals gain access to resources from formal institutions for social and economic 
development (Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). There are several 
reasons why migrants engage in vertical relations with organisations like the Home 
Office (UK) or Department of Home Affairs (South Africa). Engagement with these 
agencies strengthens migrants’ transnational practices; achieving documented 
status as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, promotes circulation as migrants are 
then able to travel home frequently and legally (Chapter 8). Additionally, 
transnationalism would be promoted as the migrants would be able to bring their 
families to their residences for short visits. As Woolcock (2003) notes, linking social 
capital with regards to immigrants implies the need for government intervention to 
implement policies to grant new immigrants citizenship and help them access formal 
resources. The formal resources so granted are not only consumed ‘in-situ’ but are 
also utilised for the benefit of those left at home.  
 
Some scholars have questioned the utility of social capital as a framework of 
explaining migration (Hawkins and Maurer, 2010). Critics have pointed out that not 
all migration assistance translates into migration as some established migrants act 
as ‘gatekeepers’ (Epstein, 2008) who may be unwilling to help potential migrants as 
much as ‘bridgeheads’ (Böcker 1994). Consequently, Portes (1998: 2) dismisses the 
concept of social capital as a fad and criticises it for being something of a cure-all for 
the maladies affecting society both in the sending and receiving country. Similarly, 
Pawar (2006:2) laments the inconsistencies in the manner in which it is applied, 
interpreted and used across a number of disciplines. Pawar’s criticisms echo those 
of other commentators such as Harris and De Renzio (1997) and Fine (1999, 2001) 
who dislike the way the concept is being applied in so many different contexts and 
ways, leading to confusion.  
 
Similarly, Portes (1998) observes discriminatory and exclusionary overtones in the 
way social capital is used in some migrant communities. For example, some 
migrants in both South Africa and the UK were isolated from participating in 
marounds22 (roscas) on the basis of religion, employment status and area of origin in 
Zimbabwe (Chapter 6) (Portes and Landolt, 1996). Yet other irregular migrants 
appeared trapped in their own community which can lead to exploitation by 
documented migrants (Kim, 1988). Prior research has highlighted the isolation of 
Polish migrants in the UK (Janta, 2009), which has implications for Zimbabwean 
migrants due to their reliance on networks. As highlighted by Das (2004), migrants’ 
capabilities to build up their social capital are impeded by time constraints as they 
regularly work long hours due to the need to meet their societal obligations at home. 
This has resonance with the work of Pasura (2008) which noted how male 
Zimbabwean migrants in Britain did not have time to socialise with people outside 
                                                     
22
 Marounds – savings’ club that usually comprise of 5-10 people who make monthly financial contributions 
which are given to each member on a rotational basis.   
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their networks because they worked double shifts. As noted by Garip (2008), the 
social practices of people have to be analysed in all their complexity, given that 
these are shaped by several factors. For example, in this study, some migrants’ 
social practices are shaped and influenced by their transnational practices.  
 
The next section reviews literature on remittances which is integral to the concept of 
transnationalism and explores how this fits in this study.   
 
3.3.2 Remittances: The new panacea to developmental problems? 
 
Transnational linkages that migrants have with people left behind or living elsewhere 
are fundamental to this thesis. This is because remittances are an exemplary form of 
migrant transnationalism by which migrants maintain transnational links with their 
home country (Vertovec, 2004). Some scholars posit that migrants’ remitting 
behaviour have a bearing on their return intentions; this mirrors the final objective of 
this study (Chapter 8). It is pertinent to point out here that remittances are a form of 
transnationalism through which material, emotional and symbolic ties are maintained 
between migrants and those left behind or elsewhere (Basch et al., 1994; Vertovec, 
1999; Portes, 2001). This section reviews literature on remittances and assesses 
claims of their developmental role.   
 
The phenomenal growth in the volume of remittances over the last decade has 
increased the interest of researchers and International Financial Institutions, such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in further examining the potential 
role that remittances can play in poverty eradication in receiving countries. Such is 
their growth in stature and prominence in the migration-development discourse that 
they are now being lauded as the ‘new development mantras’ (Datta et al., 2007: 5; 
De Haas, 2005; Kapur, 2004). Whilst the exact amount remitted to the developing 
countries may never be known due to the existence and proliferation of multiple 
informal remittance transfer channels, there is a growing consensus that vast sums 
of money have been remitted during the past decade (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). 
The latest figures from the World Bank indicate that US$351 billion was remitted to 
developing countries in 2011, an 8 percent jump from US$323 billion remitted in 
2010 (Mohapatra et al., 2011) of which US$40 billion went to Africa. Datta et al., 
(2007), estimate that about £1. 5 billion was remitted from the UK alone in 2005 to 
more than 50 developing countries.  
 
Scholars such as Datta et al (2007) and Crush (2005) concur that informal 
remittance transfers schemes are particularly apparent in countries where there are 
stringent controls on foreign exchange, differential exchange rates that inhibit the 
use of formal systems, for example in Zimbabwe prior to dollarization where the 
official exchange rates were far below those of the parallel black market, political 
instability and low levels of financial development (see Chapters 5 and 7). The notion 
of dual exchange rates as impediments to formal transfers is corroborated by 
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Bracking and Sachikonye (2008) who observed a high degree of economic 
informality in their study of remitting behaviour in Zimbabwean households. Drawing 
on the work of Freud and Spatafora (2005) they concluded that informal remittances 
to Sub-Saharan Africa are encouraged by a dual exchange rate. Informal transfer 
schemes are also thought, according to Kapur (2004), to reflect the use of high 
levels of social capital and trust, and are typified by low transaction costs as well as 
quick delivery to often remote rural households in recipient countries (see Chapter 
7).  
 
The growth of the informal transfer schemes resulted in a recent review concluding 
that the economies of countries such as Fiji, Somalia and Surinam are in a much 
better state than official figures imply due to highly developed informal remittance 
systems (Pieke et al., 2005). Recognising the scale and magnitude of the informal 
channels, The World Bank (2005) acknowledged that remittances transferred 
through agents such as informal operators or travellers may be nearly as large as 
remittances through official channels (see Chapter 7). The remitting practices of 
Zimbabwean migrants have been recognised for their important role of averting the 
total economic collapse of the country which astounded economists and scholars 
alike, who had predicted the imminent collapse as far back as 2000 (Bratton and 
Masunungure, 2011). In fact, it can be argued that in the case of Zimbabwe, 
remittances have played a far more decisive role in the people’s livelihoods and 
survival than they are credited for.  
 
Extant literature on remittances suggests that they are used for consumption (Stark, 
1991). Such ‘unproductive’ uses include basic consumption needs, buying 
medicines, building houses, and spending on conspicuous consumption (Black, 
2003b). Remittances from Zimbabweans in the diaspora have been used to augment 
incomes of impoverished Zimbabweans for rent, food, basic utility and medical bills. 
Zimbabweans remit money to pay school fees for their children, siblings and 
relatives as well as paying for ancillary education based costs such as uniforms and 
stationary (see Chapter 7) (Bloch, 2008; Mbiba, 2005). There are also cases of some 
Zimbabweans paying for university education of their siblings and children who are 
studying at South African, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand universities due to 
the collapse of state owned universities in Zimbabwe.  
 
Prior to the formation of the coalition government in February 2009, entrepreneurs 
ran medical service companies which enabled diaspora Zimbabweans to buy 
medicines such as Anti-retroviral (ARV) medicines for their families and relatives 
who were affected by HIV/AIDS at home. Datta et al (2007) argued that, while paying 
for educational expenses is mainly altruistic, it is also a form of risk-spreading in that 
it helps in the development of cultural capital which may translate in better 
employment chances. There is an expectation that those who would have been 
helped in their studies would reciprocate the help they receive later in life. The 
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reasons for remitting therefore debunk Black’s (2003b) ‘unproductive’ consumption 
tag.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that foreign currency transfers carried out by 
Zimbabweans in the diaspora surpasses earnings from all the other economic 
sectors, although it is not possible to quantify the volume of remittances due to the 
diversity of transfer practices, as well as the channels of transfer hidden due to the 
dualistic nature of the Zimbabwean economy (Tevera and Chikanda, 2009). This 
research argues that in a country such as Zimbabwe which is currently grappling 
with economic, political and humanitarian crises, remittances have become integral 
to people’s livelihoods. The importance of migrant remittances to the lives of those 
left behind is demonstrated by the findings of a C-Safe (2003) study. The study 
found out that 28.5 per cent of households regarded remittances as one of their 
income strands. Bloch (2005) posits that remittances can help to reduce poverty 
within particular households and have a wider impact due to improved education, 
health, and housing, and therefore better human development.  
 
Some literature on transnationalism has noted the growing involvement of state 
institutions in harnessing migrants’ resources for development (Guarnizo and Smith, 
1998).  Countries like India and Mexico have been at the forefront of soliciting the 
support of their non-resident citizens to play bigger economic and political roles in 
their home countries (De Haas, 2006; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-
Nielsen 2003). During the crisis in Zimbabwe, the government, through the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) conceived a foreign currency harvesting initiative called 
the Homelink/Kumusha/Ekhaya scheme. The scheme was launched by the 
Governor of RBZ, Dr Gideon Gono in May 2004 and aimed to encourage the 
Zimbabwean diaspora to remit using formal channels rather than the informal 
channels which they were favouring (Gono, 2008).  
 
The actions of the Reserve Bank lend credence to observations of political elites 
actively trying to tap into the resources of the migrant communities abroad (AI-AIi et 
al., 2001; Itzigsohn, 2000). Observers saw this as an admission by the government 
that it had failed to curb the thriving parallel market which offered higher rates than 
the government (Mbiba, 2005). As part of the initiative, the RBZ Governor toured top 
foreign currency generating countries such as South Africa, the UK, USA and 
Botswana, seeking to portray his latest venture as a noble and patriotic cause that 
diaspora Zimbabweans should embrace with open arms (Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, 2005b). Unquestionably, the scheme has not been successful. As 
Maphosa (2007) posits, only a paltry US$23.6 million had been remitted through the 
Homelink facility by July 2004 and the recent dollarization of the Zimbabwean 




Previous studies have revealed that remittances are usually sent to close relatives, 
and small amounts and transfers are likely to be most frequent from temporary 
migrants whose links with their countries of origin are still close which may indicate 
their return intentions (see for instance, Bloch, 2006; Crush, 2007; De Haan, 2006; 
Ratha, 2003). It has also been established that remittances decline over time for 
migrants with settled status, although a substantial proportion of long-term migrants 
still send money back to their relatives. This agrees with evidence of Zimbabweans 
in both countries who appear to be focused n consolidating their lives in the new host 
country rather than sending money home.  
 
A study by Mbiba (2010) about Zimbabweans’ remitting behaviour, found out that 
those with insecure legal and economic status in the UK send proportionately more 
money back home than for example, professionals with documented status. This 
may be accounted by the fact that the UK and South African governments’ 
deportation policies target undocumented migrants thereby making them susceptible 
to exploitation, so they will endeavour to build their financial reserves in a short time 
and invest it back home as a strategy against their potential capture and eventual 
deportation.  
 
3.3.3 Return Migration 
 
The preceding sections have demonstrated how transnationalism has shifted 
arguments about migration from being a one way process to one where it is 
recognised as a ‘continuous regime of migration, return, and re-migration’ (King and 
Christou, 2011:455). This is consistent with the postulation of Ammassari and Black 
(2001: 12) that return does not suggest the ‘closure of the migration cycle… [but is] 
one of the multiple steps of a continued movement.’ As Ghosh (2000, cited in 
Olesen, 2002:135) cryptically suggests ‘return migration is the great unwritten 
chapter in the history of migration.’ Some migration scholars have projected return 
migration as ‘a mirage than a reality’ (Guarnizo, 1997:286), ‘myth of return’ (Anwar 
1979), ‘ideology of return’ (Brettell 1979), and ‘return illusion’ (Hoffmann-Nowotny 
1978). 
 
The subject of return migration has elicited various permutations regarding the 
multiple possible meanings of ‘home’ (Brah, 1997), ‘homeland’ (Koser and Black, 
1999) and ‘homecoming’ (Warner, 1994; Stefansson, 2004). For scholars such as 
Koser and Black (1999:7), home ‘can represent a return to the refugee's country of 
origin; but more generally, it is seen as more specific than that, involving the place of 
origin, perhaps the refugee's own house or land that was abandoned at the time of 
flight and may be imbued with social, cultural, spiritual, or economic values.’ An 
increasing number of scholars concur that return does not need necessarily connote 
‘going home’ (Hammond, 2004:3) as some ‘returned migrants have settled in areas 
other than their areas of origin’ (Black, 2002: 131). For scholars such as Black and 
King (2004:80), the transnational discourse can be argued to be a form of return 
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which agrees with the work of Ley and Kobayashi (2005: 113) which asserts that for 
some migrants ‘return migration is less a final adjustment than another stage in a 
continuing itinerary.’ 
 
Reasons for return are both multiple and complex and include migrants’ experiences 
in the host country as well as those in the home country. Scholars such as Moran-
Taylor and Menjivar (2005: 95) posit that migrants’ return intentions are shaped by 
their perceptions of place, attachment to place and sense of belonging while other 
commentators argue that motivation to return is sometimes influenced by a mixture 
of negative and positive quality of life factors (Gmelch, 1983; Michalos, 1997; Boyle 
et al., 1999). This agrees with the sentiments of Guarnizo (1997:287) which proffers 
that ‘the effects of migration, particularly of return migration, vary widely and are 
indeterminate because they depend on the contexts that migrants encounter abroad 
and upon return, and on the particular connections and obligations they have with 
their kin and communities.’  
 
Migration literature suggests that migrants are motivated to return by a combination 
of factors which include economic, social, political and geographic factors (Cerase, 
1974; King, 2000; Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005; Agunias, 2006; Haour-Knipe 
and Davies, 2008). Studies which have investigated the return intentions of 
Caribbean communities have highlighted the importance of racism and 
discrimination in instigating return (cf. Leavy et al., 2004; Phillips and Potter, 2005; 
Potter and Phillips, 2005). These studies contend that racism and discrimination 
curtail the migrants’ economic and social opportunities (Modood et al., 1997). King 
(2000) developed a four pronged typology which captures the four main reasons that 
have been advanced by scholars to explain migrants’ return intentions (Table 3.2). 
The four main factors that King (2000) identified are:  
 Economic  
 Social  
 Family/ life cycle 
 Political  
 
King’s taxonomy captures the complexity and connectedness of the factors which 
influence return migration in both the host and home country. The importance of 
economic factors in hastening migrants’ return intentions cannot be overemphasised. 
The current global economic downturn has hit developed countries hard thereby 
hastening some migrants’ return home (Ratha et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
improving economic conditions in the country of origin may lure migrants back home 
which have resonance with Todaro’s (1969) neoclassical migration theory where 
return is considered as a consequence of a failed migration experience in terms of 




Table 3.2 Causes and Effects of Return Migration 
 
 












 More jobs/better wages 
at home  
 Unemployment/end of 
contract 




 Effect on wages Use 
of savings 
Social 
 Racial hostility/difficulty 
in integration 
 Homesickness Desire 
for enhanced status  
Social 
 Change in status 











 Destination of return 
and subsequent 
moves  
 Landscape effects 
Political 
 Government policy at 
sending and receiving 
ends 
Political 
 Local politics Voting 
patterns 
Source: Haour-Knipe and Davies (2008), King (2000:14)  
 
On the other hand, the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory 
considers return migration as a consequence of a ‘calculated strategy’ (Cassarino, 
2004) conceptualised at the household level and resulting from the attainment of the 
target that would have initialled emigration. Proponents of NELM theory such as 
Stark (1991: 26) assert that it  
 
 ‘...shifts the focus of migration theory from individual independence … to 
 mutual interdependence by viewing it as part of a household decision rather 
 than an individual decision.’  
 
According to Cassarino (2004), the NELM approach views return as the closure of 
the migration cycle by migrants who would have successfully achieved their targets 
by working in abroad.  
 
 64 
However, some scholars have berated both the neoclassical economics and NELM 
approaches to return migration for privileging economic and financial factors at the 
expense of other equally important factors such as familial relationships (Lynn-Ee 
Ho, 2008; Tiemoko, 2004). The second criticism pertains to excessive focus on the 
migrants alone and their motivations for return (Cassarino, 2004). This, as alluded to 
earlier, hinges on the isolation of other non-economic factors e.g. social and political 
environment from migrants’ decisions and strategies to return.  
 
King’s (2000) analysis gives more prominence to non-economic than economic 
factors in shaping migrants’ return plans. Haour-Knipe and Davies (2008) concur, 
arguing that economic arguments are contextual rather than paramount: migrants 
may return when economic conditions in the country of origin improve but cite family 
ties, and the desire to rejoin family and old friends as their motivations for return. In 
her study of Jamaican migrants returning home, Thomas-Hope (1999) observed two 
salient factors: the personal and domestic circumstances of the individual and his or 
her family (factors such as age and stage in career and household life cycle) as well 
as perceived conditions in the country of origin (including ‘comfort level’, 
environment, cost of living, level of crime, opportunities for investment, political 
stability and attitudes towards returning migrants) (Thomas-Hope, 1999 cited in 
Haour-Knipe and Davies, 2008).  
 
Such studies claim that migrants’ life cycle is particularly important as the potential to 
return for migrants who have been away from home for long periods are denuded 
rendering them unlikely to return than those who have been there for a few years. 
However, scholars such as Wessendorf (2010: 375) refute this arguing that ‘roots 
migrants are in search of a place that provides them with a sense of belonging’ while 
King and Christou (2010: 109) claim that ‘the search for ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ is 
often an extremely powerful, emotional and even life-changing experience: an 
enactment of family heritage across time and space’.  
 
Likewise, Iredale et al (2003) posit that skilled migrants’ decision to return are a 
result of careful consideration of personal factors, career-related prospects and the 
economic/political/ environmental climate in the home country. Such scholarship 
resonate with the work of Tiemoko (2004) which gives prominence to social and 
family factors in migrants’ return intentions as highlighted in Chapter 2. Some 
scholarship finds a causal association between return and gender in which women 
showed an inclination to return due to being family oriented than men (Guarnizo, 
1997).  
 
As Iredale et al (2003) posit, return intentions predicated on family reasons are likely 
to be cited by migrants who would not have successfully integrated in the host 
country than their peers who would have successfully transitioned to life in the 
destination country.  
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As Castles (1999) claims, we inhabit an age of migration characterised by affordable 
transportation and communication which have radically altered migration. 
Advancements in information communication technologies, air transportation have 
enhanced communication between migrants and those at home as well as facilitating 
the maintenance of physical ties. Frequent visits through holidaying in the home 
country helps migrants to assess progress of the projects that they are undertaking 
at home as well as, according to Haour-Knipe and Davies (2008), maintain ‘social 
visibility.’  
 
Some studies have found that migrants maintain links with those left behind by 
engaging in regular visits home and as demonstrated in the preceding section, 
investing in property in preparation for eventual return (Cassarino, 2004; Thomas-
Hope 1999). Scholars such as Saxenian (2006) for example, claim that the 
sustenance of these links is meant to aid the migrants on their future return while 
Meyer (2001) pointed out to the maintenance of professional registrations by South 
African migrants in the global North as pointers of these skilled migrants’ return 
intentions. Others, such as Oxfeld and Long (2004) observe that holiday visits have 
been used by migrants as strategy to assuage and overcome initial fears and 
hesitations about return. However, Conway et al (2009) claim that whilst repetitive 
return visits are useful for ‘keeping in touch’, the link to return migration was often 
tenuous as they do not automatically result in return.  
 
Return is increasingly being seen as one stage of the migration cycle and not as the 
end of it as previously thought (Cassarino, 2004) as it may be a forerunner of further 
episodes of spatial mobility (Haour-Knipe and Davies, 2008), embedded in a cyclical 
process of repeat migrations increasingly referred to as ‘circular migration’ (Elkan, 
1967; Hugo, 1977) and ‘astronaut migration’ (Ho et al., 1997). Extant literature 
suggests that return is no longer permanent, but according to Ammassari and Black 
(2001 cited in Agunias, 2006: 14) ‘temporary and even cyclical…a stage along a 
process of increasingly fluid movements between countries.’ In Chapter 2, it was 
discussed how Zimbabwean migrants working in South Africa return home only to 
return again once the farming season starts which Redfoot and Houser (2005) refer 
to as living ‘between’ or ‘across’ two countries, economies and cultures. These 
increased mobilities have been enhanced by unprecedented transformations that 
have occurred in the transport and communications sector which have made it 
‘possible for transnational connections – including visits home – to be sustained at a 
greater density and multiplicity than in the past’ (Portes et al., 1999 cited in King and 
Christou, 2011: 455). 
 
Disenchanted with the neoclassical and NELM perspectives to return migration, 
some scholars have explored it within structural approaches which privileges social 
and institutional factors in both the sending and destination countries (Cerase, 1974; 
Cassarino, 2004). Cerase (1974) identifies four types of return migrants; return of 
failure, return of conservatism, return of retirement and return of innovation. Return 
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of failure relates to migrants who choose to return because of failure to integrate in 
the host country owing to prejudices and stereotypes. The return of conservatism 
refers to the return of migrants who would have satisfied their set targets e.g. 
property acquisition. The third category is what Cerase identified as the return of 
retirement which is associated with migrants’ life course. This is consistent with 
some studies which have found out that some migrants tend to return home on 
retirement (Ley and Kobayashi, 2005).  
 
The return of innovation refers to the return of migrants with superior human capital 
acquired in the destination country which is then deployed for social mobility in the 
country of origin (Cerase, 1974: 251). Migrants predicate their return on the newly 
acquired skills and savings made during stay in exile which they hope to invest 
thereby cementing their role as ‘innovators’ and ‘carriers of change’ (Cerase, 1974). 
For migrants in this category, the perceived opportunities that exist in the country of 
origin are considered against the experiences currently being experienced in the 
host country. However, returning migrants’ intentions are often dashed because of 
the resilience and strong power relations and vested interests of traditional power 
structures (Cassarino, 2004). Similarly, King and Christou (2010) have shed light on 
the ‘return of social realism’ whereby the initial ‘calling home’ notion differs 
significantly with what obtains on the ground which may be characterised by 
confrontations, frustrations, and general annoyances with the social and cultural 
institutions in the place and its wider behavioural norms and practices.  
 
The transnational approach to return migration has gained currency with scholars as 
it differs from the structural, neoclassical and NELM approaches. Instead, it posits 
that return migration is not the end of the migration cycle but as an essential part of 
circular socio-economic relationships and exchanges linking migrants and those at 
home (Chapman and Prothero, 1983). These transnational links as explained earlier 
take place in transnational social fields where knowledge, information and 
remittances are exchanged and flow. While some migrants choose to return home, it 
is equally true that others elect to remain in the host country having successfully 
integrated. Migrants who remain form the pioneering diasporic communities and 
provide resources that potential migrants can benefit from in future migration cycles. 
 
 3.3.4 The notion of Diaspora and diasporic communities 
 
Notwithstanding the growing importance of transnationalism in migration discourse, it 
would be remiss of me not to briefly discuss the notion of diaspora given the role it 
has played in informing contemporary migration scholarship. Indeed this view is 
shared by a number of migration scholars such as Berking (2004:103) who claims 
that ’Diasporas are everywhere.’ Modern diasporas, according to Shuval (2000), now 
encompasses an array of groups such as political refugees, illegal immigrants, guest 
workers, immigrants, expellees, ethnic and racial minorities, and overseas 
communities. This is relevant to this study because the Zimbabwean diaspora 
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consists of disparate groups, as identified by Shuval. Common in the academic 
definition of a diaspora, as propounded and propagated by classical diaspora 
theorists (Cohen 1997; Safran 1991; Sheffer 2003), is that it is rooted in the 
triumvirate of history of dispersal, connections with the homeland (in term of myths, 
memories, desire for eventual return), and a collective identity or boundary 
maintenance (Brubaker, 2005, Pasura, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
There is a scholarly consensus that a diaspora embodies a notion of a centre, a 
locus, a ‘home’ from where the diaspora occurs and that at the heart of the notion of 
diaspora is the image of a journey (Brah, 1996). Zimbabwean migrants domiciled in 
South Africa and the UK self identify and are identified by those at home as being in 
the diaspora and harbour thoughts of eventually returning home (see Chapters 7 and 
8). Others, as highlighted in Chapter 2, despite ‘circulating’ between home and host 
country, still self identify and are identified as members of the diaspora. Thus, 
transnational practices do not completely remove diasporic feelings and tags. Only 
permanent return is capable of expunging these labels and identities (see Chapter 
8).  
 
The notion of a ‘home’ that Brah (1996) raises is picked up and expanded by Shuval 
(2000) who argues that the diaspora discourse reflects a sense of being part of an 
ongoing transnational network that includes dispersed people who retain a sense of 
their uniqueness and an interest in their homeland. As McGregor and Pasura (2011) 
demonstrate, Zimbabwean migrants keenly follow political, social and economic 
developments in their homeland. This is evidenced by their attendance at 
Zimbabwean themed functions like Independence Day celebrations, musical shows 
and political gatherings (Pasura, 2008a). Another useful way of judging such interest 
is by scrutinising articles which are written by migrants, or comments on diaspora 
stories that appear regularly in Zimbabwe based newspapers. Here, migrants 
engage in passionate debate with editors and reporters about governance and 
economic issues and the potential role that they can play in the country’s 
development.   
 
Diasporas have been described as ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational 
moment’, further, that the diaspora discourse reflects a sense of being part of an 
ongoing transnational network that includes a homeland (Shuval, 2000). Shuval 
further says that transnationalism is characterised by a sense of living in one place 
while simultaneously remembering and/or desiring and yearning for another place. 
Even though migrants may be living and working in South Africa and the UK, they 
still harbour feelings of returning home. Further, Brah (1996) contends that at any 
given moment in time, the sense of connection to a homeland must be strong 
enough to resist forgetting, assimilating or distancing (see Chapter 8). For some 
Zimbabwean migrants, integration has been used as a vehicle through which they 
can secure themselves in the host country, although this has not been at the 
expense of severing ties with the homeland which contradicts Brah’s assertion. The 
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case of majoni-joni/injiva in South Africa exemplifies how migrants are able to use 
their cultural capital for integration purposes as outlined in Chapter 2. Connection 
with home persists for most migrants because of the people left at home; for 
example, parents and other family members.  
 
According to Safran (1991), a group can only be called a diaspora if circumstances 
dictating their move involved a destroyed homeland, expulsion from homeland, and 
experiences of trauma. This is important in this study because of the factors which 
compelled Zimbabweans the country of their birth which were highlighted in Chapter 
2. It was argued in Chapter 2 that the second migration episode was spawned by the 
violence which took place in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces which suggests 
that the victims of this violence conform to Safran’s classification of what constitute a 
diaspora. Safran identified the basic characteristics of a diaspora to include:  
 
 dispersal from an original ‘centre’ to two or more foreign regions, e.g. South 
Africa and the UK;  
 retentions of a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland 
including its location, history and achievements e.g. free health and education 
at independence;  
 the belief that they are not – and perhaps never can be – fully accepted in 
their host societies and so remain partly separate e.g. makwere-kwere, 
asylum seeker, immigrants;  
 the idealisation of the putative ancestral home and the thought of returning 
when conditions are more favourable e.g. MDC in power, removal of 
President Mugabe from power;  
 the belief that all members should be committed to the maintenance or 
restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and prosperity e.g. 
governance reforms to curb and eradicate corruption, return of the rule of law; 
and, 
 a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on 
a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate 
e.g. Ndebele people (Safran, 1991: 83-84). 
 
The preceding discussion about the diaspora was meant to compare how the 
Zimbabwean diaspora highlighted in Chapter 2 compares with established diaspora 
such as the Jewish diaspora. It may be that Zimbabwean migrants do not fit into the 
archetypal diasporas as they may consider themselves to be in exile until the political 
and economic situation at home normalises. Having discussed the concept of 
diaspora and its history, the next section explores how the various themes can be 
consolidated into a conceptual framework for this study. Such a framework 




3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter reviewed the available literature on transnationalism, which helps to 
provide a framework for understanding migration. The transnational perspective of 
migration can help us understand why Zimbabweans moved at the time that they did. 
Migration is a complex phenomenon which cannot comprehensively be explained by 
one theory. The symbiotic and strong structural and economic relationships that 
were built between Harare, London and Pretoria during the colonial era played a 
crucial role in the decisions of migrants about where to move to (Mabogunje, 1970), 
as was the existence of social networks (Massey, 2003). The notion of 
transnationalism has been invoked to help explain why migrants continue to maintain 
ties with their homeland. The available reviewed literature suggests that contact with 
home is crucial to the lives of those in the diaspora (McGregor, 2008; Mbiba, 2010).  
 
This chapter has disclosed that ties with the homeland are maintained through a 
range of activities including remittances and political activism. The stock of 
remittances has been shown to be rising due to dwindling foreign aid from the North 
to the South. Remittances themselves are a sign of migrants’ return intentions which 
are predicated on socio-economic, political and life cycle factors. The literature has 
demonstrated that leaving home is one aspect of the migration process. The chapter 
also explored literature on return migration which is central to this study given the 
recent political developments in Zimbabwe. Migrants’ return intentions were shown 
to be a consequence of multiple and interconnected factors including economic, 
social, political and geographical factors. However, as shown in Chapter 2, obtaining 
documented status through asylum seeking is a complex process which has left 
many migrants are languishing in the asylum process in both South Africa and the 
UK. The next chapter will discuss the research aims and questions used to generate 




















Chapter Four Research Design and Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents and discusses the methodological framework and the 
processes of research design that were used to generate data to fulfil the demands 
of the research aim and question. To reiterate, the aim of this research is to unveil 
the complexities embedded in the transnational linkages between migrants in South 
Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe. The research used a mixed methods approach to 
capitalise on the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methods (McKendrick, 
1999; Sporton, 1999). A questionnaire survey was used to collect initial data due to 
the dearth of credible statistics of Zimbabweans in both South Africa and the UK. 
The questionnaire survey was complemented by qualitative methods which included 
semi-structured interviews with selected migrants and key informants as well as 
multi-sited ethnography. The semi-structured interviews privileged migrants’ voices 
to reveal their perspectives on migration experiences and transnational lifestyles, as 
well as their potential to return. Such an approach was considered to be appropriate 
not only to ensure breadth and diversity of the data but also the validity of the 
findings. The mixed methods approach ensured that results can be checked for 
rigour through triangulation. In short, this was preferred due to the complexity of the 
study, and to ensure rigour.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 explains why Leeds and Limpopo 
were chosen as the case studies for this study. This will be followed by an 
exploration of the research strategy, specifically how the fieldwork was conducted in 
South Africa and the UK and the multiple methods that were used in data gathering.  
Other sections consider the issue of researcher’s positionality and reflexivity, access 
and ethical considerations.    
 
4.2 Study areas 
 
Fieldwork was conducted in Leeds, UK and Limpopo Province, South Africa. This 
was informed by the distinctiveness and differences of the migration channels 
outlined in Chapter 2 and characteristics of Zimbabweans in these two countries 
which have implications for their transnational lifestyles (see Chapters 3 and 7), 
connections and return (see Chapter 8). Furthermore, the choice of the two areas 
was predicated on maximising diversity and differences given the two countries’ 
different stages of economic, technological and political development; i.e. South 
Africa; a country with a fairly developed economy23 but blighted by multiple 
inequalities and the UK - a developed country. A significant number of Zimbabweans 
in Leeds are highly skilled, have undertaken complex, and often costly, migrations 
                                                     
23
 South Africa is not considered to be a developing country by the World Bank which classes it as a newly 
industrialising country and therefore classifies it in the same mould as Brazil, Russia, India and China forming 
the so-called BRICS countries. 
 71 
and have different human, social and economic capital endowments than their 
Limpopo based counterparts. On the other hand as demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
Limpopo province is home to a large number of unskilled Zimbabweans who practice 
seasonal and circular migration. This Zimbabwean population as outlined in Chapter 
2 consists largely of informal migrants who maintain strong connections with their 
families at home. The migrants who constituted the episodes discussed in Chapter 2 




Leeds was selected as the focus in the UK because it is the third largest city with a 
population of approximately 750,000 people (Leeds City Council, 2011). It is home to 
a sizeable Zimbabwean community which Magunha et al (2009) estimate to be about 
10 000 while other commentators have suggested that there are 50 000 
Zimbabweans resident in the city and its precincts.24 The Zimbabwean population in 
Leeds, and indeed the entire Yorkshire region, owes its origins largely to channelling 
of Zimbabwean health and social care workers by recruitment agencies to work in 
the NHS trusts and local authorities in the region (Magunha et al., 2009).  
 
Chapter 2 showed that health institutions and local authorities in the UK launched 
aggressive recruitment forays into Zimbabwe for health and social care staff 
(McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2008). The role of social networks in the dramatic 
increase of migrants in Leeds and the surrounding towns cannot be underestimated 
(see Chapters 3 and 5). Health and social care professionals and other migrants 
already settled in the region provided important information to prospective migrants 
in Zimbabwe, and others already in the country, about job opportunities 
(Granovetter, 1973).  
 
Adding to this significant population is the central government’s clustering policy of 
dispersing asylum seekers by language and ethnicity, through the National Asylum 
Support Service (NASS) (Hynes, 2011; Valentine et al., 2007). NASS is responsible 
for providing accommodation and support services to asylum seekers and a major 
aspect of its work has been to decongest London and the South East by dispersing 
asylum seekers to areas outside London (Valentine et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2008). 
As Stewart (2012) notes, Leeds with slightly over 2,000 asylum seekers, had the 
highest number of dispersed asylum seekers in the Yorkshire and Humberside 
region in 2006 which significantly boosted the clustered population (Table 4. 1). 
According to the Yorkshire Migration Partnership, approximately 5547 Zimbabwean 
asylum seekers were in NASS accommodation in the Yorkshire and Humber region 
between 2006 and 2010 (personal communication, 2010).  
 
                                                     
24
 Personal communication with Solomon, chairman of Zimbabwe Leeds Community Organisation, 14 October 
2009. 
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Table 4.1 Top 10 Local Authority Locations of Dispersed Asylum Seekers, 
  December 2006 
 
Local Authority Total Asylum Seekers 










Source: Bennett et al., 2007 (cited in Stewart, 2012) 
 
Leeds was thus, an attractive study area because of a significant population of 
Zimbabwean migrants. In addition to the factors mentioned above, there are several 
institutions of higher education within commutable distance of the city. Another 
incentive to choose Leeds was widespread reports about the difficulties that some 
members of the community faced including health and wellbeing issues and 
destitution (Brown, 2008; Khan and Byfield, 2007). Furthermore, having lived in 
Leeds since 2003 meant that I had built significant social networks that could be 
tapped for recruitment and information.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the areas from which study participants were drawn from. These 
included East Leeds areas of Chapeltown, Gipton, Harehills, Moortown and 
Roundhay which is home to St James’ and Chapeltown Hospitals where a significant 
number of Zimbabwean nurses and other health and social care professionals work. 
The rest of the participants were drawn from the other parts of Leeds notably South, 
South East and North East. Most study participants live in inner city areas which tend 
to be deprived. NASS has increasingly been resettling asylum seekers in these inner 
city and deprived areas through its housing contractors such as Angel Housing 
Group. The East, South, South East and North East areas of Leeds in particular, are 
home to migrants from diverse backgrounds, ranging from asylum seekers and 









Figure 4.1 Neighbourhood map of Leeds  
 
Source: Leeds City Council (www.leeds.gov.uk)   
 
Chapter 2 highlighted how some of migrants left for the UK to work in health and 
social care which suggests that they had better human and social capital 
endowments. Despite their sizeable numbers and the contribution that they are 
making in their home country, no empirical studies have been undertaken to 
document their experiences, both in their host country and country of origin, a lacuna 
which this study seeks to fill.  
 
4.2.2 Limpopo Province 
 
Limpopo Province, with a population of slightly over 5 million (Statistics SA, 2008) is 
located in the north-east part of South Africa and shares a border with Zimbabwe. 
Limpopo province consists of five districts; Vhembe, Mopani, Capricorn, Waterberg 
and Greater Sekhukhune (Figure 4.2). It is a predominantly rural province with large 
swathes of commercial farms which McNab (2004), attributed to the skewed racial 
land ownership caused by apartheid. The commercial farms and farming towns such 
as Polokwane (formerly Pietersburg), Makhadho (Louis Trichardt) are the foci of this 
study. The farms and the towns have historically attracted migrants from Zimbabwe 
and beyond who provided labour on farms shunned by the locals as outlined in 
Chapter 2 (Rutherford, 2011; Rutherford and Addison, 2007). Musina town is located 
in Vhembe district and lies only 15 km from the Zimbabwe – South Africa border. 
The Beitbridge border post is the sole border post linking the two countries. 
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Figure 4.2 Map of Limpopo Province   
 






Source: Statistics South Africa (www.statisticssa.gov.za)  
 
Both documented and undocumented migrants enter South Africa through the 
Beitbridge border post although a significant number of migrants also enter through 
other undesignated entry points e.g. Dete, Chikombedzi etc. Since May 2009, most 
migrants who enter informally formalise their status by applying for asylum permits at 
the Musina Refugee Reception Centre (Figure 4.3) in the town.  
 
The decision to choose Limpopo as a case study was informed by the fact that I had 
contacts in the province and also because Limpopo is considered a reception centre 
and launchpad where migrants work to raise money before travelling further into the 
South African hinterland (Rutherford, 2011). Another factor for me was that I come 
from Zaka district, in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe (Figure 2.1). Zaka is one of the 
poorest districts in Zimbabwe and as outlined in Chapter 2; its close proximity to 
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South Africa meant that migration has always been a livelihood strategy. As a boy 
growing up, I saw other boys moving to Tzaneen and Makhadho in Limpopo to work. 
I knew some relatives and former classmates who lived in Limpopo that could be 
relied on to recruit study participants.    
 
Figure 4.3 Musina Refugee Reception Centre which processes migrants’  
  asylum permits 
 
 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
During piloting, it however, became apparent in Limpopo that I would struggle to 
obtain a diverse research sample if the study was to be conducted only in Musina as 
originally planned. This was because Musina was a transit point for onward migration 
into the South African interior and not a place where all the migrants desired to stay 
permanently. This meant that, had I stuck to the original research plan, my sample 
would mostly have consisted of asylum seekers, market traders and street hawkers, 
at the expense of other groups who are known to live and work in South Africa. I 
then decided to widen my study area to cover the whole of Limpopo province rather 
than just Musina. 
 
4.3 Why mixed method approaches to data collection?  
 
The adoption of the mixed methods approach was informed by the research 
questions of the study. Mixed methods research is, generally speaking, an approach 
to knowledge (theory and practice) that attempts to consider multiple viewpoints, 
perspectives, positions, and standpoints (including the standpoints of qualitative and 
quantitative research) (Greene, 2006). Burke Johnson et al (2007: 124) define mixed 
methods research as,  
 
‘The type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
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techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding 
and corroboration.’  
 
Some scholars such as Findlay and Li (1999) argue that mixed methods approaches 
help to uncover the multiple meanings of events such as migration. Similarly, other 
authors (Bryman, 2006; Graham, 1999) argue that mixed methods approaches 
including questionnaire surveys and interviews have emerged as a dominant 
technique in contemporary migration research. Likewise Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2010) opine that the increased use of hybrid approaches harnesses the synergies of 
both qualitative and quantitative research. White (2002: 513) advocates the use of 
hybrid approaches because,  
 
‘using the approaches together yields more than the sum of the two 
approaches used independently.’  
 
My use of mixed methods was also in accord with Phillip’s (1998) suggestion that 
they are crucial in addressing a research question at the same stage in the research 
process, in the same place, and with the same research subjects.  
 
Mixed methods approaches, as will be demonstrated later (see analysis chapters 5-
8), typically involve the dual use of extensive and intensive methods such as surveys 
and interviews to gain a fuller understanding of both the structural forces driving 
migration and the individual forces influencing migration decisions (Campbell, 2007; 
Findlay, 2005; Findlay and Li, 1999). Chikanda (2010) used the mixed methods 
approach to study the emigration of medical doctors from Zimbabwe, whilst Tinarwo 
(2011) used the approach to study the migration of Zimbabwean social workers to 
the UK with varying degrees of success. 
 
The use of the mixed method approach was prompted by the desire to obtain 
background information about Zimbabweans in the two areas given the unavailability 
of reliable statistical data. A questionnaire survey (Appendix 3) was administered to 
810 participants in both areas (200 in Leeds and 519 in Limpopo). Data from the 
questionnaire survey was used to inform the qualitative research stage. From the 
200 participants that participated in the survey in Leeds from which 27 were selected 
for qualitative interviews while in Limpopo 36 participants were selected for semi-
structured interviews from the 519 survey participants (Appendix 5). In addition, 3 
key informants were interviewed in Leeds and 4 in Limpopo. The semi-structured 
interviews enabled the study to explore the experiences of Zimbabwean migrants in 
Leeds and Limpopo. As will be shown in the following sections, the use of the mixed 
methods approach strengthened the research design and improved the quality of the 
research findings (Chikanda, 2010).  
 
Using mixed methods in the study allowed for triangulation to check the rigour and 
validity of the results (Greene et al., 1989). Denzin (1978: 291) defined triangulation 
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as, ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’ and 
proceeded to outline four types of triangulation as data triangulation, investigator 
triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation. Triangulation has 
been advanced as the panacea to rid data collection methods of their perceived 
deficiencies. Bromley (1986) and Berg (1998) have staunchly advocated 
‘triangulation’ in order to consolidate internal validity and claim that by combining 
several lines of sight (triangulation), researchers obtain a better, more substantive 
picture of reality; a richer, more complete array of symbols and theoretical concepts; 
and a means of verifying many of these elements. Similarly, Jick (1979) summarised 
the advantages of triangulation as: enabling researchers to have confidence in their 
results; encourages researchers to be proactive and creative in the way they 
generate and collect data; leading to thick and rich data; enables researchers to 
synthesise and integrate theories; it helps to uncover contradictions and that due to 
its completeness, it may serve as the litmus test for competing theories.  
 
4.3.1 Questionnaire survey 
 
A questionnaire survey was used to gather biographical data and factors 
precipitating departure from Zimbabwe, employment situation, transnational activities 
(Research questions 1, 2 and 3), standard of living in the host country, and return 
intentions (Research question 4). This agrees with the work of Parfitt (2005: 78) that 
suggests that the questionnaire survey method is an indispensable tool when 
primary data is required on people, their behaviour, attitudes, opinions, and 
awareness of specific issues. The survey was followed by the deployment of 
qualitative methods including interviews and ethnography which privileged the 
migrants’ voices.   
 
A combined total of 808 participants were approached to take part in the survey in 
both Leeds and Limpopo (Table 4.2). The table shows that 237 people were 
approached to take part in the study in Leeds. Of these, 200 agreed to participate 
while 37 refused giving an approval rate of 84%. Similarly, in Limpopo, the approval 
rate was 91% after 571 people were approached, with 519 consenting while 52 
refused. The combined approval rate for both Leeds and Limpopo was 89%. Given 
the transient and hidden nature of the population being studied, the response rate is 
consistent with other scholarly studies (Scott, 2003; Joly, 1987). It is acknowledged 
that questions may be raised about the different sample sizes for Leeds and 
Limpopo. Three factors account for these differences. Firstly, Limpopo province is 
much larger than Leeds with a population of approximately 5.5 million people 
(Statistics SA, 2010) than Leeds which has a population of just 850 000 people 
(ONS, 2012). This means that the population in Limpopo is sparsely spread as 
compared to Leeds where many migrants live in different wards which are close to 
each other. To ensure diversity, I had to recruit participants from different parts of the 
province e.g. on farms, towns and rural areas (Figure 4.2) whereas Leeds is largely 
urban (Figure 4.1). 
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Table 4.2 Survey response rate by country of residence  
 
 
Having the research statement 
read to you, do you still want to 
participate in this research 
project? 
Total Yes No 
Country of residence United Kingdom Count 200 37 237 
% within Country of 
residence 
84.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
South Africa Count 519 52 571 
% within Country of 
residence 
91.0% 9.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 719 89 808 
% within Country of 
residence 
89.0% 11.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The questionnaire was piloted in both Leeds and Limpopo (Sporton, 1999). Piloting 
entails pre-testing or ‘trying out’ of a particular research instrument (Baker 1994: 
182-3). Bryman (2006) lists the major advantages of pre-testing as that it gives 
advance warning about potential problems which may result in failure or where 
protocols about the research may not be followed, or whether proposed methods or 
instruments are inappropriate or too complicated. In Limpopo, piloting resulted in the 
decision to extend the study area to the whole of Limpopo province instead of 
Musina as initially envisaged in order to attain diversity of the study participants.  
 
The intention of the survey was to establish common positions amongst the 
Zimbabwean diaspora as well as to identify their points of departure. As Chikanda 
(2010) in his study of the migration of medical doctors from Zimbabwe argues, the 
purpose of surveys is to examine the combined or group experiences of the subjects 
being studied. He further posits that surveys are some of the best tools to use to 
obtain a snapshot of certain migrant practices, such as common forms of 
transnational links between migrants and those at home (Chikanda, 2010). The 
representativeness of the two samples can be questioned due to purposive sampling 
of recruits for the study, but this was unavoidable due to the hidden nature of the 
study participants. This was compounded by the lack of reliable data about the 
Zimbabwean population in both countries. As noted by Valentine (2001), purposive 
sampling is useful in researching hard to reach groups.  
 
The survey was a useful instrument of data gathering; it afforded me the opportunity 
to statistically analyse differing responses and produce measurements of people’s 
thoughts and behaviours across a number of variables such as age, gender, 
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education, immigration and marital status. The information produced was used to 
make wider generalisations about Zimbabwean migration.  
 
4.3.2 Sampling and problems of reliable statistical data  
 
As already described in Chapter 3, there is a dearth of reliable statistical data on the 
number of Zimbabweans resident in both South Africa and the UK (Makina, 2007; 
Pasura, 2008).  To arrive at a heterogeneous sample comprising of the different 
constituents of the Zimbabwean diaspora, I relied on my experience of having lived 
in Leeds for six of my eight years in the UK, knowledge that Leeds is a cluster area 
of Zimbabwean asylum seekers and refugees (Magunha, et al., 2009; Home Office 
Asylum Statistics, 2008, 2012), and my contacts in South Africa. In Limpopo, the 
heterogeneity of the sample was also reflected in the fact that both urban and rural 
areas were sampled.  
 
In Leeds, questionnaires and an introductory letter were sent by email to contacts in 
different religious organisations and Zimbabwean community organisations who 
articulate the concerns of Zimbabweans in the Leeds area. I then followed these with 
personal visits. The decision to target these organisations was informed by evidence 
that refugees, and asylum seekers in particular, rely on churches for social support 
more than their documented counterparts (Pasura, 2010). I was then able to 
snowball the recruitment by tapping into an extensive reservoir of contacts provided 
by community leaders and other study participants.  
 
Participants were recruited at political gatherings, rallies and religious gatherings 
such as Big Sundays (Pasura, 2008; 2010). The Zimbabwean owned grocery shops 
were also important recruitment sites as they are patronised by members of the 
Zimbabwean community. Leaflets were displayed (Appendix 4) at these shops and 
pubs soliciting for volunteers, following which, snowball sampling was used to reach 
more study participants. In Limpopo, leaflets were displayed at prominent and 
popular places such as service centres, bottle stores and long distance bus shelters. 
The bus shelters are important spaces for migrants and are used for an array of 
activities such as remittances, catching up on gossip, and employment opportunities.  
 
Two sampling methods were used to identify participants for the questionnaire 
survey: purposive and snowball sampling. According to Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(2003: 713), purposive sampling techniques (also called non-probability sampling) 
involve selecting certain units ‘based on a specific purpose rather than randomly.’ 
Purposive sampling was favoured in this study in an attempt to be as representative 
as possible to ensure comparability of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and 
the UK. There is scholarly consensus that purposive sampling is used when a 
researcher aims to select a purposive sample that is as representative of a broader 
group of cases as possible, as well as setting up comparisons among different types 
of cases (Teddlie and Yun, 2007). As Maxwell (1997: 87) notes, purposive sampling 
 80 
is useful in studies where specific information is required that cannot be obtained 
elsewhere. Thus, the use of purposive sampling, as will be demonstrated in 
Chapters 5 and 6, was intended to gather information from diverse groups within the 
Zimbabwean diaspora, including asylum seekers, refugees, documented and 
undocumented migrants and students, skilled and unskilled migrants (Bryman, 
2001). Purposive sampling also enabled the research to capture the migrants’ 
biographical data, migration experiences, and transnational transactions and return 
intentions (see Chapters 5-8).  
 
Purposive sampling was complemented by snowballing techniques in the recruitment 
of the study participants. Valentine (1997) defined snowballing as people in a group 
of interest informing the researcher about other individuals in that population who 
could also fit the criteria for inclusion in the study. I was able through snowballing to 
reach some participants that I would not ordinarily have reached because of the 
difficulties inherent in studying people’s immigration statuses, such as people not 
wanting to cooperate because of fear of the authorities as this may result in 
deportation (Corbetta, 2003). There is a body of scholarship which highlights the 
difficulties associated with researching forced migrants, principally their distrust of 
authorities which emanates from pre-migratory experiences (Silove et al., 1998) and 
fears that participation in research could impact negatively on asylum claims (Silove, 
Steel, McGorry and Drobny, 1999). Lee (1993: 60) echoes this viewpoint by claiming 
that sampling becomes more difficult the more the sensitive the topic under 
investigation, since potential informants will have a greater incentive to conceal their 
activities.  
 
Therefore, the decision to use snowball sampling was driven by its utility in situations 
where those being investigated tend to hide their identity for moral, legal, ideological 
or political reasons, or are difficult to reach groups (Arber, 2001; Corbetta, 2003). 
Scholars such as Valentine (1997: 116) argue that snowball sampling helps 
researchers overcome one of the main obstacles to recruiting survey participants - 
gaining their trust. Furthermore, snowball sampling allows the researcher to more 
easily find interviewees with particular experiences or backgrounds (Lee, 1993). 
Moreover, it has been suggested that where there is no accessible sampling frame 
within the sample population, and where creating a frame would be difficult, snowball 
sampling is the only feasible alternative (Bryman, 2001; 2004). This rings true for the 
situation in both countries; there is a dearth of credible statistics regarding the exact 
number of Zimbabweans living in Leeds and Limpopo. 
 
To ensure that only Zimbabwean nationals in the UK responded, adverts calling for 
willing participants were placed on major Zimbabwean internet news sites like South 
West Radio Africa (www.swradioafrica.com ), The Zimbabwe Times 
(www.thezimbabwetimes.com ) and ZW News (www.zwnews.com). This approach 
meant that only Zimbabwean nationals in the UK responded. In South Africa, I visited 
the Musina Refugee Reception Centre, the Musina Legal Centre, and the shelters 
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where newly arrived asylum seekers stay whilst their asylum permits are being 
processed. Other study participants were accessed through churches, the 
commercial farmers’ union and shops that are popular with Zimbabweans in the 
province. I also sent E-mails inviting Zimbabweans in both countries to participate, 
through professionals groups such as the Zimbabwe Institution of Engineers in the 
UK, through student unions at universities in Yorkshire. The same procedure was 
replicated in South Africa where there is a large contingent of Engineers. Despite the 
significant concentration of engineers in Limpopo, none of the respondents chose to 
complete the questionnaires online, preferring instead a face to face meeting during 
which discussions tended to veer towards how they could obtain visas to work in the 
UK. 
 
The recruitment of study participants which meet certain criteria was quite difficult in 
Leeds. Table 4.3, shows the criteria used to select the participants.  
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Table 4.3 Recruitment criteria matrix 
Constituent Age Ethnicity Gender Education Employment Marital status Political 
Asylum seekers        
Students        
Family Reunion        
Ancestry visa holders        
Work permit holders        
Business visa holders        
Refugees        
Citizens        
Undocumented/Illegal        
Other        
Source: Author from fieldwork data 
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Some difficulties were encountered in recruiting participants without documented 
status in Leeds due to people’s reluctance to come forward because of doubts about 
the true intentions of the study. As will be outlined in Chapter 6, there are fears within 
the Zimbabwean community, in the UK in particular, about studies of people’s 
immigration status; some migrants suspect the studies will be forwarded to the Home 
Office and the Zimbabwean government, leading to their deportation and subsequent 
persecution at home given President Mugabe’s rhetoric about migrants as sell-outs. 
Others fear that the information will lead to their family and relatives being harmed in 
Zimbabwe if it is given to the Zimbabwean government.  
 
4.3.3. Analysis of Survey Data 
 
The survey data was amended to remove mistakes made during the data collection 
process. The questionnaires were edited for accuracy and consistency. Common 
mistakes included ticking two boxes instead of one, and providing multiple dates.  
 
Once the data was amended, the questions were then imported on to an SPSS 
spreadsheet according to the preset codes that had been developed and coded to 
enable the statistical analysis of the survey results. Coding was done at two stages: 
prior to and after the survey, with the former done at questionnaire preparation stage 
while the latter was done after the completion of the data collection process.  
 
The use of SPSS and statistical tests was informed by the objectives of the research 
(Kitchen and Tate, 2000). According to Punch (2005), SPSS is one of the most 
commonly used data analysis tools in social science research. The data from the 
SPSS spreadsheet enabled me to produce descriptive statistics, bar graphs, tables 
and charts of demographics, migration and transnational practices of Zimbabwean 
migrants in Leeds and Limpopo. Furthermore, Chi-square tests using this categorical 
data were undertaken. Sarantakos (2005) defines a Chi-square test as a nominal 
level test of significance. With the results, I was able to use cross tables to compare 
the frequency of, for example, remittances to Zimbabwe and elsewhere against 
variables such as age, education, immigration status, occupation and class.  
 
4.3.4 Semi-structured interviews 
 
The second phase of the study, consisting of semi-structured interviews, sought to 
build on the information that had emerged from the questionnaire survey. The 
interviews were used to elicit information on a range of issues such as migration 
history, aspirations, and perceptions about life in the diaspora and at home. The 
semi-structured interviews were used to address the objectives of research 
questions 2 and 3. The questionnaire survey enabled the detailed profiling of survey 
respondents following which 27 and 36 participants were selected in Leeds and 
Limpopo respectively for participation in the qualitative interviews. The interviews 
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enabled the participants to tell their own stories regarding their migratory 
experiences, which the questionnaire survey could not obtain.  
 
An interview guide was followed (Appendix 6) which covered a number of points that 
were important to the research question: 
 Departure from Zimbabwe 
 Experiences in the host country 
 Social networks 
 Transnational linkages  
 Intentions of return. 
 
The flexible nature of the interviewing method provided for the alteration of the 
interview schedule where it was merited and required. However, to allow for 
comparability, such alterations did not compromise the core questions. A series of 
open ended questions were asked which allowed the participants to express 
themselves. The open ended nature of interviewing made it possible for the 
participants to generate, challenge, clarify, elaborate, or recontextualise the nature of 
their transnational relationships with those at home, and how this shaped not only 
their transnational practices, but also their way of living in their host country and the 
relationships that they had with fellow Zimbabwean migrants. This allowed me to 
unpack and interpret the different and multiple individual and collective meanings of 
being Zimbabwean in Leeds and Limpopo across a number of variables such as 
age, education, gender, immigration status, religion and social networks. 
 
Semi-structured interviews allowed me to document the migrants’ salient life 
experiences and to attach meanings to their interpretations of life in the diaspora 
(Pasura, 2010). There is a body of scholarship which shows semi-structured 
interviews to be particularly important in the study of undocumented migrants and 
asylum seekers (Pasura, 2008; Valentine et al., 2007) as it allows for exploration, 
discovery, and interpretation of complex social events and processes (Burgess, 
1991). Similarly, Bryman and Burgess (1999) posit that semi-structured interviews 
can be used as a streamlined means of obtaining rich, detailed data typically 
generated through field research without committing the investigator to prolonged 
involvement in the lives and activities of the researched community.   
 
The interviews were undertaken in Leeds between September 2009 and January 
2010, and from February to May 2010 in Limpopo. On average each interview lasted 
between 55-70 minutes although some interviews lasted over 2 hours. The length of 
the interviews largely depended on the interviewees. For interviewees in Leeds who 
do ‘shift work’ the interviews were relatively shorter compared to those who work 
between 9 am and 5 pm. In a few instances, the interviews had to be cut short after 
the interviewee had been called by an employment agency offering them a shift. In 
Leeds, most of the interviews were preceded by telephone conversations which were 
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largely not possible in Limpopo due to some participants not having access to 
telephones. In Limpopo, it was not always possible to do one-one interviews as 
some of the participants did not speak English which necessitated the involvement of 
a translator in cases where the respondent spoke Ndebele, Venda or Tonga.  
 
Wherever possible, the interviews in both areas were recorded on a digital voice 
recorder and the interviewees were debriefed at the end of each interview to ensure 
their wellbeing. The recording of interviews precluded interruptions from note taking. 
Apart from the convenience that tape recording provided, Pile (1990: 217) suggests 
that a verbatim transcript ensures a full qualitative analysis. However, it was not 
always possible to record all the interviews as six participants in Leeds refused to 
have their interviews recorded due to safety and security reasons already discussed 
above. This is consistent with Corbin and Morse (2003) who claim that some 
respondents are reluctant to have their interviews recorded due to concerns about 
what the interviews may be use for. I sought permission to record each interview 
beforehand.  
 
The recorded interviews were transcribed soon after the interviews took place, 
thereby conforming to Valentine’s (1997) observation that recorded interviews should 
be transcribed soon after the occurrence to enable easy recollection of proceedings. 
Each transcript was read, and comments appended regarding the interviewees’ 
spoken words in three steps in line with Smith et al’s (2009) advice. Drawing on the 
three steps of Smith et al (2009), I made descriptive comments about the accounts 
of the participants, which I followed up by noting any information concerning 
language used by the participants.  
 
The interviews were held in environments in which the participants were comfortable, 
like cafes in Leeds and shopping centres in Limpopo (Longhurst, 2003). A few 
interviews were held in the participants’ homes as they indicated that they felt more 
comfortable there than in neutral venues. Some participants in Leeds were reluctant 
to be interviewed, asking why I had decided to interview them further, and why the 
information that they had provided via the survey did not suffice. Others thought this 
was a trap to get them deported, and I had to explain that I had chosen to interview 
them on the basis of the information that they had provided in the questionnaire. One 
participant who was undocumented took a long time before finally agreeing to be 
interviewed, which also coincided with the day she was granted indefinite leave to 
remain in the country. The interview took a completely different direction from what I 
had envisaged as I had chosen to interview her on the basis of her undocumented 
status. This case demonstrates the fluidity which accompanies migrants’ immigration 
status (see Chapter 6).   
 
Valentine (1997: 111) observes that interviews can be conversational, fluid in form, 
each interview varying according to interests, experiences and views of the 
interviewees. She proceeds to say that that semi-structured interviews are sensitive 
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and people-oriented because they allow the interviewees to construct their own 
accounts of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in their own 
words (Valentine, 1997:112). This observation was significant for my study because 
most Zimbabweans have not had the chance to candidly express their own opinions 
due to the repression that exists in their country. Participants were able to use the 
space of being in the diaspora to criticise the government of President Mugabe freely 
without fear of reprisals (see Chapter 6). Some participants remarked that they may 
as well as have a go at the government given that they had never been asked to tell 
their story in their own words, without fearing what may happen to them. I was able 
to revisit some areas where I needed clarity which is consistent with Bryman’s (1988) 
contention that interviewees can explain the complexities and contradictions of their 
experiences and can describe the mundane details of their everyday lives.  
 
 4.3.5 Ethnography and research diary 
 
Ethnography was one of the integral data gathering methods employed in this study. 
Willis and Trondman (2000:1) define ethnography as a ‘family of methods involving 
direct and sustained social contact with agents.’ Previous migration studies have 
used multi-sited ethnography to fully understand the migration experience and its 
impacts, especially where people’s lives are conducted across borders (Burawoy, 
2000; Fitzgerald, 2006; Marcus, 1995). Some ethnographic studies have researched 
migration from both sending and receiving countries (Maphosa, 2004). However, 
scholars such as Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003, cited in Fitzgerald, 2006) have argued 
that multinational fieldwork need not include the country of origin to yield analytic 
leverage from the multi-sited method.  
 
I attended church services in Leeds and Musina and other community gatherings 
such as funeral wakes, weddings, birthdays and graduation parties. Political 
meetings and rallies were also important theatres for this study. By participating in 
these events, I was exposed to a variety of ways in which the migrants interacted. In 
Limpopo, I spent twenty days living at The I Believe in Jesus Church men’s shelter in 
Musina and ten days at the drop in centre in Makhadho. I travelled extensively 
throughout Limpopo province spending several days at a time in migrants’ homes. 
On some of the days, I went to work with migrants at their stalls on the streets of 
Polokwane, Makhadho and Thohoyandou (Figure 4.4), and fields where permission 
was granted by the farm owners. Fieldwork entailed spending long periods of time 
with migrants who were applying for asylum at the Musina Refugee Reception 
Centre as well as at the clinic run by the Medicins San Frontiers (MSF) in Musina. 
Living with the study participants enabled me to gain access to social networks with 






Figure 4.4 Manning a market stall with a couple in Polokwane 
 
 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
Foner (2003) highlights the importance of living with and interacting intensively with 
the participants. By embedding myself in the lives of the migrants, I was able to 
capture in minute detail their lived experiences, beliefs and identities (Foner, 2003). 
Such an approach resonates with recent scholarship (James, 2001 cited in Francis-
Chizororo, 2008) which contends that ethnographic approaches, by dint of their level 
of engagement with the participants inherently help researchers to recognise 
participants as competent contributors to and interpreters of the social world, and 
steers researchers towards doing work ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ migrants. Thus, 
ethnography privileges the voices of the migrants over that of officials.  
 
In order to gauge the scale of illegal migration into South Africa, I joined members of 
the South African Defence Forces (SANDF) on border patrols along the Zimbabwe-
South Africa border. I saw first-hand the dangers that migrants face in their 
endeavour to start a new life across the river. On one trip, ten people were 
intercepted by the soldiers and were taken to Musina Refugee Reception Centre 
(Figure 4.3) where they applied for asylum permits. Others escaped by retreating 
back to the Zimbabwean side of the border. By spending time with the soldiers I was 
able to understand their perspectives about the Zimbabwean migration. 
 
Despite its extensive use, ethnography has been criticised for its lack of ethics; 
essentially its failure to uphold the rights of the study participants (Murphy and 
Dingwall, 2001). Clifford (1988) has highlighted legitimation and representation 
issues which are critical for this study. Despite privileging the participants’ voice, the 
concerns about their well-being and safety remained a cause for concern throughout 
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this study. Other scholars (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995) have noted the issues of 
language barriers, due to fieldwork being undertaken in multiple sites. My own 
experiences in Limpopo substantiated this, as I have only a cursory understanding of 
the Ndebele language that some participants preferred to converse in.  
 
In both countries a research diary was kept throughout the fieldwork process as a 
method of data collection. The diary chronicled the duration of the interviews, 
observations during interviews, and critical reflections. This was a continuous 
process throughout the research process in Leeds and Limpopo. My research diary 
was a simple hard cover notebook in which I wrote after every interview. The 
research diary served a dual purpose: to document the direction of the research and 
to question my epistemological positioning (Nadin and Cassell, 2006). The diary was 
completed daily, and consisted of my reflections of the day’s occurrences. It was an 
attempt to make sense of the fieldwork. I chronicled my feelings in the diary. 
Sometimes I vented my fury and frustration in the diary while on other occasions I 
wrote of my feelings of disappointment tempered by joy, surprise and disillusionment 
(Tedlock, 2000). The entries contained the biographical details of the interviewees 
and salient points that were discussed.  
 
I used the diary to reflect. These reflections were wide ranging, from fretting about 
practical issues, to my feelings about how the interview progressed. I used the diary 
to reflect on how the interviews had gone and how I could improve my next interview, 
to examine emerging themes, and to reflect on whether there were any 
contradictions which needed further research. By using the research diary, my 
research practice was challenged; that is I became self-critical about areas in the 
research methodology which needed strengthening.  
 
4.3.6 Key Informant Interviews 
 
Key informant interviews were held with 3 participants from three institutions in the 
UK and 4 in South Africa. Interviews were held with professionals, public officials, 
and other stakeholders and power players from organisations that work with 
migrants. Table 4.4 documents agencies from which key informants were drawn.  
 
Key informants were asked for their perspectives about Zimbabwean migration and 
communities in South Africa and the UK. Thus key informant interviews were used to 
delineate the various organisations and networks that comprise the Zimbabwean 
diaspora as well as to obtain data about their strategies and internal dynamics 
(Vulliamy et al., 1995), and map out the relationships between the constituencies of 
immigrant politics (Eyles and Smith, 1988). All three participants in the UK had dual 
roles; that of participants as migrants and also as key informants. This is consistent 
with a body of scholarship that advocates and emphasises the need to seek out 
people who possess knowledge about specialised interests and concerns in the 
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social setting, people whom the researcher feels are integral to the scenes and 
situations being investigated (Vulliamy et al., 1995; Hitchock and Hughes, 1989).  
 
Table 4.4 List of key informant agencies 
 
Agency Location 
Movement for Democratic Change (United Kingdom  and Ireland) Leeds 
Zimbabwe Leeds Refugee Community Organisation Leeds 
Zimbabwe Institute of Engineers United Kingdom Leeds 
International Organisation for Migration South Africa 
I Believe in Jesus Church South Africa 
Medicins San Frontiers South Africa 
Department for Home Affairs South Africa 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and will be reiterated in Chapter 6, a significant number of 
migrants in the UK have claimed membership of the MDC as part of a broader 
strategy to gain documented status; this necessitated the inclusion of an MDC official 
in the UK amongst the key informants. On the other hand, in South Africa, the 
inception of asylum permits in April 2009, which are issued at the Musina Refugee 
Reception Centre (Figure 4.3) to newly arrived migrants, has led to the involvement 
of the third sector, such as churches, in the provision of basic services such as food 
and shelter. Unlike in the UK, the government does not provide asylum seekers with 
any support, a gap that is being filled by churches such as The I Believe in Jesus. 
The IOM is also actively involved in the provision of support to migrants in South 
Africa, as are medical charities which complement the government’s efforts.   
 
4.4 Qualitative data analysis 
 
I was always aware of the process of data analysis when I was in the field, and 
began analysis soon after the data collection process was underway, thereby 
echoing Bryman’s (2001) assertion that one ought to be conscious of emerging 
themes that may require closer attention in future interviews. I had a data analysis 
plan which had been developed prior to embarking on the fieldwork (Burgess, 1991; 
Cook and Crang, 1995), but the developments in the field were such that gathering 
and analysis sometimes occurred simultaneously depending on the type of data. 
Such an approach is informed by the realisation that research is an ongoing, iterative 
and dynamic process (Bryman, 2001). Data analysis, according to Braun and Clarke 
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(2006), starts with the researcher becoming familiar with the data during transcribing 
and reading of the entire data. Transcription of the interviews was done in the UK. 
The collected data was grouped according to themes in line with Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) who suggest that the grounded theory method entails discovering 
phenomena, developing it and provisionally verifying it by subjecting it to systematic 
data collection and data analysis. Likewise, Brannen (1992) recommend the use of 
thematic analysis where data has been collected using qualitative methods such as 
interviews. Similarly, Bryman (2004) argues that by using theoretical sampling and 
coding, grounded theory aims to develop concepts, categories, hypotheses and 
substantive theories. The breaking down of the data through process coding is also 
meant to make it more manageable (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Finnegan, 1992). 
Coding entails labelling data and then archiving it according to codes in line with 
Howard’s (2002) description of codes being tags or labels attached to chunks of 
data, words, sentences, and phrases. The coding process in this study evolved 
during the process of transcription and analysis aided in no small measure by the 
NVivo package which made it easy for me to develop, link, erase, and redevelop the 
codes.  
 
The coded data was then grouped into themes, a process Braun and Clarke (2006) 
describe as a thematic approach. Thematic analysis according to Braun and Clarke 
(2006:79) is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data. Thematic analysis entails undertaking detailed searches for themes 
across a data set with a view of finding repeated patterns of meaning from the data 
set and is often characterised by a constant moving back and forth across the entire 
set of data. Emerging themes from the interviews were assessed and mapped to the 
theoretical debates outlined in Chapter 3 as well as in line with the aims and 
objectives of the study. Examples of themes which emerged from coding were 
‘IMMIGRATION STATUS’ which emerged from codes such as ‘refugee’, 
‘undocumented’, ‘work permit’, whilst ‘TRANSNATIONAL LINKS’ emerged from 
codes such as ‘contact with home’ ‘emails’ ‘remittances’ and ‘travelling home’, and 
the theme of ‘SOCIAL MOBILITY’ emerged from the synthesis of the following 
codes, ‘studying’, ‘not working’, ‘employed’ and ‘property ownership’, amongst others 
(see Chapters 5-8) (Appendix 7).  
 
Coding has been criticised by Allan (2003) for fragmenting data, causing it to lose its 
context and narrative flow. Other scholars such as St John and Johnson (2000) 
caution researchers against getting carried away and developing too many codes as 
this negates their efficient use. 
 
 4.5 Positionality: My biography and research philosophy 
 
In this section, I consider how my position (in terms of ethnicity, nationality, age, 
gender, social and economic status etc) and personal feelings influenced the 
research process (Madge, 1993). When I set out to undertake this study, I neither set 
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out to pretend nor intended to offer an objective nor even an agreed perspective on 
the understanding of the Zimbabwean diaspora and the migration-development 
nexus. I drew on the observations, lived experiences and perspectives of the people 
who are intimately involved with the Zimbabwean diaspora who include 
Zimbabweans themselves in Leeds and Limpopo, charities that work closely with 
Zimbabweans in the two countries, government officials in both countries and 
international organisations that work with Zimbabwean migrants such as IOM. There 
is a body of scholarship which discusses difficulties that an inside researcher 
researching his/her own community grapples with, and these encompass treating as 
alien the triangular issues of bias, impartiality, whilst the outside researcher 
endeavours to make the strange environment, culture and language familiar (Collins, 
1990; Abu-Lughod, 1988).  
 
My experience of the immigration system in the UK entailed dispossession of my 
agency to provide not only for myself but for my wider family who relied on me for 
their sustenance. I found the idleness that accompanies the process of obtaining 
documented status to be very difficult given that I had worked all my adult life. NASS 
accommodated me in a neighbourhood which I can characterise as dangerous and 
deprived. This experience left me feeling disempowered and dejected leading me to 
regret trying to regularise my status in the first place. I asked myself whether I had 
made the right decision to leave Zimbabwe and come to the UK to sit at home doing 
practically nothing for seven years whilst I waited for the determination of my case. 
My liaisons with the Home Office included a one month sojourn at the Oakington 
Reception Centre in Cambridge, an experience which I found humiliating and 
depressing. 
 
Drawing on my experiences as both a civil servant in Zimbabwe and my experience 
of the British immigration system, I empathically navigated my way through the 
research project. The process of acquiring documented status in the UK helped me 
to reach out to some participants who were still struggling to legalise their status; 
some looked to me for advice, asking me about how I acquired legal status. On the 
other hand, the fact that I had worked for the government in Zimbabwe scared some 
people away from participating as they are distrustful of people who worked for the 
government in Zimbabwe, viewing them as spies of President Mugabe’s government 
and his ZANU (PF) party (see Chapter 6).  
 
There is a belief within the Zimbabwean community that there are government spies 
in both South Africa and the UK who gather incriminating evidence about politically 
active migrants, which they use against their families left in Zimbabwe (Milmo and 
Sengupta, 2008). Some participants queried whether I was doing the study at the 
behest of both the British and Zimbabwean governments as a way of getting 
undocumented migrants deported. I was able to dispel these erroneous views by 
highlighting my own difficulties which I had experienced in both Zimbabwe and the 
UK. This seemed to quell their fears.  
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My gender precluded some women from agreeing to an interview with me; they had 
suffered at the hands of male members of President Mugabe’s government. Some 
study participants associated me with the heinous assaults that they or their relatives 
had been subjected to. This was put into perspective by one interviewee who for 
example, asked me whether I had abused women when I worked in the public 
service as she had been sexually abused by soldiers during the 2002 elections. 
Similarly, some male interviewees also expressed the same fears, as they were also 
victims of President Mugabe’s government’s violence.  
 
During the fieldwork, I became acutely aware of my relatively privileged position of 
having documented status whilst the cases of the majority of my compatriots had 
been refused or were still pending with the UK Border Agency, and further, of my 
education which makes me simultaneously an insider, outsider, both and neither 
(Gilbert, 1994; Mullings, 1999). As a Zimbabwean social activist living in the UK who 
has an active interest with Zimbabwean issues that confront the community in the 
UK, locally and globally, my strength as an inside researcher lay in the critical 
perspective that the situation afforded me. My role as an observing participant 
operating in my own locale made things easier than had I been an outsider.  All 
social activities are value laden, that is, they are not completely value-free (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994), and therefore there is no objectively privileged position. This is 
consistent with claims by Quicke and Winter (1994) and McDowell (1992) that a 
value-free, ‘true’ account of experience is deemed impossible thus giving credence 
to Chambers’ (1994) viewpoint about the existence of multiple rationalities co-
existing.  
 
Being an inside researcher meant I was familiar with the various meanings attached 
to words, symbols and deeds of the Zimbabwean community that are examined 
here. For example in Leeds, people use a variety of terms such as mupoteri25, 
kundopotera26 and chidhoma27 when talking about one’s immigration status. This is 
mostly used in the presence of other nationalities in order not to let them in on the 
status of a member of the community’s status or in the presence of children. The 
familiarity that I had with the contemporary Zimbabwean diaspora situation, including 
its problems, hopes and fears, especially in the Yorkshire-Humberside region 
enabled me to be more sensitive to the research participants’ perspectives.  
 
My experiences in the two countries made me an insider, outsider, and both 
(Pickering, 2001). In Leeds, I was an insider in that I resided in the city and was 
associating with my peers. Yet, on the other hand, I was an outsider to some 
participants, for example those without documented status who regarded me as 
                                                     
25
 The term is used to describe someone who has sought asylum.  
26
 This describes the act of going to seek asylum from the Home Office. 
27
 In Zimbabwean mythology, this is associated with witchcraft and it is invisible to the naked eye. In the 
context of Zimbabwean migrants, this is used to describe people who do not have documented status and are 
thus invisible to the immigration system.  
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‘different’ from them. The fact that I was also studying for a PhD degree also made 
me an outsider to those without university education.  
 
My ‘outsiderness’ was more pronounced in South Africa because of the language 
differences. I felt out of place because I could not understand the ‘street language’ 
that the younger participants were conversing in and I constantly kept asking the 
participants to explain again in a language that I could understand. The fact that I 
was living in the UK also made me the centre of attention as the participants 
appeared to be more interested in finding out how they could obtain visas to travel to 
the UK than in focussing on the subject at hand. This appeared to turn the tables and 
made me the researched.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that I had not been to Zimbabwe since 2000 furthered my 
feelings of being an outsider, and the examples that I gave of the difficult 
circumstances which existed in Zimbabwe when I left were relatively insignificant 
compared to the conditions that existed when the participants left. For example, 
when I left Zimbabwe, a loaf of bread was selling at Z$5.00 which was a lot of money 
then but seemed reasonable to the participants - it cost millions of dollars when they 
left.   
 
4.5.1 Access and gatekeepers 
 
The issue of negotiating access to the study participants for both the questionnaire 
survey and subsequent qualitative interviews was of critical importance. Compared 
to Limpopo, access in Leeds was significantly more difficult. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, people’s frenetic working schedules meant that interviews 
were cancelled, rescheduled and postponed. Secondly, as will be outlined in Chapter 
6, there is a pervasive fear of being deported. These fears about immigration status 
meant that it took longer than anticipated to complete the interviews, as some 
interviews had to be rescheduled a number of times due to last minute changes by 
participants. A significant number of Zimbabwean migrants living in Leeds are 
undocumented, which predisposes them to be suspicions of strangers, even fellow 
Zimbabweans enquiring about their immigration status.  
 
There was a tendency to view inquisitive people as ‘secret investigators’, ‘Home 
Office’, ‘Central Intelligence Officers (CIO)’ which makes people guarded about the 
information that they divulge (see Chapter 6). This resonates with the work of Hynes 
(2003) who argues that multiple insecurities shape the formation of social 
relationships among refugees whose social worlds are likely to be marked by layers 
of mistrust. Participation, for most people approached, was decided by their 
immigration status. People who had initially agreed to participate later reneged once 
discussions regarding their status began; they feared that such disclosure would, 
despite assurances of anonymity, lead to their deportation by the Home Office (see 
Section 4.6). Conversely, immigration was not a decisive factor in South Africa, as 
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Zimbabwean migrants were not being deported regardless of their status at the time 
of the fieldwork. Hence immigration status was not cited as a factor in not wanting to 
partake in the study.  
 
Exploratory visits were undertaken to homes of participants in Leeds to forge a 
trusting working relationship prior to beginning data collection. I also carried an 
original and photocopied introductory letter (Appendix 1) that I had obtained from my 
supervisor which had a section on ethics (see Section 4.6) and another letter which I 
had written which gave a background of the study (Appendix 2). I gave each 
participant, gatekeeper and key informant a copy of both letters which was significant 
in gaining trust. In Leeds, I approached community and religious leaders who made 
announcements of the study during their community events and church services. I 
was given a platform to explain the purpose of my study. 
 
I had anticipated facing difficulties in South Africa due to the fact that I was an 
outsider as I had never lived or worked there. My fears were unnecessary to a large 
extent, as the migrants in South Africa wanted to know more about my research and 
were keen on knowing my lifestyle and experiences in the UK. In some respects, this 
threatened to derail my study because instead of talking about the experiences of 
the migrants, the discussion deviated towards me, with participants wanting more 
information about how to move to the UK and how I could help them to get visas to 
come and live in the UK.  
 
4.5.2 Using translators 
 
Recent scholarship has highlighted the salience of translation in cross-cultural 
research (Smith, 2003; Twyman et al., 1999). While the emphasis of the study was 
to privilege the migrants’ voice, the issue of representation and unequal power 
relations was unavoidable especially when interviewing non-English and Shona 
speakers which lead to ‘nuances’ of language being ‘lost in translation’ (Smith, 1996: 
161). Issues of translation surfaced in South Africa where some participants did not 
speak English or Shona which I am conversant in, but spoke Ndebele, Venda or 
Tonga.  
 
The recruitment of three research assistants/translators who were familiar with the 
geography and language eased any potential problems. The assistants were trained 
over two days in all aspects of the research process including conceptualization and 
dissemination to enable the research assistants to have a full grasp of the various 
components of the study. Some of the areas that were covered in the training 
centred on recruitment, interviewing, ethics, and data handling and management e.g. 
tape recorded data and confidentiality. The training was made easier because the 
research assistants were experienced people who had undertaken researches for 
some agencies in the same area and where thus, knowledgeable about the 
geography and research process. The research assistant played an interpreting role 
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providing oral translation services during face to face interviews with respondents 
that did not speak the same language as me (Hole, 2007; Larson, 1998).  
 
The use of translators has resonance with contemporary scholarship which argues 
that researchers who fail to systematically address the methodological issues 
translators present in a cross-language qualitative research design can decrease the 
trustworthiness of the data and the overall rigour of the study (Mill and Ogilvie, 
2003). In this study, the research assistants/translators covered and bridged any 
divides that may have existed between the participants and me. The familiarity of the 
research assistants with the study area was of paramount importance and resonates 
with contemporary debates about research being a collaborative and collective 
process (Burgess, 1984). The research assistants were paid for their work which is 
consistent with research ethics of paying research assistants for their work, 
commitment and collaborative effort (Scott et al., 2006).  
 
4.6. Ethical considerations 
 
I obtained clearance from the university’s ethical committee. Indeed, ethical 
considerations took prominence role in this study due to the sensitivity of the subject 
that was being researched. As Chapter 5 will show, the study involved human 
subjects some of whom had fled political persecution and could be in danger of 
harm, depending on how the research was conducted and how the resultant 
information was handled. Such an approach resonates with Robinson and Segrott’s 
(2002) claim that access to, and building trust with, vulnerable respondents such as 
refugees and asylum seekers can be a major problem. I therefore, sought all the 
necessary clearances from institutions like the Department for Home Affairs in South 
Africa. Bryman (2001: 475) notes that we cannot ignore ethical issues in research 
since such issues ‘relate directly to the integrity of a piece of research and of the 
disciplines that are involved.’  
 
This research conformed to the following ethical considerations: 
 the do no harm principle  
 the principle of respect for autonomy 
 respect for privacy and veracity  
To this end, I strove to prevent any harm befalling the participants or to expose them 
to unnecessary risks due to their participation in the study. To achieve this, I took 
due care in handling confidential information such as recorded interviews. These 
were destroyed as soon as I finished transcribing. In addition, I ensured that all 
records and identities of participants remained confidential and participants were 
informed that any information that would have been obtained during the course of 
study was not going to be disclosed without their express permission. The use of 
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pseudonyms was another strategy that I employed in order to safeguard the safety of 
the participants who wanted their anonymity and privacy respected.  
 
The principle of respect for autonomy compelled me to respect research participants’ 
wishes, perspectives, desires, and wants regarding the research. This was achieved 
by informing the participants in writing (which was reiterated orally) prior to an 
interview of the nature of the study and their freedom to withdraw their consent and 
discontinue their participation at any time without prejudice. By so doing, the 
principle of informed consent was achieved (Appendix 8). The notion of consent 
entails participants agreeing to take part in a research project, knowing what they are 
agreeing to, and authorising the researcher to collect information from them without 
any form of coercion and/or manipulation (Bryman, 1988; Flowerdew and Martin, 
2005). In this study, the interview participants signed a consent form which was kept 
on file. Consent in this study was needed to protect the important ethical principle of 
autonomy, the right to exercise self-determination.   
 
Appropriate authority and permissions were sought in advance throughout this study 
(Collins, 1990). This was achieved by using a reference letter from my supervisors 
and an introductory letter which I had written. Furthermore, the study respected the 
participants’ rights and immigration status. All interviews were preceded by an 
introduction of myself, my background, and the reasons for wanting to do the 
interviews (Burgess, 1984). I explained the purpose of the study to the participants, 
the benefits and the possible risks that were inherent in participating in the study. I 
also emphasised the lack of material benefits to the participants.  
 
The participants in Limpopo were recompensed for their time and effort in line with 
best practices which calls for participants to be compensated for their time, effort and 
cooperation (Mullins, 1999; Winchester, 1996). I could not compensate those based 
in Leeds because of financial constraints, whilst in South Africa this was made 
possible by the favourable exchange rate. However, some participants in Limpopo 
regarded the R20 token of appreciation as too little and demanded larger sums as a 
precondition to participation. Such people were under the erroneous impression that 
I had a lot of money given that I live in the UK, and yet others stated that there were 
precedents of being handsomely paid for participating in surveys which echoes prior 
scholarship which highlighted concern about payments being made to research 
participants to maximise response rates and reduce the risk that non-respondents 
will differ significantly from respondents (Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978).  
 
Throughout the research processes, I was open with the participants and maintained 
clear lines of communication in case they changed their minds. Echoing Burgess 
(1984), I adopted a non-judgemental approach which saw participants freely 
expressing their views, which I respected. I also respected my promises to the key 
informants by feeding back the preliminary findings of the research. I kept the key 
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informants abreast of all the developments regarding the completion of my thesis 




This chapter discussed my reasons for using mixed methods to address the 
research objectives. The use of the questionnaire survey was used in conjunction 
with and supplemented by qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews 
and multi-sited ethnography in pursuit of achieving the study’s aims and objectives. 
The deployment of a mixed methodology was informed by the theoretical framework 
approach discussed in Chapter 3. However, the lack of a reliable data sample had a 
bearing on the results of the fieldwork, and possibly the results of the study, but 
these were negligible to the extent that they did not compromise the integrity of this 
research. The difficulties confronting inside researchers were explored as well as the 
complexity of researching ‘hard to reach or hidden groups’ who would otherwise 
prefer to live below the radar of officialdom. The remainder of this thesis discusses 
the results and findings of the data generated from the use of this mixed methods 
approach. Chapter 5 focuses on the causes of migration from Zimbabwe and how 



























Chapter Five A profile of the Zimbabwean Diaspora: The causes of the 
 exodus and the migration pathways into South Africa 
 and the UK 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter begins with a synopsis of the demographics of the study participants in 
order to gain a deeper understanding of Zimbabwean emigrants given the eight 
migration episodes discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter is important because it sets 
the scene and provides a background to the formation of the Zimbabwean diasporic 
communities in the two countries. It sets the context in which migrants left Zimbabwe 
and the reasons that drove them into exile. Profiling migrants will help to understand 
the differences in migration flows to South Africa and the UK. It sheds light on the 
timing of migration episodes that were discussed in Chapter 2 and delineates the 
gender, educational and the skills base, of the two migrant communities. Such an 
approach helps to ease the contestations which surround debates about migration, 
for example voluntary and involuntary migration, skilled and non-skilled migration 
(Castles, 2000). Extant literature on migration concur that migration is a 
consequence of multiple and interrelated factors in both the sending and receiving 
country (Massey et al., 1998).  
 
As such, the reasons for migrating are numerous, complex and intertwined (Chant 
and Radcliffe, 1992). Chapter 3 demonstrated the utility of transnationalism as a 
theoretical framework for explaining migration because it provides for participation of 
prior migrants settled in South Africa and the UK in perpetuating the migration 
process once begun. Furthermore, a transnational perspective to international 
migration, as highlighted in Chapter 3, is underpinned by the notions of social capital 
(Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995), remittances (De Haas, 2007), and diaspora 
(Brah, 1996; Shuval, 2000), which play integral roles in initiating, fuelling and 
sustaining migration waves and flows. The structural links that exist between 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and the UK due to factors such as colonialism, trade, and 
cultural ties cannot be underestimated (see Chapter 2) (Castles, 2000).  
 
The chapter delves deeper into the invisible machinations of this migration process, 
some of the migration waves were driven in part by the socio-economic implosion of 
the country and other complex factors. Finally, it examines the means and ways that 
migrants used to travel and enter South Africa and the UK and the reasoning behind 
them. Such an approach dispels simplistic interpretation of migration having a start 
and end point (Black, 2006) by demonstrating the multiplicity of stages and circularity 
that are inherent in the migration of Zimbabweans (see Chapter 2). The chapter is 
divided into five sections with Section 5.2 devoted to the demographics of the 
migrants, followed by Section 5.3 which tackles the period migrants entered South 
Africa/the UK. Section 5.4 examines the factors on which emigration was premised 
on while section 5.5 is devoted to an exploration of the perilous, informalised, and 
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irregular migration to South Africa and the UK. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter by 
highlighting the salient factors that would have been revealed and discussed. The 
chapter builds on the results from the survey and the in-depth interviews and 
explores in detail the reasons the migrants cited as necessitating their exit.  
 
5.2 Demographic profile of the study participants 
 
Contemporary migration literature questions the historical dominance of the male 
gender in migration literature (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Gutmann, 2003).  
As noted by De Laet (1999:13),  
 
‘The invisibility of women in international migration scholarship does not 
correspond to the reality of international migration as women migrate across 
international boundaries at approximately the same rate as men.’  
The results from survey (Figure 5.1) supports De Laet’s claim with a near equal split 
in both countries (51% female (n=102) to 49% male (n=98) in Leeds; and 44% 
female (n=229) to 56% male (n=290) in Limpopo).  
 
Figure 5.1 Respondents’ gender by country of residence (%)  
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
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Furthermore, the near equal split confirms other scholarly literature which notes an 
increase in the number of women engaging in migration independently (Curan et al., 
2006; Kanaiaupuni, 2000) due to changing global labour markets which incentivises 
both men and women to migrate in large numbers (Piper, 2008).  
 
However, the domination of men in Limpopo is in accord with findings of other 
studies about Zimbabweans in South Africa (Block, 2006; Muzondidya, 2008). 
Zimbabwean migration to South Africa has long been associated with males (Ansell, 
2001) due to socio-cultural constraints which have historically affected female 
migration. These norms obligated women to stay at home in the rural areas whilst 
men moved to urban centres in search of employment (Zinyama, 1990, 2002). 
Movement to towns during the colonial era was restricted with preference given to 
men who were able to obtain the passes28 that were needed to travel, settle and 
access paid work in towns and cities. Thus, mobility for women has historically been 
constricted, which makes these findings important in that they highlight how women 
are exercising their agency to improve their livelihoods (Boyle, 2002). 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that the age distribution for respondents in Limpopo is different 
from that of Leeds (Chi square= 135.446, df=4 and p <0.001). The population in 
Limpopo appears to be relatively young compared to that in Leeds. The majority of 
the respondents 286 out of  519 (55%) in Limpopo lie in the 18-27 age cohorts while 
in Leeds the majority, 89 out of 200 (44%) are in the 38-47 age group. In both Leeds 
and Limpopo, the economically active and reproductive 18-49 age groups appear to 
predominate. The largest difference is in the 18-27 years age group where about 
55% are in Limpopo compared to 12% in Leeds and the difference is statistically 
significant (z = -10.69, p<0.001). Most respondents in the 18-27 years category 
migrated to South Africa and most of those in the 38-47 years migrated to the UK.  
 
The age differences suggests the existence of an economically active population in 
the two countries which can be regarded as an affirmation of the devastating socio-
economic and political problems that Zimbabwe has been experiencing in the past 
decade (Barclay, 2010; Phimister, 2009). These age groups appear to have been 
disproportionately impacted by the demise of the country’s once vibrant economy 
because as earners they were supposed to provide for their families. The inability to 
find jobs to enable them to fulfil and maintain their earner status compelled them to 
leave for South Africa and the UK to seek better opportunities, as outlined in Chapter 
2.  
 
The Zimbabwean population in the UK is older compared to that in South Africa. This 
can be explained by three factors. The majority of the survey participants in Leeds 
                                                     
28
 The colonial regime required that people moving into towns have passes in their possession which they got 
from white Native Commissioners in their districts of origin prior to visiting towns. This was used to control the 
rural-urban migration.   
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arrived between 2000 and 2002 as part of the fourth and fifth migration episodes, 
which implies that they were younger when they arrived. 
 
Figure 5.2 Respondents’ age groups by country of residence %  
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
In Chapter 2, it was outlined how professionals left Zimbabwe initially for regional 
countries before moving to the UK due to worsening economic conditions. The old 
age of the UK based respondents may also be explained by the fact that these 
professionals had spent longer periods of time pursuing higher education than their 
Limpopo based counterparts many of whom left home as part of the seventh episode 
which comprised mostly of young people seeking for a fresh start elsewhere due to 
limited employment opportunities. Finally, Zimbabwean professionals who are based 
in South Africa prefer to work in Johannesburg and other major cities like Cape 
Town, which are perceived to have more opportunities than are available in towns in 
Limpopo province. Consequently, the sample population in Limpopo may have 
distorted the findings as the majority of the respondents were predominantly young, 
with little or no professional qualifications. Tellingly, those with professional 
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qualifications in South Africa who participated in the study tended to be of the same 
age as their UK based counterparts29.  
      
5.3 Period of arrival in South Africa and the UK 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the migration episodes peaked at different intervals 
(Figure 5.3). Survey data shows that migration to the UK peaked during the fourth 
migration episode between 2000 and 2002 (70%, n=140) while that to South Africa 
reached its zenith in the sixth migration episode (43%, n=221).   
 
Figure 5.3 Period of entry into South Africa/ UK (%) 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
There is a significant difference between proportions of migrants who entered South 
Africa and the UK, pre 1999, 2000-2002 and 2006-2008. A higher proportion of 
migrants entered the UK between 2000 and 2002 (70%, n=140) compared to only 
12% (n=62) in South Africa during the same period (z =15.50, p<0.001). Between 
2006 and 2008, a higher proportion of migrants entered South Africa, 43% (n=221) 
                                                     
29
 The majority of interview participants with professional qualifications such as engineering working in South 
Africa fell within the 37-48 age range which is dominant in the UK.  
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compared to 15% (n=30) in UK (z=7.04, P<0.001). Thirty nine percent (n=196) 
entered South Africa after 2009 compared to none in the UK during the same period. 
The pre 1999 proportion of migrants was higher for the UK, 12% (n=23) compared to 
South Africa, 2% (n=10) (z =5.21, p<0.001). 
 
Several factors account for these differences. Firstly, the peak in the UK coincided 
with the non-visa requirement for Zimbabwean nationals, and implementation of a 
visa requirement prompted a sharp decline in new arrivals (Pasura, 2008; Ranger, 
2005), and a gradual increase in the number of arrivals in South Africa. Secondly, 
the ascent in number of arrivals in South Africa can be attributed to the effects of 
Operation Murambatsvina (Hammar, 2008; Mawadza, 2008), the hyperinflation and 
catastrophic collapse of the Zimbabwean economy (Hanke and Kwok, 2009), the 
cholera outbreak (Koenig, 2009; Pruyt, 2009), and the political violence that 
characterised the 2008 presidential elections (Barclay, 2010; Raftopoulos, 2010).  
 
The absence of a visa regime between Harare and London until November 2002 
drew the fourth and fifth migration waves mostly to the UK, making it the preferred 
destination for many Zimbabweans (see Chapter 2). According to some 
interviewees, it was more difficult to go to South Africa than to the UK due to visa 
requirements30. Excerpts from an interview with Owen, 33, a former teacher in 
Zimbabwe whose asylum claim is still to be determined in Leeds, aptly captures this, 
‘Although I had friends in SA who could help me to get a job, I was put off by 
visa requirements. At that time, around February 2002, you needed a visa to 
go to South Africa but you didn’t need one to come here. I didn’t see the point 
[of getting a South African visa] when I could come to London without a visa. 
Besides, earning pounds was a better option than earning Rands as pounds 
fetched more on the black market.’ (Interview in Leeds, 17 October 2009) 
As a civil servant and a qualified teacher, Owen had a relatively good standard of 
living in Zimbabwe. He was able to draw on his cultural and financial capital to 
finance his trip to the UK having been influenced by, as will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, the transnational practices of prior migrants (Fussell and Massey, 2004). 
For Owen, as for many others, being a qualified teacher meant that he could 
mobilise the financial resources needed to travel to the UK.  
 
The imposition of the visa regime by London in November 2002 not only drastically 
reduced the options for Zimbabweans wanting to leave Zimbabwe, but also shrunk 
the number of new arrivals except for those who came on work permits; their 
dependants and family reunifiers (see Figure 5.3). This was confirmed in interviews 
with migrants in Limpopo. Pepukai, a 46 year old accountant who works for a 
                                                     
30
 Prior to the lifting of the visa regime between Harare and Pretoria, Zimbabweans intending to travel to South 
Africa had to provide an invitation letter and evidence of a South African host’s address; certified copy of the 
South African identity or permit; a security deposit; a valid passport; 2 passport-sized photographs; proof of 
funds in the form of traveller’s cheques amounting to R2000.00; bank statements for 3 months (DHA, 2010b) 
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financial institution who describes himself as one of those who reluctantly moved to 
South Africa after his planned trip to London floundered due to visa problems and 
lack of social capital that could have helped him to navigate the visa problems as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. 
 
‘I only came here because of visa requirements to go to London. I already had 
my ticket and was due to fly on 18th December 2002 when visas were 
imposed which meant that this was the only place that I could come. I am still 
hoping though that one day I will be able to join you in the diaspora.’ 
(Interview in Polokwane, 5 March 2010) 
Despite living away from home, Pepukai does not regard himself as a member of the 
‘diaspora.’ This view is shared by other migrants in South Africa who associate being 
in the diaspora with being away from the African continent. Secondly, as shown in 
Chapter 2, the circulatory nature of migration has led some migrants to regard South 
Africa as ‘just another place of work’ from which they can regularly travel home to be 
with their families. Interviewed migrants considered South Africa as a stepping stone 
to destinations further afield, which affirms one of the assumptions of this study: that 
migrants regard South Africa not as the final destination but as a launch pad for 
further migration (see Chapters 7 and 8). This is similar to what Collyer (2007: 668) 
calls the ‘fragmented journey’ which,   
 ‘For many migrants on these routes their destination is not determined when 
 they leave home, it may change many times during the course of the journey 
 and, whatever it is, they may never get there.’ 
Similarly, Roberts et al (1999) noted that Mexican migrants’ journey to the US 
entailed numerous stops during which the migrants build their social capital. The visa 
restrictions had the unintended consequence of channelling migrants who intended 
to travel to the UK to travel instead to South Africa and other destinations such as 
Ireland and the Netherlands where they built their social capital with the aim of 
reaching their intended destination country (see Section 5.5). 
  
5.4 The causes of migration from Zimbabwe  
 
The reasons that migrants gave for exiting Zimbabwe are numerous, complex and 
multi-faceted. Notwithstanding this complexity, the reasons for migration fall within 
the broad realm of socio-economic and political factors. The questionnaire asked the 
respondents to select the main reason which prompted their departure from 
Zimbabwe. Figure 5.4 shows that the main reason for migrating to both South Africa 
and the UK was economic/poverty/unemployment with South Africa having a higher 
proportion, 91% (n=474) compared to the UK, 49% (n=99), z=-12.46, p<0.0001). The 
UK has a higher proportion of individuals who migrated because of political violence, 
21%, (n=42) compared to South Africa, 3% (n=14) (z=8.36, p<0.001). Furthermore, 
the UK has more respondents who came to study, 10% (n=20) compared to South 
Africa, 3% (n=14) (z=4.13, p<0.001).  
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Figure 5.4 Causes of migration to South Africa and the UK % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, asylum seeking in the UK has gained currency with 
migrants as a strategy to gain documented status. This may explain why a significant 
number of respondents in the UK claim to be victims of political violence. In South 
Africa, the preponderance of economic reasons could be a consequence of 
economic factors taking precedence over political factors.  
 
5.4.1 Economic decline as the driver of emigration 
 
The neo-classical economic theory posits that migration is principally caused by 
individuals trying to maximise their income by moving from low wage areas to areas 
where their labour is sufficiently recompensed (Borjas, 1989). As outlined in Chapter 
2, some scholars have attributed the increased emigration from Zimbabwe noticed in 
the 1990s to the hardships which accompanied the introduction of ESAP in 1990 
which were felt by both professionals and non-professionals alike (Chikanda, 2010; 
Gaidzanwa, 1999; McGregor, 2008). This school of thought ascribes the suffering 
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that people were experiencing to the after effects of ESAP, which compelled 
professionals and less skilled people to leave (McGregor, 2008; Mlambo, 1997, 
2008). The survey results supports this view point as evidenced by 50% (n=99) in 
Leeds and 91% (n=474) in Limpopo participants stating that they left Zimbabwe due 
to economic hardships.  
 
Section 2.2 demonstrated the migration episodes that were spawned by a complex 
set of socio-economic factors. For example, section 2.2.3 demonstrated links 
between ESAP and the third migration episode which was comprised mostly of 
professionals, including medical personnel migrating to regional destinations like 
Botswana and South Africa where pay and working conditions were perceived to be 
better (Chikanda, 2010; Gaidzanwa, 1998). This is consistent with Stark’s (1991) 
New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory which states that apart from 
income differentials, migration can also be explained by factors such as the 
availability of employment. The case of Dr Chokuda, 48 who left Zimbabwe in 1995 
for South Africa when discontent with the government’s macro-economic policies first 
emerged helps to explicate this. He now runs a medical practice in Thohoyandou,   
  
‘I left early, way back in the mid 90s when I realised that the country was 
lurching from one crisis to the next. Remember ESAP which Chidzero (Dr 
Bernard Chidzero was independent Zimbabwe’s first Minister of Finance 
minister) described as the panacea for our economic problems and the 
damage that it caused? I was a doctor but I could not afford a car on my 
salary.’  (Interview in Thohoyandou, 24 March 2010) 
As argued by Adepoju (2000: 385), migration may be a rational endeavour to 
mitigate the dramatic impacts of the World Bank inspired austerity programmes 
which make emigration a ‘coping mechanism of last resort.’ This is clear from Dr 
Chokuda’s account which demonstrates the predicaments faced by many 
professionals at that time. Medical professionals expect to exhibit a higher standard 
of living befitting their status and society’s expectations (Hammett, 2008). Faced with 
the prospect of out of control inflation which was slowly denuding the value of the 
local currency, many Zimbabweans, professionals and non-professionals alike 
started exploring ways to leave (see Chapter 2). Until this juncture, migration was 
largely rural-urban and intra-urban but now took on a more regional dimension.  
 
Increasing inflation and worsening economic conditions encouraged more people 
from geographic areas (Table 5.1) with little or no known history of regional migration 
to migrate, thus creating the sixth and seventh migration episodes anchored on weak 
ties as outlined in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1, p. 17). The dominance of respondents 
from Harare in the UK could be attributed to superior information flows given that it is 





Table 5.1 Geographical areas of origin by country of residence % 
 





In which province were you 
born? 
Bulawayo Count 16 10 
% within Country of 
residence 
8.0% 2.0% 
Harare Count 44 10 
% within Country of 
residence 
22.0% 2.0% 
Manicaland Count 20 57 





Count 10 26 
% within Country of 
residence 
5.0% 5.0% 
Mashonaland East Count 29 36 
% within Country of 
residence 
15.0% 7.0% 
Mashonaland West Count 13 47 
% within Country of 
residence 
6.0% 9.0% 
Masvingo Count 25 125 
% within Country of 
residence 
13.0% 24.0% 
Matebeleland North Count 11 63 
% within Country of 
residence 
5.0% 12.0% 
Don't know Count 8 0 
% within Country of 
residence 
4.0% .0% 
Matebeleland South Count 8 79 
% within Country of 
residence 
4.0% 15.0% 
Midlands Count 16 66 
% within Country of 
residence 
8.0% 13.0% 
Total Count 200 519 




Interviews with Anthony, a 42 year old former temporary teacher31 who arrived in 
South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode and now lives in Phalaborwa 
and Christopher, a 31 year old former municipal artisan now living in Thohoyandou 
attest to this stereotyping,  
 
‘I grew up in Murewa (Mashonaland East province) and, as a child growing 
up, I never knew of people from our area coming here to work. It was always 
associated with people from Masvingo and Matebeleland provinces. But 2008 
changed all that.’ (Interview with Anthony, Phalaborwa, 3 March 2010) 
‘I am from Chinhoyi (Mashonaland West province), but now I have to survive 
by hawking. Working here has not been for people from my area but from 
Beitbridge and other border areas, but now I have joined them.’ (Interview 
with Christopher, Thohoyandou, 15 March 2010)  
These narratives concur with scholarly literature which was discussed in Chapter 3 
which claims that people from communities without a rich history of migration are 
less likely to migrate than those who come from communities where migration is 
prevalent (Massey and Garcia-Espafia, 1987; Massey and Espinosa, 1997). 
However, the searing poverty that was experienced in Zimbabwe compelled Anthony 
and Christopher to break with tradition and move to South Africa thereby opening up 
new frontiers of migration for their families, friends and relatives. Anthony and 
Christopher’s cases demonstrate that migration in South Africa, far from being the 
preserve of people in border areas, is now arguably a countrywide phenomenon. 
Notwithstanding this expansion, people from the provinces that border South Africa 
still predominate, though this is reducing.  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, health and social care professionals left their jobs in 
droves after being enticed by the prospects of higher pay and better working 
conditions in the UK and other western countries in the late 1990s (Borjas, 1999). 
There had been well documented strikes in the Zimbabwean public service due to 
low pay and poor working conditions since 1989 (Chikanda, 2010; Gaidzanwa, 
1999). Moreover, their decision to migrate to the UK was aided in no small measure 
by the structural links that existed between the two countries which converted 
potential migration into actuality (Sassen, 1988). This is supported by interviewees 
who arrived in Leeds in 1998 who spoke of being offered ‘astronomical sums of 
money’ which they could not decline. As Eliza, 47, a former matron at a national 
referral hospital in Harare who now works at Leeds NHS Trust says,  
 
‘I was a matron at a Harare hospital earning a modest salary which I was 
comfortable with. Then these people from London came and offered me a job 
on a salary yearly of £26,000. I quickly did the maths; £26,000.00 was 
Zim$2,600,000.00 on the black market. With this sum, I could buy a house in 
the northern suburbs and kiss goodbye to Mabelreign (a medium to low 
                                                     
31
 Temporary teachers are hired to alleviate the chronic shortage of qualified teachers. Temporary teachers are 
paid less than their qualified counterparts.  
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density suburb in Harare). I didn’t need to think twice about it, I just got on the 
next plane for London.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009) 
The ability to afford airfares differentiates Eliza from other migrants who decided to 
go to South Africa because of the exorbitant cost of travelling. This is one of the 
arguments of this thesis: that class played a critical role in channelling migrants to 
different destinations. As Banerjee and Duflo (2008:12) posit,  
 ‘migration decisions of the middle class differ substantially from those of the 
 extremely poor; unlike the poor...migration takes the middle class further as 
 they have the means to move.’ 
Consistent with Banerjee and Duflo’s argument, it can be inferred that Eliza, like 
others of her ilk, was able to actualise her migration intentions because she was able 
to raise the airfare. Social mobility was paramount in Eliza’s decision to accept the 
job offer to work in the UK as evidenced by her reference of buying a house in the 
luxurious northern suburbs where the upper class live. Investing in property as 
outlined in Chapter 3 is also an indication of migrants’ return intentions.  
 
The chronic foreign currency shortages in Zimbabwe provided the means through 
which Eliza’s hopes of social mobility could be realised. These shortages gave rise 
to illicit foreign currency trading on the black market (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). 
The government still maintained a firm grip on the foreign currency exchange market 
and set exchange rates which did not reflect the perilous state of the Zimbabwean 
dollar (Bloch, 2006). Consequently, the few people with access to forex shunned the 
formal banking system in favour of the more profitable parallel market. It became an 
aspiration for many to work away from home where they would be paid in forex 
which could then be used for property acquisition. Hence, it is not surprising that 
Eliza accepted the job she had been offered; she was thinking of how much it 
equated to in Zimbabwean dollar terms. Her motivations for migrating therefore fall 
within the realm of NELM theory in which individuals migrate to maximise their 
income by moving from low to high wage economies (Borjas, 1989; Stark, 1991).  
 
Chapter 3 discussed how people migrate in order to save enough money for a 
specific target e.g. buying or building a house. The collapse of the economy meant a 
shortage of jobs which had a bearing on people’s ability to get mortgages. Exiting 
Zimbabwe provided the only realistic hope for Zimbabweans who could not access 
mortgages to own property. Against this backdrop, it is therefore not surprising that 
the desire to own a property was mentioned by an overwhelming majority of 
participants in both the survey and interviews, and it transcended social classes. 
While some professionals may have owned houses in towns, the majority were not 
property owners prior to leaving Zimbabwe. Owning a house in Zimbabwe is highly 
regarded and signifies social mobility. Interviews with migrants in Leeds and 
Limpopo attest to this, as exemplified by Shadreck, a 39 year old Leeds resident and 
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asylum seeker who left home in 2002 and claimed asylum in 2008 (see Chapters 2 
and 6).  
‘I left Zim (Zimbabwe) because I wanted to make money and buy/build my 
own house. I was staying in one room with my wife and three children in 
Mabvuku32. I heard that people were coming to London, working for 6 months 
and then buying a house. Although I had a fairly good job, I didn’t make 
enough money to buy a stand (residential stand on which to build a house), 
let alone a house. So I came here hoping to make enough money to buy my 
own house or build one. I managed to do that within 6 months. I am now a 
proud owner of four houses in the low density suburbs but this came at a cost 
as I could not go back home and eventually couldn’t work due to employers 
becoming strict about papers so had to go and claim about a year ago.’ 
(Interview in Leeds, 28 October 2009) 
As Chapter 6 will demonstrate, asylum seeking is used by many migrants to legalise 
their immigration status. Shadreck’s case confirms this. He is one of the target 
savers who after achieving their targets decided not to return home and claimed 
asylum to legalise his immigration status. Shadreck’s narrative demonstrates the 
changes that accompany migrants’ immigration statuses. His status changed from 
being an economic migrant who entered the UK as a visitor, to claiming asylum to 
prolong his stay (Table 2.3, p. 23). In his study of Zimbabwean migrants in Britain, 
Pasura (2008a) shows how they switch between different immigration statuses in 
order to incrementally extend their stay in Britain. It has been shown in Chapter 2 
how most asylum claims in the UK were made inside the country, a significant 
number of them several years of the expiry of the original visa. Shadreck’s case is 
emblematic of many other migrants in the UK.  
 
The surge in inflation resulted in the capitulation of ‘staunch patriots’ i.e. migrants 
who self described in interviews as supporters of President Mugabe’s government 
and had fought with him during the 1970s liberation war. As argued in Chapter 2, 
President Mugabe caused the descent of the economy by awarding war veterans 
gratuities for their participation in the liberation war and eliciting their support to 
invade white owned commercial farms (Sachikonye, 2003). According to Raftopoulos 
(2009), the hyperinflationary condition prevailing in the country reduced the local 
currency to virtual worthlessness. Similarly, the World Bank (2008) claimed that 
Zimbabwe had the world’s fastest shrinking economy for a country not at war. 
Against this cataclysmic collapse, it is therefore not surprising to hear the ‘patriots’ 
who benefited from patronage talking of having had enough of the suffering they 
were experiencing despite their relatively privileged position. These ‘patriots’ told me 
that they left home in 2008 for South Africa and the UK reluctantly, after realising that 
the socio-economic situation was not improving (see Chapter 2). The following 
excerpts from staunch ‘patriots’ like Nelson, a 55 year old war veteran who 
                                                     
32
 Mabvuku is a high density suburb in Harare. It is not uncommon to find several families living in one house 
due to the acute shortage of housing in high density suburbs in Harare and indeed other towns and cities in 
Zimbabwe.  
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abandoned the farm which he invaded at the height of the land reform programme, 
to join his wife, Eliza (p. 108) in the UK and Matongo, 58, a former colonel in the 
Zimbabwe National Army now domiciled in Limpopo shed light on this 
metamorphosis,   
 
‘I am a war veteran; I fought against the (colonial) system and never thought 
that I would leave my own country for another, worst of all the UK. It is any 
irony of the highest order that I fought against the British and drove them 
away from Zim (Zimbabwe) yet I am now here eking a living as a security 
guard. I didn’t want to come here, I could have come way back in ‘99 when 
my wife first came but I didn’t because things were still ok at home. I was a 
chef (boss), in charge of policing an entire province. I got a very big farm 
during the jambanja (violent take-over of white owned farms) but unfortunately 
things didn’t work out well...things were unbearably tough in Zimbabwe and 
when you see die hard Mugabe people like me leaving; then you know how 
bad things were. Inflation was in trillions. You guys who came here early didn’t 
see anything; you were talking of inflation in 1999/2000; that was nothing.’ 
(Interview with Nelson in Leeds, 31 October 2009) 
‘To see a man like me leave the country that I fought to liberate should tell you 
something. I don’t give up easily; I joined the struggle at 17 and was a colonel 
when I went AWOL (absent without official leave). Things were hard in 
Zimbabwe in 2008, despite the preferential treatment that people of my rank 
were getting in accessing forex, foodstuffs, farms etc; it was still hard. I think 
we were just getting the crumbs while those higher up were the ones enjoying 
it all, but you hear people saying soldiers were eating but it’s not true, we 
were also struggling. In the end, when this opportunity came, I could not resist 
the temptation of taking this job as a security manager of this mine.’  
(Interview with Matongo, Musina, 7 May 2010) 
These two accounts capture the metamorphosis in the thinking and experiences of 
people who are closely associated with the regime of President Mugabe, people who 
are largely responsible for and materially benefited from the demise of the once 
prosperous country. It is through the actions of ZANU (PF) and its war veterans like 
Nelson and Matongo that the country has gone from a bread basket to a basket case 
(Barclay, 2010; Chan, 2003). Nelson compares and differentiates the levels of 
inflation at the turn of the century and in 2008 to highlight the devastating effect that 
it had on ordinary people’s lives. Implicit in these narratives is the fact that ordinary 
people felt the ravages of economic decline more than the politically connected 
people such as Nelson33, who benefited from the transnational activities of his wife 
(Asis et al., 2004) (see Chapter 7).   
 
While Nelson and Matongo’s cases may represent isolated examples of privileged 
migrants who left during the height of the economic problems (see Section 2.2.7), 
                                                     
33
 Politically connected people also happened to be economically connected due to the inextricable link between 
politics and economic issues in Zimbabwe under the leadership of President Mugabe. The complex relationship 
between politics and economics can be argued to be part of the patronage that President Mugabe uses 
masterfully to prolong his reign in power. 
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most migrants in South Africa felt the full wrath of the precipitous economic decline 
because they left at the height of the economic crisis. Hyperinflation eroded the 
purchasing power of the local currency. As noted by Hanke and Kwok (2009), 
hyperinflation in November 2008 reached 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000% 
compared to 65% in 2000 when most migrants in the UK, like Eliza (p. 108), left 
(Chitekwe and Mitlin, 2001). Furthermore in 2008, job losses were widespread. The 
economic crisis appears to have affected all people regardless of ethnicity or gender 
as will be shown by the cases below. Both male and female migrants irrespective of 
class appear to have been equally affected by the deteriorating economic conditions 
in Zimbabwe. There is a strong correlation between the economic factors and the 
year of departure as the case of Seshegho resident, Davidson, a 37 year old 
engineer demonstrates,  
 
‘You couldn’t stay there because it was uninhabitable; it was like living in a 
desert. I don’t know how to describe it for you to understand, because words 
can’t describe the suffering that we went through, the hardships that we saw 
and felt. If you were there in 2008, you would understand what I am trying to 
say. It was tough; the money was worthless for most of us who didn’t have 
access to forex.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 8 April 2010)  
Davidson lays bare the problems and economic difficulties faced by formally 
employed people in Zimbabwe in 2008. He equates living in Zimbabwe to living in a 
desert due to the prevailing hardships that confronted people. It further illustrates the 
helplessness that people felt as they watched the currency collapse under the strain 
of hyperinflation. The majority of both the survey and interview participants ascribed 
the economic hardships to President Mugabe and his government (see for instance, 
Barclay, 2010; Mlambo, 2009; Phimister, 2009; Raftopoulos, 2009).  
 
Some scholars have argued that migration is a livelihood strategy for the poor (De 
Haan, 2006; Rogaly et al., 2002) while others claim that it is the preserve of the 
middle class (Scott, 2006). Evidence from the Zimbabwean exodus does not 
conform to these common stereotypes due to its complexity. For example, it 
comprised of mixed flows of skilled professionals and non-skilled people, refugees 
and economic migrants. Some of the migrants do not conform to the archetypical 
definition of poor people as they were from relatively privileged backgrounds but 
were still compelled to leave because of the difficult economic circumstances 
prevailing in Zimbabwe. The following section discusses the nexus between 
migration and loss of livelihood.   
 
5.4.2 Loss of livelihoods 
 
Attendant to the economic problems highlighted in the preceding section, was the 
loss of livelihoods for some survey (8%, n=13 in Leeds; and 1%, n=8% in Limpopo) 
and interview participants who owned businesses on which they depended for their 
sustenance which spawned migration episodes 5, 6 and 7 discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Amongst this group were commercial farmers who lost their farms to the violent 
takeover beginning in June 2000, bankers and bureau de change owners following 
the closure and hounding of bankers by the new Central Bank Governor, Gideon 
Gono, and informal traders whose operations were disrupted by operation 
Murambatsvina in 2005. Dan, a 52 year old former white commercial farmer in 
Banket, Mashonaland West province who is now leasing a farm in Limpopo is in this 
category, 
 
‘I lost everything that my father and grandfathers had worked hard for, to the 
extent that I feel like my whole life was taken from me, just like that, in a flash. 
I can’t describe the feeling…I was born on the farm, my parents are buried 
there, so are my grandparents. I guess I am lucky, I have managed to start 
something down here…others were not so fortunate.’ (Interview in Musina, 26 
March 2010) 
This quote highlights the anguish that white commercial farmers felt when they lost 
their farms and livelihoods. For Dan, the loss of the farm not only entailed financial 
ruin but also symbolised a ‘disconnect’ with his past given that his parents and 
grandparents were buried on the farm. Such losses were not only inflicted on white 
Zimbabweans, but were also felt by the people who worked on the farms, as in the 
case of Darios, a 25 year old former farm labourer in Chiredzi, Masvingo Province 
now residing in Giyani.  
‘I came here because baas (white commercial farmer) lost the farm, it was 
invaded and we were told to go home. The new people didn’t need workers; it 
was taken by people from maruzevha34 (reserves) in Zaka. I didn’t have 
anywhere to go; I was born on the farm to a Mozambican father and a 
Zimbabwean mother. I had to come here as others who had homes in the 
villages went back to their villages and some like me, had to think of 
somewhere else to go.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010) 
Darios’ case is illustrative of thousands other people who were ejected from their 
places of work during the violent land reform programme (see for instance, 
Alexander, 2006; Sachikonye, 2003). Rendered stateless, disenfranchised and 
ineligible for resettlement under the fast track land reform as highlighted in Chapter 
2, a number of people such as Darios chose to leave for South Africa where they 
hoped to find jobs in the agricultural sector.  
 
Black elites were not spared either, as the case of George, a 47 year old former 
owner of a financial services institution who now runs a financial services company 
in Leeds, epitomises, 
 
‘I left in 2004 when Gono (Gideon Gono, Reserve Bank Governor) was 
persecuting bankers left, right and centre, soon after he took over the reins at 
                                                     
34
 The colonial regime used the term reserve to describe the communal areas where black people lived in 
villages.  
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the apex bank. Remember when he came in, he labelled us (bankers) as 
economic saboteurs, accusing us of externalising foreign currency.’ (Interview 
in Leeds, 28 November 2009) 
The loss of livelihoods transcended social class (Scoones and Woolmer, 2003). 
George’s experiences are typical of the fate suffered by emerging black elites who 
were persecuted and scapegoated by President Mugabe’s government for the 
economic malaise in which the country was wallowing (Mawere, 2009). A number of 
well known business people were hounded out of the country for illegally 
externalising foreign currency. The state tried, through the arrests, to deflect 
attention from its own failings, and sought to blame the economic problems that were 
being experienced on malfeasance by business people.   
 
It was not only successful black elites who suffered the wrath of President Mugabe’s 
government as the crackdown was extended to the informal sector. As explained in 
Chapter 2, the infamous Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out the Trash) resulted in 
hundreds of thousands of people being dispossessed of their livelihoods, some of 
whom emigrated to South Africa and the UK as part of the sixth migration wave. With 
their livelihoods destroyed, some migrants such as Fadzai; a 29 year old single 
mother moved to Musina,   
 
‘I lost all my wares at the flea market in Harare. My property was also 
destroyed in the two room cottage that I was renting in Highfield. I didn’t have 
any alternative except to go either go to my rural home (Mutoko) or to come 
here. I decided to come here after leaving my daughter with my mother at our 
rural home.’ (Interview in Musina, 29 February 2010) 
Fadzai’s case is not isolated; Murambatsvina was indiscriminate. The high density 
areas which are inhabited by the poor felt the impact more than their middle and 
upper class counterparts who resided in the low density northern suburbs. The 
reasons for this are three fold. Firstly, because there had been a population 
explosion in the high density areas which resulted in house owners erecting 
unapproved structures on their properties which they were sub-letting to homeless 
people working in both the formal and informal sectors. Secondly, there had been a 
mushrooming of housing cooperatives which had sprung up since the late 1980s, 
offering stands to their members in zoned land, thereby violating planning laws. 
Finally, the informal economy was heavily concentrated in the high density suburbs, 
because that is where the poor live. This bolsters my argument about the role of 
class in channelling migrants to different destinations. Fadzai, unlike George, was 
compelled to settle in South Africa because she did not have the same resources as 
George, who after losing his business moved to the UK where he now operates 
another business.  
 
The use of violence on perceived opponents of the government increased 
dramatically after 2000 when ordinary people began being persecuted for freedom of 
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expression. Having watched the destruction of their livelihoods, some Zimbabweans 
felt obligated to follow their countrymen who had exited earlier. 
  
5.4.3 Growing political intolerance, violence and repression 
 
Despite the widely reported incidences of political violence against opposition MDC 
supporters by President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party supporters (HRW, 2008; 
McGregor, 2008; SPT, 2008), the results of this study do not support this widely held 
perception. The attacks against opposition supporters are reported to have peaked 
during the presidential run-off in June 2008 (SPT, 2010). It is therefore surprising 
that, despite leaving at the height of political problems, only 3% (n=13) of survey 
participants in Limpopo compared to 21% (n=42) in Leeds ascribed their departure 
to political persecution, violence, and safety and security issues (Figure 5.4, p. 102). 
Three factors could account for this. Firstly, the politically active migrants may have 
moved to metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg and Cape Town where there 
are vibrant MDC structures while others moved to the UK after a sojourn in South 
Africa. Secondly, it could be that the period of extreme political violence coincided 
with the height of the economic problems to the extent that those interviewed 
considered their economic problems took precedence over political ones. Thirdly, it 
may be that the migrants surveyed in Limpopo were not politically active, and 
resided in areas which were not affected by violence. This may suggest that the 
media coverage of political violence were exaggerated.   
 
Interview insights suggest that migrants based in South Africa experienced and 
witnessed worse levels of political violence than their UK counterparts the majority of 
who left between 2000 and 2002 when it was not too pronounced. It seems, from the 
interview and secondary data, as though ZANU (PF) resorted to brute force to beat 
the electorate into submission, leading to the death of over 500 MDC supporters 
during the run-off period in June 2008 (HRW, 2009; MDC, 2009) compared to less 
than 12 deaths in the 2002 presidential elections (Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, 
2003). The experiences of Ntokwazi, a 26 year old MDC activist in Gokwe, Midlands 
province, now living in Ellisras in Limpopo encapsulates the pain and suffering that 
people who were perceived by ZANU (PF) to be MDC supporters endured, 
 
‘I had to leave home because the CIO (central intelligence organisation), 
soldiers and green bombers wanted me dead. They killed my comrades, two 
of them in broad daylight, and, had I not escaped, I could also be dead. The 
party (MDC) gave me some money which I used to come here. I will, 
however, return home; Zimbabwe is my home.’ (Interview in Ellisras, 17 
March 2010) 
Scholars such as Brah (1996) argue that diasporas embody notions of a home from 
which migrants were expelled and to which they aspire to eventually return, as will 
be outlined in Chapter 8. Ntokwazi’s narrative is consistent with this thinking as he 
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regards Zimbabwe as his home to which he will one day return. He considers his 
existence in South Africa as enforced and temporary.  
 
A sizeable percentage of the survey respondents (21%, n=42) in Leeds attributed 
their departure from home to political persecution and safety and security issues 
which were backed by interviews. This is surprising given that when most of them left 
(2000-2002), violence was not as extreme as it was during the 2008 elections. It may 
be that their claim of political persecution is imagined, exaggerated or both. Thus, 
claims of political activism in the UK, as will be argued in Chapter 7, could be a 
strategy to get documented status. An interview with UK domiciled key informant 
confirms the use of political activism as a strategy to get documented status by most 
migrants. Zenzo, a 44 year old MDC UK and Ireland executive committee member, 
who has refugee status explains,  
 
‘To be honest, I don’t think many of us who claim to have escaped violence 
and political persecution in Zimbabwe really mean it. We are just economic 
migrants who play the system. Have you noticed how people make claims 
every time the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) rules in favour of 
Zimbabweans in test cases? We saw it recently when the papers reported 
that the number of asylum applications rose 96% from January to March 
2009. People just claim to have been MDC supporters when they were 
nowhere near the MDC. I write supporting letters to the Home Office for some 
asylum seekers who know absolutely nothing about the party, don’t even 
support the party; I am only doing so because they are fellow Zimbabweans 
who need to work to support their families at home.’  (Interview in Leeds, 22 
October 2009) 
Zenzo’s narrative is revealing because some commentators have expressed 
reservations about the authenticity of some asylum claims (Hart, 2005). His 
assertions about the number of asylum claims rising exponentially every time the AIT 
rules in favour of migrants’ applications against deportation helps to explain the 
number of asylum claims made in country. Moreover, it sheds light on the increases 
in the number of new asylum claims and fresh claims that migrants make (Table 2.4, 
p. 32).  
 
5.4.4 Family Reunion 
 
Castles (2002) has highlighted the importance of family reunion in propelling and 
perpetuating migration cycles leading to the formation of migration chains. Data from 
the survey (Figure 5.5) shows that cohabitation is a growing trend in both Leeds 
(30%, n=60) and Limpopo (27%, n=141) with the former having more respondents in 
cohabitation relationships than the latter. However, the difference is not statistically 
significant (z=0.80, p=0.421). The number of respondents who reported being 
married are evenly spread in the two areas (Leeds, 26%, n=51; and 26%, n=133 in 
Limpopo).  
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Figure 5.5 Respondents’ marital statuses by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010  
Documented migrants are able to bring their immediate family members in both 
countries. In the survey, family reunion was at 13% (n=26) of the respondents, a 
more significant reason for moving to the UK than to South Africa (2%, n=10). This 
can be accounted for by two factors. Migrants in Leeds left their families behind 
when they first emigrated as outlined in Chapter 2. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, most migrants, especially in the UK, initially intended to stay for six 
months or less, during which they worked and saved for their targets. However, as 
conditions at home deteriorated, migrants deferred their return intentions while 
others sought to formalise their status by claiming asylum or switching to student 
visas or other immigration statuses (see Chapter 6). Once they became 
documented, migrants took steps to be reunited with their families.  
 
In South Africa, family reunion has different impetuses due to the context of 
migration practices. Here, the circulatory nature of migration, which sees migrants 
shuttling back and forth more frequently than those in the UK (see Section 2.4 and 
Chapter 8), diminishes the need for family reunion. Moreover, immigration status is 
not a significant constraint to movement in South Africa; in the UK the reunification of 
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families only occurs after obtaining documented status. The case of Darios whose 
case we have encountered earlier (p.113), exemplifies this, 
 
‘My wife is at home of course, why would she need to be here? She stays at 
home with the kids and she has been here once or twice but it’s difficult to 
come here with a baby on her back. If she had a passport maybe, but 
because she has to walk like the other border jumpers, it makes it difficult. I 
go home frequently so she doesn’t really need to come. It has always been 
that way, remember our fathers used to work away and we stayed at home 
with our mothers? Its tradition, wives stay at home and men work away and 
visit home whenever they can.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010) 
This excerpt demonstrates how circulation as outlined in Chapter 2, curtails family 
reunification (see Chapters 6 and 8). Other factors include the dangers associated 
with informal migration and socio-cultural norms which require wives to stay at home 
doing reproductive roles like caring for the children and community (Ansell, 2001; 
Dodson, 1998) which Collins (1994) terms community ‘motherwork’.  
 
In Leeds, insights gained from interviews suggest that the females (15%, n=15) 
came to join their husbands who had obtained documented status such as refugee 
status; while men such as Nelson (p. 110) (11%, n=11) came to join their wives who 
had emigrated earlier on work permits. The majority of men with refugee status had 
left their wives at home when they first came. This resonates with Martin’s (2005) 
observation that the main reason for migration is an indicator of social roles of 
women and men. Male migrants moved to the UK in their role as earners (Thébaud, 
2010). This is encapsulated by the case of Shamiso, 42 who recently joined her 
husband in Leeds together with her children having remained in Zimbabwe when he 
came to the UK in 1999.  
 
‘I am still new here; I arrived in June last year (2008). I stayed at home when 
baba vaTonde35 (Tonde’s father) came in 1999. I was beginning to doubt 
whether we will be together ever again and I thought he didn’t want me to 
come. I didn’t believe what he was telling me that he didn’t have papers for 
me to come especially when other wives were coming here to join their 
husbands and other husbands were coming home yet he was saying he 
couldn’t come. I was beginning to believe that he had remarried here.’ 
(Interview with Shamiso, Leeds, 22 November 2009) 
 
Shamiso’s narrative typifies that of many transnationalised Zimbabwean families who 
negotiate the economic opportunity structures of two nation-states to sustain 
themselves economically (Schmalzbauer, 2001). Darios and Shamiso’s cases 
demonstrate that transnational families are not a new phenomenon (Foner, 2000; 
Glick Schiller, 1999a). Shamiso’s statement brings to the fore the tensions that 
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 In Zimbabwe, married people are referred to by the names of their children, usually the first born child. 
Shamiso calls her husband not by his first name but by his son’s (Tonde) name. Shamiso is also called Mai 
Tonde (mother of Tonde). This is done as a sign of respect as it is considered to be disrespectful to call an adult 
with a child by their first name. However, this practice is gradually reducing due to westernisation.  
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transnational living engenders in families, as evidenced by Shamiso’s doubts about 
her relationship. 
 
 5.4.5 The pursuit of higher education in South Africa and the UK 
 
The human capital theory of Sjaastad (1962) emphasises the importance of personal 
assets like skills, education, and physical abilities. As De Haas (2010b) elucidates, 
the human capital theory helps us to theoretically explain the selectivity of migration 
beyond explanations focusing only on costs. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the 
esteem in which the British education system to a greater extent, and South African 
education system to a lesser extent, is held in Zimbabwe due to structural links built 
during the colonial era. This esteem has proved to be enduring if judged by the 
number of Zimbabweans who continue to move to South Africa and the UK to study 
(Figure 5.4, p. 105). In accord with Bian’s (2002) argument, higher education in 
Zimbabwe has until recently been critical in ushering social mobility. It was and 
continues to be regarded in some circles as a safe path to social mobility and 
economic prosperity (Ranger, 2005).  
 
The evidence from the survey shows that 10% (n=20) and 3% (n=14) of the 
respondents moved to the UK and South Africa for study purposes respectively. 
Moreover, evidence from both the survey and interviews indicate relatively high 
levels of educational endowments in both countries, if judged by the qualifications 
that the survey respondents held on arrival in South Africa and the UK. These 
findings are consistent with other studies of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa 
and the UK which concludes that Zimbabwean migrants appear to be better 
educated than most migrants (Bloch, 2008; Makina, 2007).  
 
Figure 5.6 shows that a higher proportion of respondents in the UK were holding 
college diplomas 43% (n=85) compared to their South Africa based counterparts, 
22% (n=115), a difference which is statistically significant (z=5.63, p<0.001) which 
supports one of the aims of this thesis that migrants in Leeds have higher 
educational capital than their Limpopo based counterparts. The same trend was 
observed for undergraduate degrees, where 12% (n=23) of the UK based 
respondents held undergraduate degrees compared to 5% (n=25) of their South 
Africa based counterparts, a difference which is statistically significant (z=3.308, 
p=0.0009). There are more respondents in South Africa with primary and secondary 
level education than in the UK. The high percentage of respondents with secondary 
school level of education again appears to affirm this argument as they did not 







Figure 5.6 Respondents’ educational qualifications on departure by country 
  of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The study revealed that some of the people who moved to the UK to pursue nursing 
studies did not have sufficient ‘A’ level points needed to gain entry into the local 
universities. This scenario is exemplified by Irvine, 36, who lives in Leeds and came 
to the UK in the late 90s to study nursing at one of the universities in London, 
 
‘I finished my As (Advanced level) in 1995. I couldn’t go UZ (University of 
Zimbabwe) as I only got 636 points. I think to get into university then you 
needed a minimum of 9 or 10 depending on the programme you wanted to 
do.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 December 2010) 
 The above case highlights the competitive nature of the Zimbabwean higher 
education system where entry is on the basis of advanced level passes as it is in the 
UK (Ranger, 2005). However, it could be that at the time of migrants’ arrival in the 
                                                     
36
 Admission to universities in Zimbabwe is largely based on academic attainment. Under the points system, 
A=5 points; B=4 points; C=3 points; D=2 points and E=1 point. Students study a minimum of 3 subjects at A 
Level.  
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late 1990s, nursing was not popular with British people which enabled overseas 
students such as Irvine to enrol despite their seemingly poor Advanced level passes.  
 
While some migrants arrived in the UK with little education, a number of these 
migrants have furthered their education or had enrolled in institutions of higher 
learning. This can be ascribed to the accessibility of higher education in the UK. 
Interestingly, more women than men have attained undergraduate degrees in the UK 
which suggests that being in the diaspora has opened opportunities for migrants 
(see Chapter 6). Interviews suggested that many migrants with documented status 
had either completed their university education or were enrolled in either full-time or 
part-time studies in further education colleges. For example, some migrants did not 
have any ‘O’ levels on arrival in the UK but have been accepted on university 
courses due to their experience in lieu of formal academic qualifications. The case of 
Lynne, a 35 year old woman resident in Leeds who arrived as part of the fourth 
migration episode, encapsulates this,  
 
 ‘I came here having stayed in South Africa for three years. I entered as a 
 visitor but once I got my papers, I applied to go to university. I am now a 
 cardiac nurse. I only had four Cs at ‘O’ Level and I would not have dreamt of 
 going to university if I were at home. Now I have a degree from a Russell 
 group university, something that people at home can only dream of.’ 
 (Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the increase in the number of migrants moving to the UK 
for higher education coincided with the availability of bursaries for nursing students 
under Project 2000. Information about the existence of nursing bursaries flowed 
within knowledge fields echoing Lee’s (1966:55) observation about migration taking 
place within well-defined ‘streams’, from specific places at the origin to specific 
places at the destination. This, according to De Haas (2010b), stems from the highly 
localised nature of opportunities and the flow of knowledge back to the country of 
origin from destination countries, which facilitates the passage for later migrants.  
 
5.4.6 Social networks and the lure of others’ accomplishments 
 
The integral role of social capital in initiating and maintaining migration was 
discussed in Chapter 3 (Castles, 2003; Massey et al., 1993, 1999; Portes, 1999). 
Consequently, the role played by social networks in Zimbabwean migration should 
not be underestimated. Data from the questionnaire survey reveals that 28% (n=146) 
and 70% (n=139) of survey respondents in South Africa and the UK respectively 







Figure 5.7 Whether migrants received any help from prior migrants already 
  settled in South Africa/UK while you were still in Zimbabwe?  
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
This appears to support one of the hypotheses of this study: that UK based migrants 
had links to richer streams of social capital, which aided their migration by helping 
with the airfares, than their South African counterparts. It was demonstrated in 
Section 2.2.7 how the seventh migration episode to South Africa comprised of 
people from all parts of the country, some of whom did not have any known history of 
migration. These ‘new’ migrants e.g. Anthony (p. 108) did not have social networks 
in South Africa from which to tap; this is reflected by only 28% having received any 
help from migrants prior to departure (Figure 5.7). As shown in Chapter 2, circulation 
which is practised by a significant number of migrants in South Africa negates the 
need for social networks as opposed to the UK. 
 
Decisions about destinations were made with the consultation and acquiescence of 
other actors such as prior migrants in the destination country (Massey, 2003; Stark, 
1991). The transnational activities of pioneer migrants were critical in decisions to 
emigrate. For example, migrants who moved to South Africa as part of the seventh 
episode compared their fortunes and achievements with those who had moved 
 123 
during the fourth migration wave who appeared to be better off thereby strengthening 
their resolve to leave. The case of Dickson, 33, illustrates this point. Prior to moving 
to South Africa and settling in Tzaneen in 2007, he worked as an electrician in 
Zimbabwe. Most people of his generation in his village dropped out of school and 
went to South Africa where they worked. They would normally meet during 
Christmas holidays when the South African based migrants returned home (see 
Chapter 2).  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, majoni-joni neither have educational nor professional 
qualifications but appear to be better off than their counterparts at home. The majoni-
joni who lead transnational lives had told Dickson about their success in South Africa 
and how he too could be successful if he joined them.  
 
‘I came here because of Joseph, a former classmate who lives in my village. 
He dropped out of primary school in grade 6 and crossed the river. He came 
home every Christmas with a new car full of goodies for his mother and 
family. I have ‘A’ levels but nothing to show of it. Joseph has built a big 
house... a 4 bedroomed house ...I couldn’t buy anything for my family at 
Christmas. He told me there were opportunities for skilled people like me. I 
came with him and stayed with him briefly when I got here.’ (Interview in 
Tzaneen, 26 April 2010) 
According to Crisp (1999), social networks enable other migrants to follow peers, 
utilising the provision of information about job opportunities, money for 
transportation, and accommodation.  
 
A total of 139 out of 200 (70%) and 145 out of 519 (28%) respondents in Leeds and 
Limpopo respectively stated that they had received some help from migrants who 
were already in the UK and South Africa while they were still at home. It can be 
argued that information channelled in this way enables the perpetuation of certain 
forms of migration, in this case, informal migration. This is because the networks in 
which Dickson is embedded consist of informal migrants and would therefore tend to 
attract likeminded individuals. Winkels, (2004) in his study of Vietnamese migration, 
discovered that a major motivational factor for migration was the presence of 
relatives or friends in places of destination. Dickson’s narrative exemplifies this. It 
illuminates how migrants obtained information about the existence of job 
opportunities. Dickson, like many of his counterparts, was able to convert his 






Figure 5.8 Type of help received from prior migrants when still in Zimbabwe 
by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Once a decision had been made to exit Zimbabwe, migrants relied on a range of 
sources to sponsor their journey (Figure 5.9). The results appear to show that a 
significant percentage of the survey respondents self sponsored their journeys.  
South Africa had a higher proportion of self funders 57% (n=294) compared to the 
UK, 48% (n=96). Significantly, the UK based migrants, had at 22% (n=44), a higher 
proportion of respondents whose transport costs were borne by their spouses 












Figure 5.9 Financiers of travel to South Africa and UK % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The results appear to suggest that migrants in Leeds had higher financial capital 
given the cost of airfares than those in Limpopo. The low percentage of survey 
respondents that were assisted financially by prior migrants in Limpopo may be 
ascribed to the relatively low wages that migrants in Limpopo earn. Secondly, the 
lower cost of travelling to South Africa may be responsible. Thirdly, the informality of 
migration reduces reliance on prior migrants.  
 
The role of agents appears to have been minimal in both countries as were those of 
friends and combinations of friends and family. On the other hand, there is a near 
equal split between the two areas for migrants whose trip were sponsored by family 
which is in accord with the new economics of labour migration scholarship which as 
discussed in Chapter 3, claims that migration decisions are made by families or 
households-in which people act collectively both to maximize expected income and 
to diminish risks associated with a variety of market failures (Massey et al., 1993; 
Stark, 991). A small minority of migrants in UK had their airfares paid for by their 
employers who were mostly Zimbabwean professionals in need of nannies as 
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exemplified by the case of Thandeka, a 32 year old woman who was brought by her 
employer to look after her three children, 
 
 ‘I have been working for them since 1995. When she came here in 1999, I 
 stayed behind with her husband and their son. She then brought us here in 
 2001 where she gave birth to two more children whom I looked after. I was 
 with them till I left last year (2008).’ (Interview, 23 January 2010) 
 
While Figure 5.7 (p. 122) shows that some migrants did not receive help from 
migrants already settled in South Africa and the UK, this appears to have changed 
once they arrived in these two countries as shown in Figure 5.10 (p. 127). In Leeds, 
all respondents (n=200) reported receiving help from prior migrants on arrival 
compared to those in Figure 5.7 (n=139) who received help when they were still in 
Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the number of respondents who received help once 
they arrived in Limpopo jumped to 285 (Figure 5.10) from an initial 146 (28%) 
reported in Figure 5.7 when they were in Zimbabwe.  
 
The survey results suggest that newly arrived migrants were provided with several 
forms of help by prior migrants already settled in Leeds and Limpopo. Help took 
several forms including provision of accommodation (35%, n=69 in the UK compared 
to 57%, n=161 in Limpopo), finding employment (37%, n=73 in the UK compared to 
36%, n=133 in Limpopo), applying for asylum (5%, n=11 in Leeds compared to 6%, 
n=15 in Limpopo) and help with childcare (6%, n=12 in Leeds compared to none in 
Limpopo) which can be attributed to prevalent practices of South Africa based 
migrants of leaving children with their spouses/grandparents in Zimbabwe  while they 
parents moved alone (Parreñas, 2001b). Interestingly, 12% (n=23) of the Leeds 
based respondents stated that they had been helped with opening bank accounts on 
arrival which did not appear to figure prominently with migrants in Limpopo. This 
could be attributed to the importance that employers in the UK attach to employees 
having personal bank accounts in which their wages could be deposited into that 
appears to be unimportant in South Africa as migrants reported being paid in cash at 










Figure 5.10 Type of help provided to newly arrived migrants by prior migrants 
on arrival by country of residence % 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, for professionals and non-professionals alike, in 
South Africa and the UK, bonding social capital played a crucial role in anchoring the 
sixth and seventh migration waves given the strict visa requirements of the UK 
(Massey, 2003). The case of social workers and allied health staff, such as 
radiographers and physiotherapists, in the UK demonstrates this as they received 
help from their colleagues who had arrived earlier (Figure 5.10). This is consistent 
with Bourdieu’s (1986) claim that graduating from certain universities endows people 
with social capital in the same way as working for certain companies builds social 
capital, which can be leveraged for the benefit of other community members. The 
movement of health and social care workers to the UK attests to the existence of 
strong ties in this professional group of urban workers, which counteracts Fussell 
and Massey’s (2004:153) postulation that the social networks forged in urban areas 
comprise more of weak ties to acquaintances and workmates than of strong ties to 
kin and lifelong friends (which is typical of those formed in rural areas) which, 
according to Granovetter (1973), gives them access to more information, which 
transforms intention to migrate into actuality. 
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This study concurs with the work of concur with scholars such as Clark (1999) and 
Hanson (2005) who advocate broadening the unit of research to include urban 
actors, because social capital ties that develop in urban areas are as strong as those 
forged in rural areas. The case of Paul, a 40 year old Leeds resident and senior 
social work manager demonstrates this.  
 
‘I was recruited to work as a childcare social worker by a council in South 
Yorkshire in 2000. When I came, the manager asked me if I knew of other 
Zimbabweans who wanted work. I sent messages to three guys who were in 
my class and by the end of 2001 there were 30 of us working for this council. 
Social workers continued coming even when the government tightened the 
work permit system, we were helping people to come. They didn’t even have 
interviews; they were just offered the jobs on my recommendation. When they 
first arrived, they stayed with me or the other guys. I bought the air tickets for 
the first three guys, they repaid upon being paid their salaries, and they also 
did the same for others. The same also happened to the guys who studied 
physiotherapy who bought each other tickets until their whole class came 
here. Even now as we speak, social workers are still coming, we help them, I 
do that sort of work with my company in Zimbabwe, helping them sort out their 
work permits, General Social Care Council (GSCC) registration etc.’ 
(Interview in Leeds, 10 December 2009) 
Paul’s case resonates with Tilly’s (1990:84) observations that, 
 
‘by and large, the effective units of migration were (and are) neither 
individuals nor households but sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship, 
and work experience.’  
 
Paul’s narrative brings to the fore several issues which facilitate and impede 
migration. Firstly, finance as a both a barrier and an enabler to migration. The 
constraining effect in this case was removed by Paul and his friends’ ability to buy air 
tickets which were then repaid at a later date. Zimbabwean migrants in both Leeds 
and Limpopo use inter-ethnic ties to access diverse resources beyond their 
homogeneous networks. Secondly, it highlights the salience of embedded 
organisational ties (see Granovetter, 1973), which Paul epitomises in his role as an 
employee of a local authority in the UK which he exploited to inform former 
classmates of employment opportunities.  
 
As shown in Figure 5.11, newly arrived migrants relied on their social networks for 
accommodation. In the UK, migrants depended on their social networks while a 
significant percentage of the survey participants in South Africa (46%, n=238) relied 





Figure 5.11 Who did you stay with on arrival in Leeds and Limpopo? (%) 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
As will be demonstrated in section 5.5, this could be accounted for by the fact that 
most survey participants arrived as part of the eighth migration episode which was 
dominated by asylum seekers who were accommodated at church shelters in 
Musina.  The majority of UK based migrants were accommodated by relatives (32%, 
n=64) compared to 25%, n=128) for South Africa domiciled migrants. Similarly, the 
percentage of respondents who were accommodated by their spouses is significantly 
higher in the UK (25%, n=50) than in South Africa (4%, n=22) which could be 
accounted for by the skilled nature of migration as highlighted by the case of Nelson 
(p. 110) who followed his wife, Eliza who left during the fourth migration episode to 
work in the health and social care sector (see Chapter 2). The overall picture that 
emerges from these results suggests that professionals in both Leeds and Limpopo 






5.5 A perilous, informalised and irregular migration to South Africa and the 
 UK 
 
Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and the UK comprises of ‘mixed flows’, that 
is, of those looking for employment opportunities and others fleeing from persecution 
(Castles and Van Hear, 2005). It is characterised by both illegal and legal migration 
(Figure 5.12). The results show a high prevalence of informal migration between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa as demonstrated by 56% (n=288) of the respondents 
having entered South Africa without a visa compared to none for the UK. The main 
visa type for UK was Visitors/tourist visa, 71% (n=141) compared to 32% (n=167) for 
South Africa. The difference is statistically significant (z=9.23, p<0.0001). 
 
Figure 5.12 Type of visa held on entry by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The preponderance of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa, as 
has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, is a consequence of numerous factors 
including a loose border, proximity, a history of migration between the two countries 
etc. These informal movements are fraught with dangers to the migrants which range 
from the natural to the human. Migrants’ stories attest to this.  
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On the other hand, it is pertinent to point out that migration to the UK although 
largely formal, is tempered by migrants’ descent into irregularity, for example, after 
the expiry of valid visitors’ visa that they may have held on entry (see Section 2.2.8). 
Moreover, in Chapter 2, I demonstrated how illegality to South Africa is accentuated 
by the informality of migration. Several factors account for this informality. Informality 
is primarily driven by the prohibitive cost of the Zimbabwean passport which is 
beyond the reach of many (Lefko-Everett, 2010). Prior to the removal of the visa 
requirement in May 2009, migrants with passports also informally crossed into South 
Africa due to the high cost of the visa (Ncube and Hougaard, 2010). Information 
gained from both the survey and the interviews show that these requirements acted 
as a barrier to formal migration. 
 
The dominance of informal migration to South Africa suggests that the lifting of the 
visa regime by the South African government has not significantly reduced informal 
migration. This can be attributed, as outlined in Chapter 2, to migrants’ prior 
experiences of border jumping which has been intergenerational (Muzondidya, 
2008). The results show a high degree of informalisation of migration to South Africa 
which mirrors that of Honduran migrants to USA which Puerta (2005), attributed to 
high undocumented migration.  
 
5.5.1 A perilous migration to South Africa 
 
During fieldwork, I saw firsthand the dangers and treacherous routes that migrants 
have to navigate. For some, the journey to South Africa has left indelible physical 
(Figure 5.13), emotional and psychological scars, inflicted by wild animals, the 
Limpopo River and human smugglers who have taken over the space between 













Figure 5.13 Dangers faced by informal migrants on journey to South Africa % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
A total of 238 out of 519 respondents (46%) who crossed informally into South Africa 
reported facing some dangers in their travel. The biggest danger cited by these 
respondents was posed by maguma-guma37 (30%, n= 71). The large human 
smuggling industry between Zimbabwe and South Africa has been taken over by 
criminals, commonly referred to as maguma-guma, who extort money, goods, mobile 
phones, and other valuables from desperate migrants. According to the information 
provided by the interviewees, migrants are typically approached by members of the 
gangs or ‘runners’38 at the Beitbridge border post with the promise of a safe passage 
to Musina. They were also usually promised protection from maguma-guma. The fee 
is usually agreed in advance and often negotiable. The fees vary from as little as 50 
Rands to as high as 2000 Rands. The maguma-guma can be equated to the coyotes 
which Mexicans and other Latin American migrants use to facilitate their entry into 
USA (Mahler, 1995). Like the coyotes, maguma-guma accept payment in kind, that 




                                                     
37
 This is a Shona term which translates to people who seek to make a living through dubious means. The 
maguma-guma operate on both sides of the border (Zimbabwean and South African) and facilitate informal 
migrants’ entry into South Africa. Some informal migrants have complained of having been sexually assaulted 
and losing their belongings to maguma-guma.     
38
 Runners recruit and channel migrants to the guides (maguma-guma) 
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Figure 5.14  A gunshot victim at I Believe in Jesus Church men’s shelter,  
  Musina  
 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
According to Graycar (1999), human smuggling is concerned with the way in which a 
migrant enters a country, and whether this has been achieved with the assistance of 
third parties. As Salt (2000:32) observes, quite often irregular migrants using third 
parties to enter a country are exposed, ‘both to unscrupulous service providers and 
to the immigration and policing authorities, thereby generating a dependence on the 
safeguards provided by the trafficking networks.’ Some migrants reported being 
subjected to vicious attacks by maguma-guma in order to coerce them to pay more 
than agreed fees. One such victim of attacks is Tarisai, a 24 year old man from Bikita 
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who suffered gunshot wounds following a disagreement with a group of maguma-
guma over fees for facilitating his entry to South Africa (Figure 5.14). 
 
He explains how he met is fate,  
‘I was shot because I didn’t have more money to pay. I had already paid them 
R150 we had agreed. I told them I didn’t have any more money and he shot 
me on the leg. I was saved by the police. Now I am crippled, I left home 
perfectly normal but now I am an invalid.’ (Interview in Musina, 22 March 
2010) 
 
An interesting variant of informal migration is what the migrants referred to as ‘pay 
forward’ whereby a migrant would be smuggled into South Africa by an amalaitsha to 
destinations further than Musina on the understanding that the smuggled migrant’s 
relative (guarantor) would pay the ‘delivery’ fee once they have safely arrived. Under 
this arrangement, the smuggler transports a client without being paid the full fare 
which a relative of the client would have promised to settle in full once the client is 
safely delivered. However, because of the extortionate fares, some guarantors fail or 
refuse to pay resulting in the client being made to repay the debt by other means, by, 
for example, being forced in to sexual relationships with the transporter and his 
colleagues. While the accounts of the interviewees may not conform to archetypal 
trafficking for sexual exploitation which involves some aspect of forced labour and/or 
migration for the purpose of exchange of sexual services (Kelly and Regan, 2000), it 
is nevertheless important to note that female migrants are being subjected to sexual 
exploitation.  
 
A part from the dangers of the maguma-guma, migrants also have to contend with 
other dangers like wildlife (8%, n=19). Others reported having to contend with the 
Limpopo River which forms a formidable barrier between Zimbabwe and South 
Africa (9%, n=21). This has, however, not proved to be a sufficient enough deterrent 
for desperate Zimbabweans trying to seek a new life in South Africa. Migrants do not 
only have to outfox the raging tide of the river but also evade crocodiles. This is 
demonstrated by two accounts of migrants who arrived as part of the sixth and 
seventh migration episodes. These narratives make claims of having witnessed 
other migrants being swept away by the swollen river and being pulled under the 
river by crocodiles, never to be seen again. The following quotes are illustrative.  
‘We had to hold on to each other in a straight line with the guide in front, 
another in the middle, and one at the end.  Suddenly there was a piecing 
scream and because it was dark I could not see who it was, we were told by 
the guides that two people had been swept away when we had crossed.’ 
(Interview with Gift, 23 in Giyani, 19 March 2010) 
‘I am not doing it again...never ever. The current was too strong and it swept 
me and the person I was holding on to and the one who was behind me, 
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holding on to me. I was thinking that I was going to die and how I am still 
alive, only God knows.’ (Interview with Noah, 21 in Seshegho, 8 April 2010) 
As if the danger posed by the river was not enough, migrants also reported having to 
be constantly on the lookout for marauding animals, especially lions in the 
Gonarezhou and Kruger national parks. One interviewee told of the attacks by a 
pride of lions in which six of his colleagues perished39.  
 
There are examples in migration literature of informal migrants being exposed to 
multiple dangers during their travels, including rape (Koser, 2010; Singh, 2007). 
Rape was cited by 4% (n=10) of female respondents and some interviewees spoke 
of knowing other women who were raped but had not come forward to the nurses in 
Musina due to fear of being labelled. Yet others reported being gang raped in front of 
their husbands and threats of rape being used to extort payment40. The interviewees 
who suffered the misfortune of being raped on both sides of the border, talked about 
‘double trouble.’ The experiences of female migrants echo those of Honduran 
migrants attempting to reach USA who get raped on the dangerous journey through 
Mexico (Sladkova, 2007). Allegations of rape were echoed by Tonde, a sexual health 
specialist, who works for a medical charity that provides sexual health services in 
Musina,  
 
‘We believe that there are many women who are sexually assaulted and 
raped in the forests by the maguma-guma but only a few come forward to 
report it. What is known is the tip of the iceberg as many more are reluctant to 
come forward due to the stigma associated with rape, you know how our 
culture is regarding someone who has been raped.’ (Interview in Musina, 22 
March 2010) 
The charity runs weekly outreach sessions at shelters where migrants stay on arrival 
in Musina. Flyers advertising their services are displayed at prominent places such 
as the Refugee Reception Centre (Figure 4.3, p. 75), The I Believe in Jesus 
Church’s kitchen area (Figure 5.15) and the Catholic Church women’s shelter in 
Musina. As part of the fieldwork, I attended several sessions in the shelters and 
farms where sexual health experts talked about the need to disclose any sexual 
abuse that they may have suffered and also to get tested for sexually transmitted 
diseases including HIV/AIDS given the reluctance by Zimbabweans to know their 
HIV/AIDS status (Feldman and Maposhere, 2003). The importance of accessing 
quick treatment for sexual assault victims as well as for those living with HIV/AIDS 
was stressed.  
 
 
                                                     
39
 Interview with Tapiwa, Thohoyandou, 3 March 2010 
40
 Interview with Mavis, Waterberg, 21 May 2010 
 136 
Figure 5.15 An advert for Medicins San Frontiers at I Believe in   
 Jesus men’s shelter, Musina 
 Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
In order to develop a clear understanding of the dangers that informal migrants face 
when crossing into South Africa, I embedded with South African border officials on 
border patrols on five occasions between February and May 2010. This gave me 
first-hand experience of the dangers and treacherous conditions that migrants 
contend with on their journey. Being embedded in the border officials presented 
ethical issues. For example, it felt awkward to take photographs of women with 
children on their backs crawling through the border fence or of migrants running 
away without their permission. However, in order to capture the gravity of informal 
migration and the dangers that this presented, I felt that this was a risk worth taking if 
only to sensitise the policy makers about the dangers that informal migrants face in 
their quest to escape from the hardships being experienced in Zimbabwe. It was a 
bold decision which I felt superseded ethical considerations because it provided 
evidence of the dangers that vulnerable people experienced which I hoped would 
prompt policy makers in both South Africa and Zimbabwe to act.  
 
One may ask why I embedded with non-migrants given that this thesis is about 
Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK. Embedding with non-migrants 
provided me with the opportunity to appreciate the difficulties that migrants endure 
on their travels. It also gave me the opportunity to appreciate the scope, scale and 
extent of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. It provided me 
with the chance to hear the perspectives of border officials about emigration from 
Zimbabwe.   
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5.5.2 Irregular migration to the UK 
 
While migration to South Africa was largely informal, that to the UK was 
predominantly formal. The absence of the visa regime between London and Harare 
up to November 2002 accounts for this. The imposition of the visa regime on 
Zimbabwean nationals resulted in an increase in the use of passports of other 
countries by Zimbabweans entering the UK. This is consistent with findings from 
other studies which note the growing use of agents in procuring fraudulent 
documents and facilitating travel (Koser, 2000; Salt and Stein, 1997). The use of 
fraudulent documents is a recent phenomenon in the short history of Zimbabwean 
international migration. 
 
Both survey and interview data show that most migrants in Leeds entered the UK on 
flights directly from Zimbabwe (Figure 5.16).  
 
Figure 5.16 Travelled directly to South Africa/ UK? % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
However, a small number of the survey respondents passed through some Nordic 
countries, notably Sweden, 23% (n=8), the Netherlands and Norway with 17% (n=6) 
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each including countries such as Ireland, 20% (n=7), Finland, 14% (n=5) and 
Germany, 9% (n=3) prior to arriving in the UK (Figure 5.17). 
 
Figure 5.17 Countries which migrants passed through on way to the UK % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Such migrants constituted the fifth, sixth and seventh migration episodes whose 
inflows were significantly curtailed by the introduction of the visa regime (Section 
5.3). Having been denied visas by the British embassy in Harare, some migrants 
switched their attention to these European countries which were considered to have 
liberal immigration policies. Once granted the EU wide Schengen visa, migrants 
proceeded to the UK as previously intended after a temporary sojourn in an EU third 
country. Interestingly, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands were popular transit 
countries for migrants who had either studied or claimed asylum there after having 
failed to obtain visas to come directly to the UK. 
 
Some commentators claim that the Netherlands is popular with smugglers (Skeldon, 
1994; IOM, 1995) although the results of this study to do not lend themselves to this 
claim. The case of Chamu, a 39 year old man who lives in Leeds with his wife and 
four children highlights this practice, 
  
 ‘I was denied a visa to come here in 2005. I then got a Schengen visa to go to 
 the Netherlands.  Once there, I worked briefly before coming here as I 
 originally planned. I didn’t intend to live in Holland, it was only a strategy to 











 dreams. Together with friends, I managed to get my wife here who claimed 
 asylum as I was told that if I claimed, it will certainly be rejected as I had lived 
 in Holland and would probably be sent back there. My wife’s claim was 
 successful and I was a dependent on her claim.’  (Interview, Leeds, 15 
 January 2010)  
Chamu’s case shows how migrants used their studies in countries like the 
Netherlands as a long-term strategy to enter the UK, due to the perception among 
the interview participants that the Schengen visa opened channels to eventually get 
into the UK. It also highlights the salience of migrants’ transnational links in 
accessing information about regularising immigration status that was discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The asylum seeking migration episode that was discussed in Chapter 2 was used 
not only by migrants already in the UK and South Africa, but in other countries such 
as Ireland. This is exemplified by a small fraction of respondents who claimed 
asylum in Ireland prior to moving to the UK to join family and friends. Such migrants 
used knowledge gained through transnational links about countries with ‘easy’ 
immigration systems. This is consistent with Valentine et al’s (2007) findings in their 
study of Somali migrants in Denmark and the UK which observes that migrants 
granted asylum in Denmark later settled in the UK in order to be with family and 
friends. Such migrants believed the Irish border officials to be more accommodating 
to Zimbabwean migrants than their British counterparts. As Betty, a 54 year old 
mother of six who came through Ireland explains,  
 
‘I was deported at Gatwick on two occasions in 2001 and 2002. A friend then 
told me to go through Ireland as they were not too strict. Once there, I claimed 
asylum but left to come here before the finalisation of my case as I had 
always wanted to come here because my friends, relatives are here. My 
people are here so I can have some support. I had always wanted to be here, 
Ireland was just a means to get here.’ (Interview, Leeds, 19 October 2009) 
Chamu and Betty’s narratives highlight the multi-stage movements that were 
attendant in migrants’ journey to the UK. For both Chamu and Betty, it entailed a 




This chapter has explored the factors that caused people to flee from their 
motherland to seek refuge in other countries, notably South Africa and the UK. It 
demonstrated that some of the causes of migration are steeped in historical 
antecedents, for example the emigration of whites which preceded the country’s 
independence as well as after it, and the labour migration which sustained mining 
and agriculture in both Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
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The questionnaire survey and interviews demonstrated the causes of emigration to 
be the economic collapse in Zimbabwe which began in November 1997, and which 
was exacerbated by the violent seizure of commercial farms which, historically, 
fuelled the economy. The collapse of the economy has had ripple effects and 
impacted on the delivery of social services such as health and education. These 
sectors were struggling under the strain of massive underinvestment which resulted 
in staff leaving for South Africa and the UK. The growing political intolerance and 
repression of President Robert Mugabe’s government has exacerbated the outflow. 
The wide scale outflow has also been proved to be socially driven, as demonstrated 
by migrants in the survey’s use of social networks in South Africa and the UK. 
 
The chapter also focused on the process by which migrants exited Zimbabwe by 
highlighting the salience of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
It demonstrated how factors such social networks and social capital was critical in 
channelling migrants to different destinations. Social networks were shown to have 
played a crucial role in fuelling further migration as it provided potential migrants with 
the resources that were needed to travel and adapt in the destination country. The 
chapter also considered the role of financial capital in driving emigration and argued 
that migrants with higher social and financial capital moved to the UK while those 
with lower endowments settled in South Africa.  
 
Drawing on the lived experiences of the migrants in Leeds and Limpopo, Chapter 6 
presents a taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora to elucidate the changes 
engendered to the migrants’ lives by being in the diaspora given that some migrants 
moved in pursuit of social mobility. The taxonomy dissects and discusses the 
inequalities within the Zimbabwean diasporic communities which are driven in part 
by immigration status, social class, and education.  
 141 
Chapter Six  A taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter discussed the reasons which caused Zimbabweans to exit the 
country of their birth. It also drew the differences between flows in the different 
migration episodes that were discussed in Chapter 2. These flows consisted of 
skilled professionals and non-professionals with different demographic profiles.  This 
chapter builds on some of the information discussed in Chapter 5, and others, 
gleaned from interviews to present a taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora. In so 
doing, the chapter offers insights about the importance of transnational social fields 
through which connect migrants’ lives with those remaining in Zimbabwe. The social 
fields which were discussed in Chapter 3 shape migrants’ lives, and they are 
instrumental in connecting migrants with those still in Zimbabwe. By focusing on the 
transnational social fields, the chapter helps elucidate that migrants’ lives are lived 
in, and ‘float in and out’, of the transnational social fields which transcend the 
borders of South Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe (see Chapter 3). This will explicate 
similarities and differences in migrants’ lives in the two countries. The chapter fulfills 
Objectives 1 and 2.  
 
This chapter builds on the motivations for departure and explores whether the 
diaspora has matched the migrants’ expectations. It achieves this by firstly building a 
six pronged typology of the Zimbabwean diaspora (section 6.2). By conceiving this 
as a social field through which migrants ‘float in’ and ‘float out’ of the different 
categories, the section represents different migration waves (see Chapter 2) as 
migrant experiences in the diaspora and at home. Migrants’ abilities to meet their 
obligations to those left behind are to a large extent affected by multiple factors like 
immigration status, recognition, and transferability of prior experience garnered in 
Zimbabwe etc. The effects of these factors on migrants are the subject of Sections 
6.2.1 to 6.2.6. The Chapter closes with a summary of discussion of the impact that 
being in the diaspora has on migrants’ lives.  
 
6.2 Typology and interpretation of the diaspora 
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the heterogeneity of the Zimbabwean communities in South 
Africa and the UK. The chapter delineated the constituent parts as skilled and 
unskilled, illegal, and documented migrants etc. It will be argued in this chapter that 
migrants’ backgrounds help shape their adaptation, integration, and experiences in 
South Africa and the UK. Consequently, this shapes their interpretation of life in the 
diaspora and prospects for return which was outlined in Chapter 3. The typology 
presented in this section derives from migrants’ accounts of their socio-economic 
and political experiences in their host country, which have a bearing on their 
transnational interactions (see Chapter 7) and return (see Chapter 8). These 
interactions may be imagined, physical and/or virtual (Escandell and Tapias, 2010). 
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The analysis of evidence from the study resulted in a six pronged classification of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora: reluctant, hesitant, clandestine, fearful, ephemeral, and 
ambivalent diaspora.  
 
Drawing on the participant interviews and building on the work of Pasura (2008), six 
classes of the Zimbabwean diaspora were delineated as shown above. These 
classes were identified based on the migrants’ diasporic experiences and how these 
have impacted on their lives. This is a crucial and important area of this study as 
nothing of this sort has been done previously. The typology provides a detailed 
picture of how the migrants perceive their life in the diaspora. The typology builds on 
ongoing work examining vulnerabilities and precarities within migrant communities, 
their access to labour markets, citizenship and identities (Papadopoulos et al., 2008; 
Waite, 2009; Anderson, 2007). Migrants’ precarity is demonstrated by the type of 
work they are compelled to do due to constraints such as immigration status, 
unrecognised qualifications and experience accumulated in the country of origin 
which is ignored by employers in the destination country. Lack of immigration status 
accentuates clandestinity as migrants are compelled to go underground for fear of 
coming to the attention of authorities, which may lead to deportation (Ahmad, 2008; 
De Genova, 2002; Waite, 2009).  
 
The enthusiastic diaspora refers to those migrants whose lives have been positively 
altered by being in South Africa or the UK, for example, migrants who had limited 
opportunities at home who are now able to exercise their agency. I use the term 
reluctant diaspora to describe those migrants whose stay in South Africa or the UK is 
restricted by a number of factors such as spouses, fear of where to start if they were 
to return home etc. An ambivalent diaspora describes those migrants who are 
unsure about the effect that the diaspora has had on their lives, while a clandestine 
diaspora describes undocumented migrants who are in South Africa or the UK 
illegally. A fearful diaspora describes those migrants whose lives are pervaded by 
anxieties and uncertainties brought by tenuous racial issues in the host country, for 
example, xenophobia, racism etc. Fearfulness is also induced by lack of documented 
immigration status which means that a migrant is vulnerable to detention, deportation 
or both which has repercussions not only on the migrant but also on the livelihoods 
of those left behind. The final category, an ephemeral diaspora describes the fluidity 
that characterise migrants’ lives in the diaspora and their relationship with those at 
home. Such a classification is important because it sheds light on the feelings of the 
migrants based on their overall political, economic, social and educational 
experiences. It is an all encompassing model which presents a holistic assessment 
rather than being based on one facet of their experiences. 
 
Pasura (2008) in his study of Zimbabweans in the UK came up with a four-fold 
classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora based on their participation in diaspora 
politics. He referred to the four classes as: visible, epistemic, dormant and silent. 
Visible members of the Zimbabwean diaspora, according to Pasura, are those that 
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participate in political events and demonstrations, whilst the epistemic members 
engaged in debate on Zimbabwean issues on the internet and other forums. 
Members of the dormant diaspora although committed to the Zimbabwean cause, 
are constricted from participating in Zimbabwean oriented activities by both internal 
and external factors. He classifies the final group as silent, which comprises of 
migrants who have chosen to distance themselves from the politics of the homeland, 
and sometimes identified themselves not as Zimbabweans but as Rhodesians, 
British, South Africans or Malawians.  
 
The taxonomy advanced in this study recognises that migrants’ experiences of being 
in the diaspora are in a perpetual state of flux. This fluidity means that there will be 
overlaps in the classification at any one given time as a migrant may belong to more 
than one category. This mutability not only impacts on the lives of the migrants but 
also of their families and relatives in Zimbabwe and elsewhere (see Chapter 7). For 
example, the confirmation of documented status may switch a migrant from a state 
of reluctance to one of enthusiasm. Similarly, a breakdown in a relationship may 
result in a shift from enthusiasm to a state of hesitancy. Likewise in the UK, dispersal 
of a migrant who is an asylum seeker from the South East to Leeds may quickly 
transform a migrant from a state of enthusiasm to one of reluctance. The spectre of 
xenophobia in South Africa left some migrants in a perpetual state of fear, which has 
become the default mode for a significant number of migrants. This state of change 
is accentuated by other external pressures given that migrants do not live in a 
vacuum but, as Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) posit, states and state politics 
shape the options for migrant and ethnic trans-state social action.  
 
This six pronged classification (Figure 6.1) has been constructed based on the 
migrants’ engagement in and interaction with the social, economic and political 
transnational fields both in the host and home countries (see Chapter 3). Their group 
categorisation is determined largely by the extent to which they have adapted to their 
immigration status, socio-economic and political situation (Anderson et al., 2011; 
Waite, 2009). Membership of the group and its subgroups is driven partly by the 
perceived benefits they may accrue and often there are conflicting motivations. It is 
important to point out that some categories are more pronounced in one area than 
the other. For example, migrants in Limpopo were fearful of their safety due to 
xenophobia while those in Leeds feared deportation.  
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. Figure 6.1 A six fold classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora        
 
 




































6.2.1 An enthusiastic diaspora 
 
Enthusiasm for the diaspora is bred by a combination of socio-economic and political 
factors. Social factors such as gains in gender transformation and ability to further 
one’s education and economic factors e.g. ability to work and provide for family at 
home has resulted in some migrants being enthusiastic about the emancipatory role 
of the diaspora. For migrants whose opportunities were curtailed by a combination of 
factors at home like unemployment, economic hardships, and poor educational 
attainment; the ability to freely express their opinions and guaranteed freedoms such 
as freedom of assembly and association, the empowerment brought about by 
settling in the host country has been transformational. I refer to this group of 
migrants as the enthusiastic diaspora. 
 
Figure 6.2 demonstrates that a higher proportion of the respondents in the UK (77%, 
n=154) have noticed significant benefits in their lives since they left Zimbabwe 
compared to when they were in Zimbabwe than their counterparts based in South 
Africa (56%, n=288), (z=9.23, p<0.0001).  
 
Figure 6.2 Have there been changes to your life by being in the diaspora? %  
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
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As explained in Chapter 5, one of the main drivers of emigration was the search for 
economic opportunities to become socially mobile. Social mobility was cited by an 
overwhelming majority of both the survey and interviewees as one of the significant 
outcomes of the migration process.  
 
Figure 6.3 shows the benefits that migrants have accrued by being in the diaspora. 
These gains breed enthusiasm for being in the diaspora. Their enthusiasm derives 
from the economic, social and political benefits they have gained as a consequence 
of being in the diaspora. 
 
Figure 6.3 Improvements engendered by being in the diaspora % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
UK based migrants managed to advance their education than their South African 
based counterparts. The enthusiasts regard the diaspora as an enabler of human 
agency and attribute their success to it. In this group are migrants who were 
unemployed at home as the case of Chengeto who is now resident in South Africa 
will exemplify, those who eked a living in the informal economy as exemplified by the 
case of Sam in Leeds, those in low income employment e.g. Christopher (p. 108) in 
Limpopo, those who failed to gain access to institutions of higher learning e.g. Irvine 
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in Leeds (p. 120), those who were persecuted for their political beliefs e.g. Ntokwazi 
in Limpopo (p. 115) and others who had been disenfranchised by the government of 
President Mugabe’s warped Citizenship Act e.g. Darios in Limpopo (p. 113).  
 
Furthermore, the enthusiasts comprise of women who for traditional and cultural 
reasons were disadvantaged in marriage relationships, as the case of Shamiso (p. 
118) in Leeds attests to (9%, n=14). Enthusiasm for being in the diaspora was more 
pronounced in Leeds than in Limpopo probably because of the existence of better 
opportunities for social mobility in the former. It could also be ascribed to the 
differences in human capital which resulted in Leeds based migrants being able to 
secure better paying jobs than their counterparts in Limpopo, even if these jobs are 
routine and semi-professional occupations (Table 6.2). 
 
Female migrants welcome the re-shifting of gender roles brought about by being in 
the diaspora. For feminists, diaspora signifies emancipation from patriarchy 
engendered by cultural values that consigned them to second class status at home 
(Gelfand, 1973). Marriage in Zimbabwe is seen as perpetuating male supremacy 
which is being eroded by being in the diaspora, especially in the UK. Migrant 
narratives indicate that there are seismic changes taking place within the home, 
where renegotiating of gender roles and identities is noticeable (Pasura, 2008). 
Some of these changes were caused by the non-transferability of men’s skills and 
qualifications. Consequently, men reported performing feminine household chores 
like childcare, cooking and washing which they did not partake in Zimbabwe 
(McGregor, 2008). Women point out that this is something that men would not 
countenance in Zimbabwe. Esther, a 42 year old married woman and a mother of 
three came to the UK as part of the fifth migration episode where she now works as 
a staff nurse (see Chapter 2). Her husband, who joined her together with their two 
children, initially refused to come citing his senior job as a manager of a private 
company. Her husband currently works as a bus driver,    
 
‘being here has been good; at least my husband is seeing me as a person 
now, something that he never did when we were home. Now he cooks, he 
changes our youngest son’s diapers, something he never did for our two kids 
who were born at home. It has been a huge cultural shift. I have my own 
account, when we were home my pay would go into his account and he would 
give me what he thought I needed. He would even buy the groceries as 
though he was the one who cooked. I don't know whether he would do the 
same if we were to go back home, especially when his people, his relatives 
are there.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 October 2010) 
 
Esther’s enthusiasm for the diaspora is predicated on the effects of UK residency on 
her husband. She contrasts his behaviour in the UK with his behaviour in Zimbabwe 
and wonders whether he is doing this because his relatives are not in the country to 
see him performing domestic chores. Enthusiasm for being in the diaspora has 
implications for migrants’ return intentions as will be demonstrated in Chapter 8. For 
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example, for Esther, returning home would be regressive as it would erode the gains 
she has acquired since moving to the UK. Esther’s account highlights the oppressive 
nature of some Zimbabwean culture and traditions which some scholars have 
associated with the ‘lobola/roora’ system (Ansell, 2001; Gelfand, 1973). Roora has 
been interpreted in some circles as conferring men with rights over their wives 
(Kuper, 1982). For example, in Esther’s case, her husband had control over her 
salary which was paid directly into his bank account.  
 
Similarly, female migrants in Limpopo expressed enthusiasm (5%, n=13) for being in 
the diaspora because of what they perceived to be significant changes to their lives 
since their relocation. Some migrants who arrived in South Africa as part of the 
seventh migration episode had never worked in their lives (see Chapter 2). The case 
of Chengeto, a 28 year old married mother of four currently living in Polokwane with 
her husband demonstrates this. She embraces the diaspora for giving her an 
opportunity to work. The mere fact that she earns an income has increased her self 
esteem. Studies on immigrant self esteem emphasise the importance of individual 
accomplishments and achievements (Nesdale and Mak, 2003). She derives great 
pleasure in knowing that her husband swallowed his pride and joined her at a market 
stall that she started (Figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4 Chengeto and her husband at her market stall, Polokwane 
 
 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
Despite his initial reluctance to work on a market stall which he considered to be 
beneath his qualifications, he now joins her everyday and respects her business 
acumen. Before his desertion, Chengeto’s husband was a former commissioned 
officer in the Zimbabwe National Army. She explains,  
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‘I started here on my own. He didn’t want to come as he thought it was a lowly 
thing to sell tomatoes here. He later started coming and now we work together 
here. I decide what to order and he respects that, he respects my judgement 
because he was ordering things that were not selling. It’s good to be seen as 
a person for once, when we were home, he would do as he pleased, and it 
was his home, his money, his children, his everything. Now he consults me, 
he knows I am valuable, that I have a brain despite not going to school like 
him.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 21 May 2010) 
 
What is interesting from Chengeto’s narrative is the initial refusal by her husband to 
work on the market stall, a job that he considered to be incommensurate with his 
education. It reveals the anguish of playing a subservient role given the fact that her 
husband appropriated everything from money to children when they were at home. 
Memories of home are portrayed negatively because of the perceived injustices and 
oppression that she endured there. Denied a chance to exercise her agency, home 
is synonymous with oppression whilst moving to South Africa is tantamount to 
liberation.  
 
As chapter 7 will reveal, Chengeto’s enthusiasm for the diaspora is premised on the 
equality and financial freedom it has engendered, and which enables her to remit to 
her family members at home. Her ability to bring an income to the family has altered 
the power dynamics in her relationship with her husband. Some commentators have 
claimed that being and working in the diaspora has enabled women to negotiate 
‘patriarchal bargains’ (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Messner, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1988). For 
Chengeto and other female migrants, this equality manifests itself in the respect they 
are now shown by their husbands. Previously, her husband would not seek her 
counsel in issues that had a bearing on her life. She attributes the metamorphosis in 
her husband’s behaviour to being in South Africa. It is these feelings of increased 
self worth that make Chengeto an enthusiast.  
 
Economic empowerment wrought by an ability to engage in paid work was identified 
as inducing enthusiasm for being in the diaspora by 49% (n=76) in Leeds and 56% 
(n=160) in Limpopo. In both countries, enthusiasm is engendered by the ability to 
work, get an education, buy a house, help those at home, and own a car. The case 
of Sam, a 45 year old health and social care professional living in Leeds helps to 
explicate this, being in the UK has given him the chance to do something with his life 
that, had he remained in Zimbabwe, would have remained a pipe dream. 
 
‘I don’t have any ‘O’ levels, let alone ‘A’ levels but look at me, I am a nurse. I 
was brought here by my nephews from Gweru where I was as a hwindi41. I 
worked hard and bought three houses in Gweru for my parents and myself 
when I eventually go back. I provide for my family. My cousins encouraged 
me to go to school and after doing the access course, I trained to be a nurse. I 
tell people at home that I am a nurse and they don't believe me because I 
                                                     
41
 Hwindi is a derogatory term used to refer to mini bus/ bus terminal marshal  
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struggled at school. I don't care about that because I have achieved a lot. I 
thank God and my cousins who brought me here and helped me to get 
asylum and into college. Because they are nurses, they also helped me with 
my schoolwork. London has been good to me; it gave me a second chance 
that I was denied at home. Now, I am able to provide for my parents and 
wider family, something that I wasn’t able to do when I was home.’ (Interview 
in Leeds, 28 November 2009) 
 
Sam came to the UK as part of the fifth migration episode and is enthusiastic 
because of the second chance that being in the diaspora engenders (see Chapter 2). 
For a person without GCSE Ordinary level passes to be a qualified nurse would have 
been unheard of in Zimbabwe. The availability of further education opportunities for 
mature people has led to a sharp increase in the number of mature Zimbabwean 
students in the UK. That Sam, who was a hwindi at home, has managed to become 
a professional is a monumental feat which explains why people at home cannot 
believe it when he tells them about his academic and professional qualifications.  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, emergent research on transnationalism highlight the 
importance to transmigrants of being able to maintain familial, social, economic and 
political ties with their country of origin despite emigration and incorporation in the 
host country (Goldring, 1996a, 1996b; Guarnizo, 1997a; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). 
Sam is ecstatic about his acquisition of properties for himself and his parents, which 
demonstrate his transnational linkages (Portes, 1999) (see Chapter 7). Had he been 
at home, he would have been condemned to a life as a lodger as it is impossible for 
a hwindi to buy a house. For Sam, being in the diaspora has unlocked economic 
opportunities that would otherwise been closed had he remained at home (Massey 
and Akresh, 2006; Stark, 1991). As Chapter 7 will demonstrate, Sam’s enthusiasm is 
buttressed by being able to engage in transnational acts such as remitting which 
have a bearing on his return intentions. His acquisition of property at home is an 
indicator of his eventual return home (see Chapter 8).  
 
If migrants such as Sam come across as enthusiastic about being in the diaspora, a 
significant segment of the survey were reluctantly soldiering on despite their 
misgivings. The next section focuses on this group who are staying on due to factors 
such as wanting to be with family.   
 
6.2. 2 A reluctant diaspora 
 
Research on migrant adaptation to the host country has highlighted a plethora of 
challenges that new immigrants face (Cheong et al., 2007). As will be seen later, for 
some migrants life in the diaspora has not matched their expectations, which have 
implications on their transnational linkages (see Chapter 7) and return intentions 
(see Chapter 8). These migrants, for example, include asylum seekers whose cases 
have taken very long to be determined, and professionals who cannot secure jobs 
that match their academic credentials and end up deskilled due to partaking in jobs 
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that are below their skills and academic profiles (Table 6.2). I call these migrants the 
reluctant diaspora. As the name implies, it comprises of migrants who are staying in 
the host country reluctantly, for example at the behest of a spouse who would in 
most circumstances have been instrumental in emigration. This is typical of the male 
spouses of health and social care professionals such as Nelson (p. 110) who moved 
to the UK at the behest of his wife, Eliza (p. 108).  
 
The reluctantees are nostalgic about the power and influence that they used to wield 
at home. They are affronted by the loss of this which has relegated them to the 
periphery as highlighted in Chapter 5. This is accentuated by an inability to reclaim 
this power and influence due to the non-transferability of skills, experience and 
education to South Africa and the UK. Similar results have been noted in studies of 
Mexican male migrants in the USA who abhor the relative loss of status in the 
process of migration (Goldring 1996a; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). These studies 
have found that Mexican immigrant men, like their Zimbabwean counterparts in 
Leeds and Limpopo, tend to be in positions subordinate to their positions prior to 
emigration.  
 
These reluctantees begrudge their inability to recreate and re-incarnate their role and 
status in the diaspora. In both Leeds and Limpopo, reluctance is premised on the 
inability to secure documented statuses like work permits in order to work in their 
field (Figure 6.5). For example, in Limpopo, teachers cannot secure work permits 
because of an SADC-wide agreement which debars governments from poaching 
teachers from each other, leading to trained teachers working in private schools, 
mostly in remote parts of the country for low pay in order to avoid detection by the 




















Figure 6.5 Areas in which migrants’ lives have not improved %  
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The ‘reasons why respondents’ lives have not improved are different in the two 
countries studied (Chi-square result =29.740, df=3 and p value <0.001). Forty two 
percent (n=96) of the respondents in South Africa, cannot find a job matching their 
qualifications and experience compared to 9% (n=4) in the UK.  This is surprising 
given that many of the respondents have little or no education (Figure 5.6, p. 120). It 
is likely to be a consequence of unfulfilled expectations as migrants may have 
expected to find employment on arrival as promised by their peers (see Chapter 5). 
The results also show that 43% (n=97) of respondents in South Africa indicated that 
their social and economic standing had gone down compared to 39% (n=18) in the 
UK. 
 
Some migrants in both Leeds and Limpopo detest being in the diaspora in the first 
place. Such migrants protest that their departure from Zimbabwe was forced by 
circumstances like the economic deterioration which was discussed in Chapters 2 
and 5. The prolonged stay in South Africa and the UK has come at massive 
professional costs for migrants due to working in fields that do not match their 
professional and academic skills (Table 6.1).   
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Table 6.1 Country of residence and last job held in Zimbabwe % 
 
   





What was your last job in 
Zimbabwe before leaving for 
SA/UK? 
Higher managerial, 
administrative and professional 
occupations 
Count 6 6 
% within Country 
of residence 
3.0% 1.0% 
Lower managerial, administrative 
and professional occupations 
Count 18 6 
% within Country 
of residence 
9.0% 1.0% 
Intermediate occupations Count 29 16 
% within Country 
of residence 
15.0% 3.0% 
Small employers and own 
account workers 
Count 44 9 
% within Country 
of residence 
22.0% 2.0% 
Lower supervisory and technical 
occupations 
Count 15 22 
% within Country 
of residence 
8.0% 4.0% 
Semi-routine occupations Count 8 85 
% within Country 
of residence 
4.0% 16.0% 
Routine occupations Count 43 115 
% within Country 
of residence 
21.0% 22.0% 
Never worked and long term 
unemployed 
Count 37 259 
% within Country 
of residence 
18.0% 51.0% 
Total Count 200 518 
% within Country 
of residence 
100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
There is a significant association between ‘country of residence’ and ‘last job in 
Zimbabwe before leaving for South Africa/UK’ (Chi-square results=195.059, df=7 
and p value <0.001). The results show that migrants in South Africa held semi-
routine jobs in Zimbabwe while most of them had never worked in Zimbabwe prior to 
their emigration. On the other hand, a significant number of the UK based migrants 
were small employers and own account workers before leaving Zimbabwe. 
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As will be argued in Chapter 7, this group of migrants’ continued stay in South Africa 
and the UK is because of expediency, and a pressure to provide for those left 
behind. This agrees with Grove and Zwi’s (2006) contention that forced migrants are 
compelled into leaving their homes in an effort to ensure their own and their families’ 
survival. As Castles and Loughna (2003) remind us, conditions of conflict, political 
unrest, and with economic difficulties sometimes occur simultaneously and interact 
to contribute to the difficult decision to flee. In Limpopo, as the case of Davidson (p. 
112), an engineer, demonstrates, companies recognise Zimbabwean qualifications in 
fields as law, banking and engineering, which has resulted in employment continuity 
for holders of these qualifications. Secondary evidence suggests that South African 
based migrants find it much easier to acquire work permits in these areas of skill 
shortage (Daniels, 2007). 
 
The depth of the downward mobility for migrants is revealed by Table 6.2 which 
shows the current jobs that migrants are currently engaged in compared to the jobs 
that they held prior to their emigration (Table 6.1, p. 153). The downward social 
mobility spiral is more pronounced in the UK where there were no respondents who 
hold any higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations compared 
to 3% (n=6) when they left Zimbabwe (Table 6.1). There has been a slight decrease 
in the number of Leeds based migrants holding lower managerial, administrative and 
professional occupations from 9% (n=18) (Table 6.1) when they left to the current 
5% (n=11) (Table 6.2).  
 
Table 6.2 shows that the majority of respondents who settled in both South Africa 
(75%, n=387) and UK (55%, n=110) hold routine occupations which makes the 
difference between the two countries statistically significant (z=-5.22, p<0.001). None 
of the UK based respondents hold higher managerial occupations compared to 3% 
(n=13) in South Africa which alludes to transferability of qualifications unlike in the 
former. The high incidence of unemployment in the UK is, as has been discussed in 
Chapter 2, due to their immigration status which precludes them from working 















Table 6.2 Cross tabulation of country of residence and current job %  
 
 
Country of residence 
United 
Kingdom South Africa 





Count 0 13 






Count 11 17 
% within Country of 
residence 
5.0% 3.0% 
Intermediate occupations Count 19 12 
% within Country of 
residence 
9.0% 2.0% 
Small employers and own 
account workers 
Count 16 21 
% within Country of 
residence 
8.0% 4.0% 
Lower supervisory and 
technical occupations 
Count 21 26 
% within Country of 
residence 
11.0% 5.0% 
Semi-routine occupations Count 21 42 
% within Country of 
residence 
11.0% 8.0% 
Routine occupations Count 110 387 
% within Country of 
residence 
55.0% 75.0% 
Never worked and long 
term unemployed 
Count 2 0 
% within Country of 
residence 
1.0% 0% 
Total Count 200 518 
% within Country of 
residence 
100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The high incidence of unemployment in the UK can be, as has been discussed in 
Chapter 2, attributed to migrants’ immigration status which precludes them from 
working among other reasons. While Davidson’s (p. 112) case showed that skilled 
professionals in South Africa can easily secure jobs matching their professional 
profiles, the same cannot be said of the migrants in the UK. Here, recognition of prior 
skills in fields such as law, banking, education, engineering, and public 
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administration has proved to be difficult, resulting in deskilling and downward mobility 
as demonstrated by the case of Esther’s (p. 147) husband who is now working as a 
bus driver. The case of Nkosinathi, a 48 year old man who arrived in the UK as part 
of the sixth migration episode to join his wife who came during the fourth migration 
wave to take up a nursing position in Leeds helps to explain this (see Chapter 2). 
Prior to moving to the UK, Nkosinathi worked as a director of a power utility 
company. He holds an engineering degree and a post graduate MBA degree from 
the University of Cape Town. He explains his reasons for resenting the diaspora:  
 
‘I had a large house, 10 bedrooms, now I live in a tiny terraced house without 
any space. I park on the street when I used to have a 4 port lockable garage 
at home. I cook, wash and bath the children when I used to have two nannies, 
two gardeners and two cooks at home. It’s outrageous really how things have 
turned out. I wish I had never come, I was a Director of a power utility 
company but I can’t find a job as an engineer and I now have to do rese-
rese42 (all sorts of available work). To make matters worse, my wife has 
changed, like all other nurses who came here, she looks down on me now. It 
doesn’t help that I am a dependent on her visa, she treats me like a garden 
boy not her husband. She wears the trousers now. If it wasn’t for the children, 
I would have gone back a long time ago.’ (Interview in Leeds, 23 October 
2009). 
 
Nkosinathi’s antipathy to his situation is driven by the fact that he is doing chores that 
are associated with women. For Nkosinathi as for other male migrants, their 
reluctance is linked to gendered emasculation which echoes Ferree et al’s (1999) 
claim that the household is often the primary place where gender is produced and 
reproduced because housework is symbolically ‘women’s work.’ Nkosinathi’s 
narrative contradicts Thébaud’s (2010) claim that men in counter normative 
situations, such as earning less than their wives, reinforce their masculinity by not 
engaging in feminine activities, such as housework. He becomes more despondent 
when he compares his current job (Table 6.2, p. 155) and living arrangements to the 
ones that he had at home. He regrets coming over to the UK to join his wife as he 
believes that this caused the change in his fortunes. His aversion towards his new 
life is further compounded by the perceived lack of respect from his wife (Pasura, 
2008).  
 
For Nkosinathi as for other migrants, the diaspora has resulted in significant changes 
in power dynamics (McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2008) leading to the diaspora being 
characterised as a leveller. He says that his wife now wears trousers which have 
traditionally been worn by men in Zimbabwe and are regarded as a sign of authority 
and domination. In other words, Nkosinathi feels emasculated by his wife due to 
                                                     
42
 Rese-rese is a Shona term used by migrants to refer to migrants having to do all sorts of work going which is 
not related to their skills set. This means that a migrant may work in a care setting in the morning and in a 
manufacturing company in the afternoon etc. It is a euphemism for shift work where migrants can be called to 
work by employment agencies that they are registered with at short notice.    
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being dependent on her visa, which has implications for his return (see Chapter 8). 
His stay in the UK is contingent on the caprices and whims of his wife. Nkosinathi’s 
case agrees with prior studies which found that the structural marginalisation that 
men face in the work place in the host country is accompanied by both the dilution 
and erosion of patriarchal privilege within the family (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994).  
 
Bitterness and reluctance is exacerbated by the fact that the reluctantees have to 
work and live in the same neighbourhoods with people who, were they in Zimbabwe, 
would be beneath them; another example of the levelling effect of the diaspora 
(Figure 6.6).  
 
Figure 6.6 Quality of neighbourhood rating by country of residence %  
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
Whereas at home Nkosinathi used to live in a plush neighbourhood with a coterie of 
domestic servants, the neighbourhood and house that he now lives in are far 
removed from what he was accustomed to at home, further accentuating his 
resentment of life in the diaspora. Nkosinathi was, until the economic implosion 
leading a privileged lifestyle, which contrasts with the lives of other migrants like Sam 
(p. 149). However, Nkosinathi’s views about the poor quality of neighbourhoods is in 
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the minority as the majority of the UK based migrants rated them as excellent, 47% 
(n=93) compared to 4% (n=9) making the difference statistically significant (z=14.18, 
p<0.0001). The results further show that migrants in South Africa rate their 
accommodation poorly as opposed to their UK based counterparts.  
 
Nkosinathi continues,  
 
 ‘I had everything at home; I am not like most Zimbabweans here who started 
 driving here. I am saddened by the fact that I have lost my class, the people 
 that I socialise with and work with wouldn’t have been anywhere near the 
 people that I associated with at home. Being here has lowered my standards 
 and you hear them saying we are all the same. I am not the same with them; I 
 didn’t buy a house in Borrowdale because of the black market.’ (Interview in 
 Leeds, 23 October 2009) 
 
Some commentators have noted that although a significant proportion of people 
migrate for social mobility and for safety and security reasons, very few realise their 
goals and the rest find growing ghettoization, deskilling, isolation and cultural 
antipathies in their new settings (Cheong, 2006). Nkosinathi’s experiences 
corroborate this viewpoint. He detests the fact that he has lost his standing; 
socialising with people that he would not have met or associated with was he at 
home. Nkosinathi’s reluctance is rooted in his powerlessness to change his situation; 
he does paid work that does not fully utilise his skills which has resulted in deskilling 
(Table 6.2, p.155). Furthermore, he refutes the common assertions by Leeds 
domiciled migrants that all migrants are the same regardless of the power and 
influence that they used to wield at home. That power has been eroded by being in 
the diaspora as evidenced by performing manual labour and earning a meagre 
wage. 
 
The reluctantees perceive their loss of standing as a consequence of being in the 
diaspora. Some of them, despite coming by their own accord to South Africa and the 
UK after the worsening economic conditions at home, blame their spouses for 
forcing them to come. In Chapter 5 we encountered Nelson (p. 110) who packed his 
bags on his own volition eight years after his wife first left Zimbabwe, but still 
attribute his being in the diaspora to her. Other reluctantees like Herbert, 37, a 
lawyer who lives in Polokwane, have previously returned home after reportedly 
failing to settle but still came back after realising that they cannot cope in Zimbabwe 
as the situation there had changed drastically since they first left. He explains, 
 
‘After failing to get a job in a proper firm here, I opened my own practice but 
then you don't do real law here apart from the odd criminal case here and 
there, the majority are immigration cases. I went back after the elections but 
things have changed, the language, the way of doing things, you will need an 
induction about how to do business there...so I decided to come back despite 
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not wanting to stay here. It’s a catch 22 situation.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 13 
May 2010) 
 
Unlike other migrants such as those in Leeds who cannot travel back to Zimbabwe 
due to immobilisation wrought by immigration constraints, Herbert’s case 
demonstrates the circulation of Zimbabwean migrants between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe which was described in Chapter 2. He went back home after failing to 
settle in Limpopo but still came back, ostensibly because Zimbabwe has moved on 
during the period that he was in self-imposed exile (see Chapter 8). Herein lies the 
double pronged problem for the reluctantees: in as much as they despise being in 
the diaspora, Zimbabwe as a country has moved on to the extent that they consider 
themselves to be outsiders in their own country.  
 
Loneliness breeds reluctance. In both Leeds and Limpopo, migrants reported being 
separated from their spouses. Darios’ (p. 113) case alluded to gendered division of 
labour which meant that women remained in the village doing productive work such 
as child rearing and agriculture while men worked in towns (Ansell, 2001). This 
practice of leaving women at home living with the in-laws has been noted by Zontini 
(2004) who found that Moroccan migrants leave their wives behind when they first 
move to Spain. The reluctant migrants in Limpopo spoke of an inability to bring their 
spouses over to join them due to constraints placed on them by these traditional 
norms. Rugare, a 28 year old married man, arrived in South Africa as part of the 
seventh wave. He now lives in Lebowakgomo, alone, while his wife remains at home 
in Zvishavane with his parents.  
 
‘I feel like packing up my bags and going back home. It’s hard living on my 
own, I miss my wife but then my father won’t allow her to come and live here. 
He is one of those traditional parents, who say that the wife stays at home 
and works in the fields and bears children. It doesn’t help that I am the first 
born and he paid pfuma (lobola/bride price) for my wife, it’s like I owe him. 
Until my young brother marries, I can’t see a way out of this; it’s our culture. 
Being a son and the eldest, I can’t argue with him, I just go along for fear of 
disappointing him. He is my father after all.’ (Interview in Lebowakgomo, 19 
March 2010) 
 
Rugare feels constrained from challenging his father’s directives because of 
traditional customs which dictate that children cannot question their elders’ 
decisions. As much as he despises living apart from his wife, he feels powerless 
given that his father ‘invested’ in his wife by paying the bride price. He cannot see a 
way out of his predicament because of the tradition which obligates his wife to stay 
at his parents’ homestead until his younger brothers get married, which would then 
‘free’ her to start her own homestead. Additionally, as the first born, he is expected to 
lead by example; removing his wife from his parents’ care would be interpreted as 
being disrespectful to his parents. To maintain transnational intimacy, Rugare 
engages in frequent visits (see Chapters 2 and 8) as well as regular telephone 
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contact with his family Parreñas (2008) (see Chapter 7). The frequent visits that 
Rugare engages in are an example of the circulation that was discussed in Chapter 
2 which seems to be dominant amongst Zimbabweans living in South Africa.  
Similarly, in Leeds, reluctance is also driven by separation from family. Migrants 
without legal status cannot bring their families over to join them. This is explicated by 
the case of Gordon, a 55 year old asylum seeker living in Leeds and a former 
secondary school headmaster, who came to the UK in 2003 as part of the fifth 
migration wave leaving his wife and five children behind,  
 
‘It pains me to be here alone but then, what can I do? I miss my family and 
would go home tomorrow if I had the chance. But, I can’t just go back 
because of the commitments that I have. If I go back, how will I pay my 
children’s fees? How will I clothe them, feed them? Basically, I have nothing 
to go back home for. My wife tells me to stay here and soldier on and I am 
doing exactly that.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010) 
 
Gordon is a realist who despite reluctantly remaining in Leeds is aware of his 
financial obligations to his family at home (see Chapter 7). It can be argued that 
some reluctant migrants are compelled to stay because of familial obligations which 
supersede the loneliness that being in the diaspora engenders.   
 
6.2.3 An ambivalent diaspora 
 
The third group comprises migrants caught in two minds about the efficacy of being 
in the diaspora. For these migrants, the diaspora has neither matched their 
expectations nor materially altered their lifestyles. This has to be viewed in the 
context of the opportunities that migrants had hoped for not existing. In Chapter 5, I 
argued that for many migrants the decision to leave was premised on the success of 
pioneer migrants which they hoped to emulate and replicate. Unfortunately for some 
migrants their dream of instant success proved to be a mirage. Socio-economic and 
political developments in Zimbabwe, including the formation of the inclusive 
government, have contrived to wreck migrants’ plans (see Chapter 2). For example, 
the dollarization of the economy has eroded migrants’ earnings thereby diminishing 
their ability to meaningfully invest at home.  
 
The ambivalence felt by the migrants is encapsulated by the case of Solomon, 38, a 
former middle ranking public service officer in Zimbabwe now working as a local 
government official in the UK. His ambivalence is premised on feelings of stagnation 
in his life which he feels is not significantly different from what it was like in 
Zimbabwe. Consequently, Solomon feels that he cannot glorify the years that he has 
spent in the diaspora. For him, what stands out is the ‘disconnect’ that he has had 
with home and his family. The distance has affected his relationship with his family 
despite being in telephonic contact with them (see Chapter 7). However, he feels 
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that this is counterbalanced by the strides that he has made education wise and the 
exposure that he has gained by being and working in the diaspora. As he explains, 
 
‘I am caught in between on the issue of being in the diaspora. On one hand, I 
am grateful for the exposure and education that I have acquired by being in 
the diaspora rather than outside it like those at home who are experiencing it 
via me...through the remittances that I sent. On the other hand, I regret the 
opportunities that I have missed by being here such as being without my 
wider family, that my children haven’t seen my parents or their maternal 
grandparents and uncles and aunts for ten years. I wonder at times, how far I 
would have risen in my profession had I stayed at home. I would also have 
certainly benefited from the land reform; I would be a farm owner. So, it’s 
these thoughts that make you think whether you are better off being here or at 
home. I had a comfortable life at home which I think I have fairly maintained 
here. There hasn’t been a big change in my life to make me say I like the 
diaspora better than home.’  (Interview in Leeds, 14 November 2009) 
 
Solomon’s ambivalence derives from a number of factors. Firstly, his current 
employment is not dissimilar to the one that he had at home (Table 6.1, p. 153). He 
therefore, does not feel like there have been changes in his professional life since he 
moved to the UK. In Chapter 3, it was argued that migrants gain cultural capital by 
studying and working away from home. Solomon’s case attests to this as he is 
grateful for the exposure that he has gained and the international education that he 
has received (19%, n=29) (Figure 6.3, p. 146). However, the qualifications that he 
has gained have not translated into recognition at work although he is hopeful that 
they will be useful at home (see Chapter 8). This is consistent with scholarly 
literature about migrants failing to find jobs that match their academic profiles 
(Holgate, 2004). The restrictions placed on him and his family due to his immigration 
status makes him question the decision to leave home in the first place.  
 
The feelings of ambivalence are induced by the anxieties of home and belonging in 
the present which was outlined in Chapter 3. The ambivalent diaspora’s feelings of 
wanting to be at home are cancelled out by those of wanting to remain in the new 
host land. As Chapter 8 will reveal, family considerations are paramount in 
ambivalents’ minds, as great value is placed on children’s well-being, and fears of 
uprooting them from their settled life in the current host country prevail. The case of 
Dr Chokuda in Thohoyandou (p. 106) helps to underscore this point. His children are 
well settled in their school in Polokwane and the thought of uprooting them to 
Zimbabwe keeps him in his present location despite his opposition to staying,  
 
‘My son is at University of Cape Town (UCT) while the youngest is in high 
school at a private boarding school here. I can’t just cut ties with this place to 
return home as it’s not all about me; it’s all these things that are at the back of 
my mind. I can’t just uproot them. As much as I yearn to be home after almost 
15 years here, I can’t just pack and go back, that would be irresponsible. 
Because of my profession, I can always have somewhere to start and if things 
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don’t work, I can always come back. But going back doesn’t faze me, its home 
after all, you can’t run away forever.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 24 March, 
2010) 
 
Ambivalence is rooted in the perceived ability of the migrant to pick up from where 
they left, while, for some, it is about picking up the pieces and starting afresh should 
they return home. Migrants like Solomon who have enhanced their cultural capital by 
studying are optimistic about their chances of starting afresh should they return 
home (see Chapter 8). Tellingly, Dr Chokuda equates leaving home to running away, 
which gives insight into the depth of the problems in his country of birth. His 
characterisation of being in the diaspora as running away is in accord with 
transnationalism literature which, as emphasised in Chapter 3, argues that the 
circumstances surrounding people’s departure shape their association and 
idealisation of home (Brah, 1996). However, it is a belief shared by most migrants 
who feel that they ran away from the problems that were plaguing their country.  
 
Notwithstanding the narratives of migrants such as Solomon seen in the preceding 
paragraphs, it is important not to lose sight of the fluidity of these categories as they 
pervade the disparate groups that make up the Zimbabwean diaspora, e.g. asylum 
seekers, economic migrants. The plight of ambivalent migrants like Nelson (p. 110) 
and Solomon appears to be better than that of other migrants whose lives are lived 
at subliminal levels because of fears of the state (Ahmad, 2008) as will be shown in 
the next section.  
  
6.2.4 Clandestine diaspora 
 
The fourth group consists of what I call clandestine diaspora. This group consists of 
undocumented migrants, illegal migrants, irregular migrants, refused asylum seekers 
and visa over-stayers who would be deported if they were to come to the attention of 
the authorities. Clandestinity lies beyond illegality in that the migrants use a range of 
instruments in order to exercise their agency and to evade the authorities (Waite, 
2009). Literature on clandestinity argues that it exacerbates precarity (Ahmad, 2008; 
Anderson, 2010; Papadopoulos et al., 2008) by compelling migrants to partake in 
unstable and insecure work with limited tenure, protections, and benefits (Kalleberg, 
2009). 
 
Waite (2009:416) has explored precarity amongst migrants and noted that it 
‘conjures life worlds that are inflected with uncertainty and instability.’  She highlights 
the contestations that are inherent in its use, meaning and conception, with other 
scholars viewing it as both a condition and a possible point of mobilisation among 
those experiencing precarity. In this study, in accord with Waite (2009), I regard 
precarity as a condition experienced by migrants whose lives are lived beyond the 
‘normal’ realms of the labour market, where exploitation is rife because migrants 
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willingly and knowingly partake in exploitative labour practices due to their 
transnational remitting obligations (see Chapter 7).  
 
Comparatively, it would appear as though clandestinity is more pronounced in Leeds 
than in Limpopo due to the progress that the South African government has made to 
reduce clandestinity by granting blanket asylum to all Zimbabwean migrants as 
outlined in Chapter 2. However, such a simplistic interpretation of the South African 
government’s immigration policy risks ignoring a large segment of Zimbabwean 
migrants who led and continue to lead clandestine lifestyles by virtue of their 
undocumented status (see Chapter 5) and the general attitude of employers and 
locals towards Zimbabweans in particular and foreigners in general (see Chapter 2). 
Moreover, beginning in September 2010, the South African government launched 
the Zimbabwe Documentation Process (ZDP) which seeks to regularise the 
immigration status of Zimbabweans43. Furthermore, Chapter 2 demonstrated how 
informality of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa promotes clandestinity. 
Thus, it can be argued that clandestinity in South Africa is rooted in the informality of 
migration.  
 
The policy changes made by the government of President Zuma have not completely 
obliterated clandestinity as the interviews revealed. A significant number of the 
migrants have not taken advantage of this policy change to regularise their status, 
preferring instead to continue with the status quo. This could be ascribed to the 
migrants not noticing any positive outcome of having asylum permits given that the 
holders of the asylum permits still lead clandestine lifestyles (Ncube and Hougaard, 
2011), which may indicate limited human capital. One of the central arguments of 
this thesis pertains to the differences in human capital endowments between 
migrants in South Africa and the UK. The low uptake of the asylum offer appear to 
suggest that migrants have limited human capital and consequently lack the skills 
that are needed to work professionally. On the other hand, it could be that the 
migrants are blind to the advantages of having documented status, given that 
informality of migration is deeply ingrained in their lives (see Chapter 2).  
 
In South Africa, migrants use fake documents sourced from corrupt Department of 
Home Affairs (DHA) officials (Muzondidya, 2008). Clandestine migrants switch in and 
out of different statuses depending on the perceived gains that they can derive from 
their use at particular times (Ranger, 2005). This entails, for example, being an 
asylum seeker, a student, using false names, or all of these. Chapter 2 highlighted 
the language and other cultural practices of majoni-joni/injiva that live and work in 
South Africa. Clandestinity is therefore aided in no small measure by being able to 
                                                     
43
 The ZDP was carried out between 20
th
 September and 31
st
 December 2011. During this time, Zimbabwean 
migrants in South Africa were required to present at DHA offices in Pretoria to apply for regularisation of their 
status. The ZDP superseded the special dispensation (asylum permits) which was in effect from 1
st
 April 2009 to 
30
th
 April 2010 which saw Zimbabwean migrants given 3 month renewable asylum permits. By 31
st
 December 
when the ZDP expired, 275 762 applications had been received by the DHA.  
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speak several local languages. Being fluent in local languages not only aids 
integration but is also critical in evading immigration officials and accessing work, 
which is crucial to perpetuating clandestinity. The case of Darios (p. 113) exemplifies 
this, 
 
‘I speak seven South African languages, namely, Sipedi, Xichangani, 
Xivenda, Sotho, Tswana, Ndebele and Zulu. If I include Afrikaans, that will be 
eight although I am not yet fluent. In addition I speak Shona. If you want to 
stay here you need to speak their language, walk and behave like them and 
perm your hair. This way, the police think you are local and if they stop you, 
talk to them in their local language, the last time I was questioned in five 
languages by [the] police and each time I answered them back and they let 
me go. Funnily enough, local Shangaan people here in Giyani can’t speak as 
many languages as I and other Zimbabweans do.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 
March 2010).  
 
Clandestine lifestyles, in Leeds, are led by migrants who have been unsuccessful in 
their efforts to obtain documented immigration status such as refugee status (Figure 
6.7).  
 
Figure 6.7 Current immigration statuses by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based of survey results 2009-2010 
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Once informed of the outcome of their cases, migrants choose to sever all 
communication with the Home Office and other arms of the government. Evidence 
gathered suggests that once someone has descended into clandestinity they adopt a 
range of strategies to avoid the authorities (De Genova, 2002; Waite, 2009). Some of 
these measures include moving to a different city to start afresh, adoption of multiple 
identities, change of telephone numbers, and cutting off association with social 
networks leading to self imposed isolation (Ahmad, 2008). 
 
The following case helps to underscore this point. Dudu is a 39 year old clandestine 
migrant who lives in Leeds. She came to the UK in 2000 as part of the fourth 
migration episode where she subsequently sought asylum. She left London, where 
she was staying after her asylum claim was refused six years ago. Dudu holds a 
mechanical engineering degree from the University of Zimbabwe.  
 
‘Once they refused my claim, I changed my number, address, name and 
appearance. In fact, I changed everything that the Home Office could use to 
trace me with. I changed my friends and moved here where I rent a room in 
my new name. I have a new fake National Insurance number which I got from 
a Nigerian who I was introduced to by a Zimbabwean acquaintance; you can 
say everything about me is fake as no one knows my real name. I am Linda to 
many people and I am from South Africa, it helps that I am from Bulawayo so 
my accent is not too different from that of South Africans. I only went back to 
the Home Office when everyone started getting papers to make a fresh claim.’ 
(Interview in Leeds, 18 December 2009) 
 
The above excerpt helps to demonstrate how clandestinity is aided and abetted by 
the availability of fraudulent Home Office and EU documents, drivers’ licences and 
National Insurance numbers from the underworld that migrants can use to secure 
employment. Dudu’s narrative appears to suggest that migrants use their social 
networks to obtain fraudulent documents.   
 
There is a significant association between country of residence and current 
immigration status (Chi-square test results=63.364, df=5 and p<0.001). Figure 6.7 
shows that the major differences pertain to the dominance of migrants with refugee 
status/indefinite leave to remain in Leeds (15%, n=30) compared to 4% (n=18) in 
Limpopo and the preponderance of undocumented migrants in Limpopo (34%, 
n=177) compared to 13% (n=26) in Leeds. 
 
Clandestine working practices are further fuelled by ‘hiring’ or ‘renting’44 genuine 
documents of other migrants for a fee. Hiring and renting entails the genuine holder 
of the documents registering with numerous employment agencies and then sending 
their ‘proxy’ to do the actual work in return for a fee. By so doing, migrants ensure 
that limited resources are kept within the immigrant community by precluding others 
                                                     
44
 This entails an undocumented migrant using a documented migrant’s documents to get a job for a fee, usually 
a 60-40 split of the wages with the owner of the documents getting the lion’s share.  
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from accessing them (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003).This practice demonstrates the 
interconnectedness of migrants’ lives within the diaspora, and how this 
interconnectedness transcends national boundaries (Objective 3). The case of 
Donald, a 38 year old undocumented migrant living in Leeds, typifies this practice, 
 
‘My claim was refused long ago in 2006. I work as someone, I use his papers. 
Before, I got this fulltime position I used to work with an agency that he had 
registered with. I pay him for using his papers. He went back home last year. I 
wire his money via Western Union.’ (Interview in Leeds, 21 December 2009) 
 
Despite seemingly being an expensive exercise, hiring and renting appeals to 
clandestine migrants like Donald because it enables them to earn money to meet 
their remitting obligations and to avoid destitution (see Chapter 7), while also 
augmenting the owner of the papers’ income for use during their stay in Zimbabwe 
(see Chapter 8). Reports abound of clandestine migrants being committed to prison 
for using fraudulent papers in the UK (New Zimbabwe.com, 2009, 2010; The 
Zimbabwe Mail, 2009). This is corroborated by the Institute for Race Relations 
(2008) which observed that there were 280 Zimbabweans serving jail terms for 
working illegally with fraudulent documents in the UK in 2008.  
 
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how scholarship on transnationalism foregrounds the 
importance of embedded networks which migrants utilise in their quest to exercise 
their agency (Levitt, 2003b; Glick-Schiller, 2006; Portes, 1998). Findings from this 
study are in accord with this literature as clandestine migrants have been able to 
exercise their agency by working through recruitment agencies. Some Zimbabwean 
owned employment agencies regard clandestine migrants as sources of cheap 
labour. These recruitment agencies appear to be taking a calculated risk because if 
they were to be caught by the UK Border Agency they would be liable to a fine of 
£10,000 per worker (UKBA, 2012). It can be argued that recruitment agencies 
believe that these workers can tolerate the ill-treatment, low pay, and exploitation 
rather than report them to the authorities, given their desperation. This has some 
resonance with scholarly studies which suggest that some employers prefer to 
employ clandestine migrants because of their tolerance of low wages and need to 
avoid conflict (Piore, 1986; Sassen-Koob, 1981).  
 
The case of Charity, a clandestine migrant living in Leeds typifies this. Her asylum 
claim was refused several years ago when she lived in London. The 36 year old 
mother of four, whose husband and children are back in Zimbabwe, is reliant on the 
low wage that she gets from an agency, which is owned by a fellow Zimbabwean, to 
feed, clothe, house, and educate her children, as well as meet her essential needs. 
For Charity, as for many other migrants, the need to meet their remitting obligations 
supersedes concerns of exploitation, as will be highlighted in Chapter 7. Charity 
tolerates the delayed payments and ill-treatment of her employer as she considers 
this to be part of the suffering that comes with clandestinity. She says, 
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‘The owner of the agency is a Zimbabwean woman and she knows that I, 
together with others who work for her, don't have papers. Most of us, workers 
are illegals. I get paid £3 per hour to work in care homes. Payment of wages 
is erratic and she tells us to go and report where we want...she knows that we 
can’t because we aren’t allowed to work in the first place. Without papers, you 
are nobody and you work for nothing, employers take advantage of you.’ 
(Interview in Leeds, 12 January 2010) 
 
Scholars such as McClenaghan (2000) have observed that social ties can be both a 
blessing and impairment. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Charity used her bonding 
social capital to find a job incidentally with an employment agency owned by a 
Zimbabwean. She, like other clandestine migrants, is vulnerable to exploitation as 
demonstrated by delayed payments and working for an hourly wage which is way 
below the minimum wage. Phillimore and Goodson (2006) found similar results in a 
study of irregular migrants who work in the informal economy in the UK. Although 
Charity works in the formal economy her experiences are akin to those who work in 
the informal economy as exemplified by the withheld wages and the provision of 
transport to go to and from work places due to inaccessibility. She recognises that 
she is being exploited but is afraid to report her employer to the authorities because 
she fears reprisals and jeopardising the livelihoods of her peers (Gomberg-Muñoz, 
2010; Menjívar and Bejarano, 2004). Her experiences echo De Genova’s (2002) 
claim that clandestine migrants who, afraid of ‘deportability’, accept mundane jobs 
which they would not have accepted were they documented.  
 
Confronted by the spectre of destitution and unemployment, the clandestine 
diaspora often become trapped. Migrants have, according to Markova and Black 
(2008), been trapped in low paying ‘3 D jobs’ jobs (dangerous, dirty and difficult) that 
are characterised by poor working conditions. I refer to these jobs as ‘4 D jobs’ 
(dangerous, dirty, difficult and demeaning) which are common for undocumented 
migrants. I have added a fourth dimension to this original interpretation – 
demeaning- because, in the eyes of the clandestine migrants that participated in this 
study, they would not have done these jobs at home. Male migrants spoke of being 
demeaned by performing personal care duties for old women in the care homes, 
which they perceived as un-African.  As Gordon (p. 160), whom we have already met 
explains,  
 
‘I found the whole care experience demeaning; it affronted my dignity as a 
man. How could I bath and take an old woman to the toilet, a woman old 
enough to be my mother or grandmother? It’s unheard of in our culture but 
there I was doing that. You know us men; we never even cleaned our 
children, which was always a woman’s job at home. I found the experience 
totally demeaning, it opened up fissures in both my home as my wife started 
challenging me as to why I couldn’t do the same duties at home and in the 
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community as I was labelled as a dotcom45 person.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 
January 2010) 
Gordon feels that doing such a job resulted in the loss of his dignity not only at work 
but also at home and in the community as word would eventually reach those at 
home through migrants’ transnational linkages (see Chapters 7 and 8). Clandestinity 
for Gordon, as for many others in the UK, entails working in both the formal and 
informal sectors.  
 
Similarly, clandestine migrants in South Africa work in both the formal and informal 
economies (Table 6.2, p. 155). As argued earlier, clandestinity entails a lack of social 
and legal protection from the state. The clandestine migrants work as cleaners, farm 
labourers, construction, and domestic workers. In Chapter 2, it was argued that 
locals shun this type of work due to the low pay and poor conditions of service. 
Clandestinity means that work is highly gendered with women partaking in domestic 
work while men tend to dominate in the construction sectors. The employment of 
domestic female workers in Limpopo echoes Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila’s (1997: 
550) argument that considers the transnational movements of female domestics not 
only as, 
 
‘...physical circuits of migration but as the circuits of affection, caring and 
financial support [for their families] that transcend national borders, provides 
an opportunity to gender views of transnationalism and immigration.’  
 
Interestingly, some male respondents reported engaging in domestic work in 
Limpopo together with their wives as a means of earning money to meet their 
transnational obligations (Figure 6.8). Such migrants reported that domestic work 















                                                     
45
 Dot.com- is a term used by Zimbabweans in the UK to refer to people who work in care homes. It derives 
from the belief that people who work in care homes principally wipe old people’s bottoms.  
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Figure 6.8 Tapiwa and his two wives doing ‘piece work’  
 
 Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
This is exemplified by the case of Tapiwa, a 28 year old polygamous man who 
moved to South Africa with his two wives as part of the seventh migration episode. 
He lives in Thohoyandou in a mukhukhu with his wives,  
 
 ‘I arrived a month ago with my two wives. I have five children who remained at 
 home. I need money to send to home for the children’s upkeep. We go round 
 offering our services, washing dishes and clothes to people. We can make 
 anything between R60 to R250 per day which is quite good. In between, if I 
 get a job as a builder, my wives work with me as my dhaka boys [building 
 assistants]’ (Interview in Thohoyandou, 3 March 2010). 
 
Tapiwa’s narrative demonstrates the blurring of boundaries between what has 
historically been men and women’s work. Men have historically performed physical 
and masculine tasks such as working in the construction sector while women 
undertook feminine chores such as domestic work. However, as exemplified by the 
above case, Tapiwa’s wives works with him as building assistants in his work as a 
builder while simultaneously, he works with his wives as a domestic worker.  
 
Both men and women work on the farms where there is a space for both genders to 
exercise their agency. Clandestinity promotes intra-farm and inter-country circulation. 
This is due to the need to escape detection. For example, migrants move from one 
farm to another as and when news of raids filters through. As Shumirai, a 23 year old 
farm worker in Naboomspruit explains, 
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‘Sometimes the South African Police Services (SAPS) raid the farms to arrest 
illegal workers. Because of mobile phones we now get to hear of these raids 
before they arrive and we run away. You just move to the next farm, and keep 
on doing that. That is how it is here, sometimes, the employer is the one who 
sells you to SAPS when it is end of the month and that way they don’t have to 
pay you. I have been a victim of that twice.’ (Interview in Naboomspruit, 26 
April 2010) 
 
Other studies have highlighted the collusion of the SAPS with employers which 
deprive the workers of their earnings by conducting raids at the end of the month 
which is what Shumirai is alluding to when she talks about being ‘sold by the 
employers’ (Neocosmos, 2008). Similar abrupt movements also occur in Leeds 
where clandestine migrants ‘disappear’ instantaneously (De Genova, 2002). 
Gordon’s (p. 160) case is an exemplar of these disappearance acts. 
 
‘Working illegally means that you have to be on constant lookout for raids. 
Now the Home Office is very strict, the raids in the factories and care homes 
are frequent, it’s not like it was before. Just a month ago, the factory where I 
was working was raided and I got a call from a friend who works there to tell 
me not to come to work. I had to instantly move house as they took my home 
address from the company.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010) 
 
Gordon’s narrative highlights the salience of living ‘lightly’ to facilitate ‘melting’ into 
the crowds. Living lightly entails not having many belongings and living out of a 
‘travelling bag’ and having tenancy agreements in false names. Living lightly means 
frequently sending both cash and non-financial remittances home to avert it being 
confiscated by government officials in the event of being arrested and ultimate 
deportation.  
 
Mirroring the labour practices on the farms in South Africa, there is a blurring of 
gendered work in Leeds where both women and men increasingly work as order 
pickers, cleaners, and carers. This appears to be the only work that is available for 
both documented and undocumented migrants due to the tightening of immigration 
laws and the effects of the recession, which was highlighted in Chapter 2. Migrants 
reported being exploited by other Zimbabwean migrants and cleaning contracting 
companies which take advantage of their desperation. Their desperation is such that 
migrants end up performing domestic work for other Zimbabweans in return for 
accommodation and food. This is explicated by the case of Musa, a 39 year old 
widow and mother of five living in Leeds with a Zimbabwean couple.  
 
‘I do everything here, washing, cooking, and taking the children to and from 
school, in fact everything that a house girl does. You know what our maids, 
the house girls used to do at home, that is what I am doing for this couple. I 
am lucky if I get £50 per month because I am expected to be grateful for 
having a roof over my head. I am fortunate because if it wasn’t for this couple, 
I would be destitute. I find it strange that I look after other people’s children 
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when mine do not have anyone to look after them at home.’ (Interview in 
Leeds, 9 January 2010) 
 
Musa questions herself for caring for other people’s children while her own are on 
their own in Zimbabwe which is akin to what Hochschild (2002) calls ‘global care 
chains’ which she used to demonstrate how Filipino domestic workers cared for the 
children of other mothers abroad while their children remained at home. Musa’s 
experiences highlight the prevalence of intra-Zimbabwean exploitation in which 
documented Zimbabweans take advantage of their country folk under the guise of 
benevolence. Some commentators such as McGregor (2006a, 2006b) have drawn 
attention to the difficulties that some Zimbabwean professionals in the UK 
experience with childcare. There is a growing market for childcare within the 
Zimbabwean community which is increasingly being filled by undocumented 
migrants such as Musa who would otherwise be destitute due to their immigration 
status which precludes them from accessing state support (see Chapter 2). On the 
other hand, the cost of formal childcare services is beyond reach of the majority of 
those with documented status and those who work illegally. Consequently, the 
documented migrants resort to offering the undocumented migrants a place to stay 
in return for performing both childcare and domestic duties.  
 
Cases abound of clandestine migrants who have used their agency to circumvent 
the constraints and burdens of clandestinity. Consider the case of 28 year old 
Lebowakgomo resident Evelyn, an undocumented single mother of five. She is an 
exemplar of clandestine migrants who are utilising their agency by living off earnings 
from plaiting people’s hair and undertaking domestic chores such as washing and 
ironing, a practice commonly known as ‘piece work’. She is one of the numerous 
migrants who now eke a living through skills that she would not have otherwise 
utilised had it not been for her clandestinity.  She reflects on how she ended up 
being a hairdresser.   
 
‘I came in 2008 and could not find a job so ended doing this (gesturing). I earn 
enough to live on and to send children to school, it’s hard but then what option 
do I have? I now have a loyal customer base but competition is fierce, there 
are a number of us doing this so we undercut each other.’ (Interview in 
Lebowakgomo, 14 April 2010) 
 
For Evelyn, hair plaiting came as an afterthought following her inability to find a job. 
Had she secured a job, it is unlikely that she would be earning a living doing ‘piece 
work’ like plaiting people’s hair and other domestic chores such as laundry and 
ironing.   
 
6.2.5 A fearful diaspora 
 
Fear pervades a significant segment of the migrant population. This fear is caused 
by a multiplicity of factors. Fear in Limpopo could be ascribed to lack of safety and 
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security, such as the xenophobic attacks that were perpetrated against foreigners in 
South Africa in 2008. The threat of deportation provokes palpable fear within 
migrants in both countries. Migrants are afraid of detention and deportation as this 
curtails their ability to meet their transnational commitments (Figure 6.9) (see 
Chapter 7). In Leeds, 23% (n=45) of the respondents stated that they had been 
detained by the UK Border Agency compared to 39% (n=201) in Limpopo. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Zimbabweans without documented status in both countries 
are at risk of detention and deportation.   
 
Figure 6.9 Have you ever been detained by immigration authorities in South 
  Africa/ UK % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
In the UK, detention by the Home Office may be for several months in one of its 
holding centres in Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, and other areas. Release from the 
detention may mean dispersal to a new area, accompanied by stringent reporting 
conditions which curtail the migrants’ agency (Gomberg-Muñoz, 2010; Hynes, 2009). 
Detention may also lead to deportation from the UK. The case of Owen, a fifth wave 
migrant we met in Chapter 5 (p. 103), who was detained at Oakington Reception 
Centre in Cambridge after being arrested for illegally working at a manufacturing 
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company in Leeds helps to explicate this. He spent fifteen months in detention 
before being released. His bail conditions obligated him to ‘sign in’ at Waterside 
Court Immigration Centre in Leeds every Tuesday at 10 am and to be in his house 
between 6 pm and 6 am every day.  
 
‘I am always in fear of being deported. When they held me at Oakington, they 
took me to Heathrow on three occasions wanting to deport me via Kenya 
Airways. The first attempt was aborted because I cut my wrists and the crew 
refused to take me in. On the second occasion, I was too weak to go on the 
plane as I had been on hunger strike for 24 days. The third and final attempt 
was aborted because my solicitor got a court injunction which stopped the 
Home Office from deporting me. This was served a few minutes before 
takeoff, in fact I was already seated on the plane thinking this is it, I am finally 
going home. On being released, I had to sign every Tuesday at Waterside 
and had someone from a private security company working on behalf of the 
Home Office and the police, Group 4 Security (G4S) and Angel46 coming to 
check on me daily and twice a week respectively.’ (Interview in Leeds, 17 
October 2009). 
 
As with many other Zimbabwean migrants in the UK, Owen’s account of detention 
demonstrates the depths that migrants go in order to stop their deportation. His 
account is corroborated by scholarly literature which has identified high rates of 
suicide and self harm among asylum seekers in Immigration Removal Centres in the 
UK (Cohen, 2008). Table 6.3 shows that the main reasons that South African based 
migrants were arrested for illegal entry into the country and working illegally which is 
consistent with arguments proffered in Chapter 2 about the high prevalence of 
informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. This is demonstrated by 
seventy eight percent of respondents (n=158) in South Africa reporting that they 
were detained for illegal working compared to 37% (n=16) in the UK (z=-5.37, 
p<0.0001). Conversely, the detentions in the UK are attributable to visa over staying 
(47%, n=20), drinking and driving offences (1%, n=2), neglecting children (1%, n=2) 
and the use of fraudulent documents to access work/university education (1%, n=2). 
Parents that have been arrested for child neglect ascribe this to cultural differences 








                                                     
46
 The Angel Group is one of the private companies contracted by NASS to provide accommodation to asylum 
seekers in Leeds.   
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6.3 Reasons for detention by country of residence  
 
 
Country of residence 
United 
Kingdom South Africa 
If detained, why were you 
detained? 
Illegally entering the 
country 
Count 0 23 
% within Country of 
residence 
0% 11.0% 
Overstaying visa Count 20 21 
% within Country of 
residence 
47.0% 10.0% 
Working illegally Count 16 158 
% within Country of 
residence 
37.0% 78.0% 
Drink driving and other 
motoring offences 
Count 5 1 
% within Country of 
residence 
12.0% 1.0% 
Leaving children home on 
their own (home alone) 
Count 1 0 
% within Country of 
residence 
2.0% 0% 
Use of fraudulent 
documents to access 
work/university education 
Count 1 0 
% within Country of 
residence 
2.0% 0% 
Total Count 43 203 
% within Country of 
residence 
100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Like their counterparts in the UK, migrants in Limpopo who had been detained by 
SAPS and deported to Zimbabwe spoke of the hardships that they experienced in 
the Musina detention centre which they would not want to relive (HRW, 2006). 
Deportation for Limpopo domiciled migrants’ means being left alone on the 
Zimbabwean side of the border without any money to travel home. Migrants who had 
been deported spoke of sneaking back to South Africa once they had been freed by 
the Zimbabwean police, a phenomenon that Waller (2006) refers to as the ‘revolving 
door syndrome.’ The case of Hlanganani, a 36 year old undocumented migrant living 
in Potgiersrus highlights this, 
 
‘I don’t know how many times I have been deported, definitely over ten times. 
They will drop me off in Beitbridge and once the police release us, I go back, 
mostly on the goods train, which is easy to sneak into. Lots of people do that, 
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it’s dangerous but then there is nothing for mahala (for free).’ (Interview in 
Potgiersrus, 30 April 2010) 
 
Besides the threats of detention and deportation, migrants in Limpopo have to live 
with the threat of xenophobia. This coupled with constant threats and ill-treatment 
from locals induces fear in the Limpopo based migrants. The May 2008 xenophobic 
attacks on foreigners including Zimbabweans resulted in the deaths of 68 people 
(Muzondidya, 2008). Literature on xenophobic attacks has drawn attention to the role 
played by elites in inciting anti-immigrant feelings among locals (Neocosmos, 2005, 
2008). Adepoju (2003) claims that the actions of the elites are meant to deflect 
attention from their failures and to protect their interests and wealth by apportioning 
blame on immigrants.  
 
South Africans blame foreigners for taking away jobs from the locals despite the fact 
that foreigners take those jobs that the locals eschew (CDE, 2008). The influx of 
Zimbabweans is perceived to have exacerbated tensions between communities, 
which resonate with Dovido and Esses’ (2001) observation about the influx of 
foreigners heightening tensions in North America. They noted that the migration of 
large groups of people across borders can result in the host community’s reaction of 
feeling threatened by the new-comers either because of perceptions of economic 
strain or as a result of cultural dissimilarity. It is in this context that migrants such as 
Job, a 39 year old banking executive in Polokwane spoke of fear pervading and 
constraining his and his family’s life.  
 
‘You are always afraid of the locals. You look at what they did in 2008 and you 
wonder whether you are safe. But, what choice do I have? I have a good job 
here which pays me well. I wouldn’t find anything which pays me like this back 
home, so as much as I don’t like to live here, I have to. You think, I can’t take 
this anymore but then again you look at options and you realise you don’t 
have any apart from staying and fighting for another day. There are many 
people like me. I am a mukwere-kwere as they call us, I may be a king in 
Zimbabwe but here I am nobody and can be killed any time and the police 
won’t investigate once they know it’s a foreigner who is dead. You get robbed 
and the police instead of arresting the robber, they arrest you because you 
are a foreigner.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 28 February 2010) 
 
Fearfulness, like reluctance, is conceptualised in different ways by many migrants. 
For migrants in Limpopo, despite the dangers attendant to living in South Africa and 
the employment practices which discriminate against them, migrants, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 8, still maintain their residence due to the tenuous 
economic and political situation at home. Job, despite fearing for his safety decided 
to stay because of the remuneration that he is getting and the difficulties at home. 
His narrative, like that of many others is laden with self regret yet a gradual 
acceptance of the helplessness of his situation. It emerges from the realisation that 
the conditions in Zimbabwe are far worse than the dangers and frustrations endured 
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in South Africa. In Limpopo, documented status does not protect a migrant from fear. 
Fear permeates and supersedes documentation. It affects all migrants regardless of 
immigration status (see Chapter 7). It unites all migrants regardless of gender, 
immigration status and class. The experiences of Job and other migrants in his 
situation dovetail with transnationalism migration scholarship outlined in Chapters 2 
and 3 which posits that migrants are compelled to forge transnational links with 
home to offset racially stigmatising conditions in the host society (Basch et al., 1994; 
Portes, 1996). Fear, as Job’s case demonstrates, heightens the migrants’ yearning 
for home although this may not translate to actual return (see Chapter 8).  
 
Fear, for migrants domiciled in Leeds, is not for their safety but rather of being 
deported back home (Figure 6.10).  
 
Figure 6.10 Deportation by country of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Deportation is intimidating for some migrants who have not made arrangements for 
such an eventuality. As will be explained in Chapter 7, these arrangements include 
remitting for property acquisition. The survey results show that only 2% (n=3) of the 
respondents in Leeds were deported back to Zimbabwe before finding their way 
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back into the country compared to a significant 39% (n=203) in Limpopo. This result 
suggests that once deported to Zimbabwe from the UK, migrants found it extremely 
difficult if not impossible to return given the restrictive immigration policies compared 
to those in South Africa where the porous border does not portend doom for 
deported migrants as they can always re-renter informally.  
 
Migrants who have been refused asylum are at risk of deportation given the recent 
lifting of the suspension of deportation of Zimbabweans which had been in force 
since 2008. For migrants like Gordon (p. 160), deportation would certainly be a death 
sentence as he considers himself to be a political activist who came to the UK to 
escape political persecution, as highlighted in Chapter 2. His fears of deportation are 
also enmeshed in the economic uncertainty which would confront him at home if he 
was to be deported. They are also consistent with the argument advanced by Ahmad 
(2008) that the fear of deportation can lead to a pressure to maximise the ‘now’, 
whatever the current opportunities might be. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, 
lack of documented status does not necessarily disbar migrants from working and 
fulfilling their remitting obligations. As Gordon told me,   
 
‘my fears are twofold, one I am a member of the MDC and I participate in lots 
of activities which has brought me to the attention of the CIO and ZANU (PF). 
Despite my illegality, I am still able to work to support my family at home. If I 
get deported then, I don’t know. Every day that I read about deportations my 
stomach turns. That is why I don’t drive or go to parties because I don’t want 
to give the Home Office the opportunity of arresting me and then send me 
home. I keep to myself because if you associate with Zimbos (Zimbabweans), 
unotengeswa47.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010) 
 
The case shows how some migrants have developed coping mechanisms to reduce 
the chances of being caught by officials. As Gordon’s case reveals, fear of 
deportation breeds mistrust of fellow country people who are suspected of selling 
people out. It can be argued that fear of deportation gives rise to isolation as 
migrants cut off communication and interaction with their countrymen. While 
Shumirai’s (p. 169) case in Limpopo suggested that employers informed immigration 
authorities on their presence in a bid not to pay their wages, Gordon’s narrative 
showed that the UK Border Agency has informants that are embedded within 
Zimbabwean migrants.  
 
Working illegally also induces fear in the Leeds based migrants. This can be 
explained by four factors. Firstly, the migrants dread being caught by the authorities 
which may result in deportation. Some undocumented migrants such as visa over-
stayers have never had any form of contact with the authorities since they arrived, 
                                                     
47
 This Shona word translates to being sold. In this context, undocumented migrants believe that fellow migrants 
who may be aware of one’s immigration status informs the Home Office about them, often giving the Home 
Office officials the illegal migrant’s home and work addresses which leads to their apprehension. There is a 
widely held belief that the Home Office pays such informants £500.00 for each successful arrest.   
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which serves them well. Coming to the attention of the authorities reveals their 
immigration status. Secondly, it is likely to result in criminal proceedings for working 
illegally as outlined in Chapter 2. Thirdly, the migrant will be prosecuted for working 
with forged documents and obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception. Fourthly, 
it leads to loss of employment which has disastrous financial consequences for those 
at home (see Chapter 7). The experiences of the fearful diaspora have resonance 
with Gibney’s (2000) analysis that migrants opt to keep their presence hidden from 
the authorities due to fear of repatriation, distrust of asylum procedures, and 
unwillingness to be detained.   
 
6.2.6 An ephemeral diaspora 
 
The final category is what I call the ephemeral diaspora which derives from the 
temporality which is attached to each category and the notion of diaspora by 
migrants. A significant number of migrants regard their stay in South Africa and the 
UK as temporary which will cease once there is normality in Zimbabwe. 
Ephemeralism is driven by a complex set of socio-economic and political factors 
including immigration status, the availability of employment and educational 
opportunities etc.  
 
The ephemeral diaspora is characterised by being constantly on the move both 
within and without South Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe as they search to maximise 
the benefits of being in the diaspora. This is explicated by the case of Blessing, a 32 
year old mechanical engineer who decamped to Zimbabwe after a 6 year sojourn in 
the UK. He cites the failure to secure a job as a mechanical engineer as the primary 
driver of his decision to return to Zimbabwe initially before moving to South Africa 
(Table 6.2, p. 155). Here, he reflects on his ephemeral experiences: 
 
 ‘I moved constantly when I was in London. I lived in London, Leeds, Luton, 
 Birmingham, Milton Keynes and Coventry all in a space of 6 years. 
 Circumstances force you to move. If you don’t move, the Home Office will 
 catch you, especially when you don’t have papers. When things became 
 tough, I returned to Zimbabwe where it was like jumping from the frying pan 
 into the fire. Before long, I came here and luckily, I got the job of my dreams. I 
 did everything in London, from being a student, working as a cleaner, a 
 factory operative, courier and teacher. You have to, otherwise you won’t eat.” 
 (Interview in Polokwane, 31st March 2010) 
 
Migrants descend into ephemeralism because of their transnational obligations (see 
Chapter 2) and restrictive immigration policies. Blessing demonstrates his 
ephemeralism by having stayed in 6 cities in the UK prior to returning to Zimbabwe 
where he stayed briefly. Thus, constant movement in the UK is both a strategy to 
evade the immigration authorities and gain paid work away from London where 
employers are considered to be more strict about immigration status (see Dudu’s 
case, p. 165). 
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Ephemeralism is also caused by marital breakdowns. Family break breakdowns can 
transform a migrant from membership of enthusiastic diaspora to ephemeralism. 
Similarly, a loss of employment has had the same effect on some migrants. The 
case of Malvern a 44 year old Leeds resident, who recently lost his job as well as 
divorced from his wife, 
 
 ‘The past six months have been the worst of my life. I lost both my job and 
 wife. The divorce has long been coming. You know our wives, the nurses, 
 when they came here they became the husbands because they brought us 
 here. As for the job, it was something from out of the blue; they just said I was 
 one of the many to be made redundant. This has affected me, I used to be 
 happily married and had a relatively good job, good car, good family, and 
 good house but now I have nothing, I live in a hostel. I have lost everything.’ 
 (Interview with Malvern, Leeds, 22nd December 2009) 
 
For Malvern like many of his male counterparts, ephemeralism is partly a result of 
the gender linked emasculation that they are experiencing in the diaspora brought by 
the skilled migration flows. The loss of employment also results in ephemeralism as 
exemplified by Malvern’s case. When he was employed, Malvern could be said to 
have been part of the enthusiastic diaspora given his assertions that ‘he had 
everything, a good house, a good car, good family.’ Redundancy meant that he lost 
the good job and car while the family breakdown sealed his ‘demise’ as evidenced 
by living in a hostel.  
 
Ephemeralism is closely tied to vulnerability which eliminates migrants’ abilities to 
make a choice. The ephemeral diaspora in South Africa, especially those who claim 
asylum in Musina is confronted by serious housing problems which ephemeralists 
appear to tolerate because of the problems at home. In South Africa, the task of 
providing accommodation has been arrogated by religious bodies which are 
overwhelmed by the large numbers of asylum seekers. This is echoed by Garcia and 
Duplat (2007) who point out that there has been an increase in church-based shelter 
provisions in some parts of South Africa in response to migrants’ accommodation 
needs. At night, men sleep in a tent which also acts as a church hall during the 
Wednesday, Friday and Sunday prayers. It was revealed during interviews that the 
mats were lice infested. Darios (p. 113) stayed at the shelter for one and half months 
while waiting for the processing of his asylum permit and when he was working to 
raise enough transport fare to travel further inland.  
 
‘It is better than the show grounds where people used to sleep in the open. At 
least, there is security. It’s just the hunger, but otherwise it’s manageable. We 




For this ephemeral diaspora, food is at a premium especially for the men who live at 
The I Believe in Jesus Church men’s shelter in Musina where they have one meal a 
day in the evening which is provided by El-Shaddai International Christian Church, 
another faith organisation which is also based in Musina (Figure 6.11).  
 
Figure 6.11 Migrants queuing for their evening meal, Limpopo  
 
 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
Male migrants living at one of the shelters in Limpopo described their eating patterns 
as ‘0-0-1.’48 The shelter provides one evening meal in the evening which is eaten on 
the church ground or in the tent where they also sleep. The meal consists of rice with 
soup. For some members of the ephemeral diaspora, these hardships were worth 
enduring as they hoped for better fortunes once in the South African hinterland.  
 
However, for some migrants, the housing problems do not improve on leaving the 
shelter. Instead, due to the low wages that they earn, they cannot afford to rent 
suitable accommodation, and find themselves staying in dilapidated and ramshackle 
structures known as mukhukhu (Figure 6.12). Ephemeral migrants claim that they 
are forced to stay in poor neighbourhoods because they cannot afford the rent. It 
was not uncommon to hear of up to 10 people staying in one shack, which is a 
strategy of saving money. Other studies have found that Zimbabwean migrants are 
exploited by their landlords due to their vulnerability (Bloch, 2007; Muzondidya, 
2008). Chengeto, whom we have already met (p. 146) and lives in the mukhukhu 
pictured, explains why this is popular with migrants:    
 
                                                     
48
 Interview with Tarisai, Musina, 22 March 2010. 
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‘It’s cheap; this is what we can afford. I can’t waste money renting a good 
house when our stay here is temporary and the money is needed to cover a 
lot of things at home. We work for ourselves and those at home so spending 
money on a good house is foolish.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 21 May 2010) 
 
Figure 7.12 Inside a migrant’s mukhukhu, Tzaneen 
 
 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
 
Chengeto attributes her choice for staying in a mukhukhu to the temporary nature of 
migrants’ stay in South Africa as well as her transnational obligations (see Chapter 
3). Given the competing financial needs, migrants see it prudent to sacrifice their 




The chapter explored the impact of being in the diaspora on the migrants. This has 
been achieved through a six fold classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora which 
fills an important gap in the literature. The six categories that have been discussed in 
this chapter are important; there are many factors to each category which affect how 
migrants interpret their situation. Migrants’ enthusiasm is caused by the equal 
opportunities they have in the host country. Migration wipes the slate clean for most 
migrants, especially in the UK.  
 
Migrants, despite their backgrounds, can start afresh and have access to social 
mobility tools, such as qualifications, which did not exist at home. Existence in the 
diaspora weakens cultural practices that stifled women’s rights. This new found 
freedom is cherished by female enthusiasts while eliciting reluctance in some men. 
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Reluctance has been demonstrated to be a product of failure to acclimatise and 
reproduce the lifestyle that a migrant had when they were in Zimbabwe. It is also 
associated with the erosion of masculinity. Reluctance does not portend return. 
Instead, reluctant migrants soldier on despite these perceived injustices. 
 
Ambivalence is a product of unrealised goals and aspirations. It is seen as a 
continuation of the status quo; being in the diaspora has not materially changed the 
quality of life of the migrants. Measures taken to enhance social mobility such as 
further education would not have resulted in recognition at work. Thus, the benefits 
of being in the diaspora are not different from being at home.  
 
Clandestinity is bred by undocumented status. It entails evading the authorities. 
Clandestinity is a demonstration of the migrants’ desire to exercise their agency 
despite the structural constraints imposed by their lack of documentation. It is the 
triumph of migrants’ inventiveness over officialdom. Clandestinity breeds isolation as 
migrants shun associating with their peers for fear of being turned in to the 
authorities. The fear of being caught pervades clandestine migrants. Migrants are 
afraid of what coming in contact with the authorities may initiate.  
 
The fear of detention and deportation looms large in the undocumented migrants’ 
lives. Migrants live in fear of racial tensions coming open conflict, as was the case 
with the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in May 2008. High crime rates worry 
migrants and add to their fear of being in the diaspora. Some migrants in the 
different categories discussed in the preceding paragraphs persist with life in exile 
because of their transnational obligations to those who remained behind and 
elsewhere. As discussed in Chapter 3, transnationalism entails maintaining living 
and having ties with those left behind. Remittances are central to the maintenance of 
ties between the diaspora and those at home. Remittances can be both monetary 
and non-monetary. The next chapter examines migrants’ transnational transactions 
in the face of socio-economic difficulties that were experienced in Zimbabwe during 












Chapter Seven The transnational transactions of Zimbabwean   
   migrants 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding chapter presented a typology of the Zimbabwean diaspora which 
demonstrated how the lives of the diaspora groups are shaped by factors such as 
immigration status, gender linked emasculation etc. This chapter explores the factors 
that motivate migrants in the identified diaspora categories to engage in 
transnational linkages with those at home. Migrants’ abilities to meet transnational 
obligations such as providing for those left behind and to participate in political and 
economic activities are determined to a large extent by the diasporic group which 
they belong to. For example, a clandestine migrant may remit more regularly than an 
enthusiastic migrant due to their tenuous migration status.  
 
The contention of this chapter is that migrants maintain links with those at home for 
multiple reasons including the need to ‘maintain a presence’ which therefore reduces 
their exposure to risk. By so doing, the chapter addresses the demands of objective 
2, specifically the maintenance of links with those left at home and the complexities 
that surround this practice. Furthermore, focussing on migrants’ transnational 
linkages addresses the third objective of this study which seeks to explore the 
evolving transnational strategies employed by Zimbabwean migrants in their 
relationship with home. In doing so, the chapter extends debate about how 
transnationalism manifests in diasporic groups and communities, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. A number of scholars, as seen in Chapter 2, have turned to 
transnationalism to explain the migration phenomenon (Castles, 2003; Glick-Schiller, 
2000).  
 
Building on the taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora which was discussed in 
Chapter 6, Section 7.3 presents and discusses the political activities and factors that 
promote or constrain the migrants’ transnational political activism. Because of the 
dire economic situation in Zimbabwe during the past decade, scholarly attention has 
focused on financial remittances at the expense of social remittances. Migrants’ 
social remittances have had far reaching consequences on the Zimbabwean political 
landscape; they have been crucial to the opposition MDC thereby allowing it to 
challenge ZANU (PF) hegemony. Focusing on social remittances also recognises 
that economic remittances seldom flow on their own but rather flow simultaneously 
with other forms of remittances. Section 7.4 focuses on the maintenance of contact 
by migrants and a range of mediums through which this is affected in both Leeds 
and Limpopo before proceeding to discuss how food is increasingly being seen as a 
medium of contact and re-enactment of home. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the importance, meanings attached to, form and nature of transnational 
transactions.   
 
 184 
7.2 Remittances to Zimbabwe: An overview  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK 
maintain links with their families and relatives at home (Figure 7.1). Remittances are 
one of the transnational linkages that bind migrants to those at home (Fussell and 
Massey, 2004). The results show that an overwhelming majority of the survey in both 
countries (98% (n=507) in South Africa and 100% (n=200) in the UK) have remitted 
to Zimbabwe.  
 
Figure 7.1 Remittances to Zimbabwe by country of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The survey respondents attributed their remitting motivations to multiple factors 
including altruism (Stark, 1991), co-insurance plans (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; 
Glytsos, 1997), target saving (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998), smoothing family 
consumption (Rosenzweig and Stark, 198) and starting a business/investment 
(Connell and Brown, 199; Stark, 1991). The political problems that resulted in the 
international isolation of the country coupled with intermittent climatic shocks 
impelled migrants to remit. The volume of remittances to Zimbabwe during the past 
decade has led policy makers and academics crediting the diaspora with averting 
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economic implosion during hyperinflation (Pilossof, 2009). This has to be understood 
in the context of the flight of capital and dwindling foreign direct investment (FDI) due 
to the toxic economic and political policies of President Mugabe’s government which 
were discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
The results show that the frequency of remitting varies between the two countries 
(Figure 7.2). The reasons for these variations will be explored in Section 7.3. The 
frequency of remittances to Zimbabwe is closely related to the country of residency 
(Chi square= 116.25, df=4, p<0.001). The results suggest that UK based migrants 
are more likely to engage in remittances on an ‘as and when required’ basis (35%, 
n=69) while the majority of those in South Africa remit a few times a year (65%, 
n=327) probably because of the low wages which was discussed in Chapter 5. This 
means that accumulating sufficient amounts to remit may take longer than their 
counterparts in the UK.  
 
Figure 7.2 Frequency of remittances to Zimbabwe by country of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
This may also explain why only 3% (n=13) of the Limpopo based migrants remit 
monthly compared to 17% (n=34) in Leeds. These remitting practices suggest that 
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migrants in the UK may have been joined by their families which negate regular 
remitting. Secondly, as argued in Chapter 2, migrants in the UK come from relatively 
well off backgrounds which imply that they do not need to send money home as their 
families are self sufficient.  
 
Interestingly, there is almost an equal split between the UK and South Africa on 
‘remitting yearly.’ It was pointed out in interviews that these yearly remittances 
occurred during the Christmas period when migrants in South Africa return home for 
the Christmas break. The case of Leanne, a 26 year old woman who arrived in South 
Africa as part of the sixth migration wave in 2006 helps to bring this into perspective,  
 
 ‘I bring my mother money and groceries when I go home at Christmas. In 
 between, I have to work hard to save, I don’t earn much here so I can’t send 
 anything in between. I always go and celebrate Christmas at home and I have 
 to ensure that I buy many things so that people can see why I am here, 
 otherwise people will say I am uncultured, I don’t look after my mother and 
 children.’ (Interview in Musina, 17 May 2010). 
 
The above excerpt appears to suggest that migrants save intensively during the year 
in order to meet their yearly remitting obligations which are also motivated by the 
need to conform to societal stereotyping. Her narrative also suggests that the low 
wages which migrants in South Africa get which means that it takes them 
considerably longer to accumulate sufficient savings to send home. South African 
based migrants’ ability to remit frequently has also been diminished by the 
dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy.   
 
Mirroring the variations in the frequency of remitting, the amounts remitted fluctuate 
between the two countries (Figure 7.3). There are significant differences in the 
amounts remitted with 96% (n=484) of the 509 survey respondents in South Africa 
who remit stating that they send home the equivalent of £0 - £,1000.00 per annum 















Figure 7.3 Amounts remitted to Zimbabwe by country of residence £ 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
As already pointed out, this can be attributed to the low wages that South African 
based migrants earn compared to their counterparts in the UK. Even migrants that 
are formally employed earn low wages in South Africa, something that Leeds based 
migrants are protected from by minimum wage law. The low human capital 
endowments which Limpopo based migrants have can also account for the low 
amounts remitted. Overall, the data suggests that migrants in the UK remit higher 
amounts than their South Africa based equivalents which may be due to the reasons 
for remitting (Figure 7.4).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, migrants remit for multiple reasons. The results of this 
study lend support to this observation. The overriding reasons for remitting in both 
Leeds (49%, n=98) and Limpopo 54%, n=272) appear to be for educational 
purposes which corroborate claims of catastrophic collapse of the education system 
in Zimbabwe which has given rise to the mushrooming of private schools and 
colleges (Pswarayi, 2010). Remittances for household maintenance were also 
shared by migrants in both countries i.e. South Africa (23%, n=116) and UK (35%, 
n=69).  
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Figure 7.4 Reasons for remitting by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Echoing other literature, the remitting practices of Zimbabwean migrants appear to 
lean towards household consumption rather than investments and savings (Pham 
and Harrod, 2008; Dias and Jayasundere, 2004). Notwithstanding this, the multiplier 
effects of remittances should not be underestimated as they are considerable 
(Bryant, 2005; Hugo, 2002) given that remittances are not deployed for daily needs 
of their families alone but are also used for productive and non-productive 
investments, savings, education and healthcare needs of those left behind 
(Parreñas, 2005b; Wahyuni, 2005; Zlotnik, 1995).    
 
Sections 7.2.1 and 7.3 will examine in more detail the spatial and regional factors 
that drive the migrants’ remitting behaviours. It will investigate the reasons why 







7.2.1 Remitting motivations in Limpopo 
 
The amount a migrant remits is affected by factors such as immigration status and 
human capital which have a bearing on the amount and frequency of remittances. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, remittances are related to return intentions (Ahlburg and 
Brown, 1998). Although the motivations for remitting espoused by migrants were 
multiple (Figure 7.4, p. 188), interview data shows that migrants concur that 
remittances mitigate the suffering experienced at home, as the case of Gordon (p. 
160) shows. Evidence adduced from the study points to changes in the remitting 
behaviour which reflect the socio-economic developments at home as well as the 
migrants’ own personal circumstances. 
 
Remitting was seen as critical to household maintenance and sustenance by an 
overwhelming majority of the survey respondents regardless of socio-economic 
status (Figure 7.1, p. 184). This sheds light on the extent to which those at home 
depend on the migrants for their provisions and livelihoods. Migrants sent both 
financial and non-financial remittances e.g. clothes, foodstuffs etc depending on the 
gravity of the situation at home. For example, data from the survey shows that 
between 2007 and 2008, migrants sent mostly groceries as the shops were empty 
because the government had no forex needed to import essential foodstuffs. 
Furthermore, hyperinflation rendered futile recipients’ ability to buy goods at home. 
Migrants felt obligated to remit to meet their families’ daily needs.  
 
In fact, as explained in Chapter 3, there is a body of scholarship which argues that 
migrants regard remitting as part of their daily life and feel that there is an 
expectation of them to remit (Portes, 1999), especially for those migrants whose 
families rely solely on subsistence agriculture for their sustenance. In Chapter 2, it 
was highlighted how erratic rainfall in some parts of the country exposes migrants’ 
families to climatic shocks like droughts (Maphosa, 2011; Muzondidya, 2008). Being 
in South Africa and the UK has enabled some migrants, who described their situation 
at home as having been dire, to help their families through sending remittances. As 
the cases of Charity (p. 166), Shumirai (p. 169), Gordon, and others demonstrated in 
Chapter 6, some migrants are reluctantly staying in South Africa and the UK to meet 
their remitting obligations and mitigate the suffering of their families. The case of 
Muchi, 37, who came to South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode after 
spending some time in his rural area following his retrenchment in Masvingo in 2008 
where he worked as a factory manager, helps to bring this into perspective, 
 
‘If I don't sent money and food my family will die, it is simple as that. The rains 
were poor this year and my family didn’t harvest anything so they look up to 
me to provide them with food. I have to; otherwise they will starve to death, so 
I have to work hard in order not to fail my family.’ (Interview in Vaalwater, 23 
March 2010) 
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Muchi can be described as a member of the reluctant diaspora which was described 
in Chapter 6. However, despite his reluctance at being in the diaspora, he is happy 
with the opportunities that are attendant to it as they enable him to help his family 
through his monetary and non-monetary remittances. It can be argued from Muchi’s 
case that the reason why he is maintaining residence in the diaspora despite his 
reluctance is predicated on the need to maintain his breadwinner status which is a 
central aspect of hegemonic masculinity (Novikova et al., 2005; Thébaud, 2010). His 
case demonstrates the societal norms and beliefs that drive this phenomenon. The 
role of men as breadwinners is not confined to African culture alone but rather 
appears to transcend continents. For example, Taga (2005 cited in Thébaud, 2010) 
notes that, in Japan, masculinity is associated with the ability to provide financially 
for one’s family. The above account brings to the fore the connection between 
agriculture and remitting. When the harvests are poor, there is an expectation for 
migrants to remit more to compensate for the shortfall.  
 
Chapter 6 highlighted how being in the diaspora has changed gender roles with 
women having financial independence and a greater say in their marriages. Women 
who are enthusiastic about the diaspora have welcomed the decision making powers 
it has given them. These decisions making powers include who to remit to and the 
purpose of the remittances, without their husbands’ influence. This is explained by 
Chengeto whom we have already encountered in Chapter 6 (p. 146). 
 
‘My husband’s parents live in Harare and he grew up in Harare but my 
parents live in the rural areas. They need fertiliser and other agricultural inputs 
which his parents don’t need. When we were home, he would ignore my 
parents’ needs completely while giving his parents whatever they needed, 
saying my parents were my brothers’ responsibility. But since I came here, I 
have been sending them money to buy inputs and looked after them properly 
as he looks after his own. What he doesn’t realise is that if they get the inputs 
that they desire, they tend to have better harvests.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 
21 May 2010) 
 
Chengeto’s case shows how being in the diaspora has given financial independence 
to some women who were previously dependent. Such women decide independently 
what, when and who to remit to, without the consent and interference of their 
husbands.  
 
Although only 9% (n=43) of the respondents ascribed their remitting motivations for 
agricultural purposes, it was a recurring theme in migrants’ narratives. Migrants 
stated that their remittances were used to purchase seeds, farming implements, and 
livestock (Figure 7.4, p. 188). Migrants, like the people at home, rely on a good 
harvest. Good harvests translate to reductions in the amount to be remitted for food 
purchases thereby allowing remittances to be channelled to other critical areas such 
as education. These findings resonate with the work of Amanor-Wilks and Moyo 
(1996) who in their study of migrant remittances in Matebeleland found out that some 
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drought prone areas have sustained their populations by migrant incomes derived 
from South Africa. Similarly, Hobane (1999) found out that 62% of the adult 
population in one community in Matebeleland South were employed outside the 
country, mainly in South Africa and Botswana. These findings are contrary to 
Lipton’s (1980) postulation that migrants’ remittances are spent on consumptive 
goods.  
 
The importance attached to education by Zimbabweans, highlighted in Chapters 2 
and 5, is reflected by 54% (n=272) of the 507 survey respondents who have remitted 
for educational purposes. The figure can be attributed to the respondents leaving 
their children at home as well as paying fees for the extended family given the 
relatively youthful age of the South African based respondents whose children may 
not be of school going age. The collapse of the state education system has resulted 
in the growth of private schools and colleges (Chivore, 2004). Cash remittances 
cater for school fees, uniforms, stationery, groceries and text books. The decimation 
of businesses prompted migrants to send uniforms, text books, and other ancillary 
materials needed for their children’s education. Muchi reminisces about the changes 
that have taken place in the education system since he was at school in the late 
1980s and now:  
 
‘I have to make sure that I send pencils, pens, exercise books, buy text books, 
everything as they are not provided by the school. I can’t help but think how 
good life was to people of my generation. We were given uniforms at school 
and we would get exercise books, pens, everything. At university we didn’t 
pay anything, we got pay-out49. Now, I have to pay school fees and then pay 
the teachers on top so that my children can get extra lessons, which never 
happened during my time. Besides my own children, I also have my two 
young brothers at university that I pay fees for.’(Interview in Vaalwater, 23 
March 2010) 
 
The role of remittances in reducing school dropout rate has been noted in countries 
such as El Salvador (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003). The results of this study are 
consistent with these prior studies as remittances were used to forestall children 
dropping out of school. They were also used to pay for private lessons given the 
incessant strikes which pervaded Zimbabwean public sector at the height of the 
crisis (Masuku, 2009).  
 
Remitting for property acquisition was cited by a small minority of the survey 
participants (2%, n=12). Property acquisition has different meanings to South African 
based migrants compared to their UK counterparts. Here, migrants spoke of building 
houses in their villages unlike their UK based counterparts who showed an urban 
bias. The importance of buying a property in towns was not shared by some 
                                                     
49
 Pay-out was a government grant given to university students. The students repaid the loans once they started 
working and were repayable over a five year period. 
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migrants because of a strong attachment to their rural villages as the case of 
Anthony (p. 108) demonstrates,  
 
 ‘I have just finished building my four bedroomed house in my village, it’s 
 beautiful. I only had a small one bedroomed house which I built when I was 
 teaching in Zimbabwe 2 years ago...I could only build a house in my village, 
 as I can’t afford to buy a stand in town. Even teachers in Zimbabwe don’t 
 have houses in towns, it’s beyond their reach.’ (Interview in Phalaborwa, 3 
 March 2010). 
 
Anthony’s decision to build a house in his village was partly driven by the low 
disposable income that he and others of his ilk earn in the agricultural and informal 
economy where the majority of the study participants work. It can also be attributed 
to the circulation that they engage in between South Africa and their villages. The 
low disposable incomes for these members of the clandestine and fearful diaspora 
compel them to focus on survival and putting food on the table, as highlighted in 
Chapter 6. As one clandestine migrant put it, they are ‘caught up in surviving for the 
day and not worrying about buying a house in a town.50’  
 
Therein lies one of the key differences between the Leeds and Limpopo based 
migrants. Migrants in Leeds place an emphasis on owning a property in towns and 
cities while those in Limpopo want to do the same in their villages. This can be 
ascribed to class as the majority of the migrants in Leeds worked in urban areas 
prior to migration while those in Limpopo had limited experience of living and working 
in urban areas. Circulation which was highlighted in Chapter 2 could also be 
responsible for this occurrence. It can therefore be said that there is a strong case to 
link class with urbanity. On the other hand, interviewees with urban backgrounds 
spoke of wanting to buy or build houses in cities. However, due to dollarization, 
property acquisition has become a pipedream even for professionals like engineers 
and doctors as the prices have been pushed beyond their means as the case of 
Davidson (p. 112) shows,  
 
 ‘I started building in 2008 before dollarization. But dollarization is killing me as 
 it is too expensive to buy things at home now because the dollar is stronger 
 than the Rand.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 8 April 2010)  
Davidson’s narrative suggests that migrants’ plans to acquire property at home have 
been stymied by dollarization which has pushed the cost of building materials 
beyond their reach.  
 
Thus, the remitting behaviours and patterns of South African based Zimbabweans 
are driven by the need to protect their families from the impact of both economic and 
climatic shocks. Their remitting practices are therefore, supportive of rural livelihoods 
which most migrants have strong attachment with. The study participants felt 
                                                     
50
 Interview with Miriam, Polokwane, 23
rd
 April 2010 
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enormous pride and self worth for helping their families during their time of greatest 
need. The following section will discuss the motivations for remission of Leeds based 
migrants. This will enable us to get a clear picture of similarities and differences in 
the remitting motivations of migrants in two countries.  
 
7.2.2 Motivations for remitting in Leeds  
 
Similar to their Limpopo based counterparts, education (cited by 49%, n= 98 of the 
survey respondents) is one of the biggest motivations for remitting (Figure 7.4, p. 
188). This should be considered in the context of separation which, as demonstrated 
in Chapter 6, saw some migrants moving alone while their families remained behind. 
Remittances are driven by separation from families due to factors such as an 
immigration status that debars family reunion. Consequently, the interviewees 
reported sending money to Zimbabwe and other countries where their children were 
attending universities. Remitting for educational purposes echoes scholarly 
observations about remittances generating money for education (Lopez-Cordova, 
2005; Durand et al., 1996). A significant minority of the interviewees highlighted their 
own educational attainment as motivation for investing in their children and siblings’ 
human capital.  
 
The survey revealed that some migrants appear to be investing in their children due 
to their own qualifications (Figure 5.6, p. 120). Against this background, the evidence 
seem to suggest that migrants’ lack of social mobility which was discussed in 
Chapter 6 is not deterring migrants from investing in their children’s education, in the 
hope that it will kick-start their children’s social mobility. The flight of teachers from 
Zimbabwe has resulted in a lack of trust in the public education system. This has led 
Leeds based parents to send their children to private schools which are reputed for 
offering a better quality of education than government schools. Betty (p. 139), a 
member of the clandestine diaspora in Leeds, whose husband and children are in 
Zimbabwe, reflects on her remitting motivations,   
‘I have two children back home who are in secondary school now. I want the 
best for them, having been unable to see them for 10 years, the best I can do 
for them is to give them a good education. They are at Peterhouse51 and I 
have to fork out 3K (three thousand dollars) every term plus other expenses. 
These hardships I am facing here are worth it, they are for my children’s 
benefit.’  (Interview in Leeds, 19 October 2009) 
Betty’s mothering from afar is akin to what Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997: 548) 
refer to as ‘transnational motherhood’ which is increasingly becoming a characteristic 
feature of geographically dispersed families. Transnational motherhood has been 
defined as ‘the organisational reconstitution and rearrangement of motherhood to 
                                                     
51
 Peterhouse is a private school consisting of a Boys’ and Girls’ Preparatory and High School about 79 
kilometres from Harare. It is considered to be expensive by Zimbabwean standards and caters for the upper 
class. It offers Cambridge International Examinations whilst state schools offer the discredited local 
examinations set by the Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council. 
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accommodate the temporal and spatial separations forced by migration’ 
(Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997: 548). These transnational families, despite 
having members of the nuclear family living in different countries, share strong bonds 
of collective welfare and unity (Parreñas, 2001; Ho, 2002). Bryceson and Vuorela 
(2002) attributed the increase in this phenomenon to the changing social, economic, 
and political conditions of a globalising world.  
 
Betty’s case demonstrates the lack of trust and confidence that migrants have in the 
integrity of the Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council (ZIMSEC), which manages 
examinations. This lack of trust is manifested in parents sending their children to 
private schools where they sit for internationally recognised examinations 
administered by the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate. Thus, 
despite being in a clandestine diaspora, Betty is enthusiastic about being able to 
remit for her children’s education (see Chapter 6). She therefore, tolerates the 
hardships that her clandestine lifestyle induces as long as she is able to finance her 
children’s education and to meet their needs. Betty’s actions are consistent with 
some transnational migration literature which argues that women migrate overseas 
to improve not only their economic and social livelihoods, but also those of their 
families and children left behind (Hugo and Ukwatta, 2008; Shaw 2008) and to 
exercise their agency by participating in labour markets available in other countries 
(Parreñas, 2001). 
 
The demise of the educational system has also been acutely felt in the higher 
education sector. The country’s flagship and oldest university, the University of 
Zimbabwe is seriously understaffed, with a lecturer vacancy rate of over 80% in the 
faculties of science and medicine (UNDP, 2010). It is therefore not surprising that 
interviewees reported sending their children to universities in South Africa, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada. Gordon (p. 160) explains why he sent his daughters to 
universities outside Zimbabwe,  
 
‘My eldest daughter went to university in Melbourne. My second eldest is at 
UCT [University of Cape Town] in South Africa. I therefore remit to meet these 
obligations.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010) 
Despite the UN indicators showing that Zimbabwe has the highest literacy rate in 
Africa in 2010 (UNDP, 2010), the interviewees expressed doubt over these claims 
arguing that they are outdated. The quality of teaching and learning has deteriorated 
under President Mugabe’s regime, thereby undoing the good work that was done 
earlier. The decline in standards is demonstrated by the fact that children of senior 
government officials including President Mugabe shun local universities preferring 
foreign universities. This, according to migrants, attests to the lack of faith in the 
standards of local universities.  
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Target saving was cited by a small minority of the respondents in Leeds (3%, n=5) 
as a reason for their remitting practices (Figure 7.4, p. 188). Evidence from 
interviews suggests that most migrants achieved their targets of acquiring property 
soon after arrival which explains why only a small minority remitted for target saving 
which is a signifier of return migration. Migration literature claims that target saving 
occurs when migrants leave their country of origin to accumulate financial capital and 
assets which are then invested in a specific project such as purchasing or building a 
house (Massey and Parrado, 1994; Piore, 1979). Members of the different diaspora 
groups (enthusiastic, reluctant, ambivalent, fearful, ephemeral and clandestine) 
identified in Chapter 6 have engaged in target saving since arriving in South Africa 
and the UK. These different diaspora group members have different motivations for 
remitting. For example, clandestine migrants are driven to remit by the fear of being 
caught by the authorities (Ahmad, 2008). They live frugally, saving most of their 
earnings in case they are intercepted by the authorities and deported. The same also 
applies to the fearful diaspora.  
 
Some enthusiasts, on the other hand, engaged in target saving soon after arrival 
when they were not sure about their long term intentions before scaling down their 
remitting practices in order to concentrate on building their life in the host country. 
The case of Lynne, (p. 121) a member of the enthusiastic diaspora living in Leeds 
shows how migrants deploy transnational strategies to further their livelihoods (King 
et al., 2006). She initially left Zimbabwe for South Africa hoping to accumulate 
sufficient savings with which to start a transport business,  
 
‘I left home in 1999 hoping to work hard and save money to start my own 
transport business. It didn’t work out in South Africa because the money that I 
was earning wasn’t much so I moved here, London in 2001. Once here, I 
bought two kombis (mini-bus) and a gonyeti (lorry) hoping to get in the 
transport business on my return. After that, I focused on buying houses. Now, 
I have three houses. I think there comes a time when you give up on this 
accumulating business and just want to be happy, work normally like others 
instead of killing yourself doing the long shifts to buy things that you may not 
use in your life time. Most Zimbos [Zimbabweans] have houses in Zimbabwe; 
they bought them soon after arrival during the black market days. If you see 
anyone saying they are building a house now and they live in Leeds, maybe 
they have only arrived, or want a customised house or they were dead stupid 
not to have bought one when it was easy...now they are too expensive to buy 
and to build.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009) 
Lynne’s case mirrors that of other migrants who travelled to the UK in the hope of 
working to achieve their targets of starting their own businesses or acquiring property 
before returning home. Her narrative helps to explain why only a minority are 
remitting for property acquisition as most migrants either bought or built houses 
during the heydays of the black market due to the superior exchange rate of the 
Sterling against the Zimbabwean dollar (Mbiba, 2010). Owning a house has both 
cultural and traditional significance which, as highlighted in Chapter 3, is a sign of 
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being successful in life while, according to Van der Geest (2002), owning a house 
establishes one’s legacy. Although, target savers are thought to likely be short-term 
migrants (Ahlburg and Brown 1998), the findings of this study contradicts this 
hypothesis; some enthusiastic migrants such as Lynne, who initially considered 
themselves target savers eventually decided to stay longer despite achieving their 
goals. On the other hand, some migrants in Limpopo such as Muchi (p. 189) conform 
to projection of target savers as short term migrants who are involved in circular 
migration as highlighted in Chapter 2.  
 
Property acquisition was considered by most migrants to be a two-fold process; 
firstly as a form of insurance against old age (De Haas, 2006) and secondly as an 
investment (Berry, 2009). Buying houses is predicated on the idea of return (see 
Chapter 3) and is a ‘proxy’ presence in the country of origin (Dlakoglou, 2010) (see 
Chapter 8). As will be discussed in Chapter 8, some scholarship argues that house 
ownership should be viewed in the context of the myth of return which exists and is 
important for many migrants (Anwar, 1979; Sinatti, 2009). For some migrants, 
owning a property was an investment as the houses could be used for rental income 
(Berry, 2009). Previous work on remittances (Levitt, 1998; Vertovec, 2000) has noted 
that migrants receive non-monetary remittances from home. However, evidence from 
this study reveals that migrants from some of the six diaspora groups identified in 
Chapter 6 receive monetary remittances accruing from their property investment at 
home. These reverse remittances appear to be accidental as migrants state that 
when they bought the property in Zimbabwe, they did not anticipate that they will end 
up drawing rental income from the property (see Section 7.2.3).  
 
A significant minority of 35% (n=69) of the survey respondents reported remitting to 
meet the basic spending needs of those left behind (Figure 7.4). The diversity of 
migrants’ recipients of the remittances appears to demonstrate the deeply ingrained 
nature of circulation between South Africa and Zimbabwe which was discussed in 
Chapter 2. This is exemplified by Figure 7.5 which shows that 57% of the 507 
respondents in Limpopo cited spouses as recipients of their remittances.  
 
The beneficiaries of the remittances depend on country of residency (Chi square = 
116.25, df=4, p<0.001). A large proportion of migrants in Limpopo (37%, n=192) 
remit to their parents compared to 19% in Leeds. Furthermore, a majority of 57% 
(n=282) of the respondents remitted to their spouses in Limpopo compared to 43% 
(n=86) in Leeds. These results seem to suggest that a significant number of migrants 
in Leeds are separated from their spouses and children due to immigration 
constraints. On the other hand, the fact that only 7% (n=33) of the respondents remit 
to children in Limpopo could be informed by the youthfulness of the respondents who 
may not yet have older children compared to their UK based counterparts who are 
much older. The dominance of parents as recipients of remittances (40%) in South 
Africa demonstrates the pervasive influence of Zimbabwean culture where the 
female spouse has to report to her in-laws (Muzondidya, 2008).   
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Figure 7.5 Recipients of migrants’ remittances in Zimbabwe % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The welfare of family members at home preoccupied the study participants as 
demonstrated by the diversity of the recipients of the remittances. Despite coming 
from different social and economic backgrounds, interviewees in Leeds felt obligated 
to remit for basic household maintenance. Some remittance literature posits that 
documented status preclude migrants’ remitting obligations as they are intent on 
improving their lives in the destination country (Menjivar et al., 1998). Contrary to 
these studies, this study found that remitting was not directly related to immigration 
status. Documented interviewees still have families trapped in the lower socio-
economic class who require aid. Furthermore, the economic turmoil in Zimbabwe 
wiped out the middle class which some migrants may have belonged to prior to 
emigrating (see Chapter 2). This moved middle class families to the lower class, 
hence the need for help from relatives abroad. 
 
Against the backdrop of the cataclysmic collapse of the middleclass, it is predictable 
for migrants to prioritise sending money to meet the basic needs of their families as 
well as to catalyse upward social mobility. To understand this better, let us consider 
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the case of Chido, a 41 year old clandestine migrant living in Leeds. Chido came to 
the UK in 2000 as part of family strategy to diversity income, 
  
‘I had a relatively good upbringing and went to boarding schools. I came in 
2002 hoping to sponsor my siblings to come over but then they introduced 
visas shortly after I came, before I had raised enough money to sponsor even 
one. In 2005 my father lost his job following the closure of the company he 
was working for. I have to send money home but it’s not enough given my 
status here. For me, despite my status, sending money is not an option as my 
family relies on it. I don’t have a social life as I work continental52 shifts 24/7 
but it’s worth it as I am providing for my family.’ (Interview in Leeds, 4 
December 2009) 
Chido illustrates the decimation of the middle class by the economic crisis. Her 
father’s retrenchment means that she now carries the burden of maintaining her 
family, which is akin to what Osili (2007) refer to a family in an ‘ailing economic 
situation’ which they find to accentuate the probability of remittances. She brings to 
the surface the problems that face many migrants as they juggle to meet their 
remitting obligations. Chido, like many of her peers, fulfils her remitting obligations at 
the expense of her social life (Table 7.1).  
 
The study data show that the ‘consequence of remitting to your family at home’ 
depends on country residence (Chi square= 40.577, df=6 and p < 0.001). Most 
significant is that migrants in South Africa work long hours in order to meet their 
remitting obligations at the expense of having time for social activities while UK 
based migrants derive pride in their work by helping their families at home. The long 
hours that migrants work could be a consequence of low wages obtained in South 
















                                                     
52
 Migrants who did these continental shifts explained that they often entail working 24 hours a day often at 
different places. Such migrants stated that their shift patterns may be as follows: 7am – 3pm and then starting 
3.30 pm -10 pm followed by a night shift typically starting at 10pm-8am. Some explained that they may not go 
to their home for two to three days at any given time as they go to the next shift straight from their other job.  
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Table 7.1 Consequences of remitting on self by country of residence 
 
 
Country of residence 
United 
Kingdom South Africa 
What in your opinion is 
the main consequence to 
you of remitting to your 
family at home?  
Pride in my work Count 80 114 
% within Country of 
residence 
40.0% 23.0% 
Feeling good that I am 
helping my family 
Count 51 139 
% within Country of 
residence 
26.0% 28.0% 
Doing my duty Count 35 111 
% within Country of 
residence 
17.0% 22.0% 
Stress Count 19 27 
% within Country of 
residence 
10.0% 5.0% 
Working long hours Count 11 77 
% within Country of 
residence 
5.0% 15.0% 
Little or no social life Count 4 27 
% within Country of 
residence 
2.0% 5.0% 
Don't know Count 0 12 
% within Country of 
residence 
0% 2.0% 
Total Count 200 507 
% within Country of 
residence 
100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Like their counterparts in Limpopo, migrants in Leeds have also felt the impact of the 
collapse of the health service. This is affirmed by 8% (n=16) of the survey 
respondents sending medical supplies to sick family/relatives at home (see Figure 
7.4, p. 188). The phenomenal collapse of the public health system created fertile 
ground for the proliferation of privately owned medical practices which demanded 
payment in forex. It is in this context that the diaspora supported the medical system 
in Zimbabwe as they became both the suppliers and consumers of the medical 
services. They were suppliers in the sense that they supplied the medical industry 
with the medical supplies which were not readily available in the country. Similarly, 
they were consumers in that they footed the bills incurred by their relations given 
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that, at the height of the crisis, patients were being asked to buy their own 
medication; a death warrant for those who did not have recourse to diaspora funds. 
This is explicated by the case of Shamiso whom we saw earlier (p.118),    
 
‘I fell seriously ill in 2008 and despite having medical aid, the doctor wouldn’t 
examine me. In those days they were charging US$100 just for consultation 
yet we were being paid in Zimbabwean dollars. If it wasn’t for my husband 
who was in London, I certainly would have died as many others who died due 
to lack of money to see a doctor and also to buy the prescription that you 
would have been given. In the end, I was admitted at Parirenyatwa53 
(hospital) but had to get my own drip, oxygen, pills etc. My husband sent 
some of the medicine by DHL and my son had to go to South (Africa) to buy 
some of the medicine that the doctors wanted. The wards were full of people 
dying due to lack of medicines. They would just admit you but then ask you to 
buy your own medicines. That was how bad the situation was in 2007/2008. 
Many people died.’ (Interview in Leeds, 22 November 2009) 
Medical insurance was no longer being accepted by doctors. To compound matters, 
public hospitals did not have medical supplies in stock and were asking patients to 
bring their own medicines (Makumbe, 2009). Nyazema (2010) claims that some 
people resorted to using traditional medicine to treat patients due to the unavailability 
of medicines. Had it not been for her husband who was in the UK, Shamiso believes 
that she would have perished like others who did not have recourse to the forex 
needed to buy the medicines required for their care. Thus, for Shamiso, her 
enthusiasm for the diaspora predates her arrival in the UK given that being in the 
diaspora enabled her husband to source the medicines and forex that was needed 
for her care which echoes Ghosh’s (2009: 32) claim remittances ‘can raise families 
out of poverty and enable more expenditure in health care and education of the 
young in the household.’ The use of remittances for medical purposes, contribute to 
discrediting the myths about remittances being only used for consumptive purposes 
(Fadayomi et al, 1992; Oberai and Singh, 1980); in this case it was life saving. In 
light of the above cases, I find myself in accord with scholars such as Taylor (1999) 
and Vertovec (2004) who posit that this perspective is too simplistic and erroneous.  
 
This section has explored the reasons that drive migrants to remit in Leeds. These 
reasons were predicated on the need to ameliorate the suffering wrought by the 
failing economic situation at home. Despite some migrants leading clandestine 
lifestyles, this does not appear to have impeded their ability to remit. In fact, in spite 
of being in the diaspora reluctantly and clandestinely, migrants treat their remitting 
obligations enthusiastically, which may stem from the complexity of their ties with 
those left behind (see Chapter 3). In the next section, I briefly discuss the emerging 
phenomenon of reverse remittances within the Zimbabwean community in Leeds 
and explore the factors that have given rise to it.   
                                                     
53
 Parirenyatwa formerly Andrew Fleming prior to independence, is the largest referral hospital in Zimbabwe. 
Before independence, it was a hospital for white people only. Until the crisis started, it was a beacon of the 
country’s health delivery system but has been run down due to years of under-investment. 
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7.2.3 Reverse remittances in the UK 
 
Recent scholarship has drawn attention to reverse remittances whereby migrants do 
not only send remittances, but also receive them from those at home (Mazzucato, 
2009; Ratha et al., 2009). As Mazzucato (2009) argues, reverse 
remittances demonstrate the pooling of risks between migrants and their families at 
home as discussed in Chapter 3. Remittances in transnationalism literature 
privileges non-monetary goods and services send from the home country e.g. 
foodstuffs, DVDs etc at the expense of monetary remittances. Evidence gathered in 
this study suggests that migrants receive both monetary and non-monetary 
remittances from those at home which bucks the trend as financial remittances often 
flow from migrants to those at home.  
 
What has prompted these reverse cash remittances is the current economic 
recession in the UK, increasingly restrictive immigration policies which are reducing 
undocumented migrants’ access to work, and the unemployment crisis facing 
documented migrants. Such practices resonate with the emerging literature on 
reverse remittances which attempts to determine remittances’ scale and reasons for 
their occurrence (Marsters et al., 2006). Unable to work due to his clandestinity, 
Donald whom we have already met (p. 164) explains his remitting motives as 
follows.   
 
‘I don’t have papers and I was stopped from working after they realised that I 
don’t have papers. Luckily for me, I bought four houses during the black 
market days soon after arrival which I am now renting out. If I don’t get papers 
soon, I think I will have to go back home so that I don’t continue draining 
money from my family. I should be feeding them not them feeding me...my 
wife uses Chitoro.com to send me money. I know several others who are 
getting money from home, people who are surviving from rent because they 
can’t find jobs due to not having papers.’ (Interview in Leeds, 21 December 
2009) 
Some scholars have associated migrants’ remitting behaviour with their return 
intentions (Azam and Gubert, 2005) (see Chapter 8). Donald’s case supports this 
hypothesis as exemplified by his investment in property. Being a clandestine 
migrant, it can be argued that Donald’s investment in property was prompted by the 
uncertainties and risks associated with his immigration status. His narrative also 
demonstrates the acquisition of property for retirement purposes (see Chapter 8).  
Migrants of the different diasporic groups identified in Chapter 6 are not immune to 
the economic crisis facing the UK and other developed economies. These have 
prompted reverse monetary remittances which migrants receive from rental income. 
Although welcome, these rental incomes appear to be accidental. For Donald, as for 
some of his peers, reverse remittances are a consequence of his clandestinity which 
disbars him from accessing state benefits. For clandestine migrants, approaching 
authorities for help is not an option due to fears of being deported which therefore 
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leaves them with no option except to rely on reverse remittances from family and 
relatives at home Zimbabwean operated MTOs such as Chitoro.com and 
Mukuru.com headquartered in London (Figure 7.6).  
 
Figure 7.6 Chitoro.com website – a medium through which migrants in 





Once money has been deposited into the Chitoro.com bank account in Zimbabwe, 
the recipient contacts chitoro.com giving them the details of the deposit and his/her 
account number into which the money should be deposited into. Thus for clandestine 
migrants like Donald, savings and investments that were made initially are now being 
used to fund the migrants’ incremental stay in the host country in the face of 
restrictive immigration practices and dwindling employment opportunities (see 
Chapter 6). 
 
7.2.4 Remitting channels in Limpopo 
 
Migrants in Limpopo use both formal and informal remitting methods (Figure 7.7). 
Formal methods which migrants use include registered Money Transfer 
Organisations (MTOs) (e.g. Western Union) which were used by 7% (n=35) of the 
survey respondents and banks which were cited by less than 1% (n=2).  The low use 
of formal methods may be attributed to the high transaction costs which are 
exacerbated by the small amounts migrants remit. Further impediments include the 




Figure 7.7 Remitting methods by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
In Chapter 2, it was shown how the South African government dealt with the 
Zimbabwean asylum wave by issuing asylum permits to most migrants. However, 
this has not eliminated the need for migrants to have identity documents; banks and 
MTOs insist on them in order to access their services (Ncube and Hougaard, 2011). 
The use of MTOs is further diminished by their location as they are located mostly in 
urban areas thereby excluding large segments of the population that work on the 
farms. 
 
Evidence adduced from interviews suggests that professionals predominated in the 
use of banks and MTOs because they have documented status. Furthermore, they 
have access to the formal remitting methods as these are mostly found in urban 
areas in both Limpopo and Zimbabwe as they tend to come from urban areas than 
their undocumented counterparts who as demonstrated by the case of Darios (p. 
113) tend to come from rural areas which are underserved by financial services 
institutions such as Western Union. As Figure 7.7 shows, the survey evidence 
appears to suggest that migrants favoured informal channels to remit as they 
considered them to be more accessible to both the sender and the recipients at 
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home. A paucity of financial services in migrants’ villages compels the migrants to 
remit through informal channels (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005).   
 
Slightly over half of the survey participants (52%, n=263) remit either personally or 
through friends and relatives. This, as highlighted in Chapter 3, suggests the 
existence of strong social networks amongst the migrants (Meagher, 2005). Muchi 
explains, 
 
 ‘We help each other here. One month it’s me who will take the groceries and 
 money home and the other month it’s someone else. We come from the same 
 area and almost every month everyone is going home so you ask them to 
 take your things with them. Because we know each other there is no risk of 
 things going missing. I have never used the bank or any other method.’ 
 (Interview in Vaalwater, 23 March 2010) 
Informal systems are therefore seen as foolproof and guarantee that the proceeds 
will reach the intended beneficiary. They are, as discussed in Chapter 3, predicated 
on traditional norms and reciprocity as the person entrusted with the money and 
goods will also rely on the others to do the same in future (Putnam, 1993). However, 
there are noticeable differences in how this is practiced in Leeds where weight 
restrictions imposed by airlines mean that those travelling home are reluctant or 
refuse to carry goods for their friends because this impacts on their ability to take 
home gifts for friends and family. This should be considered against the backdrop of 
migrants’ infrequent home visits engendered by travel restrictions due to cost and 
immigration constraints which are not very pronounced in Limpopo. For South 
African based migrants, the use of personally delivered remittances or delivered 
through friends and relatives is fuelled by circulation which Muchi alludes to in his 
narrative.  
 
Door to door delivery drivers (malaitshas – Figure 7.8) are a popular medium of 
sending money and goods home (27%, n=136). The information gleaned from the 
interviews suggests that the choice of whether to use friends and family or 
malaitshas can be attributed to factors such as trust, cost and area of origin (Levitt, 
1998). Migrants from the western and southern parts of Zimbabwe dominated in the 
use of malaitshas whilst those from further afield use friends and family. The 
preponderance in the use of informal remitting channels in Limpopo appears to be 







Figure 7.8 Amalaitsha truck carrying goods for delivery in Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Solidarity Peace Trust (2010) 
 
Felicity aged 27, lives in Thabazimbi with her husband. Both are undocumented. She 
was born in Chivi district in Masvingo province while her husband hails from Mutare. 
She sends monetary and non-monetary remittances to her family via her mother 
(Figure 7.5, p. 197) even though her father is still alive; this reflects changing gender 
relations engendered by being in the diaspora, as highlighted in Chapter 6. This 
practice is contrary to what King et al (2006) refer to as the ‘male remitting channel’ 
where remittances are channelled by sons to their fathers. Felicity explains here the 
reasoning behind using her use of malaitshas since her arrival in Limpopo in 2004 
and why she remits to her parents,  
‘I have been using the same malaitsha since I came here. He comes from our 
area, he is trustworthy. When I don't have money to pay him, he will still take 
my goods home and I pay him when I have money. It works well for me. 
Occasionally I go personally, but when I can’t my brothers and sisters and in-
laws are here so there is always someone going. It just depends, but, 
because my son is at home, I tend to go there every 3 months. Being here 
means, I now have a say in who I send my money to, whether my parents or 
my husband’s. When I was home, I never had that freedom because I relied 
on what he gave me as I didn’t work. I had to save the little money that he 
gave me to give to my parents which wasn’t easy.’ (Interview in, 26 March 
2010) 
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As discussed in Chapter 6, Felicity’s case epitomises the seismic changes in gender 
roles which have occurred in the diaspora. In this regard, she can be regarded as a 
member of the enthusiastic diaspora despite her clandestinity. Her clandestinity does 
not appear to have subdued her enthusiasm for being in the diaspora. Prior to 
moving to South Africa, she was a housewife reliant on her husband’s benevolence 
to help her parents. However, since coming to South Africa, she now remits directly 
to her parents as well as remitting to her in-laws’ through her parents, something that 
would never have happened were she in Zimbabwe. Her husband appears to 
tolerate this because he recognises her contribution to household income.  
 
The role of social capital in remittances has not been clearly explored. While its role 
has been celebrated in promoting migration by channelling information to potential 
migrants (Massey, 20003; Portes, 2001), the critical role it plays in determining how 
remittances are channelled back to the homeland has been under researched. 
Felicity is surrounded by her family, which she can tap into for help with remittances 
when needed. The practise by Felicity of remitting through the malaitsha is akin to 
the ‘mula’ system used by Cuban migrants in USA in which remittances occur 
predominantly in an informal context where they are imbedded agents (Orozco, 
2002) and the ‘viajerm’ used by El Salvador migrants also in the USA (Landolt et al., 
1999). The mulas like the malaitshas carry both money and packages of goods to 
Cuba for a fee.  And like the malaitshas they are known through word of mouth, 
relatives, friends and acquaintances.  But that is as far as the similarities go, for 
whilst the mulas enter Cuba as tourists, the malaitshas are Zimbabweans who earn 
their living by ferrying the goods of Zimbabweans in South Africa. Trust and 
reciprocity lie at the heart of this system. The malaitshas carry messages between 
the migrants and their families and relatives at home and Limpopo, thus serving as 
repositories of information which travels back and forth (Mahler, 2001). 
 
Informal channels were used by both sets of migrants, that is professional and non-
professionals alike as the case of Panashe, a 31 year old banker in Polokwane 
demonstrates,  
 
‘I use friends, relatives, buses and cross-border traders to send stuff home. 
Western Union is fast but expensive, occasionally I use it when it’s urgent but 
I tend to use the other methods.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 29 May 2010) 
 
Panashe, despite being a banker, is, as already seen in Chapter 6, a member of the 
fearful diaspora group. Despite being his professional status, he remits 
predominantly via informal channels thereby contradicting the view that informal 
channels are the preserve of undocumented migrants (Ratha and Riedberg, 2005). 
Whilst conventional wisdom posits that documented migrants are risk averse and 
use formal channels to remit, evidence adduced from this study suggests that they 
use informal channels. The informal remitting channels are predicated on trust just 
as in the Hawala system in Somalia and other Asian countries (Maimbo, 2003; 
Qorchi et al., 2003).   
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This section showed the remitting channels that are used by migrants and the 
reasons why they use them. The use of formal remittance channels is obviated by 
the informal nature of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The existence 
of strong social networks perpetuates the continued use and dominance of informal 
channels to remit home. Section 7.2.5 explores continuity and change in remitting 
channels in Leeds.    
 
7.2.5 Continuity and change in remitting channels in the UK 
 
The remitting channels used by migrants vary and are affected by a number of 
factors. These factors include immigration status, legislative changes, 
trustworthiness, reliability, cost, and speed. The channels through which remittances 
are funnelled to and from Zimbabwe have evolved over the past decade mirroring 
the socio-economic, political and technological developments in both the host and 
country of origin. The dollarization of the economy in early 2009 has not stopped the 
use of informal remitting channels. Instead, informal channels are used concurrently 
with formal channels which signify the enduring nature of informal remitting channels 
which Zimbabwean authorities blamed for the collapse of the economy (Figure 7.7).  
  
The decline in the use of informal MTOs is demonstrated by only 5% (n=10) of the 
survey respondents reporting using them. Prior to their decline, unregistered MTOs 
and individual money changers were extensively used by UK based migrants not 
only because they offered higher returns than formal channels but also because of 
their accessibility. Interview participants stated that they found the black market 
convenient because it was run by people who understood their language, culture and 
values. The use of individual money changers agrees with the findings of Alvarez 
and Collier’s (1994) study of Mexican truckers whose businesses had flourished 
because of the use of their own transnational ethnically based ties.  
 
A small minority of the respondents (2%, n=3) reported relying on informal couriers 
to send non-cash remittances such as electrical gadgets. These are favoured 
because they allow the senders to avoid paying customs and excise duty which 
would otherwise attract duty if they were sent using formal channels. The informal 
couriers include diplomatic and Air Zimbabwe staff who use their privileged positions 
as embedded agents within the airline and Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimra) 
system to evade paying cargo fees and customs and excise duty thereby prejudicing 
both the airline and national fiscus. The speed with which the goods reach home is 
an added incentive for using these informal couriers. Customers are recruited 
through a network of family, friends and relatives. Potential customers are notified by 
text messages which details the departure dates and address where the goods 




Figure 7.9 An example of a text message sent to potential customers in the 
UK by informal couriers that work for Air Zimbabwe 
 
From: +447930248591Sent: Feb 21, 2009 00:00Subject: Arrived this evening and the 
last...Arrived this evening and the last day of accepting goods for freighting is 
Tuesday the 2nd of march, address 24 Ashburnham Road Luton, LU1 1JP. You can 
get me on 07939880832 or on this number. David Macheka. 
Source: A text message sent to the author by an informal courier in the UK in 2009 
 
The use of formal channels such as banks and registered MTOs has undergone a 
renaissance as witnessed by their use by 86% (n=172) of the survey respondents. 
This renaissance has been prompted by dollarization and legislative changes in both 
the UK and Zimbabwe. Previously, formal methods were shunned because they 
were considered to be expensive. As Maimbo (2005) suggests, migrants’ use of 
formal channels has been stifled by the high transaction costs. Furthermore, he 
claims that the average cost of transferring remittances remains at about 13 per 
cent, and sometimes exceeds 20 per cent of the amount remitted, which is high 
considering low wages that migrants earn. Additionally, banks are eschewed 
because of the inordinate time they take to process the remittances. The informal 
market has endured largely due to the restrictions that clandestine migrants continue 
to face in accessing formal remitting channels.  
 
Remittances that are delivered personally or through friends, relatives and family 
have also been on the rise in Leeds as demonstrated by 4% (n=7) of the 
respondents having used this method to send money or goods home (Figure 7.7). 
The surge in personally delivered remittances appears to indicate increased mobility 
due to the granting of documented status within the community. As highlighted in 
Chapter 6, asylum seeking immobilised migrants due to attendant conditions such as 
inability to travel until determination of their cases.  
 
At the height of hyper-inflation migrants considered sending money to Zimbabwe to 
be inappropriate given the shortage of goods and services. Hence, migrants were 
compelled to send non-monetary remittances such as foodstuffs. Informed by the 
non-availability of goods in the stores, migrants sent monetary remittances to 
relatives in neighbouring countries like Botswana and South Africa which were used 
to buy food to send home. Eliza (p. 108) is one of the migrants who sent foods 
through couriers and money to relatives in neighbouring countries during the crisis.   
 
‘When things were tight at home in 2007/2008, I was sending drums full of 
groceries home at least once every three months. It used to cost me £150 per 
drum which I would fill to the brim with all sorts of groceries, from cooking oil 
to sugar, and even salt as they were not available in the shops. I would also 
put clothes in the drums (Figure 7.10) for my mother, nieces and nephews. I 
sent money to my sister who lives in Botswana who then bought food to send 
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home. Even now, I still send drums but not with food as this is now readily 
available, just clothes, electrical gadgets etc to separate them from those 
without children in the diaspora, you know. There are many ways of sending 
the drums, shipping companies, air Zimbabwe people or embassy people. 
You shop around before deciding who to send with.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 
November 2009) 
This case suggests that migrants consider a number of factors before settling on the 
remitting method. The overriding factor appears to be the cost involved and the 
demands of those at home. 
 
Figure 7.10 Packed drums ready for shipping to Zimbabwe in Leeds 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2009) 
 
For example, at the height of the crisis, she sent foodstuffs as these were in short 
supply at home. As the economic situation improved and food became readily 
available, Eliza scaled back on these and now sends electrical gadgets and clothes 
through informal channels which helps to set her family ‘apart’ from those without 
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family and relatives in the diaspora. Her case shows that non-resident Zimbabweans 
became the lifeblood of those at home as they provided money and foodstuffs which 
were in short supply. Eliza demonstrates that just as migration may be a multi-step 
occurrence, so too can be remittances as evidenced by remitting to Botswana before 
reaching the intended beneficiaries in Zimbabwe.  
 
This section explored the continuities and changes of remitting strategies of migrants 
in the UK. The following section focuses on how members of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora in Leeds and Limpopo participate in Zimbabwean oriented activities such 
as political party membership and membership of community groups, as well as the 
factors which inform and motivate this participation.   
 
7.3 Instrumental activism and the shifting relationship with home 
 government 
 
The preceding sections explored the financial and non-financial transactions of 
migrants based in Leeds and Limpopo. Chapter 6 introduced the six pronged 
typology which consists of ambivalent, clandestine, enthusiastic, ephemeral, fearful 
and reluctant diaspora. Building on the financial and non-financial transactions which 
were discussed in the preceding sections, this section discusses migrants’ 
participation in Zimbabwean oriented activities. Because of the salience of political 
policies of President Mugabe in spawning the migration waves outlined in Chapter 2, 
focus would be devoted to immigrant politics.  
 
Life in the diaspora for some migrants entails participation in a number of 
Zimbabwean oriented activities in Leeds and Limpopo such as religious 
organisations, football, demonstrations etc (Figure 7.11). The survey results show 
that there are more people who participate in Zimbabwean related activities in the 
UK (79%, n=157) than in Limpopo (45%, n=234). Participation in these events is a 
signifier of social capital which was discussed in Chapter 3. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, social capital was instrumental in facilitating some migration episodes. 
The low level of participation in Zimbabwean related activities by South African 
based migrants could be indicative of social isolation which is probable because 
Limpopo is largely rural with sparse population. It may also be suggestive of general 
apathy towards Zimbabwean activities.  
 
It can be argued that the Zimbabwean diaspora exists in its present form because of 
the political problems which spawned an economic crisis leading to the exodus (see 
Chapters 2 and 5). Furthermore, political activism is a form of transnationalism which 





Figure 7.11 Participation in Zimbabwean oriented activities by country of  
  residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Although Figure 7.12 shows that only 13% (n=20) and 25% (n=59) participate in 
political activities in Leeds and Limpopo respectively and while participation in 
religious activity is much higher (30%, n=47 in Leeds and 53%, n=124 in Limpopo), 
migrants’ instrumental political activism is important not only due to different 
meanings and values attached to it but to the potential ramifications that it may have 
on the Zimbabwean political landscape which, as will be seen in Chapter 8, have 
important implications for migrants’ return. The exploration of migrants’ political 
activism is crucial given that the Zimbabwean diaspora exist because of President 






Figure 7.12 Types of Zimbabwean oriented activities that migrants participate 
  in by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
A higher proportion of UK based migrants participate in weddings (40%, n=64) 
compared to their South African based counterparts who mostly take part in church 
activities (53%, n=124), political meetings (25%, n=59) etc. Migrants appear to use 
political activism as an instrument to gain documented status in Leeds (13%, n=20) 
in particular and Limpopo to a lesser extent. Given the centrality of return in this 
study, it will be argued this instrumentalism is a significant indicator of the migrants’ 
return intentions (see Chapter 8). In Leeds, for example, the decision to confer 
refugee status is firmly rooted in political participation, similar to what Itzigsohn et al 
(1999) referred to as ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ transnational practices which was 
discussed in Chapter 3. Narrow transnationalism is exemplified by the lobbying 
practices of migrants in South Africa and the UK to ensure that the Zimbabwean 
question does not fall off the international radar. Furthermore, migrants’ narrow 
transnational practices ensure that world leaders are kept informed of alleged human 
rights abuses that the government of President Robert Mugabe perpetrates. As 
Kastoryano (2002) notes, transnational migrants aim at acting as pressure groups for 
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political recognition in both political spaces. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
Zimbabwe’s citizenship law prohibits both dual citizenship and external voting. 
 
It was noted in Chapter 3, that political involvement manifests itself in a diverse 
range of ways such as membership of a political party, engaging in demonstrations, 
lobbying host governments, and mobilising resources for a party at home, amongst 
others (Portes, 2001a). In the UK, the MDC commands considerable support as 
evidenced by the 43 branches that it has in British cities, which are twinned with 
constituencies in Zimbabwe for material support (www.mdcukandireland.org.uk). 
Membership of the MDC in both countries is achieved by purchasing a party card 
(Figure 7.13) and maintained by monthly subscriptions. Twinning can be regarded a 
form of translocal politics in which migrants from a particular area seek to better the 
situation in local communities of origin which as Portes (1999) argues, may lead to 
wider political implications as the empowerment of local communities serves as a 
medium for wider political change. The importance of MDC supporters in the UK can 
be demonstrated by the fact in the run-up to the 2008 elections they remitted to the 
main party in Zimbabwe over £80,000 for use in the campaign process (Home 
Office, 2009).  
 
Figure 7.13 Old (left) and new (right) MDC membership cards 
 
  
Source: Card provided by anonymous MDC member 
              
Migrants like Gordon (p. 160) predicate their asylum claims on alleged persecution 
from President Mugabe’s government due to their membership of the MDC. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, some migration episodes were caused by the totalitarian 
policies of President Mugabe. Despite having left Zimbabwe prior to the worst 
violence in 2008, all survey respondents who sought asylum in the UK claimed to be 
members of the MDC, resulting in a direct correlation between political activism and 
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asylum seeking in the UK. As discussed in Chapter 6, for clandestine migrants, 
being a recognised member of the MDC improves the chances of being granted 
refugee status. Being politically active entails maintaining current subscription, 
attendance at MDC meetings and rallies. Politically active members with pending 
asylum cases are issued with a supporting letter (Figure 7.14) from the party 
attesting to the claimant’s membership and the risks that may befall them from 
President Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) party were they to be forcibly returned to Zimbabwe. 
 
Figure 7.14 A standard MDC letter written in support of asylum seekers’ 
asylum claims, UK 
 
Source: MDC support letter   
 
Dudu, whom we have met earlier (p. 165), is one of the migrants whose asylum 
claim is based on political activism. She explains that her participation in diaspora 
politics is predicated on increasing the chances of being granted refugee status, 
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given that her friends were granted refugee status in the same manner. She 
observes, 
‘I support musangano (party) because I want papers. If you pay your subs 
(subscriptions) you get a supporting letter that you give to the Home Office. 
Personally, I don’t want change to happen in Zimbabwe at the moment, not 
until after my papers have come through because we are benefitting from the 
crisis.’ (Interview in Leeds, 18 December 2009) 
Dudu’s participation and membership of the MDC is informed by the potential 
contribution that this may make to her asylum application. Interestingly, for asylum 
seekers such as Dudu, they want the rule of President Mugabe to continue in order 
to justify why they are in the UK in the first place. 
 
For Dudu, like many other interviewees, the fact that her friends have been granted 
refugee status as a result of their membership of the MDC was a precedent set by 
the courts which should see her being granted refugee status. The role played by 
networks in asylum claims has been highlighted by Landolt (2008) who observes that 
casual encounters at immigration offices often serve as the point of departure for 
friendship and exchanges of information regarding claims made (see Chapter 3). 
What this obscures is the fact that, for some migrants, interest, membership, and 
participation in political activities wanes once they are granted legal status thereby 
transforming from an opportunist political activist into a reluctant diaspora. Excerpts 
of an interview with Nokhuthula, a 38 year old health and social care professional 
working in Leeds underscores this point:  
 
‘I only joined MDC when I was planning kundo seeker54 (to go and seek 
asylum) because that was the only way that I could get papers. I was 
attending all the meetings, in Leicester, Portsmouth, South-end and other 
cities. I made sure I had photographs taken with the leaders every time that 
they came here. Once I got my papers, I stopped going to the meetings, I just 
retreated to my own world. You will find there are many people like me. We 
got what we wanted from the party and they got some money from us. £70 
pounds is a lot of money to pay to be a member of the party.’ (Interview in 
Leeds, 15 January 2010) 
Once Nokhuthula was granted her documented status her enthusiasm waned and 
changed from being opportunist to ephemeral in so far as political activism was 
concerned. On the other hand, the grant of documented status meant that she 
became enthusiastic about being in the diaspora because of the ability to work and 
access new opportunities such as education. This shows the fluidity of the diaspora 
categories that were identified and discussed in Chapter 6. She was prepared to pay 
a £70 annual membership fee in exchange for the party helping her to gain 
                                                     
54
 Kundo seeker/kundo claimer/kundo potera are terms used by Zimbabweans to refer to the act of claiming 
asylum at the Home Office. The prefix kundo translates to going to, hence kundo seeker means going to seek 
asylum.  
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documentation which she discontinued once she was granted refugee status as 
demonstrated by her membership card’s subscription schedule (Figure 7.15).  
Figure 7.15 MDC membership subscription schedule 
 
Source: Card provided by anonymous MDC member 
 
This appears to be a purely contractual arrangement where, in exchange for token 
participation, Nokhuthula would get the ‘evidence’ that she needed to present to the 
immigration judge in order to support her asylum application. This questions 
migrants’ motivations for participating in diaspora politics. This needs to be noted as 
scholarship on migrant politics, as discussed in Chapter 3, suggests that migrants 
engage in politics because they are concerned about the events at home. The 
behaviour of some Zimbabwean migrants in the UK suggests that this is untrue; 
participation in politics is driven by the need to obtain documented status rather than 
political change in Zimbabwe, as the case of Dudu above reveals. The political crisis 
in Zimbabwe appears to have played into some migrants’ hands as they cannot be 
deported; this is what Dudu is alluding to by saying that she wants status quo to 
prevail in Zimbabwe until she has documented status.  
 
On the other hand, in Limpopo, asylum permits which give the migrants entitlement 
to work are not contingent on political activism. Migrants who present themselves to 
the Department of Home Affairs’ designated refugee reception centres are 
automatically given renewable six month asylum permits. Tapiwa, who we have 
already met, (p. 169) explains thus:  
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‘The Home Affairs person asked me why I came here and I told him that I was 
running away from poverty. He asked me if I was a member of a political party 
and I told him no. He then gave me asylum and told me to come back after 6 
months to renew. People here get asylum not because they are supporters of 
MDC but because things are bad at home. You don’t eat politics; we are here 
to find something to eat for ourselves and our families. What I pray for is real 
change to happen in Zimbabwe. I will therefore go back and vote when the 
date has been announced.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010) 
Tapiwa describes himself as having been a recipient of an asylum permit without 
being an asylum seeker per se. This highlights the dichotomy within the South 
African immigration policy with reference to Zimbabweans who appear to have been 
‘handheld’ into being asylum seekers rather than the ‘heartfelt’ act of seeking asylum 
(Bakewell, 2007). Political activism, therefore, carries different meanings to migrants 
in Limpopo; different from those of their counterparts in Leeds. Activism in Leeds 
appears to be driven by the need for papers, in Limpopo it appears to be driven by a 
desire for genuine change in Zimbabwe. This is not to say that all activists in Leeds 
are motivated by a desire to gain documented status. However, it is arguably true 
that the majority of the activists want refugee status.  
 
I refer to this clandestinity induced political activism as opportunism given its 
transient nature. Opportunism is a strategy used by migrants such as Dudu to 
extricate themselves from clandestine lifestyles (see Chapter 6). It is driven by the 
need to regularise their status in order to enjoy the economic benefits which come 
with having documented status. This form of the activism is driven by a specific 
need. Once that need has been met, the activist withdraws his/her support as there 
is no longer a motive for their continued participation. Not all fleeting politicians 
joined the party in their host country. Instead some joined it in Zimbabwe and only 
stopped participating due to the internecine fights that have come to characterise the 
MDC-UK and Ireland, which has seen several provincial executive committees being 
dissolved by the leadership in Harare (McGregor, 2009; Pasura, 2008). Having said 
this, opportunist politicians left Zimbabwe in different migration waves with the 
majority arriving prior to the inception of the visa regime against Zimbabwean 
nationals (see Chapters 2 and 5). The survey data show that most opportunists in 
the UK did not engage in political activism on arrival and waited several years before 
gaining membership of the party mostly to support their asylum claims as outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
 
However, this study is not suggesting that all political activists are opportunists as 
there are some whose membership predates their arrival in South Africa and the UK. 
Such migrants undertake advocacy work assisting fellow Zimbabweans regardless of 
political affiliation. In Leeds, for example, the Zimbabwe Leeds Refugee Community 
Organisation (ZLRCO) works with Zimbabwe from diverse backgrounds and its 
operations is akin to those of Latinos in Toronto which organise regular meetings 
and social events such as football for its members (Landolt, 2008). Solomon (p. 
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160), for example, besides chairing the ZLRCO and Zimbabwe Business Link, is a 
former executive committee member of the MDC and an elder in a Zimbabwean 
church, some of whose members are clandestine migrants. Here he explains the 
multiple roles that he plays in these organizations,  
‘I play multiple roles in the community, one moment I am a politician, the next 
a church elder and the next a businessman. I am all these things rolled into 
one. I was into politics but then here it is confused, so I have taken a back 
seat from politics and I am making a contribution to the community through 
my church, helping people with their statements, accessing benefits for those 
who would have been granted papers, help orphans and underprivileged 
people in Zimbabwe through the church. This is taking my time and I am 
happy with what I am doing. The church is providing destitute Zimbabweans 
without papers with food, with accommodation and some other help. ZLRCO 
also does the same. In the business link, it’s about exploring what we as the 
diaspora can do to get a foothold in Zimbabwe.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 
November 2009) 
Solomon can be classified as a member of the enthusiastic diaspora given how 
enmeshed he is in the political and economic development of the homeland 
(Østergaard-Nielsen, 2009). We have already seen how some migrants 
enthusiastically attribute the transformation in their lives to the diaspora. For 
Solomon, the diaspora has given him the space that he needs to work towards 
political and economic change in Zimbabwe. His enthusiasm also stems from being 
able to help his countrymen to gain documented status and an economic foothold in 
the home country which signifies his return intentions (see Chapter 3). He therefore, 
represents enthusiastic migrants who retain a keen interest in the political events 
that are unfolding in their home country. Solomon uses social capital, which was 
discussed in Chapter 3, to help transient politicians to gain documented status which 
is important in shifting their diasporic identities from, for example, clandestine or 
fearful to enthusiastic migrants, that arises following the attainment of documented 
status.  
 
Political instrumentalism is one of the numerous collective social remittances that 
migrants engage in (Chapter 3) (Goldring, 2000, 2004) courtesy of improved 
communication systems which link them to those at home. Individual migrants also 
engage in individual social remittances through sustained contact with those left 
behind and elsewhere (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). The following section 
considers the evolving mediums through which social remittances are conducted in 
Leeds and Limpopo.   
 
7.4 The evolving transnational mediums of contact with home 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis pertains to the maintenance of ties between 
migrants and those left at home. As highlighted in Chapter 2, recent scholarship 
advocates for the deployment of a transnational optic lens to better understand how 
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social remittances are mediated between the migrants and those at home by 
scholars and policy makers alike (Khagram and Levitt, 2008). Social remittances 
between migrants and those at home are exchanged through a myriad of ways 
including telephone, email, internet, physical visits and letters (Levitt, 2001a). 
Similarly, Parreñas (2005b) asserts that migrants maintain contact with those left 
behind through transnational communication which entails the flow of ideas, 
information, goods, money, and emotions. This was affirmed in interviews in which 
migrants highlighted the importance of maintaining contact with those at home.  
 
An overwhelming majority of the study participants reported maintaining contact with 
their families and relatives at home, 99% (n=199) in Leeds and 98% (n=509) in 
Limpopo (Figure 7.16).  
 
Table 7.16 Contact with home by country of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010  
 
The maintenance of contact should be considered against migrants’ return intentions 
which were discussed in Chapter 3. As some scholars have noted, contact is viewed 
as a way of keeping familial and friendship bonds alive (Asis et al., 2004; Levitt and 
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Lamba-Nieves, 2011). This is encapsulated by the cases of Betty (p. 139) who states 
that,  
 
 ‘Contact is important for me to know how my family is doing. It is the only 
 way that we keep alive our bonds given that we can’t visit each other 
 because I don’t have papers.’ (Interview in Leeds, 19 October 2009). 
 
Thus for Betty contact is essential because it allows her to maintain transnational 
intimacy with her family from whom she is separated because she does not have 
papers. As explained in Chapter 6, some migrants have been separated from their 
families for long periods because of the inordinate delays in determining their asylum 
claims. Similarly, in South Africa migrants reported maintaining regular contact as 
exemplified by Dzivaidzo, a 33 year old teacher who lives in Thohoyandou with her 
family,  
 ‘Talking to people at home keeps me on top of things. I think people would 
 laugh at you if you don’t maintain contact with your family at home. In fact you 
 would be mad not to phone and visit home to see how people are doing and 
 how you can help them.’  (Interview in Thohoyandou, 15 May 2010) 
For Dzivaidzo, as for many of her peers, contact is premised on her transnational 
obligations to her family and relatives which were discussed earlier. There are also 
overtones of wanting to conform to societal expectations in her narrative which are 
couched in ‘being mad if you don’t phone or visit home.’ 
 
Available evidence suggests that migrants maintain contact through a range of 
mediums e.g. telephone/text messaging, email, letter etc (Figure 7.17). In both 
countries, the use telephones/text messaging predominates. This can be accounted 
for by the high mobile penetration rates in both the UK and South Africa. A significant 
proportion of UK based migrants use the internet (49%, n=100) compared to 10% 
(n=49) in South Africa as well as telephone and short messaging system (47%, 
n=94) against 27% (n=131) in South Africa to maintain contact with their families at 
home. Conversely, in Limpopo, the results suggest that contact is mostly maintained 
through ‘word of mouth’ (23%, n=115) and ‘physical visits’ (30%, n=151). Letters 
(12%, n=63) have proved to be of enduring significance as methods of 
communication in Limpopo. This can be attributed to the circulation which was 
discussed in Chapter 2 as migrants frequently travel home during which they act as 
couriers. Secondly, it suggests that some migrants have been priced out of using 
mobile phones thereby forcing them to stick to traditional methods. Thirdly, it could 
be a consequence of poor telephone services in Zimbabwe where coverage for 
mobile phones in rural areas where the majority of the migrants come from, is still 
patchy.  
 
Migrants reported being compelled to send relay messages to their families through 
third parties. Typically a migrant would call and leave a message with a family 
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member or relative who has a phone which is then relayed to their family. Quite 
often, a mutually convenient time with the owner of the telephone is agreed during 
which the migrant would call to speak to their family or relative, echoing Parreñas’ 
(2005b) findings in Philippines where migrants have designated days to 
communicate. 
 
Figure 7.17 Mediums of communication by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Miriam, a 27 year old hairdresser in Nylstroom typifies this practice,  
 
 ‘I speak to my two daughters on a teacher’s phone. I call and then call again 
 in about ten minutes during which he would have sent word to my mother who 
 lives a stone’s throw away from the school. Sometimes the phone is out of 
 service which is frustrating; I hope there will be mobile phone coverage soon 
 in our area. I have already bought my mother a cell phone which is not 
 working because of lack of coverage.’ (Interview in Nylstroom, 26 May 2010) 
Evidence from the interviews suggests that text messaging has left an indelible 
imprint on the Zimbabwean psyche as a method of communication in both countries. 
It is perhaps rivalled by the phenomenon of ‘beeping’, ‘missed calling’ or ‘flashing’ 
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(Donner, 2007). This is when a person in Zimbabwe or elsewhere calls long enough 
for the receiver to see the number that is calling them. The receiver then calls the 
caller back. Beeping is driven by economic imperatives. As Slater and Kwami (2005) 
claim, ﬂashing is both an economic and symbolic practice. Similarly, Sey (2007) 
views flashing in the Ghanaian context as a cost-saving strategy developed by 
users.  
The beeping system is so widespread that migrants in Leeds with relatives at home 
and other African countries complained of ‘double trouble’ due to being beeped by 
people at home and elsewhere. The above example forms part of the imaginary for 
migrating. This is premised on the belief that the migrants in Leeds are better off 
than those at home and in Limpopo. This assumption and belief originated from the 
high margins that migrants in the UK made on the black market due to the strength 
of the Sterling. As discussed in Chapter 6, it was on this basis that some migrants in 
Limpopo view their stay as temporary and look forward to moving to other countries 
such as the UK which they perceive as having more opportunities than obtaining in 
there. Elizabeth (p. 108) expresses her annoyance with the concept of beeping,  
‘I don’t mind my parents beeping you know, because they may not have 
money and want me to call them back. It does my head in when everyone 
does it; even my brother who by all accounts is sitting pretty also beeps and 
expects me to call him back. It all boils down to this erroneous belief with 
people in Africa that people in London have money. I get texts saying call me, 
I have important news, why can’t they tell me the important news in the text?’ 
(Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009) 
Text messaging and beeping sustain networks in Leeds and Limpopo. They allow 
communication to flow between and within migrants. It is not only people at home 
who beep as this happen even within migrants in the diaspora, for example a migrant 
in Leeds may beep a friend when they do not have sufficient credit in their phone to 
make a call. The same applies to migrants in Limpopo where there are some mobile 
phone companies such as MTN offer ‘please call’ services which allows a person to 
send a message asking to be called back, a service also exploited by Jamaican 
customers of Digicel (Horst and Miller, 2006). Consequently, a migrant can perform 
both the ‘beeping’ and ‘receiving’ functions depending on circumstances and 
location. Beeping is a result of financial constraints and these are disproportionately 
felt by people at home which why interviewees appear to tolerate them. Beeping is 
steeped in power dynamics. As Donner (2007) contends, beeping and call back 
messages serve as a vehicle for micro-negotiations or micro-affirmations between 
two actors about who has more money. According to this school of thought, those at 
home do not have enough credit to make a telephone call or to send a text message 
which compels beeping. The financial constraints are not only faced by those in 
Zimbabwe but also by some migrants. As Mirirai, a 28 year old mother of three who 
arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode reflects, 
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‘My children and others at home beep me and I call them back whenever I 
can. Sometimes I don’t have money to call them back. My job as a nanny 
doesn’t pay as much. On the other hand, I beep my brothers who live in the 
USA and Canada. In a sense it’s a chain, on paper I appear to be better off 
than those at home and then my brothers are better off than me. If I beep 
them, I expect them to call me back just like people at home expect me to call 
them back if they beep. Besides, my brothers have got good jobs there and 
earn more than me which enables them to call home frequently and for longer 
periods. In most cases, they actually call home and then pass the message to 
me despite the fact that I am physically closer to home than them.’ (Interview 
in Waterberg, 17 March 2010) 
Mirirai’s ability to initiate and maintain contact with her family at home is impeded by 
financial constraints (Mahler, 1998). She therefore resorts to beeping which 
Zainudeen et al (2006) described as ‘‘telecom use on a shoestring’’. Contrarily, her 
brothers who work in North America are better endowed financially than her to 
initiate and sustain contact with those at home. Her experiences have resonance 
with Sassen’s (2000: 217) observation that ‘initiating and maintaining contact with 
home is not self-generative, but needs to be produced, and such a feat of production 
requires capital fixity, vast concentrations of every material and not so mobile 
facilities and infrastructures.’ Mirirai’s case highlights how beeping is being used to 
maintain transnational ties and social capital between families (Coleman, 1988, 
1990). 
 
Information is shared between migrants about mobile tariffs, mobile phone sim 
cards, international calling cards, discount access numbers and the best offers from 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) both at home and in the host country. The 
Zimbabwean diaspora has been targeted by Zimbabwe’s largest provider of mobile 
and internet services, Econet Wireless Zimbabwe which recently launched mobile 












Figure 7.18 An advert of Econet mobile in the UK  
Source: www.econetmobile.co.uk 
Evidence gleaned from interviews revealed that contact is increasingly being 
maintained through the internet and other information communication technologies. 
The use of the internet has gradually increased since the mid 2000s in both 
countries although its use in South Africa is blighted by a number of factors. Firstly 
internet access penetration is low although this is counterbalanced by the rapid 
mobile internet penetration. Until mobile internet becomes available to migrants other 
than the professionals, their participation will always be encumbered by financial 
constraints. For example, an hour of internet access costs R15 in Polokwane, R25 in 
Louis Trichardt, R30 in Thohoyandou and R35 in Musina55.  Access to internet 
facilities is further impeded by the location of internet facilities which are 
concentrated in towns. As demonstrated in the above example, the cost of accessing 
internet per hour rises the further you go away from the metropolitan centres. The 
fact that the majority of the survey participants work in deprived areas such as 
commercial farms compounds matters. The low wages further inhibits access as 
Vuyelwa, a 23 year old undocumented man living in Groblersdal exposes,  
 
‘I can’t afford to use the internet, it is expensive. Besides, even if I wanted to, I 
don’t know how to use a computer. I hear some of my friends talking about 
facebook which you get on your fone [phone] but it’s expensive, it’s not for 
                                                     
55
 These are the prices that the author was paying at various internet cafes when he was undertaking his 
fieldwork in Limpopo Province from February to May 2010.   
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people like me. I only use my phone to phone and text home which I don’t do 
as often as I would like because I don’t have money. Some people go the 
internet cafes, but I haven’t been; besides I work during the day and when I 
go home, the shops are closed. When I am off on Sunday, all the shops are 
closed.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010) 
Vuyelwa’s narrative demonstrates that the use of internet as a communication tool is 
inhibited not only by the cost but also by an inability to use computers. This inability 
and lack of access dwindles the communication options of the migrants. This 
narrative confirms my argument that a substantial number of migrants in South Africa 
have limited human educational capital. As Figure 5.6 demonstrates, a significant 
number of the migrants based in Limpopo comprise of school dropouts who are poor 
and uneducated.  Vuyelwa’s narrative highlights how the use of internet as a 
communication tool is inhibited not only by the cost but also by an inability to use 
computers. This is compounded by the high tariffs associated with using mobile 
internet. A number of studies have noted that immigrants with little or no education 
from countries where ICTs are not ubiquitous face unique and challenging situations 
in their early years (Gubbay and Cogill, 1988; Rhee and Kim, 2004).  
 
Similarly, Castells (1999: 1994) has warned that migrants risk being left on the wrong 
side of the digital divide, living in ‘informational cities’ that ‘deepen existing patterns 
of socio-spatial segregation.’ It is these differences in access to internet and mobile 
services that led Quan-Haase et al (2008) to talk about the ‘double digital divide’ 
which describes the gap in internet access and use segregated by both geographic 
locations and individual socio-economic status. This inability and lack of access 
dwindles the communication options of the migrants. This narrative confirms my 
argument that a substantial number of migrants in South Africa have limited human 
educational capital. As already demonstrated, a significant number of the migrants 
based in Limpopo comprise of school dropouts who are poor and uneducated. 
However, as Chen and Wellman (2005) have demonstrated in their study of 
immigrants in New Zealand, physical access to a computer is not enough as basic 
computer and cognitive skills are needed if the internet is to be meaningfully and 
productively exploited to learn about job opportunities, build community networks, 
constructing social capital, and participating in political activities.  
 
Alternatively, the availability of free computing and internet courses and free internet 
in libraries in the UK has ameliorated the difficulties associated with lack of prior 
computer use that confronts the migrants in South Africa. Thus, the gulf in internet 
and email use is a direct consequence of the digital divide between the two 
countries. Some UK domiciled interviewees had never used computers prior to 
arriving in the country but took advantage of the free learning opportunities that were 
available for immigrants. This has resulted in emails being their preferred method of 
communication with their relatives. The comments of Sam (p. 149), the enthusiastic 
migrant based in Leeds are typical, 
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‘I hadn’t used a computer before arriving here in 2001. Even then, it wasn’t 
until 2005 that I attended my first computer class that was run by the refugee 
council in Manchester. When I arrived, I it was all work and work. I used to 
talk to my wife by phone. After learning the computer, I fell in love with it. Now, 
I talk to my parents via skype, facebook, yahoo messenger and other 
mediums. I have sent refurbished computers home to aid our communication.’ 
(Interview in Leeds, 28 November 2010) 
Zimbabwe has seen an unprecedented rise in mobile phone subscriber base since 
the dollarization of the economy in February 2009 with the latest figures showing that 
the country’s three mobile phone companies have an estimated subscriber base of 
8.5 million in a country with about 13 million people (Chimhangwa, 2012). Such 
developments concur with reports that there are ten times as many mobile phones 
as landlines in sub-Saharan Africa (ITU, 2009). Sam’s comments demonstrate that 
the rapid technological advances in the dissemination of information between 
families allows for the instantaneous transmission of messages thereby ameliorating 
the gulf imposed by geographical and spatial variations. Some scholars have argued 
that the increasing penetration of new media, most notably of mobile telephones, 
contributes to the expansion of networks of interaction and participation across 
temporal, spatial and infrastructural distances (Shirazi, 2008).  
 
The frequency of contact appears to be a consequence of access to capital and 
other social factors such as circumstances at home (Sassen, 2000) (Figure 7.19). 
For example the frequency would increase in the event of an illness or bereavement 
in the family or if one is undertaking a project such as building a house. The 
frequency of contact tapers off once a crisis has diminished. Esther, an enthusiastic 
migrant (p. 147) expresses the sentiments of her peers when she says, 
 
‘When my husband and kids were at home, I was calling almost daily but once 
they came over, I stopped. Now, I don’t call that often unless there is 
something serious that would have happened, for example last month, when 
my sister was involved in a serious car accident; I was calling everyday to 
check on her.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 October 2009) 
It is apparent from Esther’s case that once her children joined her, she reduced the 












Figure 7.19 Frequency of contact by country of residence % 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Technological and transport developments have fuelled transnational commodity 
culture (Crang et al., 2003). For Zimbabwean migrants, the commodity culture is 
exemplified by their consumption of Zimbabwean foodstuffs imported by 
entrepreneurial migrants. As Vallianatos and Raine (2008) have pointed out, food 
connects migrants across time and place and is an essential component of 
maintaining connections to home. This is more pronounced in Leeds where a 
number of Zimbabwean shops have sprouted up in different cities. The following 
section explores this theme of food as a form of reconnecting with and contact with 
home. This is consistent with current scholarly endeavours which recognize that 
social and cultural processes regularly exceed the boundaries of individual nation 
states, sketching ‘transnational’ cartographies of cultural circulation, identification 
and action (Crang et al., 2003; Kearney, 1995; Appadurai, 1998). 
 
7.4.1 Food as a re-enactment of and contact with home 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate the interconnectedness of 
migrants’ lives with those at home and how this is reproduced in the diaspora. 
Despite the salience of contact through physical visits, telephone and virtual 
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communication, food plays an important role in connecting migrants with home given 
the important role that it plays in migrants’ lives. As Harbottle (2000:5-6) claims, 
cultural identities are shaped, established, expressed and enacted through food 
consumption and food production practices which has resonance with Edles’ (2004) 
claim that food is a cultural symbol. 
 
There is a corpus of scholarly literature which investigates the role of food in ethnic 
communities which focuses on its role in constructions of identity, belonging and 
home (Crang et al., 2003; Jackson, 2002; Mankekar, 2005). Guarnizo (2003) has 
described ethnically owned businesses as a form of economic transnationalism as 
they meet the dietary needs of the migrants. This school of thought regards business 
investment decisions as being embedded in a web of social expectations and 
obligations tied to their place of origin (Portes and Stepick, 1993; Jackson, 2002). 
The business ventures of Zimbabwean migrants in this study mirror those of earlier 
migrants which are heavily skewed towards retailing in small grocery shops. This can 
be ascribed to little financial reserves which compels them to set up shop at the 
lower end of this opportunity structure (Sassen, 1991). It is therefore not a surprise 
that migrants that have started businesses in the UK have gravitated to the lower 
end of the market as evidenced by types of business that they run such as grocery 
shops and butcheries that cater for the migrants’ dietary, cultural and entertainment 
needs.  
Scholars such as Crang et al (2003) claim that networks associated with food flow 
through complex networks rather than via vertical ‘commodity chains’. This rings true 
of Zimbabwean owned business trading in food. The imported foodstuffs travel 
through complex networks before finally arriving in the UK. Existential threats to food 
security have resulted in the Zimbabwean government banning the exportation of 
certain foodstuffs, which however, still find their way to shops in the UK and other 
countries. Prior to the ravages wrought by the global economic recession, there were 
no less than five grocery shops in Leeds, four butcheries, two clothing shops, a cafe, 
four hair and beauty salons as well as three parallel money transfer shops. A number 
of shops have since closed leaving only one shop that is operational in the inner city 













Figure 7.20 KwaMereki Butchery in Armley, Leeds 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2009) 
 
KwaMereki is a butchery which sells a wide variety of Zimbabwean foodstuffs 
popular with migrants. The name is derived from a popular entertainment spot in 
Harare where people do ‘braai’ in the open car park. During summer, migrants 
engage in ‘gochi-gochi’ at KwaMereki in an endeavour to replicate the lifestyle that 
they used to lead at home (Mbiba, 2010). It is an avenue through which 
Zimbabweans try to re-incarnate their lives at home.  
 
Despite the shops being marginally expensive than other ethnic shops, they continue 
to attract and retain a large customer base as they sell some foodstuffs imported 
from Zimbabwe and South Africa. The most popular foodstuffs are the staple maize 
meal called ‘Iwisa’ (Figure 7.21) and ‘Pearlenta’ and ‘Roller Meal’ (Figure 7.22) which 
is imported from South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. The mealie-meal is used 









Figure 7.21 South African manufactured Iwisa maize meal on sale at 
  KwaMereki Butchers, Leeds 
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2009) 
 
Figure 7.22 Two brands of Zimbabwean manufactured maize meal - Pearlenta 
  and No. 1 Roller Meal  
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2009) 
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What is clear from the migrant businesses in the UK is that they utilise resources 
from both the country of origin and in the country of settlement. As Faist (2008) 
observed, transnational ethnic ties can supply useful economic, social and human 
capital for immigrant entrepreneurs. Buying Zimbabwean made foodstuffs from 
Zimbabwean owned shops invokes emotional attachment of the migrants to the 
country of their birth. Preparing and cooking their own food was considered to be 
good for the migrants’ children as it kept them in touch with their ‘roots’ given the fact 
that some of them were very young when they left Zimbabwe. This echoes Fischler’s 
(1988) claim that food is also central to our sense of identity. Veronica, a 44 year old 
divorced mother of four who lives in Leeds shares her feelings regarding this. 
“Despite the food being expensive, it is important that I buy hupfu (mealie 
meal) and cook sadza for my children so that they know where we came from. 
I tell them that this is what they used to eat before we came here and that it’s 
better than having rice and pasta. I also buy mufuswa (dried vegetables), dovi 
(peanut butter) and try as much as I can to cook traditional food at least twice 
a week. I was very embarrassed when I took my kids home in December last 
year (2008) because they refused to eat sadza and dried vegetables with 
peanut butter. From there, I made a conscious decision to make them eat the 
traditional food that I ate when I was growing up. Besides, it’s healthier than 
what they like to eat here.” (Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009) 
As Guarnizo (2006:667) asserts, ‘eating and drinking national foods and beverages, 
or listening and dancing to “authentic” national music becomes “the thing to do” 
among many immigrant populations, especially among those living in segregated 
residential, ethnic enclaves.’ For Veronica like other migrants, eating Zimbabwean 
food signifies a reconnect and recall of the family left behind which if continually 
repeated preserves these transnational relationships and enact their companionship 
with those back home (Vallianatos and Raine, 2008). Ethnic shops provide migrants 
like Veronica with an outlet to reconnect with their past and home. Veronica’s case 
illuminates the centrality of food to the social ties and imaginings of home and 
community. For parents with children who have intermittent physical contact with 
home, food is an avenue through which culture and traditional practices can be 
transmitted. Veronica speaks of being embarrassed when she went home because 
her children refused to eat traditional food that had been prepared for them. Refusing 
food is considered to be an affront in Zimbabwean culture. Gabacia (1998:54) 
observed that for many migrants, losing traditional cooking practices equates to 
‘abandonment of community, family, and religion.’ 
 
For parents with children who have intermittent physical contact with home, 
consuming food from home is an avenue through which they can transmit their 
culture and practices to their children and young people who are susceptible to 
acculturation and possibly assimilation. Rissel (1997) defines acculturation as 
process through which migrants and their children acquire the values, behavioural 
norms and attitudes of the host society. Acculturation affects migrants’ beliefs 
surrounding food habits, including how food is shared within a household, and the 
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feeding patterns or cultural understanding of foodstuffs (Brown et al., 1981; Burns, 
2004). The children’s refusal to eat food during a visit to Zimbabwe shows evidence 
of dietary acculturation (Jerome et al., 1980). 
 
On the other hand, migrants in Limpopo have not faced significant disruptions in their 
dietary requirements due to similar diet. People in Limpopo share the same staple 
food with those from Zimbabwe. For others with secure tenancy, they are able to 
recreate their tastes by growing their own vegetables in small gardens on their yards 
as well as rearing broiler chicks for consumption and for sale to other Zimbabwean 
migrants. Iwisa maize meal is readily available as the locals also use it for their own 
food requirements. Others reported bringing food from home or arranging with their 
families to some send to them which is a form of reverse remittances discussed in 
section 7.2.3. Cross border traders also play an important role in meeting the dietary 
requirements of the migrants. At the Musina Refugee Reception Centre and in the 
streets of Polokwane, Louis Trichardt, Thohoyandou etc both male and female 
migrants sell an array of foodstuffs that are brought from Zimbabwe to both locals 
and Zimbabwean migrants (Figure 7.23).  
 
Figure 7.23 Zimbabwean women selling groundnuts, Polokwane 
 
  
Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010) 
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Zimbabwean market traders are active in several towns in Limpopo including 
Musina, Louis Trichardt, Thohoyandou, Giyani, Tzaneen etc where they sell a range 
of foodstuffs sourced from home. During interviews some migrants reported working 
for Zimbabwean cross border traders who leave them with their wares to sell.  
   
7.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has explored the activities that characterise the transnational 
transactions of Zimbabwean migrants in their host countries. It has demonstrated the 
factors that influence these transactions and how the coping strategies that the 
migrants use to maximise their remitting capabilities. The chapter demonstrated the 
remitting reasons, which are complex and to a large extent entangled in the return 
discourse. I have discussed the remitting channels that migrants use in both 
countries which are driven by a range of factors including structural factors which 
have for example, resulted in the dominance of registered MTOs in the UK and 
informal methods in Limpopo due to circulation and social networks.  
 
The political activities of the migrants were explored and the motivations for 
engaging in these activities were exposed. It was argued that political activism in the 
UK is predicated on the need to get documented status as the Home Office appears 
to place significance on migrants’ political activism when determining asylum cases. 
It was argued that migrant politics in the UK appears to be opportunistic as it 
diminishes once documented status has been obtained.   
 
This chapter has highlighted the importance attached by migrants towards the 
maintenance of contact with those left which was argued to be out of familial 
obligations, keeping track of projects at home, return strategy etc. Migrants with 
children at home were shown to maintain frequent contact compared to those with 
their families in South Africa and the UK. Contact was shown to be maintained 
through a range of mediums including mobile, text messaging, letters, word of mouth 
etc. Chapter 8 builds on the various transnational transactions discussed in this 









Chapter 8  The (im)possibility of return? An exploration of the return 
   intentions of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the 
   UK 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter explored the key transnational linkages that migrants have with 
those who remained behind which were cast as suggestive of their return intentions. 
It also discussed migrants’ participation and engagement in Zimbabwean oriented 
activities in Leeds and Limpopo. This chapter explores the conditions in which the 
different diasporic groups identified in Chapter 6 would consider returning home, a 
process that Pessar (1997) and Guarnizo (1997) consider as a continuation of the 
migration process. The exploration of migrants’ potential return intentions instead of 
actual return distinguishes this study from previous studies (Gmelch, 1992; 
Guarnizo, 1997b). As Chapter 5 demonstrated, a set of complex and intertwined 
factors compelled migrants to exit Zimbabwe in a series of migration episodes which 
were outlined in Chapter 2. The drivers for emigration to South Africa differed from 
those to the UK. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, migration to the UK appeared to be 
more skilled than that to South Africa which has implications for return. Furthermore, 
the Zimbabwean government is making concerted efforts to attract its skilled people 
from the diaspora which as discussed in Chapter 5 amounts to political factors 
affecting return. Against this background, this chapter investigates the conditions 
which will induce migrants to return home.  
 
This chapter addresses objective 4; to establish the migrants’ attitudes and 
aspirations to return in order help in the reconstruction of their beleaguered country. 
It seeks to contribute to the burgeoning literature on return migration (cf. Newbold, 
2001; Newbold and Bell, 2001; Tsuda, 1999; Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; King, 2000; 
Gmelch, 1983). Migrants’ insights about their intentions of return are used to 
demonstrate the opportunities and constraints that impinge on their return intentions 
and differences within the diaspora.  
 
Interview data suggests that the diasporic groups identified in Chapter 6 consider 
factors such as political, socio-economic, human capital development etc in 
formulating their return intentions. It was noted in Chapter 2 how emigration was 
prompted by the economic and political policies of President Mugabe. It is therefore, 
not an exaggeration to argue that, until there have been significant democratic 
changes culminating in his removal from power, return for some migrants who are 
politically active will remain a pipe dream (see Chapter 6). The Zimbabwean crisis is 
associated with the rule of President Mugabe; the demise of his rule will entice 
migrants to return and play a role in the reconstruction of their country.      
 
Furthermore, an investigation into return perceptions is supported by the cyclical 
nature of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa which was highlighted in 
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Chapters 2 and 5. Moreover, Chapter 6 revealed the different diasporic groups that 
migrants belong to, which implies that migrants in South Africa and the UK have 
different social, economic, political and cultural capital endowments. A growing 
volume of scholarly literature has highlighted the entanglements between return 
migration, identity and experiences in the host country (cf. Tanner, 2005; Thomas-
Hope, 1999).    
 
8.2 Attitudes towards return 
 
The subject of return is central to this study as explicated by the previous chapter 
which explored migrants’ transnational linkages given scholarship which consider 
them to be return indicators. The decision to focus on potential to return was 
informed by the realisation that Zimbabwe might change, and will require the 
mobilisation of human capital which was haemorrhaged during the past decade (see 
Chapter 2). As Figure 8.1 shows, an overwhelming majority of the survey 
respondents in both Leeds (82%, n=164) and Limpopo (86%, n=446) expressed a 
desire to eventually return home while 16% (n=31) in Leeds and 13% (n=69) in 
Limpopo stated that they did not intend to return with an even smaller percentage in 
both places (2%, n=5) in Leeds and (1%, n=4) in Limpopo stating that they did not 


























Figure 8.1 Return intentions by country of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted that the Zimbabwean diaspora comprises of different 
constituencies who left home for different reasons. Likewise, their intentions to return 
are argued in this study to reflect these differences as highlighted by the different 
reasons which were advanced (Table 8.1). Investigating these incongruent groups’ 
intentions to return contributes to a burgeoning literature which sheds light on the 
return motivations of labour migrants (Kubat, 1984; King, 1986), migrant-students 
(Glaser and Habers, 1974), highly skilled migrants (Lowell, 2001; McLaughan and 








Table 8.1 Reasons to return and settle in Zimbabwe by country of residence 
   
Country of residence 
United 
Kingdom South Africa 
What is the main reason 
that would induce you to 
go back and settle in 
Zimbabwe? 
Dual citizenship Count 29 5 





availability of jobs 
Count 28 222 
% within Country of 
residence 
17.0% 49.0% 
End of political 
violence/Change of 
government 
Count 19 65 
% within Country of 
residence 
11.0% 14.0% 
Owning a house/finished 
building my house 
Count 18 31 
% within Country of 
residence 
11.0% 7.0% 
To be with family Count 54 13 





Count 10 96 
% within Country of 
residence 
6.0% 21.0% 
Improved social services 
i.e. health delivery and 
education systems 
Count 11 18 
% within Country of 
residence 
6.0% 4.0% 
Total Count 169 450 
% within Country of 
residence 
100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
The data shows that reasons for returning to Zimbabwe depends on ‘country of 
residence’ (Chi square = 207.97, df = 6 and p< 0.001). South African based 
migrants’ tenuous economic situation is reflected by almost half (49%, n=222) of the 
446 respondents predicating their return on ‘improved economic conditions’ including 
the ‘availability of jobs’ while 21% cited provision of ‘financial incentives.’ Fourteen 
percent of the respondents based in South Africa premised their return on a ‘change 
of government.’ On the other hand, the overriding concern for the 169 Leeds based 
respondents wanting to return appeared to be the desire ‘to be with family’ (32%, 
n=54) which can be ascribed to immigration inhibitions that preclude migrants from 
neither bringing their families over to join them nor travelling to Zimbabwe for holiday 
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visits. Apart from immigration constraints, the ability to visit family has also been 
impeded by the high cost of travel as evidenced by the airfares which range from 
£600 to over £1,200 per person depending on the season. This does not seem to be 
a problem for South African based migrants because of circulation which was 
highlighted in Chapter 2.   
 
8.3 Intentions to return: Under what conditions, when, and how? 
 
Chapter 3 provided a theoretical framework for return migration. It discussed the 
various perspectives that have been advanced by scholars to explain return 
migration, namely, neoclassical economics (Todaro, 1969), NELM (Stark, 1991), 
structural (Cerase, 1974) and transnational approaches (Massey et al., 1993). These 
approaches suggest that migrants predicate their return on economic, 
environmental, social and political factors (Haour-Knipe and Davis, 2009; King, 
2000). In Chapter 6, it was outlined how members of the six diasporic groups 
(ambivalent, clandestine, enthusiastic, ephemeral, fearful and reluctant) were 
affected by the structural factors in host countries and how some were reluctantly 
staying because of their transnational obligations to those left behind. While an 
overwhelming majority of the survey participants expressed hope of returning home, 
the conditions under which their return intentions are premised differ significantly 
(Table 8.1).  
 
8.3.1 Familial obligations as both an inducement and constraint to return 
 
There is a body of scholarship which claims that return migration is fuelled by the 
need to be reunited with family left behind (St. Bernard, 2006; Tiemoko, 2004). 
Evidence from this study appears to support this hypothesis. Of the 164 respondents 
in Leeds who expressed willingness to return home, 32% (n=54) predicated it on the 
need to be reunited with their families. As noted in Chapter 5, the majority of the 
Leeds based migrants arrived in the UK between 2000 and 2002 (Figure 5.3, p. 102) 
and have not been back to Zimbabwe since due to immigration constraints (Figure 
6.7, p. 164). This is demonstrated by the case of Nokhuthula (p. 215), an 
enthusiastic migrant resident in Leeds who arrived in the UK as part of the fourth 
migration episode which was discussed in Chapter 2. Nokhuthula’s desire to return 
hinges on the desire to be reunited with her children, whom she has been separated 
from for over ten years,  
 
 ‘I got the papers last year and I will be going home next month. I will sneak 
 home from South Africa as others with the same papers as me do. It has 
 been a long time since I last saw my children; I left when the youngest one 
 was 5 and now he is 15. I have missed seeing my children grow up. Not being 
 there has been hard, but being here has enabled me to provide for them, they 
 live privileged lifestyles which they would not have had I been at home.’ 
 (Interview in Leeds, 15 January 2010).  
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This case highlights the anguish engendered by separation. Migrants and their 
families have endured prolonged separation due to immigration constraints as well 
as their transnational obligations such as remittances which were discussed in 
Chapter 7. The granting of refugee status although welcome, does not translate into 
automatic mobility for migrants such as Nokhuthula as it allows them to travel to 
other countries except Zimbabwe. Having not seen her children grow, she is not 
mindful of the ramifications that her actions of illegally returning to Zimbabwe may 
endanger to her immigration status in the UK were it to come to the attention of the 
authorities. It would seem from this interview that she is not alone in this 
phenomenon as other Zimbabwean migrants based in the UK also engage in this 
practice (New Zimbabwe, 2009). Nokhuthula’s case highlights the tensions that 
beset migrants’ lives in the diaspora. In as much as she misses her family at home, 
she also realises the financial importance of maintaining residence in Leeds which 
has enabled her children to lead privileged lifestyles compared to their counterparts 
who do not have recourse to diaspora remittances (see Chapter 7).  
 
On the other hand, a small percentage (3%, n=13) of the Limpopo based 
respondents (n=450) premised their return intentions on familial grounds. This 
should be considered against the backdrop of circulation and informal migration 
which are a characteristic feature of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa 
as outlined in Chapter 2. The meaning of return for South African based migrants 
differs from that of their peers in the UK as exemplified by the case of Rugare whom 
we saw earlier (p. 159), 
 
 ‘I go home two to three times a year, so I don’t really know what you 
 mean by return. Return for me, is out of question because this is my place  of 
 work, maybe I will go back home permanently when I retire. Besides, home is 
 just across the river.’ (Interview in Lebowakgomo, 19 March 2010) 
 
For Rugare as for many of his peers, return is informed by a number of factors. 
Firstly, the geographical proximity of Zimbabwe to South Africa renders return 
inconsequential as home is just across the river [Limpopo] which implies 
accessibility. Working and living in South Africa therefore, becomes akin to working 
in any part of Zimbabwe and travelling to the rural village from time to time. This 
should be considered against the background of rural to urban migration in 
Zimbabwe where economically active people move to urban areas in search of 
employment while leaving their spouses behind in the village. Secondly, return 
occurs when he retires from work which is echoes scholarly literature discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Notwithstanding the accounts of migrants intending to return to be with their families, 
some migrants stated that they have deferred their return intentions because of the 
needs of their children at home. This is epitomised by the case of Donald, a member 
of the clandestine diaspora whose case was discussed earlier (p. 164). His wife and 
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three children are at home and he has decided to abort his plans to return for their 
welfare,  
 
‘I would like to return one day. I am on my own here; bored to death by the life 
that I lead, always on the lookout for immigration and police. My wife and 
children are at home. I haven’t seen them in 9 years. I don’t have papers so 
can’t bring them over or go home to visit. My youngest has only started high 
school and two are at UZ. I have to pay almost US$5000 for their fees and 
upkeep every term and there is no way I could get that kind of money at 
home. I will soldier on here till they finish their education then I will return. I 
really want to go back for the sake of my marriage and family but then, I have 
to bear in mind that returning for the sake of it is useless. My children’s 
education comes first; I think any father or parent worth their salt will tell you 
that.’ (Interview in Leeds, 21 December 2009) 
It is clear from the above case that regardless of where the children are domiciled, 
intentions to return are predicated on what is in their best interests. Donald has had 
to postpone his return because he needs to work to raise his children’s tuition fees.  
His experience is similar to cases of El Salvadoran and Guatemalan migrants in 
Arizona, USA whose return intentions are contingent on the financial and educational 
needs of their children (Moran-Taylor and Menjívar, 2005). Donald’s case and that of 
other parents who have had to defer and redraw their plans to return appears to 
contradict some literature which posits that migrants return home to be with their 
families (Lynn-Ee Ho, 2008; Tiemoko, 2004). It would appear from this narrative that 
the desire of wanting to be with family does not supplant other considerations e.g. 
financial obligations for returning home which were discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Quite to the contrary, migrants demonstrate some willingness to delay their returning 
decisions on the basis of wanting to meet the needs of their family members at home 
(see Chapter 7). It is when these needs have been satisfied that the decision to 
return is affected. For Donald, his transnational transactions are a form of return 
which echo Black and King’s (2004: 80) postulation that ‘transnationalism itself can 
arguably be conceptualised as a form of return.’ Donald’s case epitomises how as 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, clandestine migrants persevere despite the difficulties 
engendered by their lack of documented status. Returning home for undocumented 
migrants in the UK entails losing their ‘stay’ as they would not be able to come back. 
Consequently they are enmeshed in a web of unconscious immobility (Binaisa, 
2008). His case, as that of many others in his predicament, corroborates the findings 
of a study by Massey et al (2002) which found that lack of legal immigration status 
curtails migrants’ ability to move back and forth between the U.S. and their countries 
of origin. It also contradicts McGregor’s (2008) claim that undocumented migrants 





8.3.2 Citizenship and deferred returns 
 
Return intentions are promoted and repressed by the attainment of citizenship in the 
host country. As Reyes (1997) observed, a migrant’s immigration status in the host 
country goes a long way in determining their return intentions.  Evidence adduced 
from the study shows that migrants in the UK in particular, are keen on attaining 
British citizenship (17%, n=29) as this brings with it the freedom to travel to other 
countries, including Zimbabwe, without hindrance (Table 8.1). This concurs with 
other scholarship on dual citizenship which claims that it ‘is ‘crossborder’ institutional 
and legal right that many cherish because it facilitates their transnational practices, 
and legitimizes and widens their mobility options’ (Conway et al., 2008: 391).  
 
Leaving the UK in particular without citizenship or some form of documented status 
curtails a migrant’s ability to return. On the other hand, the attainment of South 
African citizenship is not considered to be a critical factor in determining return as 
evidenced by only 1% (n=5) of the survey respondents citing it as motivating factor 
for returning home. For some South African based migrants, the award of South 
African citizenship is the beginning of another journey as South Africa is seen as a 
stepping stone to other destinations such as the UK, USA and Australia as the case 
of Pepukai demonstrated (p. 103) (Guarnizo, 1997; Ley and Kobayashi, 2005). It is 
in this context that some migrants predicate their return on securing citizenship in 
both countries which would enable them to return should things not work out at home 
as anticipated (Şenyürekli and Menjívar, 2012).  
 
The prolonged crisis in Zimbabwe, which was highlighted in the previous chapters, 
resulted in some migrants delaying their planned return and in many cases 
compelled them to explore getting residency and citizenship in the host county. 
Citizenship complicates migrants’ return intentions. Migrants with citizenship instead 
of returning home, opt to bring their families to join them. Although Zimbabwe does 
not recognise dual nationality, this has not dissuaded Zimbabwean nationals abroad 
from acquiring citizenship of the countries in which they are domiciled. The 
acquisition of new citizenship in host countries has led to people staying longer than 
originally anticipated (Levitt, 2001a). Like other migrants, Eliza (p. 108), a member of 
the enthusiastic diaspora, arrived in the UK with the intention of staying for one year 
during which she saved money for her target before returning home. However, this 
changed when the economic situation at home degenerated resulting in first, her 
children and then husband joining her, 
‘My aim when I came here was to buy a house in Borrowdale. I didn’t intend to 
stay for more than a year but now it has been over 10 years since I came. I 
can’t see myself returning now as my youngest daughter is in Year 9. If at all I 
am going to return, it will be after she finishes university. I now have the red 
passport (British) so I can go and come back as I please. I am not only a 
Zimbabwean now, but a British-Zimbabwean which gives me options about 
where I want to live. I have worked here and I am entitled to my pension 
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which I don’t have in Zimbabwe. I may as well stay and draw my pension as I 
worked for it. For now, I am content with visiting home once a year so that the 
children don’t lose touch with their home country, our culture and traditions. 
Besides, it’s good for them to see their grandparents and other relatives and 
yes, despite the good living here, Zimbabwe will always be home, London is 
not our home.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009) 
Eliza’ case although personal and distinctive, nevertheless echoes and exemplifies 
the plight of her peers in the community. It brings to the fore several issues that 
migrants have to exhaustively debate regarding the timing of their return. Chapter 3 
highlighted how migrants’ life courses affected their return intentions. The life course 
approach posits that an individual’s life comprises of a series of transitions or life 
events, which are embedded in trajectories or status passages that give them a 
distinct form and meaning (Elder, 1994: 5). Eliza’s narrative appears to confirm this 
postulation as she premises her return on retirement from her current job. It was also 
exposed in Chapters 2 and 5 how migrants left home hoping for brief stays during 
which they accumulated sufficient savings which they hoped to deploy at home in 
property acquisition and other business ventures but have had to continuously revise 
thereby derailing their original intentions.  
 
Such continuous postponements are akin to Anwar’s (1979) ‘myth of return’ in which 
Pakistani migrants in the UK harboured thoughts of returning home which they never 
fulfilled due to economic reasons and their children’s futures. An interviewee’s life 
cycle also plays an important role in the decision to return (Rogers et al., 1992). 
Eliza’s life cycle dissuades her from returning permanently and has substituted this 
with yearly visits which still enable her to maintain ties with home. Eliza’s dilemma 
about retirement and pension mirrors that of her peers who find themselves in a 
quandary about whether to forgo their pension benefits in the host country. 
Prolonged stays in the host country obfuscates the whole notion of return as the 
above case shows. Migrants who like Eliza, have acquired citizenship of the host 
country have to decide about which country that they would prefer to live in, an 
option that those with only Zimbabwean citizenship do not have. Eliza’s documented 
status enables her to travel frequently between London and Harare. She calls both 
Leeds and Harare home which resonates with Brah’s (1996:194) contention that 
despite people in the diaspora referring to more than one location as home does not 
mean that such groups feel settled in their host country (see Chapter 3). 
 
The importance of children’s education is a theme that pervades this study. Parents 
have had to redraw their return intentions to accommodate their children’s education 
(Anwar, 1979). The findings of this study resonate with Ong’s (1999) study of 
Chinese migrants in Canada who predicated their return on the acquisition of a 
Western education which Mitchell (1997) contends is deemed crucial in the 
constitution of a ‘cultural citizen’ (see Chapters 2 and 5). This is consistent with 
King’s (2000) observation that the reasons for migrants returning home are multiple 
and intertwined. The evolvement of migrants’ goals due to progression of their life 
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cycle continues to redefine both the concept and timing of return (Rogers et al., 
1992). It is these constant shifts that explain why Eliza has delayed her return 
intentions. As with many Zimbabweans, Eliza’s perspective on return has changed 
significantly to the extent that she now talks of yearly visits to enable the children to 
have contact with their grandparents and to keep them grounded in Zimbabwean 
culture and tradition. Regular visits have thus supplanted permanent return.  
 
Similarly, Pepukai, a reluctant migrant in Limpopo (p. 103) hopes to return eventually 
once he has South African citizenship. Pepukai stated that he hopes that the 
acquisition of the South African passport will enable him to embark on yet another 
migration excursion having failed to travel to the UK due to visa constraints.  
 
 ‘Once I get my citizenship, I will return home and restrategize. It’s not like I 
 can’t  go home, I go there every holiday, and it is only a stone’s throw away. 
 Going  back to work there is another matter, but with the insurance of a South 
 African passport, it is doable, I will try it and see what happens but if things go 
 haywire again, I will use my new passport to go to other countries e.g. 
 Australia.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 5 March 2010) 
 
The acquisition of citizenship appears to have the same meanings and undertones 
for skilled migrants in Leeds and Limpopo who consider it to be a form of insurance 
that they can bequeath to their children. For Pepukai as for many others, a South 
African passport ensures that were he to return to Zimbabwe and the economic and 
political situation deteriorated, he can use it to parachute himself out of the country. 
Pepukai, like Eliza, has found that his returning intentions are contingent on 
citizenship issues. The quest for British and South African citizenships should be 
understood in the context of their perceived benefits such as ease of international 
travel. This mirrors the findings of Ley and Kobayashi’s (2005) study of the return 
intentions of Hong Kong citizens resident in Canada which found that most migrants 
returned once they acquired Canadian citizenship which they considered to be useful 
for international travel. Interestingly, both British and South African citizenship are 
considered to be a form of insurance that parents confer on to their children. 
 
Equally, migrants chose either to return or defer their return due to the welfare and 
educational needs of children (Constable, 1999). In Eliza’s case, she has put off her 
return ambitions due to wanting her children to receive British education which is 
perceived as superior to Zimbabwean education (see Chapter 2). Ley and Kobayashi 
(2005) also found that Canadians of Hong Kong descent delayed their return plans 
to enable their children to complete their studies at Canadian universities which they 
deemed superior to the ones in Hong Kong. Such migrants are afraid that their 
children would fail to adapt if they were to return to Zimbabwe given not only the 
differences in the educational system but also the quality of education between 
Zimbabwe and the UK in particular. Unlike in Zimbabwe, education in the UK state 
schools and some designated South African schools is free of charge. Furthermore, 
the South African Schools Act (1996) states that no child can be denied access to 
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education for non-payment of fees (Department of Basic Education, 2011). Parents 
are therefore, reluctant to return to a country where they will have to pay 
astronomical fees for an education system whose credibility is compromised 
(Nyazema, 2010).  
 
Conversely, some migrants are planning to return home because they have failed to 
secure legal immigration status which has relegated their stay in the host country on 
the margins (see Figure 6.7, p. 164). The results of this study suggest that return is a 
response to the structural barriers that inhibit migrants’ agency rather than failure per 
se (Cerase, 1974; Todaro, 1969). These structural impediments, as outlined in 
Chapter 6, include lack of documented status, reluctance to recognise qualifications, 
and the lesser value of accredited to experience acquired in home countries by 
employers etc (Bloch, 2006). For migrants who have exhausted their appeals 
process to get documented status, life in the UK can be an uphill struggle 
characterised by clandestinity and caprice (Waite, 2009). It is an existence 
punctuated by being on the lookout for immigration officials, of solitude and 
exploitation (see Chapter 6). The same is equally true in South Africa where even 
those with legal status endure untold suffering similar to their documented 
counterparts. This stems from the widely held perception amongst locals of 
Zimbabweans as a source of cheap labour (Crush and Tevera, 2010). 
Undocumented migrants and those on asylum permits56 in Limpopo appear not to 
attach the same importance to citizenship as their documented and skilled 
counterparts.  
 
Chapter 6 discussed the difficulties faced by migrants regardless of documented 
status. It is these hardships that compel migrants to give up their quest for a new life 
in the host country and contemplate returning home. Home, despite the imagined 
and real problems, is construed as offering better opportunities than are existent in 
the host country. These difficulties are acutely felt by migrants who were in the 
middle to upper classes at home but have failed to replicate their class status in the 
host country. By comparing their current situation against what it was when they 
were home, migrants are able to evaluate if life in exile has paid off. The desire to 
return home is accentuated by narratives of the success of their peers at home or in 
other countries. Dudu (p. 165), an engineer speaks of her peers when she talks of 
being pained by destitution induced her immigration status;  
  
 ‘Life is unfair. I was doing well at home, had my own car, a company car and 
 had bought a stand all at the age of 26. If I had stayed, maybe I would have 
 been someone now. Somehow, I threw that away by coming here, I should 
                                                     
56
 For holders of Zimbabwean special permits (asylum permits) to migrate to the new work permits which are 
going to be issued to Zimbabwean from October 2010, applicants for the new permits are required to have a 
valid Zimbabwean passport; proof continuous resident in South Africa dating back to 31
st
 May 2010; a letter 
from their employer stating that they are employed by a registered company; documents proving employer is a 
registered company; an affidavit from the police stating that the person is employed at the previously mentioned 
company (DHA, 2010b) 
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 have maybe gone to Joza (Johannesburg) as some of my friends did. But I 
 was lured by the pound. Now, I have to rely on the generosity of others to 
 make ends meet, I have to sleep on friends’ sofa. I am going home, I have 
 registered with IOM to go back under that scheme where they give you £500 
 upfront and buy you a ticket. Hopefully when I get home, I will be able to pick 
 up the pieces and rise again. I know someone who went back the same way 
 and now they say they are doing well. People will laugh at me initially when I 
 arrive with nothing, but I am determined to start afresh, to prove to people that 
 not making it in London is not the end of the world.’ (Interview in Leeds, 15 
 January 2010) 
 
The above quote suggests that Dudu erred by coming to the UK instead of going to 
South Africa where she would have been able to get documentation which would 
have enabled her to find work in her profession. This echoes Borjas and Bratsberg’s 
(1996) claim that migrants fail in the host country because of misinformation or high 
expectations, followed by disillusionment. Her narrative, like that of her peers, is 
tinged with regret and self blame. Many migrants in Dudu’s position wonder whether 
they made the right decision in moving to their host country. The perceived success 
of their peers as one of the causes of emigration from Zimbabwe was discussed in 
Chapter 5 and still agitates many migrants, leading them to regret at the choice of 
destination that they made.  
 
In the UK, the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP) is 
run by IOM on behalf of the British government to assist refused asylum seekers and 
other illegal immigrants to return home by providing a financial stipend of up to £500 





















Figure 8.2 An IOM advert on a Zimbabwean internet news site targeting 
  asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers in the UK 
 
 
 Source: www.zimdiaspora.com 
 
Adverts about how to access VARRP support are placed in Zimbabwean internet 
websites such as NewZimbabwe.com (www.newzimbabwe.com), Zimbabwe 
Diaspora (www.zimdiaspora.com), and The Zimbabwe Mail 
(www.thezimbabwemail.com). Chapter 5 highlighted the salience of economic 
problems in driving emigration from Zimbabwe and it appears it is against this 
background that the IOM provides returned migrants with a financial grant to start a 
business on arrival at home. Like other migrants, Dudu has used her transnational 
networks to ascertain the efficacy of this scheme (see Chapters 3 and 7). Home is 
contextualised as prosperous and free of social problems that migrants face in their 
everyday lives (Razum et al., 2005). In this regard, Dudu hopes that her problems 
would be absolved once she gets home as her agency will not be constricted. 
 
8.4 The economic renaissance in Zimbabwe and the global economic 
 recession 
 
The formation of the inclusive government in February 2009 appears to have 
stemmed the economic decline. In 2011, the Zimbabwean economy recorded a 9.3% 
growth rate, one of the highest in the world (van der Vaart, 2011). In Chapter 3, it 
was highlighted how migrants may predicate their return on improved economic 
conditions in the home country (King, 2000). The return to near normalcy has 
prompted international agencies such as IOM to help the country to entice back 
skilled professionals who left at the height of the economic and political malaise to 
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help resuscitate the collapsed public services e.g. health and higher education (IOM, 
2010).  
 
Likewise, the huge mineral deposits reputed to be in abundant in the country have 
stirred investors’ interest resulting in multi-billion dollar investments being made in 
the extractive industries (Matsika, 2010). These investments have also lead to a 
huge demand for skilled personnel most of whom had left the country during the era 
of economic and political crisis. Private companies have thus, embarked on 
recruitment drives in countries such as South Africa and the UK, thereby 
complementing the efforts of the government in attracting skilled personnel back 
(King, 2000). These efforts have coincided with unprecedented economic recession 
in western countries such as the UK which has resulted in swingeing cuts being 
made on the public sector as part of deficit reduction plans (Mead, 2011). The cuts 
have resulted in some migrants who work in the public sector being made redundant 
which has obliged them to consider returning home sooner than they had planned.   
 
8.4.1 Human Capital: Return as retracing the 1980 precedent 
 
Migrants have utilised their time in exile to pursue different interests and activities. 
As highlighted in Chapter 6, some migrants have furthered their education during 
their time in South Africa and the UK. Migrants who have enhanced their human 
capital frame their return intentions in historical terms. These migrants draw parallels 
of their own situation and that of prior exiles who returned soon after independence 
in 1980 having fled Zimbabwe during the liberation war (see Chapter 2). The analogy 
was invoked to mirror the political developments in the country that culminated in the 
formation of a coalition government between ZANU (PF) and the MDC parties in 
February 2009. This is symbolic in that, like in 1980, the developments in February 
2009 potentially ushered a new era in the country following a decade of protracted 
political upheaval and socio-economic regression.  
 
In the 1980s, returnees due to their superior human capital were parachuted into 
senior positions in both the public and private sectors. The current crop of migrants 
hopes to emulate this precedent. Returning migrants plan to leverage their academic 
and professional capital to land senior positions in both the public and private sectors 
which are still struggling after years of human capital depletion (Ammassari, 2004). 
This is encapsulated by the following two cases of Paul whom we met earlier (p. 
128) and Muzinda, a 43 year old Limpopo academic who moved to South Africa as 
part of the second migration wave (see Chapter 2) initially to work as a teacher 
before studying for his MA and PhD degrees at a leading South African university. 
Paul came to the UK armed with a Social Work Diploma which he since upgraded to 
a BA (Hons) degree in Social Work as well as completing an MA degree in 
Development Studies.  
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‘I have decided to go home and swim with the sharks, you know. I came here 
a long time ago and now have got a PhD plus other professional qualifications 
which will help me to get a job. My PhD is from a reputable university here, 
not the ones they are churning out in Zim [Zimbabwe]. Think of the guys who 
benefitted from jambanja (land reform), ngoda57 and then again in this 
coalition. I can’t continue to lose out that’s why I am going back to swim with 
the sharks. Think back to 1980 or in the late 1970s, the guys from the UK 
going to Mozambique when they knew that the war was ending and then 
being given senior positions. As a student of history, I am learning from it to 
advance my personal interests. I could have stayed here as an academic but 
there is more to be got by going home than from staying here.’ (Interview in 
Thohoyandou, 26 April 2010) 
‘I came here with only a Diploma in Social Work but now I have a Masters, so 
I can go back and do something there with my education. My degree is 
superior to those obtained in Zimbabwe. Besides, I have some business there 
which advise professionals like social workers and nurses who want to come 
and work here. It will work out; I am tired of being here. I will leave the wife 
and the kids for now while I go and test the waters. If it doesn’t work out, I can 
always come back as I have a British passport.’ (Interview in Leeds, 10 
December 2009) 
In Chapter 3, it was put forward how the NELM approach to return migration 
considers it as a ‘calculated strategy’ incepted at the household level as a 
consequence of successful achievement of set targets (Stark, 1991: 26). It can be 
argued that the acquisition of educational qualifications by both Paul and Muzinda 
symbolise the achievement of goals that Stark (1991) refers to. The excerpts show 
that both Muzinda and Paul are banking on their superior human capital to kick-start 
their careers back in Zimbabwe. While both Muzinda and Paul initially left Zimbabwe 
to work in South Africa and the UK respectively, they also utilised their time in exile 
to advance their academic and professional qualifications. Muzinda and Paul’s return 
intentions echo Jasso and Rosenzweig’s (1988) claim that skilled immigrants had a 
higher probability of return migration which was discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
For Muzinda, history has clearly demonstrated the significance of opportunism which 
he is seizing by going home to ‘swim with the sharks.’ Reference to the sharks is 
significant because it demonstrates that he is self aware, conscious of the risks that 
he is taking and the dangers inherent in such actions. It is a risk that he is prepared 
to take in the hope that he will reap significant returns. Like other migrants, Muzinda 
is pinning his hopes on the new government turning to its non-resident citizens to fill 
the labour vacuum. These findings echo Ammassari’s (2004) findings in which 
                                                     
57
 Ngoda is a term used to refer to diamonds by Zimbabweans. Alluvial diamonds were discovered in the 
Chiadzwa area of Manicaland Province in 2005. The government did not control the diamond mining until 2008 
and during this period, several people associated with ZANU (PF) are thought to have amassed significant 
wealth as they controlled the illegal mining. Today, the diamond trade is closely associated with ZANU (PF) 
and the state security sector who are accused of trading in blood diamonds by organisations such as the World 
Diamond Council.    
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recently returned Ghanaians and Ivoirian migrants were employed in key positions in 
the public and private sectors due to their superior human capital.  
 
International agencies such as UNICEF and IOM have been instrumental in 
facilitating the return of skilled professionals back to their home countries, a move 
which has been hailed in some quarters as turning the ‘brain drain’ into ‘brain gain’ 
(Chikanda, 2010; Meyer, 2003). The cholera epidemic in 2007-2008 provided the 
spur for some Zimbabweans to return to help contain the devastating disease.  
 
8.4.2 Brain gain and brain circulation: The professionalization of return 
 
The concepts of ‘brain gain’ ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain exchange’ in international 
migration have gained traction during the past few years, with scholars such as 
Bastia et al (2007) arguing that returning migrants possess higher human capital 
than those who stayed behind, which they then use to contribute to the development 
of the country. Migration literature is still dominated by the dangers of the so-called 
‘brain drain’ in the developing countries, which is blamed on poor salaries and 
working conditions in the Global South (Docquier and Rapoport, 2001; Stark, 2003). 
Having depleted a significant amount of her human capital, Zimbabwe has recently 
started enticing her professionals back. This process has been gathering momentum 
since the outbreak of the cholera epidemic in 2007 which killed over 2000 people 
(WHO, 2010). 
 
After failing to contain the cholera outbreak, the government of President Mugabe 
requested international assistance from international agencies such as UNICEF and 
WHO (Makumbe, 2009). These organisations in turn, set up an initiative targeting 
skilled Zimbabweans to temporarily return to work in the health sector to curb the 
crisis. Thus, the Zimbabwe Human Capital Initiative (ZHCI) was born which sought to 
encourage skilled migrants to return home to alleviate the critical skills shortage 
ravaging the health, engineering, and education sectors (Figure 8.3).  
 
This approach is consistent with developments that are being deployed elsewhere to 
counter the global shortage of skilled staff such as health workers (Chikanda, 2010; 
Roberts, 2008) through innovative health worker policies (Crush and Pendleton, 
2012). It can be argued that the Zimbabwe Human Capital Initiative (ZHCI) is an 
endeavour to overturn the ‘brain drain’ into ‘brain gain’ (Hunger, 2004; Kingma, 2006; 
Skeldon, 2005). Employers from both the private and public sectors advertise their 
vacancies on the ZHCI website to attract skilled diaspora professionals.   
 
The temporary returns programme enables skilled workers to voluntarily return home 
for periods lasting up to three months to work in hospitals or higher education 
institutions such as universities (IOM, 2008). IOM provides the returnees with 
monthly stipends that equate to their salaries during the period that they are at 
home. 
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Lynne, whose case was previously discussed (p. 121), has been to Zimbabwe on 
two occasions in the last 3 years as part of the ZHCI and has enjoyed the experience 
to the extent that she wants to return home permanently. She currently works as a 
staff nurse at a Leeds hospital, 
 
‘It’s so different from working here. At home, they appreciate what you are 
doing. It is challenging yes, but there isn’t this targets crap, you don't have to 
work constantly looking over your shoulder to see if someone is watching you. 
Ehe, there are challenges like equipment but you get so much joy from 
working with people who appreciate you, you don't have to do extra-ordinary 
things to prove yourself. Here, I am already disadvantaged before I do 
anything because of my colour, the patients, the managers, your fellow pros 
and the patients’ family doubt you; you have to show them that you know your 
stuff. At home, patients know I am a nurse and I can be a doctor too as the 
doctors give you freedom. They know I trained in London and that I have been 
working there for almost 10 years which makes them defer to me, they say, 
‘she was working in London; she was treating white people so she should 
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know this and that’. I enjoyed that, it is one of the reasons why I am going 
home, to work in an environment that is tolerant, this is not to say all the 
people here are intolerant, but you know, this isn’t our country and despite 
smiling at you, it’s not as it looks.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009) 
Frustrations at work and harsh working environments have been cited as reasons for 
wanting to return home (Hardill and MacDonald, 2000; Kingma, 2001). In this case, 
Lynne rants about the target culture that pervades the NHS which she claims 
impedes her work. The poor treatment of overseas trained nurses in the NHS has 
received scholarly attention and Lynne’s case highlights the enduring nature of the 
problems which not only foreign-trained nurses but also UK trained nurses of foreign 
origin have to contend with in their working environments (Allan et al., 2004; Buchan, 
2003; Larsen et al., 2005). Returning home for Lynne as for many others in her 
position, can be considered as an escape route which some migrants are intent on 
seizing.   
 
The experience that migrants have gained by working in world class institutions such 
as the NHS is not only recognised, but is most sought after and appreciated at 
home. It is this experience that is responsible for the deference Lynne gets from her 
peers in Zimbabwe. By contrasting her working environment in the NHS with that in 
Zimbabwe, it is clear that Lynne has been swayed by the adulation and higher status 
which she is afforded in Zimbabwe. The high doctor to patient ratio in Zimbabwe 
(itself a product of massive flight of medical personnel) means that she is given 
added responsibility (Chikanda, 2006). Although this contradicts some of the drivers 
of emigration which were discussed in Chapter 5, this should be understood in the 
context of Lynne not having been a nurse when she left Zimbabwe. Returning as a 
nurse represents a ‘triumphant return’ for her. She relishes this added responsibility 
and the prestige that her history and experience of having worked in the UK begets 
her from peers and patients alike. Nursing in Zimbabwe is a high status job. It is 
these considerations that are enticing her home. This begs the question, why Lynne 
has not returned home if her aversion to the working conditions in the UK is so 
strong? This can be answered by the conflicts that return endangers within migrants.  
She explains why these enticements have not translated into the actual return,  
‘I want to go back; everything is set on my going back except one major 
issue...pay. When I went IOM and UNICEF were paying me the equivalent of 
my salary here in US$ but when I told them that I wanted to come back 
permanently, they told me that I would have to go on the civil service salary 
which is ridiculous. So, until I get a job at a private hospital which can pay me 
a net salary of over US$2000 per month, I may have to extend my stay here 
indefinitely.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009) 
Lynne’s return intentions have been delayed by financial considerations as IOM and 
UNICEF do not pay salaries for permanent returnees but only for those they bring on 
temporary secondment. Permanent return would entail a massive pay cut for Lynne 
given that civil servants earn a paltry US$380 per month compared to her gross 
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monthly salary of over £3,000.00. Lynne’s case demonstrates the gulf that exists 
between wanting to return and the actual act of returning informed by the practical 
implications of cost of living in Zimbabwe.  
 
The resuscitation of the extractive industry in Zimbabwe has resulted in demand for 
skilled personnel including artisans. Some migrants who abandoned their jobs at the 
height of the economic crisis and settled in South Africa are trekking back to 
Zimbabwe after being head hunted by mining companies. Many of these migrants, 
despite their qualifications, were underemployed (see Chapter 6). Monica, an 
instrumentation technician who left the then state owned Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
Company (ZISCO) for South Africa in 2008 as part of the seventh migration wave 
epitomises this type of clandestine migrants who are looking forward to returning 
home (see Chapters 2 and 6). The 29 year old mother of three currently lives in a 
mukhukhu in Phalaborwa where she ekes a living distributing promotional leaflets for 
a Nigerian ‘doctor’, 
 
‘I have been offered a job by Mimosa [a leading platinum mining company] in 
Zvishavane. I can’t wait to go back home and kiss goodbye to this life of 
servitude. Imagine, I did my apprenticeship and had a good job, good house 
but lost all these when ZISCO collapsed which forced me to come here and 
do this. I am glad I am going back to use my skills instead of shouting about 
these flyers [waving the flyers that she hands out to potential customers]. I am 
leaving at the end of the month.’ (Interview in Phalaborwa, 26 May 2010).    
For migrants like Monica, the enthusiasm to return home is prompted by the 
frustration of living in South Africa where she is underemployed. Her return intentions 
appear to have been informed by her precarious living conditions and clandestinity 
which debars her from accessing formal employment. The clandestine lifestyle that 
she is leading although better than the conditions that she fled from in Zimbabwe, 
appear to be no match to the potential benefits that she stands to get in Zimbabwe 
which include subsidised housing, company car, a decent salary etc.   
 
While some scholarship argues that skilled professionals are more likely to return 
than their unskilled counterparts, evidence from this study does not appear to 
support this. Some migrants (n=222) in Limpopo and (n=28) in Leeds suggested that 
they would return home once the economic situation normalises and jobs are 
available. It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 how the majority of respondents in 
Limpopo were economic migrants with little education. This is evidenced by the case 
of Khanyesile, a 23 year old clandestine migrant who arrived in South Africa as part 
of the seventh migration episode whose two children are in Zimbabwe,  
 
 ‘I want to return home provided that there are jobs. I can’t go back now 
 with little prospects of getting a job. My family depends on me, if I go back  go 
 without a job, how will I feed my family? I hope things normalise at home 
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 and we can go back, no-one wants to live here like this.’ (Interview in 
 Potgiersrus, 26 May 2010) 
Khanyesile’s case highlights the salience of improved job prospects in luring 
migrants back home. This is not surprising given the prominence of economic factors 
in driving emigration as outlined in Chapters 2 and 5. The neoclassical economics 
approach to return migration discussed in Chapter 3 ascribed migrants’ return 
intentions to failure to achieve higher earnings in the destination country as originally 
anticipated (Todaro, 1969). This may be what Khanyesile is alluding to when she 
says ‘no-one wants to live here like this.’ This statement, apart from describing her 
precarious financial position, may also denote the harsh and intolerable conditions 
that migrants live in as described in Chapter 6.  
 
8.4.3 Curtailed opportunities: Recession induced returns 
 
The neo-classical economics approach to migration described in Chapter 3, posits 
that return migration is driven by failure to meet targets (Todaro, 1969). In Chapter 6, 
it was revealed how the diaspora has been a disappointment for some migrants as it 
had not fulfilled their expectations. The global economic recession has 
disproportionately affected western countries such as the UK resulting in widespread 
redundancies as part of deficit reduction initiatives. In Chapter 2, it was 
demonstrated how public sector organisations such as NHS trusts and local 
authorities launched recruitment forays into Zimbabwe to lure health and social care 
workers. The recession has resulted in some of these recruited workers being made 
redundant. Faced with receding job prospects, some of these migrants are 
considering returning home. Chapter 3 discussed Cerase’s (1974) typology of return 
which includes return of failure, innovation, conservatism and retirement. The 
findings of this study suggests that migrants whose return intentions have been 
shaped by the global recession, far from being failed returnees, can be categorised 
as innovators given the human capital that they have acquired in during their time in 
exile coupled with the experience of working in advanced economies such as the 
UK.   
 
The global economic recession has caused an upsurge in migrants wanting to return 
home (Fix et al., 2009). Interviewees who work in the public sector in the UK have 
seen their employers hit hard by the cut backs which are part of the measures 
adopted by the British coalition government to reduce the budget deficit. Jervas, 39, 
was, until his retrenchment, a member of the enthusiastic diaspora given his middle 
level management position in a Yorkshire local authority. The economic recession 
has wreaked havoc in migrant communities and does not discriminate between the 
documented and undocumented. It would appear as though the unemployment that 
migrants fled from is being re-enacted in the host country. So widespread have been 
the redundancies that migrants now talk of ESAP having followed them to the UK 
(Chapter 2).  As Jervas observes:   
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 ‘Do you still remember ESAP and the retrenchments back home in the early 
 1990s? The same ESAP that we ran away from has followed us, it is now 
 here. Look at how they are retrenching, the councils, hospitals and other 
 public owned agencies, just like what happened when Chidzero58 adopted 
 ESAP. I was made redundant, in fact I was one of the first ones to be gotten 
 rid of. Since my redundancy, I haven’t found anything; I have had to go back 
 kumachembere59 and indanda where I started. You can say I have gone full 
 circle so I may as well as go home as that is where I started when I first 
 arrived. There is nothing to stay here for, no jobs, nothing. I am taking the 
 ultimate leap of faith by going home. Like others, I was afraid of coming out of 
 the comfort zone, we are so used to the buy one get one free things that we 
 think that is the end of the world. I will take the positives with me; at least I 
 have the experience of working here which I think will help when I look for a 
 job at home. Definitely not, I will succeed at home.’ (Interview, Leeds, 12 
 December 2009) 
 
The current unemployment crisis in the UK has been described by commentators as 
the worst since the Thatcherite cuts of the 1980s (Milne, 2010). South Africa has 
also been struggling to contain rising unemployment (The Mail and Guardian, 2011). 
As with many other migrants, Jervas draws parallels between the current cutbacks 
being seen in British public services to the ones witnessed in Zimbabwe which were 
discussed in Chapter 2. In Zimbabwe then, as in the UK now, the panacea to the 
huge budget deficit that the country was saddled with was thought to lie in 
outsourcing public services to the private sector and to reduce the number of public 
workers.  
 
Migrants like Jervas who were made redundant because of ESAP in Zimbabwe have 
spoken of having experienced ‘double jeopardy’ to highlight their misfortune of losing 
jobs due to fiscal measures that are meant to rein in public expenditure (Chapter 2). 
For Jervas as for others, he now has the unviable record of having twice been made 
redundant in two different countries due to deficit reduction initiatives. Redundancies 
are therefore, the cue for migrants to leave, in this case, returning home, just like 
they were for exiting Zimbabwe. Like many other migrants, Jervas eschews the 
thought of reverting back to work in old people’s homes (kumachembere) and 
manufacturing industry (indanda) which he considers a backward step. As he 
explains, working in care homes and doing manual labour in manufacturing 
industries is viewed as a regressive step which is associated with the newly arrived 
migrants.  
 
Despite the difficulties that have punctuated his stay in the UK, Jervas refutes the 
claim that he has failed. This rebuttal should be understood in the context of his 
                                                     
58
 Dr Bernard Chidzero was the Minister of Finance when the government introduced ESAP; hence it became 
associated with him.  
59
 Machembere refers to old people. Kumachembere therefore refers to working with old people in old people’s 
care homes doing care work. Care work was known as dot.com by migrants (during the early days of arrival in 
the UK) 
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achievements both in the UK and at home where he has furthered his education (see 
Chapter 6) and acquired property (see Chapter 7) (Borjas, 1994; Lindstrom, 1996; 
Massey et al., 1993). Thus, returning home for migrants with properties and those 
that have managed to further their education agrees with Todaro’s (1960) neo-
classical economics approach which posits that migrants that successfully return 
would have achieved their targets such as property acquisition (see Chapter 3). 
Thus, despite the circumstances attendant to their returns, the nature of Jervas’ 
return like that of his counterparts, cannot be considered to have been one of failure 
as they have something to fall back on upon their return. Such narratives contradict 
the findings of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) who in their study of return migration in 
USA found that migrants with higher than average educational qualifications and 
skills are more likely to stay than their less skilled counterparts. In Limpopo, it is the 
professionals who are actively considering returning home to take advantage of the 
arising opportunities, not the less skilled who have always aspired to work in South 
Africa.  
 
The failure to find employment which matches a migrant’s professional and 
academic profile has seen some migrants contemplating making the journey home. 
Chapter 6 lends credence to cases in the literature of highly educated migrants 
having to settle for low paying jobs that have no bearing to their specialist training 
(Bauder, 2003; Kofman, 2004). Studies of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK 
mirror this trend (McGregor, 2008, Muzondidya, 2010). Blessing, a member of the 
ephemeral diaspora whom we have met earlier (p. 178) cites the failure to secure a 
job as a mechanical engineer as the primary driver of his decision to return (Table 
6.2, p. 155). This is consistent with findings from other studies. For example, Borjas 
(1989) found out that return migration was higher in immigrants who did not perform 
well in the labour market in USA. Following this failure, he retrained as a maths 
teacher and taught mathematics in secondary schools in Birmingham and Luton 
before deciding to go back home. Apart from failing to work in his preferred area of 
expertise, Blessing identifies the difficult behaviour exhibited by his pupils as the final 
straw. Following his failure to adjust to the socio-economic difficulties that were 
prevailing at home, Blessing left for South Africa where he soon found a job as an 
engineer. Here, he reflects on his experiences, 
 
 ‘I wouldn’t say I left London because I failed there, I was never given a chance 
 to work in my field - engineering. In the end I became a teacher before 
 deciding to return home as I was wasting my time. I just had had enough of 
 living from hand to mouth because in London. You can’t save any money.  So, 
 I decided that I was better off at home so I went back. I stayed at home for 
 about 6 months before coming here. It took me a month to get a job as an 
 engineer and within a year and half I was appointed a director of the 
 company. I have since helped other guys to move from England to here, 
 where they have found good jobs. In fact, people are moving from London to 
 here, it’s better, it offers better opportunities. Eish, instead of doing rubbish 
 jobs in London, SA offers real chances for professionals. I think, many people 
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 even though they won’t admit it, are failures there in London. London was 
 good until they introduced the USA (US dollar) and now with the exception of 
 a few people, many live from hand to mouth, they are failures because they 
 don’t have anything to show for their stay there. Going back to this issue of 
 being a failure, I would say I am not because I returned home voluntarily; I 
 had a work permit which is still valid and can travel to London anytime I want. 
 It’s difficult to say who is a failure although there are people in London who 
 have failed e.g. guys who don’t work and spend their time drinking etc. So 
 would you say such a person is not a failure because he is still in London than 
 say someone like me who returned home because I didn’t like what I was 
 doing and knew that I could strike gold here? It’s hard to determine, but all I 
 can say is that some people are embarrassed to go back.’ (Interview in 
 Polokwane, 31 March 2010) 
 
For Blessing, return did not represent closure of the migration cycle, but lead to 
continuity of migration manifested in circulation (Ammassari and Black, 2001). 
Return in this case, as with many others, marked a ‘stage in a process of 
increasingly fluid movements between countries’ (Agunias, 2006:14). This case also 
highlights the growing phenomenon of migrants moving from the UK to other 
countries such as South Africa and others leaving South Africa for Australia and the 
UK. The reasons for moving to South Africa are threefold: firstly, its close proximity 
to home appeals to a large segment of migrants. Secondly, it offers migrants the 
chance to work in the field that they trained in. Thirdly, it enables migrants to trial 
their return before deciding to eventually go back to Zimbabwe. Blessing’s narrative 
uses metaphors to highlight weaknesses that are inherent in Cesare’s ‘return of 
failure’ typology.  
 
His decision to return was not instigated by low wages given that teachers are 
modestly paid public servants in the UK. Thus, his case contradicts Todaro’s 
(1969:140) claim that migrants return home because they had not achieved their 
goal of increasing their earning potential. It is important to embrace Blessing’s 
insights regarding how one defines return of failure which (Herzog and Schottman, 
1982) also refers to as the disappointment theory of migration. Implicit in the above 
narrative is a sense that some migrants may remain in the host country without 
necessarily achieving the objectives which they left home for. Blessing claims that it 
is apt to label such migrants as failures even though they are reluctant to return for 
fear of exposing their failure to those at home. On the other hand, he did not 
consider his return as a failure as he had accumulated human capital to enable him 
to start afresh at home and in his current host country. His case corroborates Ley 
and Kobayashi’s (2005:113) claim that return migration for some migrants is less a 
final adjustment than another stage in a continuing itinerary.  
 
This thesis contends that, because migrants already own houses in towns and their 
villages as well as cattle, the issue of ‘return of failure’ does not adequately capture 
the conditions under which migrants choose to return. Migration scholars such as 
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Ammassari and Black (2001) have argued that migrants acquire skills that are 
seldom useful during their stay away from home. The evidence from this study, 
especially in South Africa appear to contradict this viewpoint as some migrants work 
in the agricultural sector doing the same mundane things that they grew up doing at 
home which they also do when they return home. Interviewees who work on the 
farms in Limpopo talked about helping their families in the fields when they return 
home during holidays, mirroring their line of work in South Africa60. Thus, the skills 
that the migrants pick up can be successfully put to use at home. 
 
8.5 Holiday visits and seasonal migration: the circularisation of return 
 
Technological and transportation advances have had a significant effect on return 
migration. As Castles (1998) observes, these advancements have resulted in 
migrants maintaining physical ties, person-to-person communication and social 
networks with those left at home as shown in Chapter 3. The combined effects of 
immigration status and high airfares on migrants’ ability to engage in return visits is 
demonstrated in Figure 8.4 where only 27% (n=54) have been to Zimbabwe 
compared to an overwhelming majority of 98% (n=510) in South Africa in the last 12 
months. Lack of documented status does not impede travel in South Africa unlike in 
the UK. Circulation in South Africa is promoted by factors such as proximity and the 
























                                                     
60
 Interview with Tapiwa in Thohoyandou, 3 March 2010. 
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Figure 8.4 Migrants who have been to Zimbabwe in the last 12 months by 
country of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Holiday visits are undertaken by migrants for diverse purposes (Figure 8.5). The 
findings of this study concur with Thomas – Hope’s (1999) observation that migrants 
returning regularly or periodically maintain family obligations (53%, n=29 in Leeds 
and 84%, n=427 in Limpopo) and investing in land and housing in preparation for the 
final move back. Likewise, scholars such as Cassarino (2004) and Oxfeld and Long 
(2004) have posited that holiday visits are used to assuage and overcome migrants’ 
initially held fears and hesitations that surround the act of leaving the host country 
and allowing them to choose if they want to return permanently. Furthermore, 
evidence from other studies (Braakman and Schlenkhoff, 2007; Ramji, 2006) 
highlight the importance of maintaining ties with the home country through regular 
visits, which make migrants more aware of the reality of the country, rather than 







Figure 8.5 Main purpose of last visit to Zimbabwe by country of residence % 
 
 
Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 
 
Similarly, Faist (2000b) posits that visits serve to link multiple ‘homes’, ‘spaces’ and 
‘bridges’ multiple identities. Likewise, Duval (2004) argues that return visits constitute 
transnational exercise through which multiple social fields are linked. As Vertovec 
(1999:448) points out, return visits enable the maintenance and representation of the 
‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of 
nation-states.’ Other literature claims that return visits symbolise conduits or 
mediums through which social practice can be channelled through between former 
homelands and new homelands (Duval, 2004). In accord with Boyd (1989: 650), this 
thesis argues that migrants settled in South Africa and the UK use visits as a tool of 
maintaining their personal networks. Some scholarship claims that return is 
preceded by visits and by remittances that may well include funds for the 
construction of a new family house (Duval 2004).  
 
The interviewees who had spent considerable amount of time without physical 
contact with their families stated that they found holidays provided them with 
opportunities to visit and strengthen relationships with families, relatives and the 
wider social networks (Boyd, 1989). Yet again, for interviewees who had postponed 
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their return intentions due to the need for their children to complete their education in 
the host country, return visits provide opportunities to visit home (Byron, 1999). 
Solomon whom we met earlier (p. 160) shares his views on the importance of visiting 
home,   
 
‘I had gone for six years without going home coz [because] of papers. Now 
that I have stay, I tend to go to see what it is like, just to reacquaint myself 
with home, really. Eventually I would like to return once there is (democratic) 
change and these visits are my way of trying to see if I can fit in. Besides, I 
need to take the children to see where I grew up and meet my people, the 
animals and everything that is there. It keeps them grounded, to know the 
limits rather than the rights that they are taught at school. It removes them 
from the bad influence of London, this country is very bad for children, no 
morals and they have more rights than I as a parent. They need to know who 
they are, where they came from. It is important culturally, look at the Asians, 
they go to Pakistan or India almost every year to make sure that they don’t 
lose touch with their roots. I want them to speak my Shona language and the 
time we spend at home is invaluable for that because when we come back, 
they will be speaking it quite well. ’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 November 2009) 
Solomon’s case exemplifies the problems facing migrants regarding the cultural 
clashes between western culture and their own. The interviewees view return as 
reinforcing cultural hybridism and strengthening transnational identities (Castles, 
1999; Oxfeld and Long, 2004). The issue of children elicits conflicting emotions. 
Some migrants in the UK in particular, resent the system which they perceive as 
rendering them impotent in disciplining their children. Bloch (2006) has highlighted 
the difficulties that Zimbabwean professionals face in raising children in the UK. 
Migrants are worried about the negative influences that their children are picking up 
such as poor educational attainment, drug use and promiscuity (Guarnizo, 2003).  
 
There is a grudging respect for the Asian culture within the community in the UK 
which ensures that the children learn and abide by their culture. Thus, the sending of 
children home during holidays is motivated by identity preservation (Binaisa, 2009, 
Bloch, 2008; McGregor, 2008, 2009) as parents strive to conserve the little of their 
culture that is left. Parents also encourage their children to attend activities where 
their language is spoken, for example Zimbabwean churches such as Johanne 
Masowe, Roman Catholic and United Methodist Church where the sermons are 
conducted in the local Shona and Ndebele languages. This is premised on 
forestalling the children from becoming misfits when they eventually return home 
(Oxfeld and Long, 2004).  
 
And like other migrants, visits for Solomon enable him to catch up with developments 
at home. This is important as some migrants due to reasons elucidated above, had 
not been able to return home whilst their asylum claims were being determined. For 
this group of migrants, visits are an avenue to see the progress of their projects 
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(housing, agricultural, business investments) which they have been told about but 
had not seen.  
 
8.6 Political reform as key to unlocking return: The adoption of a wait and 
 see approach to return 
 
While the formation of the inclusive government has reduced incidences of political 
violence, it has not abated them completely and the political landscape is still 
dominated by President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party. The dominance of 
President Mugabe in the inclusive government is exemplified by his party’s control of 
the security levers of the state such as ministries of defence, state security, justice 
and home affairs which he has used skilfully to stifle democratisation. Consequently, 
migrants expressed disappointment at the slow pace at which the political, security 
and safety issues are being addressed in Zimbabwe leading 14% (n=65) and 11% 
(n=19) of the respondents in Limpopo and Leeds respectively to adopt a wait and 
see attitude towards return (Table 8.1, p. 234).  
 
For migrants who suffered trauma at the hands of ZANU (PF) and other elements of 
the state machinery, returning home in the absence of a complete change in 
government is impractical. Return, for such migrants, can only take place once there 
have been demonstrable changes in sectors of the state like police, intelligence and 
the army, which are known to have been used by President Mugabe and his party to 
persecute opponents (Makumbe, 2009, 2010; Masunungure, 2010, 2011) (see 
Chapters 2 and 5). The fact that there have not been any prosecutions for 
perpetrators who meted violence to opposition supporters during the 2008 elections 
and others going back to 2000 does not inspire confidence to this group of migrants.  
 
President Mugabe has staunchly refused to cede control of the security sector, and 
the commanders of the army and police have pledged their unflinching support to 
ZANU (PF) and its president (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2011, 2012). In fact, 
recent developments have not done anything to persuade members of the diaspora 
groups to return home as people perceived to MDC supporters continue to be 
arrested whilst ZANU (PF) supporters behave with impunity (The Independent, 2011, 
2012). It is therefore, not surprising that those migrants who suffered political 
persecution are not packing their bags yet. Solomon (p. 160), a staunch MDC 
supporter who lost two members of his family to political violence and still bears 
physical, psychological and emotional scars vows never to return home permanently 
until there is complete change (see Table 8.1, p. 237),    
‘For some of us who fled genuine political persecution, who escaped death by 
a whisker, talk of imminent return is immature given lack of substantive 
change on the ground. The people who killed my family are still roaming free 
and boasting about it. I will only return when Chihuri (Commissioner-General 
of the Zimbabwe Republic Police) is gone and the soldiers are back in the 
barracks, when there is proper rule of law. The MDC may be part of the 
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government but they don’t have real power, just look at who controls the 
police, the army, and CIO and justice delivery system. It is Mugabe and his 
party so they can do whatever they like without batting an eyelid. Only 
economic migrants are the ones who are free to return not us political 
refugees. That is why when I go home I go clandestinely as I don’t want to get 
into trouble with both ZANU (PF) and the Home Office here as my refugee 
status bars me from travelling to Zimbabwe.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 
November 2009) 
As with many political refugees, Solomon is sceptical about the political changes that 
have taken place so far in Zimbabwe. Like his peers, Solomon is fearful of the 
insecure political environment which to all intents and purposes is still heavily 
dominated by ZANU (PF) (Compagnon, 2011; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010). These 
apprehensions are compounded by the fact that the perpetrators of heinous acts of 
violence during the 2008 elections, which were discussed in Chapter 2, are yet to be 
brought to account for their actions and seem to be protected by the police.  
 
There are serious disagreements between MDC and ZANU (PF) about what to do 
with the perpetrators of political violence, with President Mugabe insisting on a 
blanket amnesty whilst Tsvangirai and his MDC want them tried (Amnesty 
International, 2009; The Financial Gazette, 2012). The fact that the perpetrators are 
still roaming the streets dissuades migrants like Solomon from returning formally and 
permanently. He speaks for many migrants when he talks about entering Zimbabwe 
clandestinely due to restrictions attendant to his immigration status. Clandestine 
entries occur when migrants enter Zimbabwe informally to avoid violating their 
immigration status as demonstrated by the case of Nokhuthula (p. 215) 
 
Interestingly, Solomon differentiates political refugees from economic migrants and 
claims that the environment at home is not yet conducive for political refugees to 
return home although it is ripe for economic migrants to return (see Chapter 6). 
Solomon’s interpretation of the conditions which would induce him to return 
substantiates Krulfield and Macdonald’s (1998:125) claim that refugees ‘would return 
home if conditions changed.’  
 
On the other hand, migrants who bore the brunt of political violence during the June 
2008 run-off elections in Limpopo were adamant that they would not be returning 
unless there is substantive political change where individual rights are respected. 
Ntokwazi whom we have already come across (p. 115) represents this group of 
migrants, 
 
 ‘I am not returning until Mugabe goes, he is the author of our problems and 
 suffering. I escaped death by a whisker at the hands of Mugabe’s thugs. Even 
 though I didn’t work when I was home, now being here has enabled me to 
 work. It’s not ok for Zimbabweans to return home at the moment whether 
 you are a refugee or an economic migrant because the economic problems 
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 being experienced there can’t be separated from politics.’ (Interview in 
 Ellisras, 17 March 2010).  
 
While Solomon insists that economic migrants can return home, his views are 
inconsistent with migrants such as Ntokwazi who can be described as both an 
economic migrant and a victim of political violence. This is because migrants move in 
mixed flows (UNHCR, 2004). For Ntokwazi as for other migrants, the economic 
problems being experienced in Zimbabwe cannot be separated from President 
Mugabe’s long reign, political and economic policies which make it illogical for all 
migrants to return while he is still safely ensconced in his throne. Return for such 
migrants, is only feasible when President Mugabe is no longer in office which 
represents complete democratic change.  
 
8.7 No desire to return 
 
At the other extreme are migrants who are adamant about not ever returning to 
Zimbabwe, 16% (n=31) in Leeds and 13% (n=69) in Limpopo (Table 8.1). These 
migrants cite a number of reasons why they do not entertain thoughts about ever 
returning home. These findings echo findings from scholars like Moran-Taylor and 
Menjivar (2005) who in their study of the return intentions of Guatemalans and 
Salvadorans found some migrants did not intend to return home, a phenomenon 
which they termed ‘no desires’ to return home. Migrants who stated that they are not 
returning home cited factors like interracial marriage, destroyed livelihoods, death of 
family members in Zimbabwe, welfare of their children who are already settled in 
South Africa and the UK etc (Chavez, 1988).  
 
The Gukurahundi violence that broke out shortly after independence prompted the 
second migration episode which was discussed in Chapter 2. Some of the migrants 
who arrived in the UK in the 1980s as part of this wave stated that they would never 
return home as there is nothing worth returning for. This is demonstrated by the case 
of Mduduzi, a 43 year father of three who arrived in the UK in 1986 after fleeing the 
political violence in Gwanda, Matebeleland South Province,  
 
‘I lost my family during the Gukurahundi; they were butchered by the 5th 
Brigade. I came here as a teenager and as you can see my wife is white and 
my children are mixed race. This is my home now, maybe if my parents, 
sisters and brothers were alive, I would think about returning, but there is 
nothing to go back for except sad memories. Besides, my children will be 
misfits if I were to return home. I would also lose out professionally as I am a 
nuclear physicist and the Zimbabwean economy has nothing for people like 
me.’ (Interview, 10 June 2010, Leeds) 
 
Mduduzi’s decision not to return home is informed by four factors. Firstly, the demise 
of his family during the political hostilities means that there are no familial incentives 
to return (Tiemoko, 2004). Returning to Zimbabwe would lead to reliving the horrors 
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of his youth which he wants to leave behind. Secondly, family reasons; that he has 
married a white woman. There is scholarly consensus that marriages of people from 
different countries have a bearing on migrants’ attitudes and perceptions of returning 
to their home country (Hirsch, 1999; Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005). However, 
this should not be construed to mean that all migrants in interracial marriages have 
no desire to return. Mduduzi’s decision not to return was compounded by the loss of 
his family. Thirdly, he is concerned about opportunities for his children as well as the 
difficulties that they are likely to encounter if they were to be uprooted from the UK to 
Zimbabwe. Mduduzi’s decision not to return may have been affected by the length of 
time that he has been domiciled in the UK, which resonates with Hondagneu-
Sotelo’s (1995) claim that the longer a migrant has been in a country the less likely 
they are to return to their home country. Fourthly, his decision not to return was 
predicated on professional grounds given his profession as a nuclear physicist. This 
suggests that economic considerations were instrumental in his decision not to 
return home.  
 
Dan (p. 113), the commercial farmer in Limpopo whose farm in Zimbabwe was 
expropriated during the land reform exercise, typifies this group of migrants who do 
not want to return to Zimbabwe. For Dan as for many others, Zimbabwe is no longer 
home but just another place as there is nothing to return for. As he explains, 
 
‘My home is here, there is nothing that binds me to Zimbabwe anymore. I 
used to think that I will return one day once there is change but now those 
thoughts have receded, I can’t go back there. I am a South African now and 
from here, maybe I will go to Australia but never Zimbabwe, it’s a closed 
chapter.’ (Interview in Musina, 26 March 2010) 
 
Dan’s case is instructive in that it reveals the dissociation that some migrants have 
with home. Chapter 2 revealed the exodus of white people to South Africa and 
Australia prior to and shortly after independence due to fears over the socialist 
policies of President Mugabe. Dan’s narrative suggests that there has been a 
resurgence of white emigration engendered by the land reform programme (see 
Chapter 2).  
 
For migrants like Caroline, 27 who arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh 
migration episode and Chamu (p. 138) in Leeds, the decision not to return home is 
informed by the lack of opportunities and life prolonging anti-retroviral medicines 
given her medical condition. Here they explain their reasons for not wanting to return 
to Zimbabwe,  
 
‘I am not going back to Zimbabwe. When I came here, I was on the verge of 
death; I was a walking skeleton due to AIDS. I couldn’t get ARVs in 
Zimbabwe, you need to know someone in order to get them, but here they are 
readily available. I am fine now, if I hadn’t told you that I am HIV positive, 
would you have known? Besides, here I can work which I couldn’t do at home 
 265 
as no one wanted to employ me.’ (Interview with Caroline, Naboomspruit, 26 
April 2010) 
 
‘I left Zimbabwe on the verge of death; I was thin, very thin, and ‘literally’ 
being blown by the wind as I had lost so much weight. There were no pills for 
people like me who don’t have connections with people in high places. Now, 
look at me, do I look sick? I am not returning back there permanently because 
I am not guaranteed my supplies of ARVs. Each time I visit home, I take with 
me my 6 months worth of supplies which I get here.’ (Interview with Chamu, 
Leeds, 13 January 2010). 
 
Caroline and Chamu’s cases are emblematic of many other migrants who are living 
with HIV/AIDS. Recent reports in Zimbabwe show that only about 450,000 people 
affected by HIV/AIDS are accessing life saving ARVs medicines in a country where 
over 3 million are HIV positive (Machingura, 2010; The Herald, 2012). Reports also 
corroborate their allegations that the distribution of ARVS is cloaked in corruption, 
leading to the unnecessary deaths of the poor and the politically unconnected. For 
Caroline and Chamu, as for many of their colleagues, the fact that ARVs are readily 
available in South Africa and the UK respectively as well as the fact that they have 




The chapter has also explored the factors affecting the return intentions of migrants. 
The intentions to return are shaped, and amplified by several factors including 
citizenship and identity, desire to be reunited with family and accomplishment of 
targets which prompted the departure from home, amongst others. The chapter has 
further shown that the attitudes towards return are fluid and mirror developments in 
both the host and home country. The formation of the coalition government between 
MDC and ZANU (PF) has not, as was expected in some quarters, resulted in a 
stampede of migrants wanting to return home (Crush, 2012; Crush et al., 2012; 
Faber, 2011; IRIN, 2009; Magaisa, 2009). Instead, migrants have expressed caution 
in their return intentions and have adopted a wait and see attitude. However, the 
adoption of this wait and see attitude should not obscure the fact that many migrants 
have and continue to prepare for eventual return as evidenced by investment in 
property and remittances, as highlighted in Chapter 7.  
 
The continued conflict in the homeland has been identified as one of the biggest 
impediments to return, as are the dwindling employment opportunities. Although 
some migrants have deferred their return, there is a substantial willingness to return 
as evidenced by some short-term return by skilled professionals to ameliorate the 
critical staff shortages in sectors like health and higher education. The chapter has 
also shown how some migrants, instead of planning to return home, are instead 
thinking of remigrating to other countries such as Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada, which are perceived as better than the current host country. Other migrants 
 266 
are planning to leave the UK for South Africa instead of returning to Zimbabwe 
outright. South Africa is seen as offering better opportunities than Zimbabwe and its 
close proximity to Zimbabwe is seen as advantageous.  
 
Return intentions of the migrants are cloaked in the need to provide for their families. 
For those who suffered trauma due to their political involvement, return remains a 
mirage due to lack of substantial changes in the governance of the country. Migrants 
appear to be aware of the serious problems that they will confront on their return, 



























The aim of this research has been to examine and investigate the formation of the 
nascent Zimbabwean diasporic communities in Limpopo, South Africa, and Leeds, 
UK. This stemmed from a realisation that these two countries attracted different 
types of migrants who possessed different economic, political, human and social 
capital. Research findings were presented and discussed in-depth in each chapter 
subsequent to Chapter 5. This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising and 
highlighting the salient findings on migration and transnational practices of the 
Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo.  
 
The chapter further discusses the academic contribution of this thesis and presents 
pertinent issues that need to be addressed in order to safeguard the welfare of 
Zimbabwean migrants domiciled in South Africa and the UK. Moreover, the chapter 
identifies and reiterates areas for further research as well as identifying areas which 
have implications for the study’s broader academic and methodology. Section 9.2 
outlines the research’s fundamental findings in line with the research objectives that 
guided the study. In section 9.3, I discuss the original academic contribution of the 
research project while section 9.4 examines the study’s methodological contribution. 
Section 9.5 focuses on the limitations of the study while the final section, 9.6, 
focuses on identifying areas for future research and critical inquiry.     
   
9.2 Summary of findings  
 
A critical question in this study sought to ascertain the human and social capital 
differentials between migrants in the Leeds and Limpopo. The study further explored 
how these different capital levels have helped channel migrants to specific 
destinations. The thesis thus, unveiled the complexities embedded in the 
transnational linkages between Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, the UK and 
those at home. This was achieved by exploring emigration from Zimbabwe in order 
to better our understanding of mixed migration flows. Previous studies have focused 
on the migration of either skilled (Bloch, 2006; Tinarwo, 2011) or unskilled migrants 
(McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2010; Muzondidya, 2008) from Zimbabwe to South Africa 
and the UK. Given the complexity of the Zimbabwean migration witnessed since the 
dawn of the new millennium, it made academic sense to undertake a study which 
examined these mixed migration flows.  
 
Objective 1 was addressed by undertaking a questionnaire survey and in-depth 
interviews which enabled the thesis to build detailed profiles of the study participants. 
The survey captured migrants’ biographic data, educational attainment; reasons for 
migration etc (see Chapter 5). In accord with prior research, the profiling of migrants 
demonstrated the multiplicity and complexity of the reasons for emigration (Gordon 
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and Jones, 1989; Bloch, 2008). Profiling enabled the breakdown of the migrants into 
smaller components, which allowed a profile to be built of the different components 
that constitute the Zimbabwean diaspora in the two locations. The demographic 
profile of the study ranged from 18 to 58 years. The majority of the migrants in South 
Africa are under 30 years which is consistent with findings of similar studies (Bloch, 
2006, Crush et al., 2012; Makina, 2007). Those in the UK are much older, which 
demonstrates the different migration flows between the two countries.  
 
The differences in migrants’ age profiles in the two countries demonstrate the 
different migration flows that characterised emigration from Zimbabwe. Most 
migrants in Leeds held professional jobs prior to relocating in the late 1990s to early 
2000s while those in South Africa appear to have less educational capital (see 
Chapter 5). Most migrants in South Africa are ‘born frees’, that is, they were born 
after independence in 1980. The older migrants benefitted tremendously from the 
investments in education that followed independence. This investment was not 
sustained; the quality and standard of education declined as lecturers and teachers 
joined the exodus to escape economic hardships. The deteriorating infrastructure 
meant that most migrants in South Africa had not had access to the same quality of 
social services, such as education, which their older counterparts in Leeds had 
enjoyed.   
  
Traditional migration theories stress the importance of economic motives in 
propelling emigration, mostly from low wage developing countries to high wage 
developed countries (Todaro, 1969). However, modern migration is more complex, 
to the extent that it renders these traditional perspectives of migration obsolete. 
Migration cannot be ascribed to a single reason but is the result of a series of 
factors. One of the concepts that scholars have turned to in order to capture and 
explain the complexity of migration is transnationalism (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; 
Hannerz, 1996; Castells, 1996). This research sought to investigate the emigration 
from Zimbabwe from a transnational perspective. The transnational approach to 
migration is relevant to this study because it encompasses the notion of social 
capital which recognises the important role that prior migrants play in fuelling and 
sustaining migration flows between the sending and destination country. This 
theoretical framework was explained in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
 
The migration episodes that were identified in the study showed the different 
contexts in which migrants exited Zimbabwe for South Africa and the UK which was 
critical in unveiling migrants' experiences. This is because the year of departure from 
Zimbabwe and arrival in South Africa and the UK shed more light on the migration 
type and choice of destination. For example, the UK was a prime destination for 
health and social care workers beginning in the late 1990s to early 2000s while 
South Africa attracted a significant percentage of the Zimbabwean population in the 
late 2000s as migrants’ options became constricted due to restrictive immigration 
policies of most western governments. The study showed how the decision on which 
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country to migrate to was influenced by migration networks and economic or 
professional concerns.  
 
While one or more migration theories may work for particular migrants, they fail to 
apply to all cases. Some commentators such as Pessar (1997) have argued that 
conditions that cause migration for a particular group may change with time, making 
migration theory that used to apply irrelevant at a later stage. In this ‘age of 
migration’ (Castles and Miller, 2009) and a globalising world, mainstream migration 
theories need to be revisited if they are to remain relevant. It is noted that migration 
theories remain good points of departure but cannot explain the complexities of 
modern international migration. This complexity was explicated by migrants’ 
interview insights (Chapter 5).  
 
In accord with recent scholarship which highlights the increasing number of women 
migrating independently, this study observed similar trends. In Leeds, the demand of 
health and social care staff may explain the dominance of women in the sample. 
Nursing has historically been feminised owing to the gendered division of labour. 
This echoes findings of similar studies in the UK which found that women constituted 
the majority of overseas nurses in the NHS (Alexis et al., 2007). Men in Leeds play 
the archetypical ‘trailing spouses’ role as they followed their spouses who pioneered 
migration to work as health and social care professionals in the NHS and local 
authorities. On the other hand, the findings in South Africa confirm the historical and 
traditional trends where migration is dominated by males (Crush et al., 2012; 
Mlambo, 2010). There is evidence, however, that this is changing; women accounted 
for 44% of the survey (Figure 5.1, p. 96). The study echoes findings of prior studies 
which noted that migration from Zimbabwe increasingly consisted of whole families 
rather than just male earners (Muzondidya, 2008). There is, therefore, a correlation 
between the emancipation of women from the hardships experienced at home and 
elimination of traditional practices. This study, therefore, identified a causal link 
between socio-economic hardships and increased participation of women in 
migration. 
 
Consistent with other studies, this research finds evidence of Zimbabwean migrants 
possessing comparatively higher levels of educational capital than other groups of 
migrants (Magunha et al., 2009; Bloch, 2006, 2008; Makina, 2007; McGregor, 2008). 
In Leeds, a significant number of the survey has taken advantage of the 
opportunities attendant to their documented status to further their education during 
their time in exile. This is one of the original contributions of this study as no other 
study has tracked the educational endeavours of Zimbabwean migrants in the 
diaspora. The possession of higher educational capital has not translated into 
professional progression as many migrants find themselves underemployed, which 
heightens fears of de-skilling (Chapter 6). Some studies have highlighted the 
corrosive effect of de-skilling in migrant communities (Phillimore and Goodson, 
2006). The depth of de-skilling is exposed by the fact that both the survey and 
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interviews in Leeds and Limpopo engaging in mundane occupations. Similarly, there 
has been a significant reduction in the number of migrants holding managerial jobs in 
both Leeds and Limpopo which is in accord with previous studies that demonstrates 
that there is a continuing decline in migrants’ occupational trends (McGregor, 2008; 
Pasura, 2008; Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). 
 
In accordance with other studies, this study found out that care and industrial work 
offers migrants an entry into the paid labour market in Leeds (Bloch, 2006; 
McGregor, 2008) while in Limpopo most migrants enter the job market through the 
informal economy in the Musina area before progressing to the farms and later to the 
metropolitan cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town (Crush et al., 2012; 
Muzondidya, 2008; Rutherford, 2011). Professionals such as nurses and social 
workers and engineers were headhunted from Zimbabwe by nursing agencies and 
local authorities (UK) and engineering firms (South Africa).  In accord with Bloch 
(2006), this study found that migrants in the UK are seeking to incrementally extend 
their stay by studying for courses such as nursing and social work which, until 
recently, guaranteed an assured route into employment. Thus, nursing and social 
work are the most popular degree courses with migrants.    
 
Objective 2 sought to examine the role of social networks in producing and 
maintaining diaspora links and the complex connections with those left behind. This 
objective was addressed by the discussions in the analysis chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 
7 and 8). Chapter 5 revealed the salience of social networks through the cases of 
migrants who chose to travel either to South Africa or the UK at the behest of their 
family, friends and relatives. Ties built at school, college or university played a 
significant role in channelling some migrants to particular destinations. Prior migrants 
provided a range of information including job opportunities, college applications, 
invitation letters, accommodation etc. Social networks transcend boundaries; so 
does the help and support that were provided by pioneer migrants. Such an 
acknowledgement recognises the complexity of migration, and that no one theory of 
migration can adequately explain why people migrate.   
 
Social capital is a manifestation of transnationalism. The existence of social 
networks within the Zimbabwean diaspora helps to dispel claims propagated by 
traditional migration scholarship which projected migration as a linear but inter-
connected process (Pasura, 2010). I have demonstrated throughout this study how, 
far from being a linear process, migration encompasses a series of multi-step 
journeys which migrants undertake as they build their social capital until they reach 
their desired destinations. Social capital was critical to migrants’ ability to travel from 
Zimbabwe to either South Africa or the UK and was utilised to access a range of 
services such as employment and negotiating the immigration structures, especially 
in the UK. Newly arrived migrants settled in areas that already had high 
concentrations of Zimbabwean migrants e.g. Harehills in Leeds and Louis Trichardt 
in Limpopo.  
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The transnational linkages that migrants have with the people at home and 
elsewhere serves to highlight the interconnectedness of lives and how these 
linkages transcend boundaries. The notions of diaspora, transnationalism and social 
capital have emerged as credible approaches that can be deployed to explain the 
international migration phenomenon. These highlight the interconnectedness of the 
migrants’ lives with those that remain at home, and how these connections are used 
to perpetuate further migration and cushion those at home from shocks through 
transnational transactions such as remittances (Goldring, 1999; Itzigsohn et al., 
1999; Portes, 1996). Migrants use their transnational practices and networks 
produced and reproduced in the diaspora to initiate, reproduce, and maintain contact 
with those left at home and in other countries. Migrants in the UK for example, used 
their networks in neighbouring countries such as Botswana and South Africa to buy 
foodstuffs, educational materials and medicines for their family and relatives in 
Zimbabwe during the height of the crisis in 2007-2008. The research endeavoured to 
map out the experiences of the migrants in transnational and social capital 
discourses to establish their utility. 
 
Furthermore, migrants’ transnational transactions have changed in tandem with the 
evolving socio-economic needs of those at home as well as the attendant political 
regulatory frameworks that governments have been imposing following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in USA. These financial regulations resulted in the outlawing of 
unregistered MTOs which were popular with UK based migrants as they offered 
higher returns than registered MTOs. While the 9/11 attacks jeopardised the 
operations of unregistered MTOs, the dollarization policies pursued by the coalition 
government delivered the fatal blow to the few operational informal MTOs in the UK 
and Zimbabwe. Post dollarization, migrants reported using formal channels for 
monetary remittances although this was more pronounced in the UK than in South 
Africa. The circulatory nature of most South African based migrants impeded formal 
remittance channels, as did the existence of strong social networks. The high 
transaction costs also diminished the number of migrants in South Africa wanting to 
use formal remitting channels. Infrastructural constraints were also found by this 
study to encumber the use of formal channels in South Africa.  
 
Transnational practices of migrants are not just confined to economics but extend to 
political transnationalism. Diasporic political activism was shown to be rooted in the 
‘politics of papers’ whereby migrants participate in diasporic immigrant politics in 
order to bolster their pending asylum claims (McGregor, 2009; McGregor and 
Pasura, 2010). Notwithstanding the opportunism that is linked to politics for papers, 
there was evidence of some committed political activists whose participation was 
premised on realising political change in Zimbabwe. For this group of migrants, they 
have lobbied the host governments to maintain pressure on President Mugabe and 
his ZANU (PF) party in order to democratise the political space in Zimbabwe. In this 
context of transnationalism from above, therefore, migrants have acted as 
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‘representatives’ (ambassadors) of the MDC in both South Africa and the UK in its 
fight to unseat President Mugabe from power.  
 
Others’ activism was predicated on having a profile high enough to secure them 
positions in a new government (McGregor, 2009). Participation in diasporic politics 
appears to be hampered by fragmentation of the Zimbabwean community which 
permeates political and civic organisations of the Zimbabwean diaspora in both 
South Africa and the UK. The extent of participation was shown to be dependent on 
a number of variables including gender, class and type of migration. Unlike other 
studies which have drawn links to participation by the middle and upper classes, 
results of this study do not lend themselves to this as migrants from these groups 
appear to shun diasporic politics probably due to the incessant squabbling within the 
MDC diasporic structures. The omnipresent fear of President Mugabe permeated to 
migrants in the diaspora, some of whom were reluctant to go public in their fight for 
change because of fear about their own security as well as that of their family 
members at home.  
 
The fourth objective considered the return intentions of Zimbabwean migrants in 
Leeds and Limpopo. The study established that while migration could have been 
used for a number of factors such as social mobility, escaping political persecution 
etc, most migrants harbour thoughts of returning home. Exile, for an overwhelming 
majority of the survey and interview participants, was nothing but a temporary phase 
of the migration process. As revealed in the interviews, there was an expectation 
among migrants that life in the diaspora was a necessary phase that they had to 
endure in order to accumulate sufficient resources needed to kick-start social 
mobility before returning.  
I have stressed the complexity of this migration which detaches it from previous 
emigrations from Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding this complexity, many migrants 
intended to stay for short durations prior to making triumphant returns to Zimbabwe. 
As noted in Chapter 2, circulation has been a way of life for people living in the 
border areas of Zimbabwe and South Africa while movement to South Africa and the 
UK to gain higher education has been perennial. What differentiated this migration 
phase from previous was its diversity, as women and children also became ‘birds of 
passage’ (Morokvasic, 1984). Thus, migration ceased to be associated with males, 
and saw the emancipation of women migrating on their own thereby mirroring trends 
elsewhere (Bonney and Love, 1991; Hochschild, 2002). Likewise, there was a 
noticeable movement of whole families rather than earners alone.  
 
Another distinctive feature of the ‘new’ emigration from Zimbabwe was migrants’ 
settlement patterns. As noted in the preceding chapters, migration has always been 
circulatory, with migrants returning home after completing their education or 
accumulating enough resources to assuage the shocks that were being experienced 
at home. However, migrants’ settlement patterns have been undergoing a 
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metamorphosis, with permanency becoming an option for a significant number of 
migrants in both countries, particularly in the UK.  
 
Permanency was shown to be a consequence of migrants endeavouring to 
incrementally extend their stay in the host country. Permanency is driven by the 
worsening conditions at home, the desire to bequeath ‘better’ citizenship to their 
children, which is considered to be superior to Zimbabwean citizenship. The survey 
and interviews revealed that migrants’ decided to return home because of their 
children and other familial connections (Tiemoko, 2004). Migrants who were 
separated from their families intended to return in order to be with their families. 
However, separation was not in all migrant groups a reason for return; some 
migrants delayed their plans because they needed to meet their families’ 
transnational obligations. Thus, while separation engendered strong feelings about 
return, these plans are tempered by individual circumstances.  
  
Return intentions for some migrants have been affected by events in the destination 
country. The failure to secure employment, for example, which matches a migrant’s 
educational and professional profile sometimes made migrants want to return, 
though this effect was not universal. Thus, members of the different diasporic 
groups, identified in Chapter 6, were capable of exhibiting simultaneous feelings, that 
is: enthusiastic, reluctant, and ambivalent or no desires. For other migrants, the 
decision to return home was informed by events in Zimbabwe rather than in the host 
country. The improving socio-economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe acted 
as a draw for migrants who considered their lives to have stagnated in the diaspora. 
Other migrants were planning to return because they had always planned to return 
home after reaching their targets. It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 how target 
saving caused emigration. Likewise, the attainment of these targets for some 
migrants’ connoted return while for others created new targets and prolonged their 
stay.  
 
As reiterated in Chapter 8, and frequently highlighted, return was a key theme of this 
study. Return assumes different meanings to migrants in South Africa and the UK. 
For the South Africa based migrants, return did not seem to be a prominent thought 
because South Africa was a place of work; migrants felt they had never been away 
from home. On the other hand, for UK domiciled migrants, return did not entail the 
end of the migration process as they were more likely to move to South Africa which 
was considered to be better than the UK because of its close proximity to Zimbabwe. 
South Africa, for these migrants, eased the return process as it allowed migrants to 
‘acclimatise’ to life in Africa without necessarily being ‘immersed’ in the harsh 
Zimbabwean environment.  
 
Chapter 6 identified six diasporic groups whose affinity to life in the diaspora varied 
from one group to the next. The enthusiastic diaspora was shown to be grateful to 
the life changing experiences of being in the diaspora. Returning home for some 
 274 
members of the enthusiastic diaspora was seen as a regressive step as it would 
undo the gains realised in the diaspora. This was exemplified by some female 
migrants for whom the diaspora had had an emancipatory effect. Conversely, men 
who had seen their masculine hegemony diminished by being in the diaspora could 
not wait to return. The study also revealed that despite staying in the diaspora 
reluctantly some male migrants were not in a hurry to return home due to the 
uncertainties that such a bold move would entail. In addition, an overwhelming 
number of the surveyed and interviewees showed an inclination to return, but some 
migrants did not harbour any such desires. However, not all legal migrants wanted to 
return home, as argued in Chapter 8; some migrants adopted a ‘wait and see’ 
attitude because of uncertainties in the homeland (Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 
2005). 
 
Return for documented migrants has been shown to be associated with enjoying the 
best of both worlds, that is, entrenching transnational living as migrants ‘float’ and 
‘circulate’ between Zimbabwe and the host country. Unlike their undocumented 
counterparts who could not travel outside the UK, legal migrants were not 
constrained from travelling between Harare and London, thereby negating the need 
for permanent return. The frequent return visits were used to ease the transition of 
eventual return, a phenomenon which has been observed in other prior studies 
(Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; Duval, 2004).  
 
9.3 Academic Contribution 
 
The original contribution of this thesis is its place specificity. By focusing on specific 
areas, the research was able to delve deeper into migration practices of migrants 
who left Zimbabwean at different times for different reasons in different migration 
episodes. By privileging migrants’ voice and experience, the thesis enriched our 
understanding of the notions of transnationalism and transnational social fields from 
a specific context. This enabled a richer picture of emigration from Zimbabwe to be 
painted as well as the characteristics of migrants to be unveiled. Some of the 
distinctiveness of the migration streams that were identified by focusing on two 
specific areas included the effect of factors such as gender, class and education in 
shaping the exodus from Zimbabwe. It also enabled the study to find out the place-
specific factors which shape migrants’ return intentions and understanding of life in 
the diaspora as experienced by both skilled and unskilled migrants. Previous studies 
focused either on skilled or unskilled migrants which produced a literature specific to 
those migrant groups. Such literature does not capture the complexity and broad 
characteristic of the ‘age of migration’ (Castles, 2000, 2007) in which mixed flows 
predominate (UNHCR, 2007).  
 
The second contribution of this study is its comparativeness which has seen it tease 
out differences that characterised migration flows to South Africa and the UK. By 
comparing the eight migration episodes that were identified, the study was able to 
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delineate the factors underlying emigration from Zimbabwe and the experiences of 
migrants who left under the same factors in the destination country. For example, it 
was able to compare the migration outcomes of migrants who left during the fourth 
migration waves in South Africa and the UK. The comparative nature of the study 
provided for similarities and differences to be drawn out and the factors which 
underpinned these. By comparing the political activism of migrants in Leeds and 
Limpopo for example, it was possible to decipher the factors which drive and/or 
hinder political activism in both areas.  
 
Thirdly, the study contributes to literature on labour mobility through its comparative 
focus which helped to bring out the differences between migration flows to South 
Africa and the UK (Vaugeois and Rollins 2007). Prior research has focused on the 
migration of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa through the historical prism of 
WENELA schemes and cross border traders while that to the UK was mainly for 
higher education. This study does not support the archetypal characterisation of 
migration to South Africa being dominated by migrants with poor educational capital 
with that to the UK comprising sorely of highly educated migrants. Instead, it 
suggests that migration to both countries consists of both skilled and unskilled 
migrants who are moving in mixed flows. The comparative approach enables the 
research to use an empirically vigorous examination of transnationalism, using social 
capital and diaspora as frameworks for explaining the migration of Zimbabweans to 
South Africa and the UK. The study has demonstrated the centrality of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora to the lives of those in Zimbabwe. It has moved debate away 
from a fixation on movement from the South to the North by exploring movement 
from Zimbabwe to countries in both the South and the North. 
 
Closely tied to the above contribution, empirically, the study has added to the already 
burgeoning literature on the Zimbabwean diaspora and its relationship with home - 
Zimbabwe. This was achieved by firstly, zeroing on the importance of migrants living 
away from home in the country’s economic and political fortunes. In contrast to 
existing studies which tend to consider migrants’ transnational practices from a 
North-South axis, this study examined transnationalism and migrants’ transnational 
identity in context of flows within both the North and South. The inclusion of migrants’ 
voices in South Africa and the UK helped the study to achieve this. What emerge 
from this study are the various meanings attached to ‘home’, ‘transnational linkages’, 
‘diaspora’ and ‘return migration’. Some migrants in both countries do not consider 
themselves to be away from home; instead they consider South Africa and the UK 
home given advances in transport and communication. Furthermore, ‘home’ for 
some migrants was not seen as being ‘fixed’ in Zimbabwe per se, but rather as the 
current ‘place of abode.’ The study findings question some aspects of 
transnationalism e.g. circulation as some immobile migrants especially in the UK still 
considers their transnational linkages as transnationalism. The thesis therefore, 
contributes to our theoretical understanding of transnationalism by stretching its 
constituents to include the transnational activities of immobile migrants such as 
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asylum seekers in the UK who are proscribed from travelling home by virtue of their 
immigration status. Furthermore, extant transnationalism literature highlights the 
benefits which migrants and their home countries derive by living and working away 
from home while neglecting the contributions that they make to the economy of the 
host country. This study suggests that both South Africa and the UK appear to have 
benefited immensely from Zimbabwe’s skills flight (Tinarwo, 2011; Chikanda, 2010). 
By so doing, the study deviates from prior studies which have dwelled mostly on 
migrants’ origins.   
 
The links that the migrants forge have been shown to extend to several countries 
within the southern African region, which shows that the benefits of migration have 
been felt not only in Zimbabwe but also in other countries. The study has shifted 
debate from the economic benefits of migration to other ‘subtle’ benefits which have 
been crucial in the repair of the country. These benefits are social, political and 
cultural, and are evidenced by the accumulation by migrants of human, social and 
cultural capital as a result of working in developed economies and world class 
facilities. The benefits engendered by migrants by being in the diaspora do not 
appear to have been occasioned by their immigration status. Migrants have been 
adept at using their agency to circumvent the hurdles wrought by their immigration 
status. The study highlighted that these acts encompass both legal and illegal acts 
e.g. the use of fraudulent documents and the sprouting of informal remitting channels 
which are popular with migrants because of their low fees in comparison to legal 
channels such as banks and registered MTOs.  
 
The thesis argued that migrants’ transnational linkages are important arenas through 
which migrants depict and exhibit their ‘Zimbabweanness’ by re-enacting life through 
the prism of home. This is performed through buying and eating Zimbabwean food, 
attending and hosting Zimbabwean parties and other Zimbabwean themed events 
such as the National Independence Day and musical festivals. It is also at these 
events that stories are shared about being Zimbabwean in London or South Africa; 
how to access paid work without the requisite documentation etc. Whereas, Pasura 
(2008:276) asserted that ‘pubs and gochi-gochi are community spaces where 
sentimental bonds are etched, recycled’, this thesis demonstrated that these are 
shared and performed at both the private and public levels.  
 
Fourthly, the theorised taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora in UK and South 
Africa which was presented in Chapter 6 contributes to academic debate about the 
formation and experiences of modern day diasporas which comprise of both 
voluntary and involuntary departures. The taxonomy is unique because it is derived 
from migrants’ utterances which were captured in their narratives. Some scholars 
have argued against taxonomies by claiming that they categorise people (cf. Portes, 
2003; Vertovec, 1999). The taxonomy advanced in this thesis is derived from 
migrants’ perceptions and reflections of their situation in the diaspora rather than the 
author fitting their narratives into already defined categories. In addition, far from 
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being rigid and static, the typology realises and captures the fluidity that pervades 
the lives of modern day migrants which are shaped, amplified and refracted by being 
‘in the diaspora.’ Echoing Binaisa’s (2008:206) study of Ugandans in Britain, this 
study has demonstrated the futility of drawing boundaries ‘heuristically for the 
purposes of managing our research data between migrant, non-migrant, citizen, 
refugee, indigenous, non-indigenous’ because these categories are not etched in 
stone but should be reflective of migrants’ lived experiences. For some of these 
migrants in the diaspora, has had a transformative effect, e.g. for migrants who were 
shorn of opportunities at home, while those migrants with superfluous skills, the 
diaspora has had a devastating deskilling effect. The taxonomy presented in this 
study is fluid to reflect the complexity and mutability of the migration phenomenon.  
 
The six categories presented in this study capture the lived realities of migrants in 
both countries where deportation, racism and xenophobia are everyday practices 
that migrants have to contend with. In both South Africa and the UK, deportation is 
seen as a way of managing immigration (Bloch and Schuster, 2005: 491). While 
South Africa under the leadership of President Zuma tried to deal with the ‘problem 
of Zimbabwean migrants’ humanely by relaxing its asylum policies which was 
followed by the grant of documented status to all Zimbabweans who presented at the 
Department of Home Affairs with valid passports, the same cannot be said of the UK 
government. The UK government has been vociferous in criticising the government 
of President Mugabe of human rights violations but has not matched this rhetoric in 
its treatment of Zimbabwean asylum seekers who have been continued to be used 
as pawns by both the Conservative and Labour parties in their battle for supremacy 
in domestic politics. The findings of this research therefore, build on the work of 
scholars such as Pasura (2008) to conceptually theorise the Zimbabwean diaspora. 
Some migrants in both South Africa and the UK left home both voluntarily and 
involuntarily. Furthermore, other migrants have since settled permanently in the UK 
and South Africa. Unlike other previous studies, this study noted that permanency 
was a growing phenomenon within Zimbabweans migrants as opposed to circulation. 
Having said this, it should be noted that permanency has not supplanted occasional 
home visits as this is one of the characteristic feature of the Zimbabwean diaspora in 
both countries.      
 
The taxonomy advanced also demonstrated the importance of instrumentalism in the 
Zimbabwean migrants who have turned to political activism in order to satisfy their 
immigration status in the host country. Nowhere is this more explicit than in the UK 
where the grant of asylum is predicated on participation in oppositional politics of the 
Movement of Democratic Change. The findings of this study show that political 
activism for a significant number of migrants in the UK are shored up by the desire to 
acquire documented status as opposed to the attainment of democratic change at 
home. This is exemplified by Dudu (p. 165) who would rather have the status quo 
prevail for a while until she gets documented status. This is important because 
transnationalism has historically been framed as migrants participating in homeland 
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politics due to their desire to effect positive political change rather than for self 
interest in the host country (Faist, 2000; Vertovec, 1999). Migrants’ political activism 
has prompted some scholars to characterise them as social actors who are socially 
aware of the circumstances in both the host and home country (Pasura, 2008). Such 
scholars further claim that participation in transnational diaspora politics is the 
preserve of ‘visible and epistemic’ members (Pasura, 2008) which is refuted by the 
findings of this study. The thesis has demonstrated that participation in diasporic 
politics is an open field which migrants ‘float in and out’ dictated by their socio-
economic and political imperatives.  
 
A notable contribution of this study to Zimbabwean migration literature pertains to the 
identification of the eight migration episodes between 1975 and 2010. These 
episodes were driven by a complex set of factors including the prosecution of the 
liberation war in the 1970s, the political violence of the early 1980s, the after effects 
of ESAP, the seizure of white owned commercial farms and political repression 
which all contributed to an economic meltdown that resulted in multiple migration 
flows to South Africa and the UK. These migration episodes comprised of migrants 
with different characteristics in terms of their age, education, financial and social 
capital endowments as well as the class structures that they hailed from which 
influenced their destination choices. Thus, the study finds the salience of social 
networks in the migration process as the information and support provided by prior 
migrants was invaluable in propelling and sustaining migration flows into both South 
Africa and the UK. Once a decision was made about exiting Zimbabwe, migrants left 
either formally or informally. The informality of migration was more prevalent 
amongst those migrants who moved to South Africa than to the UK due to close 
proximity, affordability and loose border patrols. Movement to the UK was curtailed 
by the exorbitant airfares which resulted in the predominance of migrants from 
middle to upper classes who could individually and collectively afford the airfares. 
The episodes identified had a bearing on migration outcomes e.g. the temporality or 
permanency of migration 
 
The study has furthered our understanding of the sacrifices that migrants make in 
order to gain a foothold in the labour markets of the host country. Some prior studies 
have focussed on the difficulties that ethnic minorities face in their endeavours to 
access labour markets (Iredale et al., 2003). This was confirmed in this study 
(Chapter 6) where it was demonstrated how migrants took jobs that were 
incommensurate with their professional and academic qualifications in order to gain 
a foothold in the employment ladder. These jobs typically involved care work and 
industrial work which were shown to have been the default entry route for migrants 
arriving in the UK while the agricultural sector in Limpopo is anchored by foreign 
nationals including Zimbabweans (Rutherford and Addison, 2007; Rutherford, 2011).  
 
The study suggests that migrants appear to countenance ‘short term’ suffering in 
order to accumulate relevant experience and capital for use in the future. As Grillo 
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(2007:128) notes, ‘migrants find themselves occupying a liminal space, betwixt and 
between’ where according to Binaisa (2008:215) ‘they respond to the daily pressures 
of life as a migrant’ by partaking in jobs that are beneath their academic and 
professional qualifications thereby shattering any hopes of social mobility that they 
may have harboured at the inception of their migration journey. Working in low 
paying jobs in agricultural, care and manufacturing sectors can be argued to be ‘rites 
of passage’ which most migrants lacking the requisite skills needed in South Africa 
and the UK had to do prior to finding employment with better remuneration. The 
study, thus, contributes to literature on the problems that confront migrants in both 
regulated and unregulated work sectors in the two countries (Muzondidya, 2008; 
Pasura, 2008) which are dominated by underemployment, deskilling, exploitation 
and downward social mobility. In so doing the study adds to literature on nascent 
diasporas which have until now been under the shadow of established ones. It shifts 
focus from a preoccupation with the difficulties that dominant Diasporas such as the 
Pakistani (Anwar, 1979) to less established ones in the mould of the nascent 
Zimbabwean diaspora. The study therefore, contributes to the studies about 
inclusion and exclusion of ethnic minority members in the labour markets in both 
South Africa and the UK. In accord with other prior studies, the study observed the 
difficulties that migrants face in the host countries regardless of documentation, 
which could form the basis for further research. However, for some migrants, career 
progression remained elusive, leaving them stuck in low paying jobs which they 
initially thought were temporary inconveniences.  
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties that migrants face in adapting and accessing the 
labour market, this study revealed opportunities of the diaspora which some migrants 
have exploited for upward social mobility. The UK has been shown to have more 
opportunities than South Africa once a migrant obtains documented status. The 
thesis showed how some migrants have utilised their time in exile to enhance their 
educational capital. This was more pronounced in the UK than in South Africa 
because of easier access to higher education institutions as well as the different 
flows of migrants. It would be recalled that the UK attracted a different breed of 
migrants who had superior educational qualifications than those who moved to South 
Africa. In this context therefore, the thesis makes a significant contribution to 
contemporary literature and debates ‘brain gain’ as opposed to ‘brain drain’ which 
scholars such as Ghosh (2006) and Chikanda (2011) have shed light on. The study 
does not suggest that all skilled migrants would return given the competing demands 
such as family and career prospects which question the applicability of some 
migration notions of return migration and brain circulation (Chikanda, 2011). The 
thesis does not support assertions by commentators such as Marcelli and Lowell 
(2005) who claim that that migrants’ transnational practices such as remittances are 
denuded by the amount of time that they would have spent in the host country. On 
the contrary, the thesis noted that migrants still maintain links with their families at 
home and elsewhere regardless of the time that they would have spent away from 
home. In this regard, the study contributes to literature by demonstrating that 
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migrants’ transnational transactions do not appear to be circumscribed by the length 
of time that they would have spent away from home (Marcelli and Lowell, 2005).  
 
The sixth contribution of this study pertains to return migration of millions of 
Zimbabweans living outside their country. In accord with other studies, the study 
found that migrants hoped to return home after brief sojourns in South Africa and the 
UK (Chikanda, 2010; Pasura, 2008). Mirroring other studies, migrants had 
misconceptions about the UK and South Africa with a significant number of study 
participants stating that they thought they would work hard for six months before 
returning home triumphantly (Duval, 2004). These misconceptions have not been 
realised as the ‘gold that they wished the streets of London and Johannesburg were 
paved with has not materialised’ which has impacted on their return intentions. 
Consequently some migrants have found themselves getting married and raising 
children in the diaspora while others have had to start new relationships and families 
with new spouses after failing to be reunited with the families trapped at home due to 
immigration constraints. This comes at a time when Zimbabwe is reeling from 
serious human capital shortages following years of haemorrhaging skilled 
professionals. The study argues that return migration should be interrogated through 
a multi-disciplinary perspective rather than narrow models which privilege economic 
motivations at the expense of social and structural factors. This has policy 
implications for the government of Zimbabwe which is currently enmeshed in 
constitutional debate about how to handle the Zimbabwean diaspora issue.   
 
9.4 Methodological contribution 
 
Methodologically, the study contributes to scholarly literature on researching ‘double’ 
hidden groups who fear reprisals from both the host and home countries. Some 
Zimbabwean migrants expressed fear not only of their own security but also of those 
left behind should their identities be divulged and come to the attention of President 
Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) supporters because of their political activism at home 
and abroad. Similarly, others were reluctant to come forward because of their 
tenuous immigration status which could lead to deportation which has disastrous 
consequences for them and their families.  
 
Researching documented migrants was equally beset with problems given the 
complexity of the Zimbabwean migration, pervaded by the politics of President 
Mugabe. The fear of President Mugabe’s intelligence operatives transcended 
boundaries and was feared by both sets of migrants alike. Accessing the right type of 
migrants was integral to the success of this research as it sought to be inclusive, 
capturing the views of the different constituents of the Zimbabwean diaspora. The 
study employed new and innovative research methods including the use of online 
questionnaires, which were a success in the UK where migrants had busy working 
schedules which precluded face to face meetings. The use of online methods 
simplified the process of gaining people’s insights on their lives in the diaspora. It 
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can be suggested that using the internet and online methods for data collection is 
ideally matched to the study of ‘transient’ communities, some of whom have an 
aversion for officialdom, given their tenuous immigration status.  
 
Secondly, the study’s methodological contribution lies in its use of mixed methods to 
examine the reasons underlying the migrants’ decisions to leave Zimbabwe; their 
transnational transactions and return intentions. The dual use of questionnaire 
survey and qualitative methods e.g. interviews and ethnography was shown to be a 
suitable approach to researching hard to reach groups unlike contrary to traditional 
migration approaches which place too much emphasis on quantitative methods. The 
use of a hybrid approach gave deeper insights to migrants’ experiences and resulted 
in the collection of data which would otherwise not have been possible had the 
research only used quantitative methods. The different methodologies 
complemented each other to the benefit of the research given that it concerned 
some hard to reach groups thereby contributing to academic debates about 
undertaking fieldwork with both ‘hard to reach’ groups and documented migrants.  
 
Thirdly, the methodology was both participatory and ethnographic as it entailed both 
living and staying with research participants as well as key protagonists in stemming 
illegal immigration. The time I spent with members of the SANDF on border patrol 
duties was revealing and enriched this study as I was able to observe and participate 
in their day to day operations. It also afforded me the opportunity to talk with 
migrants who would have been intercepted trying to ‘jump the border’ to understand 
their motivations, fears and anxieties and future plans. The multi-sited nature of the 
study meant that I was able to reach out to a diverse range of study participants in 
both Leeds and Limpopo. In Limpopo, I was able to reach out to participants in 
farming areas, in small towns such as Thohoyandou and bigger ones such as 
Polokwane, in villages and in shelters which enriched the study as it captured the 
multiple interpretations and meanings attached to what constitute being in the 
diaspora and return.   
 
9.5 Policy Implications 
 
It is proposed that the policy relevance of this research is rooted in its engagement 
with the world today – the nexus between migration and development through 
migrants’ transnational transactions like remittances. In a world of contracting FDI, 
the role that migrants are playing as sources of forex cannot be underestimated. 
Regardless of the critical role that the diaspora played in averting the total economic 
implosion of the Zimbabwean economy, the government of Zimbabwe does not 
seem to have a coherent diaspora policy.  
 
The study suggests that for Zimbabwe to derive higher returns from her exiled 
people there is need to build safe remitting channels which have migrants’ trust and 
buy-in. The informal systems that are currently being used by some sections of the 
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migrant population in both South Africa and the UK have resulted in the leakage of 
foreign currency and losses by migrants. The engagement of financial institutions 
could therefore, focus on shrinking the transactions costs which are acting as a 
barrier to the majority of migrants who are on low wages. Extant literature points to 
the extensive use of informal remitting channels in Asia and Africa (Sander and 
Maimbo, 2006).    
 
The host conditions in which migrants live in South Africa and the UK have been 
highlighted, so too the exploitation that they endure because of their immigration 
status and transnational remitting obligations. It has been suggested that there is 
need for greater intervention by the governments of destination countries to stem this 
exploitative practices. The research noted the involvement of non-state actors in the 
provision of welfare services in both South Africa and the UK. This research can be 
the foundation upon which the capacities of these institutions, especially those in 
South Africa, can be strengthened to further meet the needs of all migrants rather 
than Zimbabwean ones only.  
 
While the government of Zimbabwe profess to recognise the important role that its 
citizens in the diaspora play in the national socio-economic development, it has not 
fleshed up its diaspora policy. Not much is known about how the government intends 
to harness the developmental potential of its citizens apart from the usual rhetoric 
although there is a desk in the Prime Minister’s office which is supposed to deal with 
diaspora issues. What the study brought to the fore is the need for the Zimbabwean 
government to be proactive in its interactions with her non-resident nationals in order 
to tap into the skills and expertise that the diaspora Zimbabweans evidently possess. 
Some countries such as Sri Lanka have created institutions to study, legislate, and 
administer the migration flows after realising the important role that their non-resident 
nationals play in economic development.  
 
9.6 Limitations of the study 
 
The major limitation of the study pertains to the lack of a sampling frame given the 
unavailability of reliable data sets about the actual number of Zimbabweans resident 
in South Africa and the UK in general and Limpopo and Leeds in particular. This 
coerced me to use purposive and snowball sampling which may have discriminated 
against other migrants who were socially isolated given the hidden nature of the 
participants under study. The informal nature of migration which was discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 5 further exacerbates the problem of reliable data. Informal and 
undocumented migrants are inclined to shy away from having contact with officials 
due to fear of deportation as demonstrated in Chapter 6. The problem of researching 
hidden migrants is not peculiar to Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK alone, 
but can be applied to other studies that are concerned with researching informal and 
illegal migrants in other developed countries.  
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There is a pervasive fear not only of the immigration authorities in South Africa and 
the UK, but also with the alleged infiltration of President Mugabe’s intelligence 
operatives within the Zimbabwean communities in South Africa and the UK. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this palpable fear may have impacted on the diversity of the 
sample as some potential participants may have been dissuaded from participating 
in the study. Migrants who declined to participate on the basis of fear of President 
Mugabe’s secret police claimed that they were afraid of possible security 
ramifications that participating may endanger to their families in Zimbabwe. 
Furthermore, some participants were reluctant to participate because of fears of 
deportation and had reservations about the purpose of the study. This was 
particularly the case in the UK were migrants feared that the study may have been a 
ploy by the Home Office to identify undocumented migrants for deportation which 
would have repercussions on their livelihoods as well as that of those left behind. It is 
therefore likely that some groups were under represented in the sample due to fears 
for their own security as well as that of their families still in Zimbabwe.  
 
9. 7 Areas for Future Research  
 
The results of the study have important implications for the study of migration of both 
skilled and non-skilled migrants. By undertaking this comparative research which 
focused on mixed flows of migrants, avenues for further research have appeared. 
Future research could follow through the experiences of migrants identified in this 
research to better understand their transnational practices and investigate their 
effects on the recipients in Zimbabwe. For example, such a study may explore the 
use of remittances by those at home to ascertain their developmental role.  
Closely linked to the above is the need for a longitudinal study of Zimbabwean 
migrants currently in Leeds and Limpopo in about 10 years from now to investigate 
their progress and perspectives about their experience in the diaspora or at home if 
they would have returned. This may help to provide answers to the mixed messages 
that some migrants are sending about their return intentions given the tenuous 
political situation at home which induced some migrants to adopt a wait and see 
attitude.  
 
Further comparative studies can be undertaken in other parts of South Africa and the 
UK or other countries with significant concentrations of Zimbabwean migrants in 
order to draw out similarities and differences with this study. Such endeavours would 
provide holism to the research as they would be able to compare their experiences 
with those documented in this thesis. Similarly, future research may focus on the 
progress that the returnees and their families would have made in Zimbabwe. This is 
pertinent given the emerging identity conflicts between migrants and their children 
raised in South Africa and the UK who do not have the same attachment to 
Zimbabwe as their parents.  
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There is scope to explore the experiences of the migrants who have moved to other 
countries, such as Australia, from South Africa and the UK, to find out their 
experiences. While this thesis documented the experiences of some migrants that 
had returned home and migrated again to South Africa after failing to settle at home, 
there is evidence of some migrants who have returned to Zimbabwe only to continue 
their migration to third countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Such studies 
can explore the differences between the migrants’ experiences in South Africa, the 
UK, Zimbabwe and the new host country to elicit similarities and differences.  
 
Furthermore, future studies may want to investigate health and well-being issues 
within the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK. This is an under-
researched area given the multiple health inequalities prevalent in this community. In 
the UK, it is known that people from ethnic minorities face multiple health 
inequalities. Lack of documentation is exacerbating these inequalities given the 
limited access to health services that refused asylum seekers have. Such an 
exploration may look at the gendered effect of these inequalities given the differential 
health needs.  
 
The lifestyle transition from Zimbabwe to the host country also needs scholarly 
attention. Migrants were not prepared for life in South Africa and the UK, and the 
cultural clashes have resulted in family breakdowns, child protection issues, and 
poor educational attainment by children and young people. Some families have had 
their children removed by social services. There is need for further work which 
investigates how children have been affected by the transition from life in Zimbabwe 
to life in South Africa and the UK. Some parents have also returned home with their 
children; transitional, adaptation and integration issues of such returned children and 
their parents merit further attention.  
 
A further area of research could be to track and document the experiences of skilled 
returnees who left Zimbabwe without any qualifications, in order to establish their 
experiences in the job market upon their return. Such an exploration would explicate 
the extent to which the newly acquired human capital skills gained in the UK are 
being deployed given the tensions that may exist between locally trained and foreign 
trained workers. Chapter 8 alluded to the existence of this tension between returnees 
and those who had stayed behind during the crisis. A study of this nature would also 
illuminate our understanding of the difficulties that returnees face in entering the job 
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APPENDIX 2 – SELF INTRODUCTORY LETTER TO ALL PARTICIPANTS  
Hello, 
My name is Liberty Mupakati and I am a student at the University of Sheffield in 
Sheffield, UK. The title of this study is: Reparation and Inequality through different 
Diasporas: The case of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK. 
I am kindly asking you to participate in a study which is focusing on Zimbabwean 
adults who are living away from home/exile in Leeds (UK) and Limpopo Province 
(South Africa). I would like to ask you some questions about your experiences. I 
want to know how you came to the United Kingdom and South Africa and about your 
life here particularly as you interact with service providers. I am also interested in 
knowing the experiences of service providers who are implementing programmes 
targeting Zimbabweans migrants. There is no right or wrong answers to these 
questions; I just want to know what you think.  
Often people make decisions for migrants and asylum seekers without asking them. I 
want to find out what you think so that I can tell the government and other people 
who make decisions about migrants and asylum seekers’ lives. The interview should 
take about one and half hours. There might be follow up interviews and every time I 
will seek your consent. Participation in the study may take you away from your 
normal daily activities. I will spend at least three months in Musina as I want to 
understand your lives or work in detail. 
The interview will be conducted at a place you view as private and where you feel 
comfortable sharing the story of your experiences with me. I may ask you to allow 
me to attend some of the meetings and events that you hold, attend or places of 
interest that you visit within the town. In addition I may ask you to allow me to either 
observe or participate in some of the activities you will be doing. This will allow me to 
have hands on experience about what you go through in your lives.  
I may also ask you some questions about your life or organization that you find 
difficult to answer or upsetting. I will provide you with a list of organizations which 
can provide you with professional support (show list).  
There will not be direct benefit to you as an individual, friends, family or organization 
but the information that you will provide will be useful in the understanding the lives 
of migrants and asylum seekers and the work of service providers. This information 
might later assist service providers to better assist other migrants and forced 
migrants.     
I will not write down your name or address so no one will know what you have said. I 
will write all the migrants’ answers in a report, but no one will know which answer is 
yours.  
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Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to decline to 
participate. If you decide not to participate in this study, your decision will not affect 
you or your organization’s future relations with any organization. If you choose to 
participate, you will still have the right to withdraw from participating in the study at 
any time without negative consequences to you or your organization. You do not 
have to answer any question that you do not want to answer. If you have any 
questions related to this study you are free to ask, before or after you have agreed to 
participate in the study.   
For any questions you may have regarding this study, you are advised to contact 
Liberty on the following telephone numbers +27 780 638 383 (SA) or +44 773 312 
5796 (UK) or on this email: L.Mupakati@sheffield.ac.uk/ libertymup@gmail.com.  
Should you wish to make a complaint regarding any aspect of this study or how it 
has been conducted, please contact the PhD study supervisors, Dr. Deborah 
Sporton on the following telephone number +44 114; Email: 
D.Sporton@sheffield.ac.uk or Dr Chasca Twyman on +44 114 222 7953; Email: 
C.Twyman@sheffielf.ac.uk   
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Appendix 3 – Questionnaire Survey 
My name is Liberty Mupakati, a PhD research student in the School of Geography at 
the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom. I am currently undertaking a research 
project which seeks to profile the various constituencies of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora, their lived experiences and the inequalities inherent in this diasporic group 
in the United Kingdom and South Africa.  
I appreciate that the study is very sensitive and may evoke sad memories of your 
flight from Zimbabwe. I have to point out that you do not have to participate in this 
study if you do not wish to and that you may withdraw your participation at any time 
without prejudice. All the information that would have been collected about you 
would be destroyed once you have decided to withdraw.  
Great care and significance will be placed on ensuring your anonymity and 
confidentiality. Accordingly, no one will have access to this data and no names will 
be recorded if you do not wish. All field notes, tapes or transcripts from the study will 
be stored in a safe place and the information will only be used for the purpose of the 
research. You can ask any questions at any time and you will receive information 
about the research results. You will not be coerced into participating in this study and 
your inalienable right to choose whether or not to participate will be respected. This 
research will be guided by and will conform to the University of Sheffield’s research 
ethics.  
 PART A: BIRTH PLACE AND OTHER RELATED DATA 
1. Having heard the purpose of the research do you want to participate in 
 this survey? 
            1. Yes               2. No 
2. What is your country of residence?  
 1. United Kingdom                                             2. South Africa   
3. What is your country of birth?  
 1. Zimbabwe                           2. South Africa                           
 3. Other (please specify) -----------------------------------------------------------                   
4. What is your nationality?   
 1. Zimbabwean    2. British    
 2. South African    3    Dual (Zim & British)        
 4. Dual, Zim & S. African)          
 5. Other (please specify) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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5. In which province were you born?  
 1. Bulawayo             2. Harare                     
  3. Manicaland     4. Mashonaland Central          
  5. Mashonaland East    6. Mashonaland West   
  7. Masvingo      8. Matebeleland North    
 9. Don’t know    10. Matebeleland South    
 11. Midlands     12. Other (please specify) -------------- 
6. In which district were you born? 
7.        How would you describe your ethnicity as? 
 1. Shona    2. Ndebele 
 3. Manyika    4. Shangaan 
 5. Tonga    6. Venda 
 7. Muchikunda   8. White Zimbabwe  
 9. Don’t know      
8. What is the main language that you speak in your household? 
 1. English                2. Shona/Karanga                         
 3. Ndebele    4. Shangaan                       
         5. Venda                                        6.  Tonga  
 7. Chikunda         8. Don’t know                     
9. What is your marital status?  
 1. Married                          2. Single                         
 3. Cohabiting     4. Divorced/Separated              
           5. Widowed    6. Refused to disclose  
 9. Don’t know           
10. Do you have children? If no, skip to Q13. 
 1. Yes    2. No 
11. Where do your children live?   
 1. With you in SA/UK  2. Elsewhere in SA  
 3. In Zimbabwe           4. Elsewhere in the UK 
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 5. Other (please specify) ---------- 9. Don’t know                         
12. If you have children who are in Zimbabwe, are you financially 
 responsible for them?  
 1. Yes     2. No                 
 3. Sometimes    4. Other (please specify) ----------  
13. If your parents are still living in Zimbabwe, are you financially 
 responsible for them?        
     1. Yes     2. No     
 3. Sometimes                 4. Other (please specify) ------------------- 
14. Are you financially responsible for any family members that still live in 
 Zimbabwe? 
 1. Yes     2. No     
 3. Sometimes                   4. Other (please specify) ------------------- 
15. What is the highest educational qualification that you attained in 
 Zimbabwe? 
 0. None    1. Primary   
 2. Secondary    3. College 
 4. Undergraduate             5. Masters            
 6. Doctorate     7. Other (please specify) ------------------ 
16. What is the highest educational qualification that you attained in UK? 
 0. None    1. Primary   
 2. Secondary    3. College 
 4. Undergraduate          5. Masters     
 6. Doctorate     7. Other (please specify) -----------------              
17. What is the highest educational qualification that you attained in SA? 
 0. None    1. Primary   
 2. Secondary    3. College 
 4. Undergraduate         5. Masters      
 6. Doctorate     7. Other (please specify) ---------------------- 
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PART B: MIGRATION HISTORY & TRAJECTORIES 
18. In which period did you come to SA/UK? 
 1. Pre 1999    2. 2000-2002     
 3. 2003-2005    4. 2006-2008                   
 5. 2009-2010                        6. Other (please specify) -----------------   
 9. Don’t know             
19. What was the main reason that caused you to leave Zimbabwe? 
 1. Economic/poverty/unemployment  2. Political    
 3. Join family      4. Study 
 5.  For career and professional development  
 9. Don’t know    
20. Did you travel directly to SA/UK from Zimbabwe? If yes, skip to Q22. 
 1. Yes     2.  No 
21. If you did not travel directly to South Africa/United Kingdom, which 
 other  countries did you pass through? 
22. How did you travel to SA/UK? If you crossed into SA other than by foot, 
 skip to Q24. 
 1. Bus           2. Car     
 3. Walked      4. Train/Goods train    
 5. Long distance cargo hauliers   6. Air  
 9. Don’t know 
23. If you travelled by foot, how long did it take you to reach your 
 destination? 
 1. Under a week  2. Two weeks  3. Three weeks 
 4. Over four weeks   9. Don’t know   
24. Which border post did you use to enter SA/UK? 
25. What problems did you face at the border? 
26. If you used informal crossing points to enter South Africa, what 
 problems did you face during your journey? 
27. Have you ever been detained by the Immigration authorities i.e. South 
 African Police Services/Department for Home Affairs or UK’s Border and 
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 Immigration Agency (Home Office)? If you have not been detained, skip 
 to Q30. 
 1. Yes   2. No   9. Don’t know  
28. If detained, how many times were you detained? 
 1. Once               2. Twice        
 3. Thrice                         4. Over four times        
           5. Can’t remember               6. Don’t want to answer 
 9. Don’t know 
29. If detained, why were you detained? 
 1. Illegal entry     2. Overstaying the visa 
 3. Drink driving     4. Leaving children home alone 
 5. Use of fraudulent documents   6. Domestic violence 
 9. Don’t know 
30. Have you ever been deported by South Africa’s Department of Home 
 Affairs or the UK’s Border and Immigration Agency (Home Office) back 
 to Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q33. 
 1. Yes    2. No               9. Don’t know 
31. If you have been deported, how many times have you been deported? 
 (SHOW CARDS #1) 
 1. Once    2. Twice     
 3. Thrice    4. Over four times   
 5. Can’t remember   9. Don’t know 
32. Why were you deported? 
 1. Overstaying the visa   2. Illegal entry 
 3. Illegal working    4. Criminal offences 
 9. Don’t know 
PART C LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND HOUSING HISTORY 
33. How would you describe your current housing arrangements? 
 1. Very Poor     2. Poor  3. Fair 
 4. Good    5. Excellent 
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34. Using a rating of 1-5, where 1 means “very poor”, and 5 “excellent”, how 
 would you rate the quality of your current housing arrangements? 
 (SHOW CARDS #2) 
 1. Very Poor    2. Poor   3. Fair  
 4. Good    5. Excellent 
35. Overall, how would you rate your neighbourhood as a place to live in? 
 Would you say it is? (SHOW CARDS #3) 
 1. Very Poor             2. Poor         3. Fair  
 4. Good                               5. Excellent   
36. Have you ever slept rough i.e. slept on the streets, bush, bus shelter, 
 petrol station etc? If no, skip to Q39. 
 1. Yes                         2. No    9. Don’t know            
37. If rough sleeping/slept rough, how long did you slept rough/have you 
 been rough sleeping? (SHOW CARDS #4) 
 1. Less than 1 week                  2. 1-2 weeks    
 3. 2-3 weeks                                       4. 3-4 weeks   
 5. Over 4 weeks                            9. Don’t know 
38. What are/were the reasons for rough sleeping? 
 1. Can’t find work    2. Evicted due to non-payment of rent 
 3. Can’t find work due to immigration status 
 4. Family/relationship breakdown   5. Can’t remember 
 9. Don’t know 
39. What was the visa type you held when you first entered SA/UK? 
 0. None  1. Visitor’s/Tourist  2. Student            
 3. Work Permit      4. Transit  
           5. Family reunion/Settlement                    6. Ancestry                 
 7. Entertainment/Business         9. Don’t know 
40. What is your current immigration status? (SHOW CARDS #5) 
 1. Asylum Seeker Permit/Asylum seeker       2.  Work Permit              
 3. Refugee/ILR/Residency             4. Undocumented  
 5. Citizen          6.  Student               
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 7. Ancestry                 9. Don’t know                     
   PART D: FAMILY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
41. Have you been back to Zimbabwe since you came to SA/UK? If no, skip 
 to Q44. 
       1. Yes      2. No 
42. If you have been to Zimbabwe, how many times have you been there in 
 the last 12 months? 
 1. Once           2. Twice                            
 3. Thrice     4. Over 4 times   
 5. Can’t remember    9. Don’t know 
43. What was the main purpose of your visit to Zimbabwe in your most 
 recent visit? 
 1. Get married            2. Business       3. Political meeting 
 4. Attend a funeral     5. Illness in the family  
 6. Attend a job interview    7. Visiting family  
 9. Don’t know 
44. Thinking back to the time you left Zimbabwe for SA/UK, what made you 
 choose to migrate to SA/UK? 
 1. Family ties          2. Friends              3. Social networks  
 4. Family reunion                       5. Safety and security  
 6. Accomplishments of others already settled there  
 7. Take up job offer          8.No particular reason          9. Don’t know            
45. Who paid for your travel?                  
 1. Self    2. Family   3. Spouse  
 4. Friends    5. Agent      
 6. Combination of family/friends/employer   9. Don’t know 
46. Who did you first stay with when you first arrived in SA/UK? (SHOW 
 CARDS #6) 
 1. Alone       2. Spouse            3. Friends                     
  4. Relative   5. Hostel/Shelter  6. Employer                         
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 7. Church   9. Don’t know 
47. Did you receive any help from other Zimbabweans who were already in 
 SA/UK when you were still in Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q49. 
 1. Yes    2. No    9. Don’t know  
48. If you did, what sort of help was this? 
 1. Financial      2. Groceries/Foodstuffs 
 3. Payment of school fees    4. Invitation letter 
 5. College applications    9. Don’t know 
49. Did you receive any help from other Zimbabweans who were already 
 settled in SA/UK when you first arrived in the country? If no, skip to Q51. 
 1. Yes    2. No    9. Don’t know  
50. If you did, what sort of help was this?   
 1. Accommodation             2. Help to open bank account 
 3. Getting a job     4. College applications  
 5. Childcare     6. Asylum claim 
 7. Remittances        8. Contacting home 
 9. Don’t know  
51. Are you in contact with your family in Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q54. 
 1. Yes     2. No 
52. If so, how do you contact them?  (SHOW CARDS #7)   
 1. Telephone /text/sms   2. Email   
 3. Letters     4. Word of mouth/intermediaries 
 5. Physical visits    9. Don’t know 
53. How often do you contact your family? (SHOW CARDS #8) 
      1. Daily     2. Weekly                 
 3. A few times a month   4. Monthly  
 5. Never           9. Don’t know 
54.  Do you participate in Zimbabwean oriented activities in SA/UK? 
 1. Yes      2. No 
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55. What sort of Zimbabwean related activities do you participate in? If 
 none, skip to Q57. (SHOW CARDS #9) 
 1. Weddings                        2.  Parties and braais 
 3.  Church           4. Football tournaments   
 5. Political meetings/demonstrations  6. Independence day 
 9. Don’t know 
56. How often do you take part in these activities? 
 1. Weekly      2. Fortnightly    
 3. Monthly         4. Half yearly                  
 5. Yearly       6. As and when   
 7. Can’t remember              9. Don’t know 
57. Since your arrival in SA/UK, have you remitted (sent money or goods) to 
 Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q59. 
 1. Yes       2. No   
58. If you remit to Zimbabwe, how often do you remit to Zimbabwe? 
 1. Weekly 2. Monthly    3. Every two months  
 4. A few times a year     5. Yearly    
 6. As and when required     9. Don’t know             
59. Who are the beneficiaries of your remittances? 
 1. Spouse                  2. Children                
 3. Parents    4. Relatives            
 5. Friends    6.Orphans and vulnerable children 
  7. Political party           8. Religious organisation    
 9. Don't know  
60. Approximately how much money have you remitted to Zimbabwe in the 
 last 12 months? (SHOW CARDS #10) 
 1. £0- £1000.00                 2. £1,100-£2000.00  
 3. £2,100-£3,000.00    4. £3,100-£4000.00   
 5. £4,100.00+     9. Don’t know                  
61. During the last 12 months, for which of the following reasons have you 
 367 
 remitted money or goods to Zimbabwe or elsewhere?  
 1. Education     2. Household maintenance 
 3. Buying a house/res. Stand   4. Funeral  
 5. Health and medical care   6. Agricultural purposes 
 7. Clothing      8. Business investment 
62. Which of the following remittance methods did you use in the last 12 
 months? (SHOW CARDS #11) 
 1. Registered MTOs   2. Informal MTOs 
 3. High Street Bank     4. Friends/Relatives/Personally 
 5. Informal couriers     9. Don’t know 
63. What was your main consideration(s) in settling for this method? 
 (SHOW CARDS #12) 
 1. Costs      2. Speed      
 3. Ease of use      4. Trustworthy   
 5. Guarantee of remittance reaching recipient       
 6. Only method I know     7. Security  
 8. Recommended by colleagues    9. Don’t know 
64. What in your opinion are the consequences to yourself of remitting? 
 (SHOW CARDS #13) 
 1. Pride in my work   2. Feeling good that I am helping my family  
 3. Doing my duty   4. Stress  5. Work long hours   
 6. Little or no social life     9. Don’t know                 
65. What is your annual household income? (SHOW CARDS #14) 
 0. None     2. Less than £10000   
 3. £11,000-£20,000    4. £21,000-£30,000                            
 5. Over £31,000    9. Don’t know   
 
66. In your opinion, do you think there are inequalities within the 
 Zimbabwean community in Limpopo/Leeds? If no, skip to Q69. 
  1. Yes    2. No     9. Don’t know           
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67. What, in your opinion are the causes of these inequalities? 
 1. Education      2. Immigration Status   
 3. Unemployment     4. Gender 
 5. Area of origin in Zimbabwe   6. Lack of social networks 
 9. Don’t know 
68. Has being in SA/UK improved your life when compared to what it was 
 when  you were in Zimbabwe? If No, skip to Q71. 
 1. Yes   2. No   3. Don’t know  
69. If you feel it has improved, please describe in what ways you think that it 
 has? 
 
70. If you answered No in Q69 above, please explain in what ways do you 
 feel that your life has not improved by being in South Africa/United 
 Kingdom?  
 
71. What was your last job in Zimbabwe prior to emigrating to South A/UK? 
 
72. What is your current job now? 
73. Is this job:     
 1. Permanent?   2. Temporary?  9. Don’t know 
74. Is it: 
 1. Full-time    2. Part-time    9. Don’t know 
75. If you are not working, what is the reason for this? 
76. Do you think you are using the skills that you acquired whilst you were 
 still in Zimbabwe in your current job? 
 1. Yes   2. No     3. Partly   
 4. Never trained for any qualification             9. Don’t know  
77. Do you intend to return and settle in Zimbabwe? 
 1. Yes   2. No     9. Don’t know 
78 . What would induce you to return and settle in Zimbabwe? (SHOW 
 CARDS #15) 
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 1. Dual citizenship   2. Improved job prospects                           
  
 3. End of End of political violence and harassment  
 4. Own a house    5. Accumulated sufficient savings 
 6. Financial incentives  7. Improved social services  
 8. Change in government             9. Don’t know                     
79. How old are you? (SHOW CARDS #16) 
 1. 18-27    2. 28-37   3. 38-47   
 4. 48-57   5.  58-67             6. 68+   
 9. Don’t know 
80. What is your gender? 



















Appendix 4 – Request for volunteers’ flyer and advert 
Request for volunteers in the Leeds (UK) and Limpopo (South Africa) areas to 
participate in a questionnaire survey 
I am appealing for 200 volunteers in Leeds and Limpopo areas to participate in a 
questionnaire survey about a study that I am currently doing regarding Zimbabweans 
who are currently living away from home/ in exile and are resident in the Leeds and 
Limpopo areas and their vicinity. The survey is part of my studies that I am 
undertaking at The University of Sheffield’s School of Geography.  
Completing the questionnaire will take no more than 45 minutes and all the 
information provided will be treated in the strictest of confidence and will be 
according to the University of Sheffield’s Research Ethics. In conformity with the 
University of Sheffield’s Research Ethics and Guidelines on Research, no names 
and other confidential information will be collected. Participants also have the option 
of choosing pseudo names where they do not want their names to be known.   
Should you wish to participate in the questionnaire survey, please contact me on the 
following email address: L.Mupakati@Sheffield.ac.uk or Mobile: 07733125796. 
[The advert was placed in the Zimbabwe Times (www.zimbabwetimes.com); SW 
Radio Africa (www.swradioafrica.com); ZW News (www.zwnews.com); Zimbabwe 
Situation (www.zimbabwesituation.com) and at public spaces patronised by 
Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo]. 
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APPENDIX 5 – Profile of interview participants 
Name Age Gender Immigration Status Employment 
status 
Profession Area 
Donald 38 Male Undocumented Employed Accountant Leeds 
Musa 39 Female Asylum seeker Employed Teacher Leeds 
Eliza 47 Female British citizen  Employed Nurse Leeds 
Nelson 55 Male British citizen Employed Security Guard Leeds 
Owen 33 Male Asylum seeker Unemployed None Leeds 
Lynne 35 Female British citizen Employed Nurse Leeds 
Irvine  36 Male British citizen  Employed  Biomedical scientist Leeds 
Chamu 39 Male Settlement Employed Teacher Leeds 
Nkosinathi 48 Male Settlement Employed Engineer Leeds 
Veronica 44 Female Citizen Employed Teacher Leeds 
Chido 41 Female Undocumented Unemployed None Leeds 
Nokhuthula 38 Female Refugee Employed Social Worker Leeds 
Charity 36 Female Undocumented Unemployed None Leeds 
Gordon 55 Male Asylum seeker Unemployed Teacher Leeds 
Malvern 44 Male Citizen Employed General Hand Leeds 
Mduduzi 43 Male Citizen Employed Nuclear Physicist Leeds 
Betty 54 Female Asylum seeker Unemployed Lecturer Leeds 
Sam 45 Male Refugee Employed Nurse Leeds 
Shadreck 39 Male Undocumented Employed Civil servant Leeds 
Dudu 39 Female Undocumented Unemployed Engineer Leeds 
Esther  44 Female  Indefinite Leave Employed Nurse  Leeds  
Paul  40 Male  British citizen  Employed Social work manager  Leeds 
Shamiso  42 Female Settlement  Employed Learning assistant  Leeds  
Jervas  49 Male British citizen Employed Management Leeds 
Solomon 38 Male Refugee Employed Local governance Leeds 
George 47 Male Business Visa Employed Businessman Leeds 
Zenzo 44 Male British Citizen Employed Lawyer Leeds 
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Thandeka 32 Female Asylum seeker Unemployed Domestic worker Leeds 
Dr Chokuda 48 Male Citizen Employed Medical Doctor Polokwane 
Monica 29 Female Undocumented Unemployed Technician Phalaborwa 
Ntokwazi 26 Male Asylum seeker Employed None Ellisras 
Dickson  33 Male Work Permit Employed Technician Tzaneen 
Darios 25 Male Asylum seeker Employed None Giyani 
Felicity 27 Female Undocumented Employed None Thabazimbi 
Mirirai 28 Female Asylum seeker Unemployed Secretary Waterberg 
Davidson  37 Male Permanent Resident Employed Engineer Seshegho 
Blessing 32 Male Work Permit Employed Engineer Louis Trichardt 
Job 39 Male Work Permit Employed Banker Ellisras 
Muchi 37 Male Work Permit Employed Technician Vaalwater 
Khanyesile 23 Female Undocumented Employed None Vaalwater 
Hlanganani 36 Male Undocumented Unemployed Teacher Potgiersrus 
Caroline 27 Female Asylum Seeker Employed Shop Assistant Roedtan 
Matongo  58 Male  Work Permit  Employed Security Polokwane  
Panashe  31 Male Work Permit Employed Technician Polokwane 
Evelyn 28 Female Undocumented Unemployed Shop assistant Lebowakgomo 
Fadzai 29 Female Asylum seeker Unemployed None Musina 
Pepukai   46 Male Citizen Employed Accountant  Polokwane  
Muzinda 43 Male Permanent Resident Employed Academic Polokwane 
Christopher 31 Male Undocumented Unemployed Clerk Thohoyandou 
Shumirai 23 Female Asylum seeker Employed Shop Assistant Naboomspruit 
Miriam 27 Female Asylum seeker Unemployed Hair dresser Nylstroom 
Anthony 42 Male Asylum seeker Employed Teacher Phalaborwa 
Herbert 37 Male Permanent resident Self employed Lawyer Polokwane  
Chengeto  28 Female  Undocumented Self employed None Polokwane  
Rugare 28 Male Work Permit Employed Technician Lebowakgomo 
Tarisai 24 Male Asylum Seeker Unemployed None Musina 
Dan 52 Male Permanent Resident Employed Commercial Farmer Musina 
Dzivaidzo 33 Female Refugee Employed Teacher Thohoyandou 
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Gift 23 Male Undocumented Unemployed None Giyani 
Noah 21 Male Undocumented Unemployed None Seshegho 
Tapiwa 28 Male Undocumented Employed Builder Thohoyandou 
Mavis 18 Female Undocumented Employed Domestic Worker Waterberg 
Leanne 28 Female Undocumented Unemployed Domestic Worker Musina 
Vuyelwa 23 Male Undocumented Unemployed None Groblersdal 
Tonde 39 Male Work Permit Employed Nurse Musina 
Pastor Simon 48 Male Citizen Employed Miner Musina 
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APPENDIX 6 - Interview Guide  
 
1.    Biographical detail  
 
i. gender  
ii. Occupation - employment and employment history 
iii. Hours worked, job satisfaction etc 
iv. marital status  
v. education/ training 
 
2. Migration pathways 
 
i. Reasons for leaving 
ii. Means  
iii. Date of arrival 
iv. Future plans 
v. Experiences  
 
3.  Immigration status 
 
i. Immigration history  
ii. Current status 
iii. Impact of immigration status on health, education, work etc 
iv. Support around immigration 
 
4.     Social networks 
 
i. Support networks – how accessed, utilised etc 
ii. Housing 
iii. Schooling 




5.    Transnational transactions  







viii. Impact on self 
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6.     Inequalities and vulnerabilities 
 
i. View on inequalities within Zimbabweans living here  
Prompt- e.g. income, housing, educational attainment 
 Causes e.g. immigration status, job, social class 
ii. How are these inequalities manifested?  
Prompt- e.g. underpayment, harassment by police, underemployment, 
prostitution, crime) 
 
7.             Return Intentions 
I. Views towards return 




VI. Family?  
VII. Barriers to return 
VIII. Children? 













APPENDIX 7 – INTERVIEW CODES 
Interview Codes 
1. Zimbabwe: Turmoil, implosion and departure. Conditions and factors that 
propelled people to leave their country 
 i. Economic implosion  
 Rampant inflation, high cost of goods and services 
 Job losses, retrenchments, company closures 
 Strength of the pound/Rand 
 Poor salaries 
 Deteriorating work conditions 
 Loss of livelihoods e.g. Operation Murambatsvina, farm seizures 
 Sponsored by employer 
 
ii. Social 
 Poverty and hardships 
 Way of life where I come from 
 Success of others in the diaspora 
 Family reunion 
 Children’s future 
 Language considerations 
 Had friends and networks already here 
 Educational pursuit 
 Collapse of health delivery system 
 Health problems e.g. HIV/AIDS, cholera 
 Collapse of education system 
 Better life prospects in SAUK 
 Had studied or worked here before 
 
iii. Political 
 Political persecution 
 Lack of safety and security 
 Violence and repression 
 Lack of democratic space 
 Farm seizures 
 Breakdown in law and order 
 Escape conscription into youth militias 
 Went AWOL from the army and other security agencies 
 
iv. Professional and career development 
 Lack of clearly defined career paths 
 Frustration at work 
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 Remuneration 
 Political interference/ unprofessional interference 
 Better career prospects 
 Had worked away from home before 
2.  Migration pathways – strategies, complexities and problems 
i. Leaving preparations 
 How decision to leave was arrived at 
 Who was consulted 
 What else was needed 
 
ii. Formal routes 
 Visitor’s  
 Student 
 Work permit 




iii. Informal routes and reasoning 
 Border jumping – what everyone was doing 
 Smuggling  
 False passports 
 Strategies 
 Circuitous routes 
 Third country passage 
 Fraudulent visa 
v. Problems encountered and effects 
 Clearing immigration 
 Deportation 
 Extortionate and exorbitant fees 
 Criminals 
 Rape/ assaults 
 Hunger/ thirst/ starvation 
 Emotional, physical and psychological scars 
vi. Other countries lived in prior to leaving here 
vii. Why you left this ‘other’ country for here? 
 Had always wanted to come here 
 Raising money to come here 
 Strategy to get documents to enable me to come here 
 
3. Diaspora as a melting pot: migrant experiences in South Africa/UK 
i. Profile of migrants 
 Education 
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 Social background 




 Marital status 
ii. Social networks and help provided 
 Accommodation 




 Childcare and help with children’s schooling 
iii. Immigration and access to services 
 Immigration status 
 Flirting in and out of statuses 
 Negotiating the asylum process 
iv. Diasporic experiences 
 Employment and nature of work available 
 Deskilling and upskilling 
 Impact on self and family 
 Gender renegotiations/realignment 
 Comparisons with life at home 
 Social mobility 
 Property acquisition at home and in the diaspora 
 Financial independence 
 Health 
 Work opportunities 
 Remittances 
 Better training opportunities 
 
4.  Transnational transactions 
i. Form and nature of contact with those at home 
 Circulation 
 Zimbabwean events 
 Communication 
 Food 
ii. Transnational transactions  
 Monetary and non-monetary 
 Channels and forms 
 Reasons for remittances e.g. property 
 Beneficiaries 
 Problems of remittances on self and wider family 
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iii. Migrant and immigrant politics 
 Scope, breadth and reach 
 Benefits 
 Views on migrant politics and activism 
 
5. Return intentions 
i. Return intentions and immigration status 
ii. Attitude towards return 
iii. Human capital 
iv. When, for what and for how long 
v. Factors encouraging return 
vi. Barriers  





















APPENDIX 8 – CONSENT FORM 
ZIMBABWEANS LIVING IN LEEDS AND LIMPOPO RESEARCH 
 
     CONSENT FORM 
 
I, .............................................................................................hereby certify that I am 
18 years and above. I further confirm that my participation in this study is entirely 
voluntary. I confirm that I have read and understood the above information and any 
areas that I had difficulty with were fully explained to me. It has been explained to me 


















    
